A MARXIAN MODEL OF NOMADIC PASTORALISM by RONALD LAWRENCE HOLT, B.A.
A THESIS IN ANTHROPOLOGY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Approved ^
Accepted
August, 1976 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am deeply indebted to Professor Richard E. Salzer for his direction of this thesis and to Professor Philip A. Dennis for his criticism and advice. I would like to especially thank Lutf'ali Khan and Hamid Khan Kashkuli, my hosts in Iran, for their hospitality and friendship. My research was partially funded through a grant by Texas Tech University, College of Arts and Sciences, Institute for University Research.
11 TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii LIST OF TABLES , . . , . v CHAPTER I. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 1 Foreword 1 The Value of Models 3 Equilibrium and Conflict Theory 4 Marxian or Conflict Methodology 12 Previous Models of Nomadic Pastor- alism 15 II. THE TECHNO-ECONOMIC BASE 19 Environmental Relations . 22 Historical Determinants 26 III. PRODUCTION 30 Forces of Production 30 Means of Production 39 Relations of Production 42 IV. THE JURIDICO-POLITICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE .... 45 Kinship 46 Authority, Power, and Class ... 50 Law and Custom 58
111 CHAPTER V. THE IDEOLOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE 61 Religion 61 Ideological Reproduction ...... 63 VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 66 REFERENCES CITED 69
IV LIST OF TABLES
Table Page 1. Conflict vs Equilibrium Theory ,..,,.. 11 2. Environmental Variables of Nomadic Pastoralism ...... ,«,.««. 27 3. Relative Herd Size ...... «...«,. 37 4. Agricultural Production ....«...,• 38 CHAPTER I
THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Foreword The purpose of this thesis is to begin constructing a Marxian model of nomadic pastoralism in Southwest Asia. For the purposes of clarity and uniformity. Southwest Asia is defined as: Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Barth 1960:341). This study centers on the sheep-goat complex and excludes the peoples whose primary occupation is herding camels, cattle, reindeer, or horses. For three months during the summer of 1975 I lived with the Kashkuli Kuchek, a tribe of nomadic pastoralists, in southern Iran. The Marxian orientation of this thesis derives from my observations and impressions of their class structure. I saw extremes of wealth and poverty existing side by side, separated only by the hereditary division of class. In seeking an explanation of this phenomenon I began to search the growing literature on social conflict. Con flict led me to the new Marxist interpretations in social anthropology.
The discussion of social anthropology's traditional paradigm of structural-functionalism, versus the new empha sis on conflict oriented anthropology, reflects my theoretical interests and concerns. The use of empirical data on nomadic pastoralists illustrates both my areal interests, and an attempt to validate my Marxian model against the available data. This model will necessarily be limited in scope due to the structural-functional premises of the original data collectors. As of yet, there has been no attempt to con duct anthropological fieldwork among nomadic pastoralists using a conflict or Marxian research strategy. This limits the horizons of this paper, as most of it is drawn from library sources. However, by looking at the existing material on nomadic pastoralists in Southwest Asia, in Marxian terms, I hope to produce new insights and new ques tions for future fieldwork. The central proposition of this thesis is that a Marxian analysis will elicit data from new and old sources and order it in such a way as to better explain the social processes of nomadic pastoralism. I will attempt to gain a new perspective, a new ideological orientation in the study of pastoralism. My major expectation is that this model will supplement and challenge the current assumptions of the structural-functional paradigm in social anthropology. How ever, both approaches have merit, and illuminate different problems from differing points of view. The Value of Models Empirical observations are usually made within a prior conceptual framework. In theory this framework should be formulated and conceived through logic and the scientific method in advance of the actual observation. However, at times this conceptual framework may be only an afterthought, perhaps only cultural norms or a particular societal ideology disguised in scientific terminology. In the social sciences a broad but more formal con ceptual "model" is often used. A model, in its simplest form, is a general perception of how society is put together and works or fails to work. Models vary in scope from com plex mathmatical schematics to descriptive outlines. Models are necessarily less complex than reality. A model so complex as to explain every detail of. a social form would, by its very complexity, explain nothing. "A model is a simplification of reality, and that is its pur pose. Simpler models that convey as much about reality are preferable" (Francis 1972:8). Models have meaning in the abstract; they are a guide to the essential factors in a real-world situation. "A model, then, is a very general set of ideas and concepts—a point of view—that the scientist uses to select his problems, organize his thoughts, and pursue his inquiries" (Chambliss 19 73:2). We will define our conflict model as a set of analyti cal generalizations that guides and organizes our empirical data into statements about the social process. This Marxian model will focus on and describe various features of the nomadic social form. It is deterministic in that it assumes that the world is comprehensible, but it also assumes that random variables will render prediction possible only in a probabilistic framework.
Equilibrium and Conflict Theory Structural-functionalism has been the major heuristic model or paradigm of social anthropology since the late 1930's (Harris 1968:514). The concept of " equilibrium" lies at the heart of the structural-functional argument. Equilibrium means that societies invent machanisms whose function it is to redirect conflict and reinforce the status quo. Self-regulating social equilibrium models focus on the processes that produce stability and continuity in society rather than on what produces change and disruption. Marxian conflict models, on the other hand, rest on the assumption that societies are always in flux, and that coercion, in its various forms, imposes a minimal change in the social formation.
While equilibrium theory may be the child of Plato, its modern use can be traced back to Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) (Russett 1966:3). The two major categories of equilibrium theory may be stipulated as "static" or "dynamic." Comte's equilibrium was "provisional, always changing and never settling down to a permanent posi tion of rest" (Russett 1966:35). While Spencer realized that all societies were not in total equilibrium, he was too enamored with the status quo to stress any aspect other than the stable "culmination of progress" (Ressett 1966:42). He wrote;
Social statics may be aptly divided (as political economy has been) into statics and dynamics; the first treating of the equilibrium of a perfect society, the second of the forces by which it is advanced toward perfection (Spencer in Russett 1966:40). Where Comte spoke of order and progress, Durkheim (1958-1917) emphasized "social solidarity" (Harris 1968: 466). Durkheim's major contribution to equilibrium theory was the hypothesis that the "function" of many social phenomena was to preserve the unity and harmony of the society. While Pareto, Malinowski and Henderson certainly made great contributions to equilibrium theory, it was under the direction of Radcliffe-Brown, Homans, and Talcott Parsons that it assumed its present form. Radcliffe-Brown stressed the dichotomy between his structural-functionalism and the purely "welding torch" functionalism of Malinowski. According to Radcliffe- Brown, functional unity can be defined: ... as a condition in which all parts of a social system work together with sufficient degree of har mony of internal consistency, i.e., without pro ducing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:181). George C. Homans describes equilibrium thus: . , . the state of the elements that enter the system and of the mutual relationships between them is such that any small change in one of the elements will be followed by changes in the other elements tending to reduce the amount of that change (1950:303-4). Talcott Parsons has constructed a "grand theory" of functionalism that presumes to deal with social change: The theory of change in the structure of social sys tems must, therefore, be a theory of particular sub- processes of change within such systems, not of the overall processes of change of the systems as sys tems (Parsons 1951:486). In other words, the structure of a society remains fixed, or only succumbs to "value" changes, while the func tional mechanisms or social organization may vary. Conflict theory, on the other hand, rests on the premise that change is endemic in society. Conflict is always present, but an effective society's coercive mechan isms are able to suppress or re-direct that conflict (Duke 1976:71). Modern conflict theory begins with Karl Marx (1818- 1883) "the social and political thinker of the nineteenth century" (Mills 1962:35). The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles (Marx and Engels 1967:79). Or more directly: Without conflict no progress: this is the law which civilization has followed to the present day (Marx and Engels 1967:103). Marx believed that the social organization of society was in a state of continuous change. Unlike Marx, many social scientists, oriented to structural-functionalism, strictly dichotomize society into "social organization" and "social structure." Social structure is the abstract ideal of society and social organization is the concrete observ able activity. This interpretation of dual structures focuses on change in the organization of society but seldom attempts an explanation of structural change. Marx recog nized the utility of abstracting structure out of society but never lost the reality of people as the units of social structure. Marx's model was based on the hypothesis that economic production (mode of production) is the pivotal point of organized social life. Production determines the relations (organization) of production and together they act as a base upon which society's superstructure (social institutions, law, ideology et al.) is built (Appelbaum 1970:82; Duke, 1976:17; Terray 1972:97). Marx viewed control over social institutions as flowing directly from economic and class 8 interests and supported by economic and political sanctions (Duke 1976 : 38-39). While Marx emphasized power as leading to conflict. Max Weber (1864-1920) refined and extended Marx, He drew a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power, and asserted that power based on coercion was ineffective cind unpredictable. Illegitimate power is based on conquest, and while it may appeal to certain interest groups or classes, it is exercised against the wishes of the majority of the people. Legitimate power, based on social norms, hides the raw power of politics and motivates the average citizen to comply with authority (Duke 1976:39). Weber also divided legitimate authority into three types: (1) legal, rational and legally enacted via impersonal rules, (2) tra ditional, not codified and based on inheritance, and (3) charismatic, emotional or ideological. These were "ideal types" and most political organizations would contain various authority combinations (Duke 1976 :49) Both Marx and Durkheim treated conflict as disruptive to the social order, but where Marx saw the value of con flict, Durkheim only saw an obstacle to social solidarity. Georg Simmel (1858-1918) saw conflict as an integrative force and brought more balance to conflict studies (Coser 1956:31; Duke 1976:98). Simmel also declared that conflict leads to organizational complexity and centralization (Simmel 1955:88-107) . Unlike Marx, Gaetano Mosca proclaimed that in every society there is a constant tendency to form a ruling class; He held that conflicts over power are natural and that democracy draws the most capable leaders from the masses to the ruling elite, thus depriving the masses of revolutionary leadership (Duke 1976:126). Mosca also stressed the role of ideology in maintaining the ruling class: As a general rule, if a system of ideas, beliefs, feelings, is to be accepted by great masses of human beings it must address the loftier senti ments of the human spirit; it must promise that justice and equality will reign in this world, or in some other, or it must proclaim that the good will be rewarded and the wicked punished (Mosca 1939:176). Contemporary conflict theory may be best represented by the work of Ralf Dahrendorf. Dahrendorf's highly influential book. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, has done much to bring about the resurgence in Marxian thought. This volume is primarily a sympathetic critique of the preceding works on conflict and class (Duke 1976:144-45) . Dahrendorf believes that class is defined by power, not property as in Marx's formulation. While Dahrendorf does not reduce class to government elites, he gives 10 managerial and capitalist elites second place in the power structure behind governmental elites (Dahrendorf 1959:302). Dahrendorf (1959:161-162) proposes four postulates of con flict theory, and in a dialectical fashion, of equilibrium theory:
Conflict Theory 1. Every society is subjected at every moment to change: social change is ubiquitous. 2. Every society experiences at every moment social conflict: social conflict is ubiquitous. 3. Every element in a society contributes to its change. 4. Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others. Equilibrium Theory 1. Every society is a relatively persisting config uration of elements. 2. Every society is a well-integrated configuration of elements. 3. Every element in a society contributes to its functioning. 4. Every society rests on the consensus of its members. Conflict theory has tended to explain order as a constraint through use of power, whereas equilibrium theory has tended to see a different side of the question and ascribe order to consensus (Demerath 1967:508-510). There is a whole series of disagreements between the two models, some of which have been summarized in Table 1. 0) 11 iH }H (d d f>- U -p d O 0c 0 (U -H do •H -P
0 M d 4-> O d iH 0 4J iH cn ^ < (d iH EH o •P (d 0 cn •H X d >i d o ^•. E-i 0 u d 0 cn -H (d cn •P iH 4J d >i 0 •H u fd CU 0 iH > >i IW -H o d -H +J 0 •H ^ 0 •H JH +j d > cn TJ d rH d m fd V^ cn d 0 -H CO Tf 0 0 c •iH 0 •H iH u O 0 0 cn Xi o X +J TJ o 0 ^4 M a 0 u M cn > X 0 o. td Ou 0 (d -H d 0) d 0 a X g X S ffi O f« H u o CO H :s
d tn cn o •H •H 0 d cn 0 cn -P cn >i cn td •H •H d •H 4-» 0 Xi 4J 0 d y. td >i g 0 rH td >i 0 4J +J d cn U u 0 cn d 0 j-i •H d d JH 0 rH d 0 •iH 0 -p cr o 0 -P u •H u > ^ rH 0 X d 0 M 0 o td d d td EH o PM O cn o tJ u H 12
Marxian or Conflict Methodology This thesis uses the Marxian or conflict model of nomadic pastoralism, and at this point we will outline some of the methodological assumptions this approach entails. Graham defines methodology as "merely a set of rules for formulating knowledge in a manner that facilitates its communication" (1971:27). Marxian methodology begins by precisely analyzing the origin, nature, and development of the entire social system and its structure as a whole, and then uses this information as a base for analysis of the various sub-systems (Frank 1973:66). Since political orientation and ideology are factors in the scholarly process, we must be explicit as to what facts we notice and utilize, and what facts we do not notice or utilize. The use of a model should help us to get at the more important facts, realize what we miss, and serve as a testing agent in determining how close to reality our product actually is. Marx's conception of a social system was that of dynamic totality composed of relations between people and between people and nature (O'Laughlin 1975:349). He wished to show that the relations of the social system had differ ent significance, with those of the economic base ultimately determining the structure of the whole. 13
In analyzing any institution the Marxian method would be to make an inventory of labor processes and dominant and subordinate modes of production. The relations of produc tion should be defined and linked systemically to the techno-environmental base (Terray 1972:99). Drawing on O'Laughlin (1975), Terray (1972), and Duke (1976) a framework of methodological rules may be created: 1. Analysis should be of the social formation as a whole (O'Laughlin:350). 2. Analysis should be historically specific (0'Laughlin:353). 3. Analysis of social change cannot be separated from technological change (0'Laughlin:354). 4. Analysis must assume that social relations condi tion the use or the method of adoption of tech nology (O'Laughlin:355). 5. Analysis must consider that "scarcity" is socially as well as technologically defined (O'Laughlin: 356). 6. Analysis of the mode of production and of the social form cannot be independent (O'Laughlin: 359). 7. Analysis of the mode of social reproduction requires us to consider: patterns of consumption, distribution, exchange, and the role of the superstructure (O'Laughlin:360). 8. Analysis of surplus cannot assume that the indi vidual is an independent unit of production or consumption (O'Laughlin:363). 9. Analysis of production must consider that there may (and probably is) a dominant mode and one or more subordinant modes of production (O'Laughlin: 364-365). 14
10. Analysis must consider the possible exploitation of women, children, classes, slaves, servants and retainers, and minorities. 11. Analysis of the branches of production and forms of cooperation should be articulated to the mode of production (Terray:107-115). 12. Analysis of kinship relations should distinguish: (1) the division of the labor force, (2) the juridico-political level of status, and (3) the dominant ideology (Terray:145). 13. Analysis of the authority, power, and status relations of elites should be traced through all aspects of the social formation. 14. Analysis of social control should be approached via economic and political power and who bene fits (Duke:270). 15. Analysis must consider that while conflict may appear from any part of the social formation, property, power, and status are its major sources (Duke:38). O'Laughlin provides a good general summary of Marxian methodology in this statement: Analysis of a mode of production must be movement from abstract general determinations to observation at the level of the concrete and then back to the theoretical articulation of general and specific categories (1975:451). This Marxian "research strategy" presumes that the investigator is engaged in original research. When utiliz ing library materials, as in this thesis, these rules may be used to guide the investigation of the compiled data and its application and significance to Marxian analysis. 15
Previous Models of Nomadic Pastoralism One of the most distinguishing features of the litera ture on nomadic pastoralism is the paucity of elaborated models. While numerous descriptive ethnographies exist, few have had an explicit theoretical base. Only Brian Spooner (1971; 1973) has attempted to formulate a model for nomadic pastoralism. Fredrik Barth (1966) paves the way for Spooner's model with his Models of Social Organization. This work suggests the utility of a "generative" model. A generative model would be a series of abstract statements that can be made to generate regularities. Generative methodology comprises three steps: (1) The formulation of an hypothesis about empirical determinants and processes which affect form; (2) the construction of a generative model with variables depicting these determinants (here: the specific content of descent rights, and the other principles of allocation which affect these same rights), and operations depicting the processes (here: transac tion, incorporation, growth); (3) finally, the com parison of the forms generated by the model, and those, of the empirical cases (Barth 1966:31). Barth's model clearly distinguishes process from form and draws our attention to the former. His model makes the determinants of change explicit. We may note that Earth's (1961) work with the Basseri tribe of nomadic pastoralists in southern Iran (five years before he wrote Models of Social Organization) was certainly based on equilibrium assumptions. 16
Brian Spooner has produced the only explicit model for the study of nomadic pastoral societies. In a 1971 article he listed seven rules for a generative model and in 1973 he produced six rules of nomadic adaptation. These rules can be combined, and paraphrased into the following; 1. Optimum levels of herds and herding groups must be maintained. 2. Local groups are essentially unstable while the larger tribal structure is conceived as being stable. 3. Except where local political processes are influ enced by sedentary populations, leadership roles are based on personality rather than institu- tionalism. 4. Religious expression reflects "a stoical, unritualized relationship between man and an intractable supernatural" (Gulick 1976:77). 5. Nomadism developed as a response to population pressure on agricultural peoples. Thus, the geographical location of nomadic groups is the result of exogenous factors. 6. Cultures and societies seek to eliminate chaos, Spooner (1973) calls his method a "cultural ecological" model of pastoral nomads. However, it can easily be seen that the emphasis of Spooner's model is on equilibrium. Rule number one assumes the homeostatic model. Rule number two is the functional idea that social organization may change but the structure will not. This rule could be restated to say that the instability of the herding groups reinforces the stability of the corporate structure. Rule 17 number three emphasizes Weber's charismatic leader category and fails to mention that most of the tribal population in Southwest Asia has been heavily influenced by the sedentary population. In fact, leadership often comes through wealth or membership in an elite. Rule six, which Spooner left out of his 1973 rules, mentions the function of a tribal nobility but makes no reference of the measures utilized to eliminate this "chaos." In the 1971 article he mentions "socio-cultural" idioms such as interpersonal relationships and the father's brother's daughter marriage preference (client and slave relationships are mentioned in this con text) . However, coercion, exploitation, and conflict are not investigated.
Philip Salzman (19 72:6 7) contributed the idea of a "multi-resource" nomadism. He stressed that most nomadic pastoralists' economic systems rest in several resources that are seasonally extracted. This insight dramatizes, "the tremendous conceptual confusion in the study of pas toral nomadism brought about by the use of ideal-type concepts." Salzman separates nomadism from pastoralism. "Pastor alism is management of and food extraction from a particular type of resource, domesticated or semi-domesticated animals" (Salzman 1972:67). Nomadism is movement in a yearly cycle of multi-resource food extraction. 18
Salzman postulates that ecological conditions provide a foundation for the political and economic activities of a nomadic group. He finds that predictable resources create strong authority and more stable groups, whereas unpredic table resources create unstable groups and little central authority. CHAPTER II
THE TECHNO-ECONOMIC BASE
This model will take the techno-economic base as a point of departure for its analysis of Southwest Asian nomadic pastoralism. This techno-economic base will be defined as the environment, raw materials, and available technology that man transforms through his labor into sub- sistance and the overall social form. The basic theme behind an extensive review of the base structure of nomadic pastoralism is that the base and the cumulative historical situation enforces a certain mode of production on the people being analyzed. This means that environment and technology impose limits but are not strictly deterministic, since the effects of the relations of production and superstructure must be considered in causal analysis. The availability of water does not always deter mine social access, nor does the past always rule out inno vation or revolutionary change. Humans do not passively accept nature, but through the application of labor, they actively transform the natural conditions of their existence into social conditions. By investigating the techno- economic base, we also gain a better understanding of both the productive mechanisms and the superstructure of a
19 20 specific society. This complicated process of articulation, feedback, and conflict between the various abstractions of the base and superstructure have been depicted in simpli fied form in the illustration called the "Simplified Marxian Model" on the following page.
This model illustrates the unity in the forces of pro duction and the relations of production in the specific overall mode of production. Technology and social relations combine through the means of production to produce goods from the raw materials of the physical environment. Just as the forces and relations of production interact through history to produce the mode of production, the techno- economic base through the mode of production forms the societal superstructure. It is through the conflict between the means and forces of production, on one hand, and the relations of production, on the other hand, that the class structure is created. The class structure is visible through this conflict and through various organizational devices of the superstructure, i.e., rank, status, and dif ferential access to wealth. Forces of production do not merely exist as independent technologies, but, in effect, owe their existence to the relationship between the means and relations of production. This articulation illustrates that only by analyzing the social formation as a whole can we grasp the significance of the abstracted parts. 21
SUPERSTRUCTURE
Juridico-Political Ideological (Law, Politics, Kinship) (Norms, Religion, Social Reproduction)
BASE
Means of Production (Property)
Forces of Production Relations of Production CTechnology) (Social Organization)
Physical Environment (Raw Materials and Environment)
Simplified Marxian Model 22
Environmental Relations Nomadic pastoralism can easily be broken into two components: care of domesticate animals and movement. Both of these variables are directly affected by environmental conditions. Historically, nomadic pastoralists have been pushed into environmentally marginal areas, areas where agriculture has been limited by topography, water, climate, and soils.
Due to ecological limitations, Southwest Asian pas toral nomads have a discontinuous pattern of occupation of their habitats. The prevailing condition in pastoral regions is aridity. Plant growth and production is too irregular for profitable agriculture without irrigation. Seasonal variation in temperature, water and feed, renders parts of their traditional areas unfit for animal use or human comfort. Many nomads travel hundreds of kilometers through non-tribal territory to reach their summer or winter quarters. These "vertical" nomads such as the Basseri (Barth 1961), Qashqa'i (Salzer 1974) and Bakhtiari (Salzman 1967) exploit the seasonal variation in temperature between the Zagros mountains and surrounding lowlands. They travel to the cooler mountains in the spring, remain for the summer, and return to the lower areas with the fall. Other tribes like the Boir Ahmad (Fazel 19 71) and the Turkmen
(Irons 1969) move their flocks altitudinally with the 23 y seasons but the distance of movement is less and they generally remain within their own tribal territories. This "short range" vertical nomadism may be viewed as much as a political adaptation to hostile neighbors, as in the Boir Ahmad case, or to political boundaries and coercion, as in the case of the Turkmen, as to the environment.
Salzman (1967) has made the observation that in areas of more dependable climate and resources the political organization of nomadic peoples is more complex. Planning and coordination of herd distribution and migration is more profitable in areas of a more predictable environment. The Qashqai confederacy is a good example of a high level of political organization in marginal but more predictable areas, whereas the Baluch may be said to represent the other end of the scale having a less complex political organization and more meager resources. From a conflict perspective, the nomads with better resources have more to defend and hence need more organization, whereas the less affluent nomads would tend to compete more for the scarce and unpredictable resources.
Sheet and Goats Sheep and goats are ecologically well adapted to the utilization of marginal resources, and since pastoral nomadism has a specialized technology adapted to marginal 24 niches, there is little surprise that the sheep/goat com plex originated in Southwest Asia. Sheep and goats are commonly herded together in Southwest Asia. Herd size varies from area to area and from tribe to tribe. There is a minimum number of animals that are needed to maintain a nomad's lifestyle and a maximum number that can be profitably managed by a nomadic family. In Southwest Asia dogs are rarely used in the actual herding of sheep or goats.
The wool coat of sheep helps protect them from solar radiation. Wool length is inversely related to respiration rate, skin and rectal temperature. Normal body temperature ranges from 37.5° to 40.5° centigrade. Panting and evapo ration from the respiratory tract are the prime mechanisms for heat loss. Sheep do sweat and this sweating aids in cooling, particularly during periods of heat stress. One important adaptive feature of sheep is their ability to maintain normal body temperature under hot climatic con ditions. This is of prime importance in order to reproduce effectively since high body temperatures interfere with sperm production, ova development, the degree of fertility, and the survival of the embryo (Terrill 1968:247-294). Goats seem to be very similar to sheep in normal body temperature and temperature regulation. An increased rate of respiration resulting in heat loss from evaporation 25 is the goat's primary mechanism for controlling his body temperature.
Sheep and goats under normal conditions consume on the average three to four kilograms of water per day. Pregnancy and lactation may increase water consumption by fifty to one hundred and twenty-five percent. There is a daily water loss through feces and urine of approximately seven percent (Terrill 1968:225-261). The primary selec tion has been for animals that produce both a high wool output and a reasonable amount of milk, along with a low rate of water consumption. While the migratory pattern is adjusted to the effective management and exploitation of herds and pasture conditions, it is also shaped by human needs and desires and by the pastoralists' competitors. Tribal boundaries, encroaching peasants armed with irrigation pumps, and government regulations tend to affect and change the pattern of land use and migration. And many groups tend to migrate near market towns to trade, gossip and enter tain themselves. Habit also plays an important role in the pattern of migration. Tribesmen tend to stick to the same areas where they know the availability of water and pasturage, and the total terrain. Of course, in some countries and among certain tribes, the national government may be a major factor in determining movement. 26
This is especially true in Iran. A military officer, assigned to the tribe, will allocate a migration route and timetable to the tribal chief who will then distribute the schedule to the section leaders and camp headmen (Salzer 1974:223).
Nomadic pastoralism represents an extreme interaction with and adaptation to the environment. The nomads are dependent on their herds and their lifestyle is based on providing the animals with the essentials of water and pasturage. Table 2 illustrates some of the variables that must be considered in dealing with nomadic pastoralists. All of these variables interrelate with each other and pro duce limits on the development of nomadic pastoralism. The variety of sheep and animals is restricted by the food, water, and weather of the area. The number of animals has a direct relationship to the problem of overgrazing: over grazing produces new limits to the number of animals that a pasture can support and the number of humans that, in turn, can be supported by the herd.
Historical Determinants Nomads are culturally, as well as eco-geographically, marginal. Much of their social and cultural patterns derive from the dominant political society that they are peripheral to. Historically, nomads have been studied 27
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There is a generally accepted evolutionary correlation between nomadism and agriculture. Pastoralism obviously appeared after the domestication of certain animal species, A domesticated species can be defined as a species in which man has reproductive control. Charles A. Reed (1959:1638) stated: Domestication to me means simply that the animals are under the control of man to such a degree that, if he wishes, their choice of mates is determined. Artificial selection is thus possible and usually, to some extent at least, inevitable. In a very important sense then domestic animals (as well as plants) are a type of human artifact, since they exist in a form changed by man. Nomadic pastoralism probably evolved as a partial response to population growth outstripping agricultural production. Population growth could easily occur in the arid areas of the Middle East where the existing technology 29 of agriculture could not cope with the problem and nomadism was the only way to exploit the existing resources. There has always been much demographic and political interaction, exchange, and conflict between the nomadic peoples and the settled populations. The process of pro curing non-pastoral products from settled peoples, by trade or force of arms, has been a large factor in migra tions and the division of nomadic labor (Spooner 1973:4-6). This chapter has related the techno-economic base to a limited supply of data about nomadic pastoralists. Variables such as the heat tolerance of certain breeds of sheep and the attitudes of the sedentary farmer and govern ment, have, through history, helped form the nomadic pas toral mode of production. The next chapter will deal with the process of production, which grows out of the techno- economic base. CHAPTER III
PRODUCTION
Forces of Production The Marxian term "forces of production" refers to the process in which raw materials are shaped into a determinate product. In the case of pastoralists, this might be the care and maintenance of a lamb until it is ready to be sold or to produce milk. This process breaks down into three components: the labor, the labor's object, and the tech nology employed. The social organization of the labor and the articulation of labor to its object and relations defines the "forces of production" (Hindess and Hirst 1975: 10-11). Using the concept of "forces of production" in relation to nomadic pastoralism, we shall center of herding and the social organization that implements it. While the herding of sheep and goats is the dominant mode of produc tion among nomadic pastoralists in Southwest Asia, they also engage in some agriculture, weaving, and day labor. Hiring out as a shepherd is also a common practice. Among groups like the Turkman or Marri poor nomads can start their own herds by working for richer nomads; among other groups this is also practiced, but does not appear to be as
30 31 lucrative. The reader should be warned not to think of "forces of production" as existing independently of the relations or production, the means of production, or the societal superstructure. Nomadic pastoralism, as any social form, is a highly interdependent and articulated system of real events and people. As we abstract the "parts," we must not forget their actual existence lies in their relationship with the other variables.
A nomadic pastoral subsistence is based on two major assets: domesticated animals and grazing rights. To con temporary pastoralists the recognition by the sedentary authorities of traditional grazing rights is basic to the pastoral adaptation and also to conflict between the nomads and sedentary population. As Barth points out: There is much variation as regards the nomad's rights in, and access to pasture lands. In general it may be said that a number of tradi tional rights are recognized and in many areas have been confirmed by successive central govern ments of the states concerned (1960:345), Traditionally, among the Kashkuli Kuchek tribe of the Qashqa'i confederacy, each household head had the right to pasture his herd within the tribal areas, but specific pasture allocation was the role of the Kalantar or tribal chief. Pasture areas were reassigned every year according to such variables as available water and pasturage, chang ing herd unit ratios, and family power and status. This 32 allocational process provided needed flexibility in the face of environmental pressure and human/herd population change. Nomadic capital is in the form of individually owned livestock and certain agricultural products. Essentially, all productive capital is in consumable form. The live stock may be killed and eaten, and agricultural products may be consumed by the grower. Thus, although in Southwest Asia more and more production is geared to the market, capital consumption is still possible without the necessity of conversion through a market system. Barth (1961:108) hypothesizes that only those nomads in a downward spiral towards sedentarization consume their own capital (exclud ing excess males that are sold). Amongst the Kashkuli Kuchek it is the elites that consume their own capital in the usual form of excess male animals. While the basic unit of production and consumption is the tent, the primary unit of social organization is the camping unit. The tent is usually a nuclear family and sometimes an extended family. In the summer of 1975 the average tent in the Kashkuli Kuchek held slightly over six individuals. The size of Kashkuli Kuchek camping units varies from five to twenty-five tents (Salzer 1974:64). Security, sociability, and movement seem to be the basic functions of the camping unit. The personal abilities of 33 the camp headman and his kinship networks are almost as important in determining the size and distribution of the camping units as the topography, water and pasturage. A camp headman is generally the oldest and richest competent male (Pastner 1971:94-95). Salzer (1974:76) recognizes this correlation between wealth and camp leadership but also mentions the variable of authority allocated by the tribal Khan to a chosen heaciman. Membership in a camping unit is usually a matter of kinship ties and less frequently of friendship. In areas of more predictable resources the households tend to be more self-sufficient and only on migration is any major effort made to pool labor. In the harsher regions, the pooling of labor for projects other than migration is more common (Salzer 1974; Pastner 1971). Capital gains form a large portion of income to the nomadic pastoralist. The lambing interval produces a relatively quick capital gain. A lamb may reach productive maturity in two years. A herd increase of 40% per year is not unusual with the Kashkuli Kuchek or the Boyr Ahmad (Salzer 1974; Fazel 1971). The minimum number of animals needed to maintain a pastoral family varies from area to area as resources and the local economy change. Fazel (1971:205) lists 40 animals as the minimum, and Barth mentions 50-60 animals as the minimum number that would permit survival and maintenance of their lifestyle (1964:76), 34
Table three shows the range of minimum herd size in seven tribes and their average herd size.
Life is not all capital gains for the nomadic pastor alist. Accidents or predatory animals may strike the herds, and disease (perhaps an annual rate of 20% losses), and a drought or cold weather may destroy more than 50% of a herd in less than a week. Since all property is movable, loss while on migration is a very real danger. And if the governments did not allow the nomads to move annually their losses could exceed 70-80% (Fazel 1971:55; Farvar and Dar ling 1972:671-677). Income may also decrease with an increase in herd size. At a point between 200 and 350 animals, depending on the topography, a single individual will not be able to control all of his animals. At this point he must hire someone to help him herd and care for the animals. More over, in a very good year, the principle of diminishing marginal returns comes into operation and a herdsman may find the price for his products only able to bring him a small or even negative return for his investment. Cases of sedentarization through capital accumulation and land purchase are rare. In the Kashkuli Kuchek, since the nobility lost its authority to allocate land, there seems to be considerable pressure on them to settle and turn to agriculture and orchards for a living. One ex-noble 35
(but definitely a member of the elite class) told me that he only broke even on his herd of 250 sheep and goats and that he only kept them as a symbol of status and to slaughter on festive occasions. For the tribal elite, in the case of the Kashkuli Kuchek, movement to the summer quarters in the high Zagros mountains constitutes a vaca tion from the heat more than economic necessity. Seden tarization through poverty has been said to affect as many as one in three nomads (Barth 1964:78) amongst the Basseri. Other tribes such as the Yomut Turkmen find a large labor pool advantageous, and impoverished nomads can easily find herding work and rapidly rebuild their personal herds (Irons 1970:252). Salzer (1974:115) suggests that the impoverished Basseri settle so frequently because they are nearer more sedentary people and therefore more non- pastoral work is available. He notes that many members of the Kashkuli Kuchek continue to migrate with an extremely low standard of living.
Unfortunately, one of the nomads' defenses against sedentarization is overgrazing. Overgrazing not only brings deforestation and depreciation of rangelands, it also makes the herds more vulnerable to drought and disease. When nomads were forced to settle in 1925 (the Reza Shah pro grams in Iran), the continuous occupation and overgrazing around settled areas brought sheep mortality to about 80% 36 and the changed composition of the pasturage brought a decline in the quality of the remaining animals (Farvar and Darling 1972:671-682). Herd size and production vary from year to year. The average number of sheep and goats in the Kashkuli Kuchek in 1969 was 66 per tent (Salzer 1974:99). This low number of animals was attributed by the Kashkuli to the high mor tality of animals during an extended drought. By the time of my fieldwork in 1975, the average herd had grown to 9 7 animals per family. The ratio of sheep to goats was one to two. This ratio is particularly important in a bad year when even the fat-tailed sheep die and the herdsman must depend on his hardiest goats. In 19 75 the male/female sheep ratio was one to twenty-four and the male/female goat ratio was one to twenty-one. The Kashkuli Kuchek freely borrow male animals and these ratios are within limits of maximum fertility (Holt 1976). Relative herd sizes of several nomadic pastoral groups are included in Table 3 for comparative purposes. The expansion of agriculture has caused the pasture lands and migration routes of the Kashkuli Kuchek to shrink and has caused more overgrazing on already overgrazed range- land. A range that may support 200 animals without over grazing may have a governm.ent permit for 500 animals and actually be grazed by over 1000 animals (Holt 1976). 37
TABLE 3
RELATIVE HERD SIZES
Minimum Size Average Size
Basseri 60 Fewer than 100 Boyr Ahmad 40 Kashkuli Kuchek 60 97 Yomut Turkmen 40 Yoruk 100+ 268 Marri Baluch 30
This overgrazing has grave consequences for people whose productive system is to bound to the environment. Barth states: The peoples of the Middle East have not been in ecological balance with their surroundings, as perhaps some of the tropical non-industrialized populations of man; on the contrary they have throughout history cumulatively developed, changed, and in part destroyed and devastated their land through their own traditional modes of exploita tion (19 75). From a production point of view, it may very well be this overgrazing and eco-kill that finally forces the nomadic populations to settle in villages or migrate to
the cities. Next to the production of meat, wool, milk and milk products, agriculture is the second most important branch 38 of production for the nomadic pastoralists. While grazing land is "owned" in common, agricultural land is either individually owned as in the case of the Kashkuli Kuchek or owned by tribal sections as with the Marri Baluch. Both the Kashkuli Kuchek and the Boyr Ahmad raise barley and wheat. Most of the cultivation is done in their winter quarters and the reaping is accomplished with a short-handled sickle (Salzer 1974:105-106; Fazel 1971:72). The Kashkuli Kuchek and some of the Makran tribes also own orchards. While the Makran tribes (Pastner 1971:32) engage in limited date cultivation, the Kashkuli Kuchek own both date trees and lime orchards.
TABLE 4 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
Cultivation of Fields Orchards
Basseri light Boyr Ahmad moderate Kashkuli Kuchek moderate to heavy lime, date Yomut Turkmen heavy Brahui light to moderate date Yoruk light Baluch light date 39
Some of the Qashqai tribes, the Kashkuli Kuchek in particular, make a substantial contribution to their cash funds by sale of woven goods. The women do all the weaving and are well aware of the demands of the world market (Salzer 1974:104).
Means of Production In nomadic pastoralism there is little separation of the laborer and the means of production. In a simple har monious model of nomadic pastoralism the shephard's staff and reaper's sickle might be viewed as the technological means of production. But from a conflict perspective, we find that property and credit play a most important role. For most Southwest Asian nomads labor and animals fit the classic interpretation of the means of production. Camels are mostly used on migration and for carrying heavy loads. Except in the case of the Brahui dogs only figure in the productive process by acting as sentries and pro tecting the camps. Donkeys serve as all-purpose carriers of people, firewood, baggage, lambs, and chickens. Goats and sheep produce kids and lambs, meat, wool, hair, milk and milk products. Hand-made looms, and for certain rich nomads tractors and jeeps provide the means of producing commodities for markets. 40
Land is the most important of the means of production in a nomadic society and second to it credit. Land is theoretically "owned" by the entire tribe. Any member can use any area of the traditional tribal grounds. However, in reality this is not strictly true. Traditionally, with the Kashkuli Kuchek pasture land was re-allocated every year by the Kalantar. The tribal elite reserved the best pastures for their own use (Salzer 1974:190). For the elites herding is of secondary importance in terms of economic value (Salzer 1974:193). Privately owned land provides for the orchards and cultivation that promotes their greatest profit. Thus the tribal elites belong to the land-owning class and as such are part of the national elite. This matter will be discussed at length in the section on class. Of vital interest to all nomadic pastoralists if the question of credit. It may certainly be classed as part of the means of production in the case of the nomadic pastoral mode of production. Without credit most pastoral nomads would find their lifestyles drastically curtailed or impossible. With the Boyr Ahmad and Kashkuli Kuchek virtually every household head has one or more "friends" that lend him money or goods. Usually these "friends" are sedentary people that reside near the tribal summer or winter quarters. Fazel (1971:183) 41 points to the advent of government control over the Boyr Ahmad and the end of the tribal raiding option as the beginning of the credit and entrepreneurial relations between the Boyr Ahmad and non-tribal people. A group of non-tribal merchants or pilevars was formed. The pilevars sell tea and other merchandise to the tribal people on credit but at a high mark-up. While itinerant pilevars may be limited to a dozen tribal trading partners, shop keepers in market towns may average as many as two hundred "friends." Credit is extended on the basis of social and economic status as well as overall natural and economic conditions (Fazel 1971:188).
Because of the exorbitant prices of some of the iten erant pilevars most nomads who will have no access to the market towns in the summer buy their supplies on credit before beginning the migration to their summer quarters. Debts are settled every six months at an interest rate of 20% (Fazel 1971:191). Nomadic collateral for loans is in the form of a signed bill of sale for a certain number of lambs and kids born in the winter. The Kashkuli Kuchek also have the system of "friends" who provide credit and to whom they usually sell their goods. In contrast to Fazel's Boyr Ahmad "friends," Salzer (1974:119) reports that little interest is charged on these debts. Tribal entrepreneurs seem to hold about the same 42 position in both tribes. They are a growing "middle class" that appears to be making a huge profit. These tribal entrepreneurs usually own a truck or landrover and provide transportation where no buses exist. The drivers carry people and produce for a drayage fee, buy products for re-sale, take products on consignment, and buy certain products in the markets for their motor transportationless "friends" (Salzer 1974:98).
Relations of Production The overreaching importance of the relations of pro duction lies in the effect of social relations on the productive process. The social organization of producers has a profound effect on the allocational and production flow. It is through the relations of production that the means and forces of production are most visibly articulated with the superstructural components of the social form. The relations between the nomad and sedentary peasant have been described both in equilibrium and in conflict terms. Spatial mobility as a factor in most nomad-sedentary relations diminishes as nomadic military power is replaced by that of a central government. In recent times there are no clear-cut ethnic or tribal distinctions between sedentary cultivators and nomadic pastoralists. As we have seen, both occupations may exist 43 within the same tribal or ethnic group. Most Southwest Asian pastoralists have at least some rainfall agriculture. The main interest of the nomadic pastoralist is his herds and while the sedentary individual may keep a few sheep and goats, his major interest is his crops. Barth has been one of the major exponents of non competition between nomads and sedentary peoples. Nomads become, according to Barth, tied in relations of dependence and reciprocity to sedentary populations in their areas. Barth (1958; 1960) proposes that patterns of stable co-residence arise from differing but complementary modes of production. Other data, however, stresses conflict between the nomad and villager. Bad years have more effect on the nomads, and during bad years they took to raiding the settled villages. Before the various central govern ments had control over the nomads, they used raiding as a sort of insurance policy against the effects of natural disasters on their herds (Irons 1965). Competition for land use is one of the major disrup tive forces between the nomad and the sedentary villager (Barth 1961). Without a considerable outlay of capital for irrigation, there is usually a clear limit to the expansion of agriculture in a region, but there is no clear limit as to where a nomad may graze his flocks. Only force can prevent the nomad from intruding onto the lusher arable 44 lands. Crop damage done by nomad's animals is always a matter of local conflict where nomads and sedentary peoples come into contact (Salzman 1967:122). My general conclusion is that Barth was wrong to see in stable pat terns of exchange a lack of conflict in the exploitation of niches. A better perspective is provided by Bates, who stresses governmental coercion in his (1971) model of peasant-nomad relations. He equates the equilibrium that does exist, i.e., business exchanges, with the power of the central government: In short, the equilibrium established between the two modes of production is a function of the manner in which power enters the system from the outside (1971:292). CHAPTER IV
THE JURIDICO-POLITICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE
The superstructure of nomadic pastoral society rests on the foundation of the production process. The economic base has been defined with some rigor in the Marxist and conflict literature; the superstructure is frequently des cribed as what is left. In general, law, politics, social institutions, and ideologies constitute the superstructure. As Engels pontificates to Block in 1890: The economic situation is the basis but the various elements of the superstructure-political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: consti tutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views, and their further development into systems of dogmas—also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form (Feuer 1959:398).
Following Terray (1972:97), I will divide the super structure into the juridico-political and ideological branches. This chapter on the juridico-political super structure will focus on the centers of power and authority, classes, politics, and law and custom in Southwest Asian nomadic pastoral life. While several nomadic societies will figure in this discussion, the major emphasis will
45 46 be on three of the tribal confederations: the Khamseh, the Qashqai, and the Kalat Khanate.
Kinship Kinship is the basis for most nomad to nomad rela tions. These relations must provide some framework for individuals to predict their statuses, roles and authority or lack of authority. The major problem is that of articu lating the spatial distribution of the social structure with the necessary organization for social life. And with our model in mind we must see who benefits from the method adopted. . . . the native model of how society is organized is most commonly genealogical. Where the native model is more complex, and other organizing prin ciples are found in a<3dition to kinship, the idea of formal contract or informal personal arrangement becomes more explicit in the formation and refor mation of subsistence groupings and in the position of the individual in the society at large (Spooner 1973:25) . Patrilineal descent is the basis for genealogical organization in most nomadic pastoral societies. In south ern Iran it is the genealogy of the Kashkuli Kuchek Kha- vanin or tribal nobility class that gives rise to its authority and serves as the point of differentiation. As Salzer (1974:134) puts it: Since membership in aKhavanin group is ascribed by birth into a Khavanin patrilineage, and given the absence of fiction kin relationships, there is no possibility of individual mobility into Khavanin status. 47
Genealogy can be used to rationalize or ideologically protect the status of the power elites, especially in a society that traditionally changes as slowly as one based on nomadic pastoralism. "Genealogical details are con tinually quoted as rationalizations of decisions, and tend to vary with expediency, arbitrated by the influential 'authority'" (Spooner 1973:26).
Marriage and alliance are closely interrelated processes in nomadic pastoral life. At the camp level, agnatic kinship produces the pressure of public opinion to sanction the authority of the headman and hold the families together. However, leadership succession, pasture rights, and personality are sources of conflict that often lead to lineage segmentation. First cousin marriage, espe cially with the parallel cousin, is usually the preferred marriage form. Political bonds and alliances are one of the primary dividends of affinal ties. The richer nomads, having more property and status to conserve, seem to be the most lineage, clan, and class endogamous. Salzer (1974:157) shows 84.6% of the Kashkuli Kuchek Khavanin (tribal nobility) marry within their own Khavanin class or into another tribe's equivalent class. Of the rest, 6.2% marry out of their class and 9.2% out of the tribe. In the herder class, the marriages tend to be into the local groups or other kin. The less wealthy 48 nomads should benefit more by marrying further away from their own families than the rich nomads. The larger economic and social ties would have ecological and tactical benefits for the herder class, Bridewealth is a widespread phenomenon among nomadic pastoralists. The family that loses the labor of the female is compensated by the bridewealth. The family paying the bridewealth makes an investment to provide for the wife's and future children's labor. Of course, the more endogamous the marriage, the smaller distance the bridewealth has to travel. Thus if sister exchange or other endogamous manipulations are practices, the bride wealth and labor is merely traded back and forth. The division of labor follows sex and age lines. Domestic chores and weaving are done by the women and girls. Shepherding is done by the men and boys. Agricul tural tasks are done by men while women milk the flocks. The training of children to fill their various economic roles is shared by both parents, relatives and "experts" (Fazel 1971:87-89). The major device by which new households are created is that of anticipatory inheritance. This is a procedure in which the son at marriage receives his fraction of his father's wealth as if the father had died. Forms of anticipatory inheritance are widespread and practiced by: 49
Kashkuli Kuchek, Baluch, Boyr Ahmad, Kirgiz, Turkmen, Yoruk (Bates 1972:188; Salzer 1974:56; Pastner 1971:134). As Bates notes:
In general, the system works to favor the younger sons. Not only does the youngest son inherit the bulk of the property if he is the only son remain ing with his father, but the natural increases in herd size after every division means that approxi mately the same number of animals is divided among fewer shares (1971:188), Contractual arrangements are a way to look at the relations of production and point to how the herder is or is not being exploited by his fellow nomad. In the Boyr Ahmad the ideal shepherd is a campmate and between 8 and 14 years old. The verbal contract provides for food, new clothes at the Persian New Year, lodging, one of ten newborn animals, and 300 to 500 tomans (Fazel 1971:175-176), This type of contract takes advantage of the willingness of younger boys to work at low wages for a year. Salzer (1974:190) (field research 1969-1970) reports that in the Kashkuli Kuchek shepherd for the Khavanin receive: 360 Kg. of wheat and dates, one or two sets of clothing, about 1000 Tomans per hundred sheep and goats, a number of lambs or kids, and an amount of wool and clarified butter. This more lucrative contract reflects the fact that the Khavanin utilize grown men to do their shepherding. How ever, by 1975, perhaps due to the rampant inflation in the Iranian economy, the contract did not include the dates and
TEXAS TECH LIBRAH1 50 wheat, but the cash payment appeared to vary from 1000 Tomans to 1500 Tomans. Herding contracts among the Yomut Turkman are very lucrative and there is no stigma about an adult working as a hired shepherd as there is among the Boyr Ahmad. In the Yomut/shepherding another man's flock apparently provides an excellent opportunity for turning labor into capital (Irons 1970:256), There appears to be an-attempt by the richer, more politically organized tribes like the Kashkuli Kuchek to enforce the economic and class divisions by contracts that keep a man and his family alive but little else. The less organized and less class oriented tribes, like the Yomut, seem less interested in preserving class differentiation and exploitation through herding contracts.
Authority, Power, and Class Dahrendorf (1959:76) differentiates between class and stratiom thus: Class is always a category for purposes of the analysis of the dynamics of social conflict and its structural roots, and as such it has to be separated stirctly from stratum as a category for purposes of describing hierarchical systems at a given time. Dahrendorf asserted that authority in a society is defined by cultural values and norms and the class position of any individual results from authority in social 51 organizations (1959:148). For Dahrendorf, structure and role are the signposts of class:
Classes are based on the differences in legitimate power associated with certain positions, i.e., on the structural roles with respect to their authority expectations. It follows from this that an indi vidual becomes a member of a class by playing a social role relevant from the point of view of authority (1959:149). This "political determinism" has several applications in methodology, but with nomadic pastoralists birth must usually be within a certain patrilineage in order for an individual to be able to assume certain structural roles. Dahrendorf carries Marx a step further and presents various analytical strata as forming a class. Marx stressed the property aspect of class to the detriment of the other parameters such as: status, power, social roles, and authority. The Marxian view, properly modified, should enable us to see both the "dynamics of social conflict" and the "hierarchical system" as a functioning whole. This heuristic viewpoint sees stratum in the context of class and not as an independent variable. Following Schumpeter, Dahrendorf asserts that an individual is "born into a class position only in societies in which he is born into a position endowed with or deprived of authority" (1959:149). Dahrendorf adopts a conservative attitude and considers the implications of those "endowed" to a much greater extent than those "deprived." 52
In Southwest Asia, the concept "tribe," while con
taining important ethnic and linguistic components, is
basically a political concept (Barth 1961:85), In the
three tribal confederacies (Khamseh, Qashqa'i, and Kalat
Khanate), we find several strata in each class and at
least two and as many as three classes. The classes are
recruited at birth, there is little or no social mobility
between classes, and there is a definite behavior pattern
for each class.
The Qashqa'i confederacy was officially disbanded
in 1956 by the Iranian government but the social organiza
tion that it left behind is still visible among the once-
member tribes. The Kashkuli Kuchek, an ex-Qashqa'i tribe,
is composed of two major classes: the Khavanin or tribal
nobility and the afradi-ashaer or herder class. Salzer
(1974:9) describes the Khavanin as "a patrilineal, primarily
endogamous, descent group with all agnatic kin linkages
generally known among the members." The Khavanin families
are usually large and the important ones keep low-paid
servants,
The Qashqa'i recognized four major political offices
of which three were formed from the elite class. They were:
(1) the Ilkhani, or paramount chief of the confederation,
(2) the Ilbegi, second in rank to the Ilkhani and collector of revenues, (3) the Kalantar, the chief of a single tribe. 53 and (4) the Kadkhoda, leader of a section of a tribe and a commoner.
The Ilkhani, Kalantars, and Kadkhodas traditionally had the right to levy taxes on the herders under their authority. The Ilkhani*s tax was three percent per annum on all the herds. The Ilkhani also had a formidable bodyguard drawn from his personal retainers or Amaleh, Since the end of the confederacy, the Amaleh are given the status of a regular tribe (Salzer 1974:217-220), Barth suggests that the existence of trade routes in tribal areas correlates with the formation of confedera cies and the degree of centralization in their political structure. This notion is substantiated by the redirection of English trade through Bushire and the rise of the Qashqa'i, the Ghavam family interest in the Khamseh, and the importance of trade routes in the Kalat Khanate (Barth 1961:130; Swidler 1969:177). Barth (1961:128) notes a higher degree of "internal hierarchization of political offices, and the greater wealth" in the Qashqa'i than in the Khamseh, The Khamseh confederacy, the Basseri tribe of which was studied by Barth in 1957 and 1958, was formed by and for the Ghavam family in Shiraz. The Ghavams, merchants and province governors, formed the Khamseh to aid in their conflicts with the Qashqa'is and to protect their caravans. 54
The five Khamseh tribes were loosely connected and their tribal areas featured much larger non-tribal sedentary populations than did the Qashqa'i areas (Barth 1961:87-89). The confederacy seems to have been without any special administrative apparatus, Ghavam visit ing separate chiefs or calling them together in ad hoc meetings, and dealing directly or per sonally with them (Barth 1961:88). The Khamseh political structure on the individual tribal level is much like that of the Qashqa'i, The Khavanin are shown respect, given authority, and are members of the national elite. As Barth (1961:74) des cribes them, "In wealth they are a class entirely apart from the other Basseri. ..." The Basseri chief could tax his subjects as much as three sheep in 100 and each tribal section paid regular annual taxes in clarified butter. The chief displayed an autocratic control and power of decision over the tribe. The Basseri Darbar corresponded to the Qashqa'i Amaleh as a section of personal retainers (Barth 1961:74-76). On the death of a chief all of his close agnates are potential successors. The system of election is informal and the tribal chief is apparently the one whose orders are obeyed (Barth 1961:82-90), Swidler (1969:181) lists four tiers to the political structure of the Kalat Khanate of western Pakistan, At the lowest level the motebars use personal prestige to 55 elicit community decisions. The section heads relay orders and carry out the instructions of the sardar. The sardar serves as tribal chief, administrator and judge. The khan represented the entire tribal federation, supported a lavish court for status, and attempted to control the sardars.
The military might of the khan rested with the will ingness of the sardars to call up the tribes: Although the Khan was protected from palace coups by his personal bodyguards, his coercive power vis-a-vis the tribes was limited, depending mainly on his personal relationships with the individual sardars and his ability to exploit traditional hostilities among them (Swidler 1967:172). The Khanate developed as a response to the needs of the agriculturalists for protection from the wild tribes of raiders that harried them, and the need of the highland tribes to have access to winter lowland pastures (Swidler 1979:179). Like Barth (1961:130), Swidler suggests that trade routes and participation in a regional economic net work provided a source of stability for the developing tribal confederation. Each Brahui tribe in the Khanate has a primary sec tion line in which leadership is vested. One primary section does not have a head; instead it is headed by the sardar. Succession of sardarship is from father to eldest son (Swidler 1969:146). 56
In the Makran, which lies in the western border of Kalat, there are three social classes. The Hakim are the traditional ruling elite. Baluch is a broad term denoting middle class nomads and independent peasants. The lowest class is the Hizmatkar class of menials. Many of the Hizmatkar are descended from black slaves. They work for wealthy landholders as servants and sharecroppers, or sweepers and carriers of manure. The Hakim appear to be keeping the social order as little changed as possible and holding on to their property and prestige (Pastner 1971:21-'25) ,
The Marri Baluch live on the northeastern frontier of the Kalat, Pehrson (1966:27) holds that sectional loyalties, intra-camp suspicions, and fear of deceit keep the commoners' communicactions to men of rank to a minimum. In this manner a small and scattered elite can, mostly by bribes and intricacies of council politics, dominate the "economically independent population of commoners," Three classes of Marris emerge: (1) the noble leaders, (2) the independent commoners, and (3) the low castes, serfs, and freed slaves. This stratification is reflected in the graded scale of blood compensation to be paid to a murdered man's relatives. A sardar*s life is worth 8,000 Rupees, a commoner's Rs, 2,000, and an ex-slave's Rs. 1,000, Slavery existed in this area until 1952 and full political status 57 is only given to males in the upper two classes (Pehrson 1966:28-30), The Marri system seems to serve the elites and reproduce itself: The whole population is welded into a single, centralized political unit by allegiance to a single sardar, the holder of the highest title, and by acceptance of a central tribal council composed of the most important title-holders (Pehrson 1966:31). In summary, the nomadic pastoral mode of production in Southwest Asia certainly is a social formation of classes. Lenin (1971:231) defined classes thus: Classes are groups of people one of which can appropriate the labor of another owing to the different places they occupy in a definite system of social economy. The vast majority of nomadic pastoralists can be described as petty commodity producers that participate in a market system. But as the foregoing discussion illus trates, we also find an elite class, some of which are non- producers, disposing of and controlling both the means and relations of production. Replication at all levels of social organization (except for certain groups at the camp level) is controlled by the elites. They appropriate a portion of the surplus and use it to further their own economic and political ends. In most cases, this domination remains what Marx called formal domination i.e., it does not radically twist the mode of production into a new and more fully capitalistic form. 58
Law and Custom Our conflict orientation suggests that law is inherently coercive. Law, according to Weber, was "a rule to which conformity is achieved by the application of sanctions by a specially designed body of men empowered to punish disobedience"(Duke 1976:57). Custom is the term usually used to refer to rules that have no sanctions, Duke (1976:59) summarizes the Marxian orientation toward law by stating;
. , , laws tend to develop in support of those powerful people who are able to influence the process of creation of law. Laws are presented to the members of the society as binding upon them and are enforced by sanctions. Order in a society is achieved when individuals conform their behavior to societal laws. Such conformity usually is voluntary, since the promulgation of law is accompanied by an ideology which defines the law as "right" and specifies the duty of the citizen to obey it. The Kalat Khan's court doubled as a lavish status symbol and an aciministrative law court. The court was very formally structured. The common tribesman, but not the lowest class, had a theoretical right to come and appeal; but, in effect, access was very difficult and usually required bribes. Blood compensation was the usual sanction applied by this court. The court was run for the protec tion of the elites. Succession to even the lower court posts was from father to son (Swidler 1969:172). 59
With the Qashqa'i, the Ilkhani was the court of final appeal. Cases of common tribesmen were taken to the Kadkhoda, between Kadhkodus to the Kalantars, and between Kalantars to the Ilkhani. Corporate disputes between Kalantars or with non-Qashqa'is were resolved by the Ilkhani. As Salzer (1974:219) puts it, "Underlying all these nego tiations was always a potential resort to force, a resort not uncommonly used in the past." The Boyr Ahmad, like the Qashqa'i usually used mediation up the political hierarchy to settle conflict. Intra-camp conflicts are often resolved via the coercion of the wealthiest, most influential, men in the camp. His kinship ties and his ability to channel public opinion are the major devices available to the camp headman in resolv ing conflict (Fazel 1971:121). Occasionally the Boyr Ahmad refer a complex case to the Khan. However, the Kadkoda is normally the highest tribal court of authority and his primary aim is to bring about the conciliation (Fazel 1971:154). The Iranian civil courts are rarely resorted to. The tribes contend that they are corrupt and most pastoralists cannot spend the time away from their herds that is necessary to plead their cases. One of the major jobs of the tribal elites has been to intercede with the governmental authorities in cases involving nomads and villagers. The nomad must constantly 60 care for his flocks but the sedentary farmer can camp at the courthouse if necessary (Barth 1961:78-79). When law or authority is breached, sanctions vary from corporal punishment, fines, blood compensation, to frequent assignment of poor pastures. Of course/ between tribes or with sedentary peoples the nomads have always in the past held the optional sanction of raiding and warfare. CHAPTER V
THE IDEOLOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE
Men produce and communicate ideas just as they pro duce and distribute other products. Ideology is a much more effective means for social control than is an over- reliance on raw power. An ideology motivates the masses to voluntarily obey the elites, Mosca felt that the masses needed ideology to justify their desire to obey and refrain from aking decisions (1939:176), Most Marxian or conflict theorists agree that ideology represents and helps to disguise powerful interests of the elites: Hence for Marx ideology was the abstract conceptual form in which members of a class disguised their concrete economic, social, and political interests and position (Firth 1975:32), In a class society, the ruling ideology is the ideology of the ruling class. Ideology is mostly uncon scious; it is a result of social-cultural conditioning imposed by the ruling class.
Religion Religion is one of the major expressions of an ideological system. In Southwest Asia all the nomadic populations, regardless of sect, are Moslems. This
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presents us with a uniform religious pattern for all the scattered tribes.
Among the Kashkuli Kuchek (a Qashqa'i tribe) I found that everyone was interested in religion and maintained that they were Moslems. But only the older men and occa sionally the older women participated in any prayer or other religious activities. There is a great deal of prestige attached to becoming a Hajji by making the pil grimage to Mecca. Modern pilgrims make their journey to the holy city via airline. This requires a great deal more money than the average common herder has and consequently the Hajjis come from the tribal elite. Salzer (1975: per sonal communication) feels that the recent increase in the number of people making the Hajj is a mechanism whereby the elites can retain respect and prestige that, is other wise being eroded away by the Iranian government's assump tion of their traditional decision-making powers. Barth (1961:136-37) notes the laxness of religious observations among the Basseri: The nomads pray irregularly and always individually; even on Friday there is no communal gathering of worshippers within a camp or even within a tent. Most tribes in Southwest Asia commonly stop and pray or make sacrifices when their migration or travels take them past a shrine, i.e., the grave of a holy man (Dupree 1973:104-105). 63
Religious events such as the fast of Ramadan and the feast of Moharram are observed by few of the Basseri (Barth 1961:137), The Kashkuli Kuchek will not celebrate Nowruz, the Persian New Year, if it is during the month of Ramadan,
Nomadic pastoralists are not noted for their religious activities or for their ritual life. The data presented on religion in most monographs on pastoralists is extremely meager. Barth (1961:148-49) postulates that the Basseri find symbolic meaning in the grandeur of their everyday activities. Migration is held to have dramatic emotional value, Barth admits that methodologically this explanation is hard to demonstrate. In summary, the religious and ritual life of most nomadic pastoralists is sparse. Religion is held in respect and the elites do not fail to utilize this respect for their own benefit.
Ideological Reproduction It is ideology which allows for the reproduction of the conditions of production. Althusser (1971:132-33) explains: . , . the reproduction of labor power requires not onl. .y a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression , , . 64
Various ideological mechanisms such as religion, the family, and the political hierarchy function to reproduce both their structure and their guiding elite. In recent years access to education has been the privilege of the children of the wealthy. This tended to solidify their position of political dominance and make them necessary in relations with the extra-tribal laws and governments.
The class system reproduces itself through the super structure. The children of the elites are born into the ruling genealogies, they are raised as superior to the common herdsman's child, they are better educated, and they take their father's place in the hierarchy when he dies or relinquishes power. The children of the servants or herder classes are born into their parents' class, they lack the nutritional advantages of the elite children, they are raised under an aura of their parents' respect for the elites, they lack the educational advantages of the elite children, and they take their father's place as herdsmen or servants. Among the Kashkuli Kuchek the tribal educational system is slowly breaking this cycle of reproduction. I met one university student whose mother was a weaver in the camp of a tribal chief. Military service is also helping to break this system of class domination. Young tribesmen 65 are drafted into the Iranian army at the age of eighteen and presented with a new hierarchy and broader world-view. Change is gradual when the tribal elites fight to retain their statuses and perogatives. When the tribal people finally break out of their traditional class system they may find themselves on the bottom of a national class system unless they have managed to procure a good educa tion. CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis is an attempt to apply a Marxian frame work to the available data on nomadic pastoralism. Chap ter I presented a broad definition of the "model" concept and a more exact definition of a Marxian model. The his torical development of both equilibrium and conflict theory was outlined and conflict theory was found to pri marily emphasize social change and conflict. Basic rules of Marxian methodology were summarized, with class conflict within an economically limited base and superstructure as its prime parameters. And finally. Chapter I reviewed a previous model of nomadic pastoralism and suggested that a Marxian analysis would be useful. Chapter II reviewed the concept of a techno-economic base. It was established that nomadic pastoralism was an adaptation to a particular marginal environment and to particular suitable animals. Nomads were found to be socially marginal as well as inhabiting an environmentally
marginal area. Chapter III looked into the production process and stressed how competition and conflict are the norm between the nomad and the sedentary population. Herd structure 66 67 was investigated as a major variable in the productive process and agriculture was determined to be the second most important branch of production. Land and credit were discussed as the most important of the pastoral means of production and the hegemony of the ruling elite class was attributed to their control of the means of production.
Chapters IV and V explored the superstructures of nomadic society, Salzman's correlation between limited resources and limited political development was enlarged to enclude the political economy of tribal confederations and the various levels of class differentiation and domi nation. It was postulated that the more politically com plex groups such as the Qashaq'i and Kalat Khanate were, and to some extent still are, dominated by the elite class throughout all aspects of their social and economic rela tions. The Marxian model points to kinship and genealogy as protecting and preserving the class privileges of the elites. In all but the most egalitarian tribes like the Yomut, herding and other contractual relations work to the advantage of those who control the means of production and dominate the social organization. Ideology was found to be another force holding the elites in power as legitimate rulers of the tribe. The socializing and educational mechanisms in pastoral society are shaped by those who administer them. Thus the process 68 of reproducing the social form is also turned to repro ducing the existing class structure.
This Marxian model provided an analytical framework that exposed several problems in nomadic society that had not been adequately dealt with by the non-conflict oriented investigators. The presence of a class structure where previously only the concept "stratum" had been des cribed presents a new picture of the social forces in pastoral society. The elites' domination of the political superstructure and techno-economic base destroys the equalitarian image of nomadic societies. The fact that the more politically complex societies are the most class- oriented and repressive may be vital in a Marxian theory of civilization and its rise. And the coercive nature of the kinship relations in nomadic society presents a different view of lineages and their break-up and segmentation. It is hoped that this perspective will have, by pre senting the nomadic pastoral data in a new light, yielded new insight on the political economy of Southwest Asia. But even more important, this perspective should enable us to formulate new questions: questions that can be clarified by the existing data but only answered by fieldwork based on a Marxian research strategy. REFERENCES CITED
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