Indonesia: Radicalisation of the “Palembang Group”
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Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°92 Jakarta/Brussels, 20 May 2009 Indonesia: Radicalisation of the “Palembang Group” I. OVERVIEW The second, Sulthon Qolbi alias Ustad Asadollah, had fought in Maluku, an area of intense sectarian fighting in the years immediately following the downfall of Indonesia has earned well-deserved praise for its President Soeharto, from 1999 to 2005. Engaging, per- handling of home-grown extremism, but the problem suasive and very hardline, he was on Indonesia’s most- has not gone away. In April 2009, ten men involved in wanted list for his involvement in an attack in May a jihadi group in Palembang, South Sumatra, were sent 2005 in West Ceram, Maluku, in which five para- to prison on terrorism charges for killing a Christian military police were killed. teacher and planning more ambitious attacks. Their history provides an unusually detailed case study of Both men separately came upon a small study circle radicalisation – the process by which law-abiding whose biggest concern was the conversion of Mus- individuals become willing to use violence to achieve lims by Christian evangelicals. Three of the men their goals. The sobering revelation from Palembang involved were members of the South Sumatra branch is how easy that transformation can be if the right of an Islamic anti-apostasy organisation, Forum Against ingredients are present: a core group of individuals, a Conversion Movement (Forum Anti Gerakan Pemur- charismatic leader, motivation and opportunity. Another tadan, FAKTA), and FAKTA materials helped set the ingredient, access to weapons, is important but not group’s agenda, but neither these three nor any of the essential: the Palembang group carried out its first others in the group had ever actively endorsed vio- attack with a hammer and only later moved to making lence. Fajar and Sulthon provided the ideology and bombs. political drive to turn them into an Islamic group (jama’ah) with a commander (amir) and a commitment The group was uncovered by accident. Singaporean to jihad in the form of military operations (amaliyah) authorities and Interpol had mounted an international against Islam’s enemies. The first big leap was getting manhunt for a fugitive Singaporean member of the the members to consider violence against the Christian regional jihadi organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), proselytisers they thus far had only preached against. Mohammad Hassan bin Saynudin alias Fajar Taslim. Once they were willing to kill, a broader range of tar- Indonesian counter-terrorism police were separately gets became thinkable, including Western civilians. pursuing the network of the elusive Malaysian terrorist Noordin Mohammed Top. Both searches led to Palem- Access to weapons kept the group going when other- bang in 2006 and the targets turned out to be linked. wise motivation might have waned. Without firearms The Singaporean had helped turn a local non-violent or explosives, carrying out a radical agenda has natural religious study circle into a militant jihadi group that limits. Getting a gun, even just one, gave the Palem- then made contact with the Noordin network. By 2007, bang group a huge incentive to use it. By contrast, the men were under surveillance; by mid-2008 they funding was not a particularly important factor in were under arrest. radicalisation, nor was access to the internet. With the exception of the gun and a large donation of potas- The most important element in the group’s radicalisa- sium chlorate for bomb-making, the group scraped tion was charismatic leadership, which two men pro- together what it needed locally, and it was not much. vided. One was the Singaporean, Fajar Taslim, a large, The biggest expenses were round-trip bus tickets and good-humoured, bushy-bearded man of unlimited self- a house rental at about $20 a month. All communi- confidence. He had trained in Afghanistan, reportedly cation took place by mobile phone or through face-to- met Osama bin Laden or succeeded in convincing face meetings; there appears to have been almost no others that he had, and by his own admission, acted as use of computers. a provocateur, constantly goading his colleagues to prove themselves. At the time he arrived in Palembang, he The Palembang group was not particularly competent was being sought by Interpol in connection with a 2001 nor ideologically driven; most of the men used as plot to blow up Singapore’s airport. operatives needed repeated infusions of jihadi pep talks. Indonesia: Radicalisation of the “Palembang Group” Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°92, 20 May 2009 Page 2 Four of its five attempts at operations failed, and none II. ANI SUGANDI AND THE BEGINNING of the many bombs it made was ever used. But its lack OF THE NETWORK of success should not obscure some important war- ning signs that the investigation revealed. The emergence of the Palembang group is the story of First, fear of “Christianisation” in Indonesia can be a how several different networks came to intersect.1 One powerful local driver for radicalisation, perhaps not as emerged around Ani Sugandi, founder of the JI- strong as communal conflict that takes Muslim lives, affiliated pesantren al-Furqon in Ogan Komering Ilir as in Ambon and Poso, but potent nonetheless. When (OKI), a Javanese transmigrant area of South Sumatra the Palembang group’s links to FAKTA were first repor- some five hours outside Palembang. This network ted, FAKTA’s national leaders indignantly rejected any extended back to Central Java, to Yogyakarta, where link to terrorism, and they were right: theirs is a non- Sugandi first joined JI; Kudus and Solo, where his JI violent, if hardline, civil society advocacy organisa- superiors lived; and Purbalingga, where his wife is tion. But for some conservative Muslims, apostasy is from. Sugandi never joined the Palembang group or a worse sin than murder, and the outrage engendered endorsed its plans, but he nevertheless played a by Christian conversion efforts can be exploited by pivotal, if inadvertent, role in its development. those with a jihadi agenda. Sugandi has impeccable JI credentials, with direct per- Second, a loose association of current or former JI sonal ties to Abdur Rohim bin Thoyib alias Abu Husna, members, including Noordin Top, the Malaysian respon- the JI leader arrested in Malaysia in January 2008.2 It sible for the major bombings in Indonesia between was on Abu Husna’s recommendation that he went to 2003 and 2005, apparently continues to look for and the Afghan-Pakistan border for training from 1987 to train proxies to undertake attacks on the U.S. and its 1992, in the same batch as some of the men who were allies. In this case, an Afghan veteran and JI member, to become JI’s top commanders.3 On his return to Saifuddin Zuhri alias Sabit alias Sugeng, became the liaison to the Palembang group, saying that he was in direct communication with Noordin. It was immate- 1 For more on terrorist networks in Indonesia, see among rial that the group’s members, with one major excep- other Crisis Group publications, Asia Report N°147, Indo- tion, were not JI and had no past affiliation with jihadi nesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, 28 February groups. Sabit provided a gun, ammunition, explosive 2008; Asia Report N°142, “Deradicalisation” and Indone- materials, a bomb-making instructor and suggestions sian Prisons, 19 November 2007; Asia Briefing N°63, In- on possible targets. His gamble on the Palembang group donesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, 3 May 2007; Asia Report N°114, Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s did not pay off, but bets in the future on other possible Networks, 5 May 2006; Asia Report N°92, Recycling Mili- proxies could – and Sabit is still at large, as are tants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Em- several other fugitives with the potential to lead and bassy Bombing, 22 February 2005; and Asia Report N°83, recruit. Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, 13 September 2004. Third, attention to JI-affiliated schools remains critical. 2 Sugandi was born in 1966 in South Sumatra of Javanese The problem is not what they teach; it is that they parents. When he finished elementary school, his parents serve as places of refuge and communication hubs, sent him to Yogyakarta, their hometown, to continue his stud- and the bai’at, or oath of loyalty sworn by JI mem- ies. He was still in a Muhammadiyah junior high school in bers makes it unthinkable to turn anyone away. In this Sleman, Yogyakarta, in 1983, when he joined an activist case, a JI boarding school (pesantren) became critical Muslim student group, Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Mesjid, led by a young preacher close to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and to the Palembang group’s radicalisation, simply by Abdullah Sungkar, co-founders of al-Mukmin Pesantren in being a place where extremists periodically showed up. Ngruki, Solo. Ba’asyir and Sungkar had just been released from prison after being detained for their fiery criticism of Finally, assistance to the police should continue. The the Soeharto government and were hugely popular in the Palembang group was uncovered by accident, and student community. They were also actively organising there were various points along the way where better cells of the clandestine Darul Islam movement. In 1984, investigative skills could have detected its existence Sugandi enrolled his younger brother in Ngruki, entrusting much earlier – long before the Christian teacher was him to the care of Abu Husna, then a young teacher there. murdered or any bombs prepared. Even with the enor- Two years later, he was inducted into Darul Islam, and mous strides made by the counter-terrorism unit of the shortly thereafter, he abandoned his studies at the Sunan police, it is still possible for serious extremist activity Kalijaga State Islamic Institute and signed up for training to take place in Indonesia without anyone knowing.