A MARXIAN MODEL OF NOMADIC PASTORALISM by RONALD LAWRENCE HOLT, B.A. A THESIS IN ANTHROPOLOGY Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved ^ Accepted August, 1976 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am deeply indebted to Professor Richard E. Salzer for his direction of this thesis and to Professor Philip A. Dennis for his criticism and advice. I would like to especially thank Lutf'ali Khan and Hamid Khan Kashkuli, my hosts in Iran, for their hospitality and friendship. My research was partially funded through a grant by Texas Tech University, College of Arts and Sciences, Institute for University Research. 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii LIST OF TABLES , . , . v CHAPTER I. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 1 Foreword 1 The Value of Models 3 Equilibrium and Conflict Theory 4 Marxian or Conflict Methodology 12 Previous Models of Nomadic Pastor- alism 15 II. THE TECHNO-ECONOMIC BASE 19 Environmental Relations . 22 Historical Determinants 26 III. PRODUCTION 30 Forces of Production 30 Means of Production 39 Relations of Production 42 IV. THE JURIDICO-POLITICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE .... 45 Kinship 46 Authority, Power, and Class ... 50 Law and Custom 58 111 CHAPTER V. THE IDEOLOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE 61 Religion 61 Ideological Reproduction .......... 63 VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 66 REFERENCES CITED 69 IV LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Conflict vs Equilibrium Theory ,..,,.. 11 2. Environmental Variables of Nomadic Pastoralism ........,«,.««. 27 3. Relative Herd Size ......«...«,. 37 4. Agricultural Production ....«...,• 38 CHAPTER I THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND Foreword The purpose of this thesis is to begin constructing a Marxian model of nomadic pastoralism in Southwest Asia. For the purposes of clarity and uniformity. Southwest Asia is defined as: Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (Barth 1960:341). This study centers on the sheep-goat complex and excludes the peoples whose primary occupation is herding camels, cattle, reindeer, or horses. For three months during the summer of 1975 I lived with the Kashkuli Kuchek, a tribe of nomadic pastoralists, in southern Iran. The Marxian orientation of this thesis derives from my observations and impressions of their class structure. I saw extremes of wealth and poverty existing side by side, separated only by the hereditary division of class. In seeking an explanation of this phenomenon I began to search the growing literature on social conflict. Con­ flict led me to the new Marxist interpretations in social anthropology. The discussion of social anthropology's traditional paradigm of structural-functionalism, versus the new empha­ sis on conflict oriented anthropology, reflects my theoretical interests and concerns. The use of empirical data on nomadic pastoralists illustrates both my areal interests, and an attempt to validate my Marxian model against the available data. This model will necessarily be limited in scope due to the structural-functional premises of the original data collectors. As of yet, there has been no attempt to con­ duct anthropological fieldwork among nomadic pastoralists using a conflict or Marxian research strategy. This limits the horizons of this paper, as most of it is drawn from library sources. However, by looking at the existing material on nomadic pastoralists in Southwest Asia, in Marxian terms, I hope to produce new insights and new ques­ tions for future fieldwork. The central proposition of this thesis is that a Marxian analysis will elicit data from new and old sources and order it in such a way as to better explain the social processes of nomadic pastoralism. I will attempt to gain a new perspective, a new ideological orientation in the study of pastoralism. My major expectation is that this model will supplement and challenge the current assumptions of the structural-functional paradigm in social anthropology. How­ ever, both approaches have merit, and illuminate different problems from differing points of view. The Value of Models Empirical observations are usually made within a prior conceptual framework. In theory this framework should be formulated and conceived through logic and the scientific method in advance of the actual observation. However, at times this conceptual framework may be only an afterthought, perhaps only cultural norms or a particular societal ideology disguised in scientific terminology. In the social sciences a broad but more formal con­ ceptual "model" is often used. A model, in its simplest form, is a general perception of how society is put together and works or fails to work. Models vary in scope from com­ plex mathmatical schematics to descriptive outlines. Models are necessarily less complex than reality. A model so complex as to explain every detail of. a social form would, by its very complexity, explain nothing. "A model is a simplification of reality, and that is its pur­ pose. Simpler models that convey as much about reality are preferable" (Francis 1972:8). Models have meaning in the abstract; they are a guide to the essential factors in a real-world situation. "A model, then, is a very general set of ideas and concepts—a point of view—that the scientist uses to select his problems, organize his thoughts, and pursue his inquiries" (Chambliss 19 73:2). We will define our conflict model as a set of analyti­ cal generalizations that guides and organizes our empirical data into statements about the social process. This Marxian model will focus on and describe various features of the nomadic social form. It is deterministic in that it assumes that the world is comprehensible, but it also assumes that random variables will render prediction possible only in a probabilistic framework. Equilibrium and Conflict Theory Structural-functionalism has been the major heuristic model or paradigm of social anthropology since the late 1930's (Harris 1968:514). The concept of " equilibrium" lies at the heart of the structural-functional argument. Equilibrium means that societies invent machanisms whose function it is to redirect conflict and reinforce the status quo. Self-regulating social equilibrium models focus on the processes that produce stability and continuity in society rather than on what produces change and disruption. Marxian conflict models, on the other hand, rest on the assumption that societies are always in flux, and that coercion, in its various forms, imposes a minimal change in the social formation. While equilibrium theory may be the child of Plato, its modern use can be traced back to Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) (Russett 1966:3). The two major categories of equilibrium theory may be stipulated as "static" or "dynamic." Comte's equilibrium was "provisional, always changing and never settling down to a permanent posi­ tion of rest" (Russett 1966:35). While Spencer realized that all societies were not in total equilibrium, he was too enamored with the status quo to stress any aspect other than the stable "culmination of progress" (Ressett 1966:42). He wrote; Social statics may be aptly divided (as political economy has been) into statics and dynamics; the first treating of the equilibrium of a perfect society, the second of the forces by which it is advanced toward perfection (Spencer in Russett 1966:40). Where Comte spoke of order and progress, Durkheim (1958-1917) emphasized "social solidarity" (Harris 1968: 466). Durkheim's major contribution to equilibrium theory was the hypothesis that the "function" of many social phenomena was to preserve the unity and harmony of the society. While Pareto, Malinowski and Henderson certainly made great contributions to equilibrium theory, it was under the direction of Radcliffe-Brown, Homans, and Talcott Parsons that it assumed its present form. Radcliffe-Brown stressed the dichotomy between his structural-functionalism and the purely "welding torch" functionalism of Malinowski. According to Radcliffe- Brown, functional unity can be defined: ... as a condition in which all parts of a social system work together with sufficient degree of har­ mony of internal consistency, i.e., without pro­ ducing persistent conflicts which can neither be resolved nor regulated (Radcliffe-Brown 1952:181). George C. Homans describes equilibrium thus: . , . the state of the elements that enter the system and of the mutual relationships between them is such that any small change in one of the elements will be followed by changes in the other elements tending to reduce the amount of that change (1950:303-4). Talcott Parsons has constructed a "grand theory" of functionalism that presumes to deal with social change: The theory of change in the structure of social sys­ tems must, therefore, be a theory of particular sub- processes of change within such systems, not of the overall processes of change of the systems as sys­ tems (Parsons 1951:486). In other words, the structure of a society remains fixed, or only succumbs to "value" changes, while the func­ tional mechanisms or social organization may vary. Conflict theory, on the other hand, rests on the premise that change is endemic in society. Conflict is always present, but an effective society's coercive mechan­ isms are able to suppress or re-direct that conflict (Duke 1976:71). Modern conflict theory begins with Karl Marx (1818- 1883) "the social and political thinker of the nineteenth century" (Mills 1962:35). The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles (Marx and Engels 1967:79). Or more directly: Without conflict no progress: this is the law which civilization has followed to the present day (Marx and Engels 1967:103). Marx believed that the social organization of society was in a state of continuous change. Unlike Marx, many social scientists, oriented to structural-functionalism, strictly dichotomize society into "social organization" and "social structure." Social structure is the abstract ideal of society and social organization is the concrete observ­ able activity. This interpretation of dual structures focuses on change in the organization of society but seldom attempts an explanation of structural change.