1 Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia: Progress Made and Lessons Learned

Austen Moore* University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, USA

Background to the Conflict and Rajalahti, 2010). Liberia received World Bank funding to expand its extension work- Conflict and agriculture have been intertwined force and place officers in every county, district in the Republic of Liberia since the country’s and klan (township), dramatically increas- formation by repatriated slaves from the ing the number of farmers reached by exten- USA and subsequent independence in 1847 sion information (MoA, 2007). Funding was (Pham, 2004; CIA, n.d.). Early in its history, also used to enhance domestic agricultural Liberians of American descent dominated research through the Central Agricultural the political process and began to annex Research Institute (CARI) in Bong County lands that traditionally belonged to indigen- and Cuttington University, Liberia’s leading ous groups (Humphreys and Richards, 2005; agricultural institution (FARA, n.d.). MoA, 2007). The Americo-Liberian minority However, benefits were not felt by all eventually controlled many of the nation’s Liberians. Highly productive plantations and most productive agricultural lands and nat- lucrative export agreements allowed the ural resources (Unruh, 2009). Americo-Liberian minority group to accumulate Many Americo-Liberian landowners prac- further wealth and prosperity (Sawyer, 2005), ticed a plantation-style agricultural model, while indigenous Liberians became dispro- while most indigenous farmers either served portionately poor (Pham, 2004; Humphreys as labor on large-scale plantations or practiced and Richards, 2005; GRC, 2007). Notably, small-scale farming. The plantation model the Liberian government authorized the lease led to relative productivity in staple and of 100,000 acres of prime agricultural land cash crops into the late 1970s (MoA, 2007). to the US-owned Firestone Company in Liberia became a net exporter of sugar cane, 1926, an arrangement that was subsequently cocoa, palm oil and rubber. criticized for benefitting ‘elite’ Americo- This period also represented the peak Liberians while displacing indigenous farmers of agricultural extension in Liberia. During (Saha, 1988). the late 1970s, the World Bank heavily funded Similarly, extension services did not training-and-visit extension to spread Green reach all Liberians equally. The Green Revo- Revolution technologies in Africa (Swanson lution model and corresponding technology

* Corresponding author e-mail: [email protected]

transfer approach encouraged large-scale and reported that agriculture was the main agriculture, and services were often directed income-generating activity of 74% of Liber- towards plantation-style farming systems ians. In 2013, the agricultural sector still made (Saha, 1988; Pham, 2004). Indigenous farm- up 76.9% of the national gross domestic ers’ role as laborers or practitioners of small- product (GDP) (CIA, n.d.). scale subsistence agriculture meant that Liberia also has significant potential for extension services were seldom tailored to agricultural growth. The country contains their needs (MoA, 2007). This disparity con- huge amounts of arable lands and fertile tributed to mounting tensions, especially in swamps due to topsoil accumulation (FAO, rural areas where food security was lowest. n.d. b). Liberia receives 240 cm (94 inches) Political, economic and ethnic tensions of precipitation annually (FAO, n.d. a), an ultimately led to full-scale conflict in 1980, extremely high amount relative to other West when indigenous military leaders led a coup African countries. Improved water manage- that toppled the Liberian government. The ment and usage of arable land could increase following 25-year period saw ongoing internal production, food security and livelihoods for conflict, widespread human rights violations Liberian farmers (MoA, 2007). and devastating destruction (Humphreys Despite its importance and potential, the and Richards, 2005; CIA, n.d.). Peace was agricultural sector was also devastated by the re-established in 2003 under a transitional Liberian civil war. Overall production government, followed by elections in 2005 levels of rice, cassava and maize were much (MoA, 2007; World Bank, 2013). lower than before the war (FAO, n.d., c), and The Liberian civil war devastated the food security dropped to crisis levels for many country, erased years of development (UNDP, Liberians. During the early post-conflict 2005) and crippled the Liberian economy period, food aid was provided to address (Humphreys and Richards, 2005). Post- emergency shortages, but little was done to conflict Liberia had few options to promote improve domestic production. By 2007, food development, economic growth and poverty insecurity still affected 80% of rural house- reduction or to address other effects of the holds (MoA, 2007), with people displaced by war (Blattman and Annan, 2012). conflict up to 20% more food insecure Liberia’s recent Ebola epidemic further (Ghimire et al., 2013). Female-headed house- complicated post-conflict challenges. A total holds, the number of which increased due to of 10,666 cases and 4806 deaths were recorded conflict, also showed lower productivity per during the outbreak, which occurred from hectare and correspondingly lower food secur- 20 March 2014 to 9 May 2015 (WHO, 2015). ity and income levels (Ghimire et al., 2013). The epidemic had considerable implica- Staple crop production declined for tions for Liberia’s development, agricultural several reasons. Large landholdings and productivity and economic growth. In fact, plantation systems were targeted during the Ebola is expected to cause development in- conflict as symbols of oppression and mar- dicators (e.g. Human Development Index, ginalization (Unruh, 2009). Plantations were poverty, life expectancy) to decline for the often abandoned as owners and laborers first time since 2005 (UNDP, 2015). were displaced, and post-war land-rights issues made restarting plantation agriculture problematic. Efforts to restart large-scale production Post-Conflict Agricultural Context have centered on farmers’ groups and producers’ organizations. However, virtually all ex- As other post-conflict economic sectors strug- isting farmers’ groups dissolved as farmers gled to rebuild, many Liberians reverted to were displaced during the conflict, and a slow small-scale agricultural production. In a 2007 and difficult reintegration and reconciliation report, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) process made their revival and rehabilita- described food crop production as Liberia’s tion during the early post-conflict period dif- ‘most important source of livelihood’ (p. 13) ficult (Fearonet al., 2009). Farmers’ groups Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 3

are more viable today, but are still affected period. Even in 2012, 94% of roads in Liberia by community dynamics and post-conflict remained unpaved, and many become im- tensions. passable during the rainy season (Shor, 2012). The conflict also changed the character- Currently a major road project is underway istics of rural labor. Rebel movements primar- connecting Liberia’s ‘breadbasket’ counties ily originated in rural areas and also in the to the capital (Moore, 2014). However, in the three counties (Bong, Lofa and Nimba) con- meantime farmers struggle to take produce sidered the nation’s breadbasket (Humphreys to market, which reduces their returns and acts and Richards, 2005; Stack and Brabazon, as a disincentive to large-scale production. 2008). Since these were the epicenter of Other infrastructure was also affected. fighting, rural peoples in this region were Irrigation infrastructure was widely des- displaced and fled towards neighboring troyed, especially in swamp-based rice sys- Guinea or the coastal capital of Monrovia. tems in the rural north. In 2013, only 5% of Nearly half (45.5%) of Liberians displaced farmers had access to irrigation infrastruc- from these areas fled to Guinea, where many ture (Ghimire et al., 2013). Government build- resettled or remain in refugee camps (Ghimire ings, including those of CARI and other et al., 2013). As a result, many rural areas were agricultural extension facilities, were looted underpopulated when the fighting ceased. and burned. Liberia’s main energy source, the Prior to the war, young men had com- Mount Coffee hydroelectric plant in Mont- prised much of the agricultural workforce. serrado County, was damaged in the conflict However, many rural youth were displaced and is still being rebuilt (IFC, 2013), which or mobilized into armed groups (Stack and limits processing and storage capacities and Brabazon, 2008). Post-conflict youth are accelerates post-harvest loss. largely uninterested in agriculture, prefer- Agricultural tools and inputs were stolen, ring economic activities in other sectors or in lost or destroyed during the war, as people urban areas, and often lack the requisite fled rural areas. Farmers operating after the skills to succeed in the sector, even if they war lacked even the most basic tools to pre- do express a desire to join the workforce pare fields, weed and harvest. They also (Blattman and Annan, 2012). lacked the seeds, rootstock and plant mater- As a result, the overall demographics of ial needed to quickly resume production. the rural agricultural workforce changed. The Donor agencies distributed agricultural in- majority of farmers in post-conflict Liberia puts and equipment to farmers in the early are older than 50 (USAID, 2008b), and most post-conflict period, but these conditions are women (MoA, 2008b). These groups are slowed the redevelopment of the agricultural less suited to labor activities common to sector (Ghimire et al., 2013). plantation systems (MoA, 2007). Furthermore, female-headed households are generally poorer (MoA, 2007) and less able to employ workers (Moore, 2014). Because the work- Significance of Agriculture force made reinstituting plantation-style and Agricultural Extension agriculture untenable, the majority of post- conflict agricultural production is small Despite the challenges, agricultural devel- scale and largely for subsistence purposes opment is fundamental to reconstruction, (Ghimire et al., 2013). peace and stability, and to overall develop- Agricultural production was also com- ment in post-conflict Liberia. The transitional promised by the widespread destruction of government identified the importance agricultural and non-agricultural infrastruc- of rebuilding agriculture in early policy ture. Fighting damaged bridges and roads documents. Liberia signed the 2003 Com- needed to bring agricultural products to mar- prehensive Africa Agriculture Development kets, as well as limiting penetration of whole- Programme (CAADP) agreement, which sale buyers and increasing the transport costs committed the country to allotting 10% or of seeds and inputs during the post-conflict more of the national budget to agriculture 4 A. Moore

(MoA, 2007; IFPRI, 2013). These early policies food security and promote stability in rural were subsequently reinforced by President areas (MoA, 2007; MoA, 2008a; MoA, 2009). Johnson-Sirleaf following her 2005 election The Ebola epidemic led to a downturn in victory. The new administration placed agricultural yields and an increase in food agriculture ‘at the center of reconstruction insecurity, leading to increased efforts that and development efforts’ (MoA, 2007: 1) reinforced the focus on agricultural develop- and identified rice as a commodity as im- ment (World Bank, 2015b). portant to national development as oil and concrete (Shor, 2012). Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy also cited agriculture as crucial for economic revitalization (Zinnah Post-Conflict Agricultural Extension and Perry, 2011). Furthermore, agriculture was viewed as the sector most able to reincor- Swanson et al. (1997) described food secur- porate displaced people and former fighters, ity and rural livelihood development as the contributing towards long-term peace and two primary objectives of agricultural exten- stability (Blattman and Annan, 2012). sion. Similarly, during the post-conflict period, Specific strategies represent the two Liberia prioritized both objectives and re- phases of post-conflict development. Early lied heavily on agricultural extension to reach agricultural policies created and implemented its development objectives (MoA, 2007). during the emergency (or relief) phase focused Whereas pre-war extension services were mainly on food security. In addition to food provided largely by the MoA (Moore, 2014), aid, programs to rebuild large-scale produc- in the current post-war phase the system is tion systems, use modern technologies and composed of a range of actors. At the center is develop value chains and markets for Liber- the MoA’s Department of Rural Development, ian produce dominated this period (MoA, Extension, and Research (DRDER). A total of 2007). While the Government of Liberia 134 extensionists work in the DRDER (Moore, lacked the capacity to adequately implement 2014), including 72 field-based extension offi- this strategy, international donors contrib- cers serving Liberia’s 15 counties (McNamara uted funding and programming towards pro- et al., 2011). Each county contains County duction agriculture (USAID, 2008a). Many Agricultural Coordinators (CACs) and District international agencies distributed seeds, tools Agricultural Extension Officers (DAOs), sup- and other inputs designed to help farmers ported by regional subject matter specialists restart food and cash crop production. Rice responsible for multiple counties (MoA, 2007; production was prioritized through several USAID, 2008a; USAID, 2009). large-scale irrigation and swamp development The demographics of public extension schemes. Increasing production of Liberia’s personnel were substantially impacted by second staple, cassava, has also become a the conflict. The majority of extension ad- deliberate focus of the Government of Liberia ministrators, but also most field-level offi- and international donors (MoA, 2007; MoA, cers, are over 50 years old. Many had served 2009; DAI, 2012; Moore, 2014). since before the conflict and are expected to Agriculture in the development (or retire in the next few years (USAID, 2008b; rehabilitation) phase expanded to better align McNamara et al., 2011). During the conflict with changing conditions. Stakeholders itself, younger extension officers fled, due to sought to transform the sector to foster both security concerns and the inability to draw a large- and small-scale production models salary as services were suspended (MoA, (MoA, 2008b). Policies began to include ‘pro- 2007). As a result of this ‘brain drain’ there poor’ strategies designed to enhance the pro- was a need to restock the extension system duction capacity and yields of smallholder after peace was re-established (Eicher, 2006). farmers, thereby improving rural livelihoods However, the MoA struggles to attract and re- and increasing incomes (MoA, 2007; MoA, tain young extension officers, despite wide 2008a, 2009). This livelihood-centric focus agreement on the need to employ younger was intended to address poverty, build local staff (Moore, 2014). Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 5

In addition, 89.3% of MoA extension recently, organizations such as the Commu- personnel are male (Moore, 2014). Represen- nity of Hope Agriculture Project (CHAP), the tatives from the Farmers Union Network of FUNL and the Sustainable Food and Seeds Liberia (FUNL) described this imbalance as Project have emerged to address specific a major impediment to serving female farm- needs of the post-conflict period; serve unique ers and an indication of cultural bias and segments of the population, regions and inadequate political will rather than a lack crops; and increasingly work in partnership of qualified candidates (Moore, 2014). The with the MoA, donors and INGOs as they MoA is currently undertaking actions to nar- grow in number, capacity and relevance row the gender gap (Zinnah and Perry, 2011). (Moore, 2014). Meanwhile, the private sec- While the MoA occupies a central role, tor remains minimally involved in exten- a large number of donors, international non- sion service delivery. governmental organizations (INGOs), local Donor- and NGO-employed extension civil society organizations (or domestic NGOs) officers are typically much younger and and a small contingent of private sector actors more likely to be female than their MoA also provide extension services to farmers. counterparts. These organizations have been Liberia experienced a sizeable influx of proactive about hiring and developing recent donor-funded projects immediately follow- agriculture graduates of the University of ing the 2003 peace agreement, when the Liberia and Cuttington University (Feed the institutional and operational capacity of its Future, 2011). Donor projects in particular government to provide essential services to attract younger and more educated workers farmers was at its lowest (USAID, 2008a). This due to higher salaries and better working phenomenon is common in post-conflict or conditions (Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010). post-disaster situations, where injections of Often personnel are recruited away from the donor funding are often needed to provide MoA or other agricultural employers because services in a vacuum of public capacity the supply of trained extensionists is low, (Schuller, 2012). Many of these efforts in- having been diluted by conflict and the ‘brain cluded short-term food aid, but also the drain’ (Eicher, 2006). Donors and NGOs have dissemination of inputs and basic exten- proven far more likely to employ female sion services to rapidly restart agricultural extensionists, although even these organiza- production. tions have rarely exceeded a rate of 40% As Liberia moved from the emergency women (DAI, 2012; Moore, 2014). phase into the development phase, many organizations ceased operations and were replaced by others with different mandates. Experiences, Impacts and Issues Still others (e.g. the Adventist Development and Relief Agency) have shifted from pro- Extension in post-conflict Liberia is compli- viding aid to conducting more traditional cated and faces considerable challenges in extension activities (Moore, 2014). Approxi- serving farmers. A range of contextual factors, mately 60 donors and NGOs (both inter- strategies and approaches have been used— national and domestic) were operating in with varying levels of success—in the post- agricultural extension in 2011 (McNamara conflict period. The following sections et al., 2011). Among these are ACDI/VOCA, assess some key issues affecting the extension BRAC, Care International, the Food and Agri- system. culture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and Winrock International. Domestic NGOs and civil society organizations have also proliferated in the early Policy and planning development phase, and especially since 2010. During the conflict and early post-conflict Post-conflict Liberia has undergone several period, church-based organizations were the major extension policy shifts between the predominant actors within civil society. More emergency and development phases. Initially 6 A. Moore

Liberia, like many post-conflict countries, was invited to conduct a scoping mission as did not have much formal agricultural policy a step towards this objective (MEAS, 2011). in place. In the first few years following the These transitions have slowly occurred, conflict, the MoA largely promoted extension although considerable support from within policies to rebuild food security through the Liberian government and from outside speeches, press releases and other informal stakeholders is required (MoA, 2007; MoA, channels. Liberia later signed the CAADP 2008a; MoA, 2009; McNamara et al., 2011). agreement, and President Johnson-Sirleaf However, implementation of transitions emphasized agricultural production in her in extension policy has proven slow to match inaugural policies (MoA, 2007). This approach the rhetoric. One such policy transition is did not always provide a consistent message decentralization (USAID, 2009). While decen- or strategy for agricultural development. tralization of extension services to the county Without established policy, donors and level was an objective of the 2008 and 2009 INGOs implemented their own operational policies, administrative procedures remain policies and many actors used disconnected highly centralized and bureaucratic years or contradicting development approaches later (Moore, 2014). Activities such as iden- in the early post-conflict period. tifying program foci and priority-setting re- However, from 2007 to 2009 the MoA sponsibilities are largely undertaken at the created several key policies intended to clar- MoA office in Monrovia. Requests for mater- ify development priorities and shift the ials, and especially funding, are also relayed extension system towards longer-term de- by officers through their CACs to the national velopment efforts. These policies discussed level, where funding and supplies are man- a pluralistic, participatory, value chain ap- aged and dispersed (Moore, 2014). Donor proach designed to be more appropriate to projects and INGOs are more decentralized. changing conditions than the largely top- Many large programs—such as ACDI/ down, technology transfer model used in VOCA’s LIFE III program and Development the pre-war period (MoA, 2007; MoA, 2008a; Alternatives International (DAI)’s Food and MoA, 2009). Policies also included an em- Enterprise Development (FED) program— phasis on livelihood development and have county-level offices with relative auton- farmer empowerment strategies. omy (MEAS, 2011; DAI, 2012). BRAC has This policy transition is significant for community-level programs that operate in- several reasons. It represents a semi-resolution dependently, depending on the needs of its of an ongoing revitalization versus modern- respective sites (BRAC, n.d.). ization debate between extension providers. The MoA’s struggles to decentralize are The majority of MoA administrators and likely to be a legacy of the Liberian conflict. CACs were trained during the training-and- Mutual distrust between the central govern- visit era when Liberia’s agricultural sector ment and local authorities is certainly a factor. was stronger. In several interviews, senior Whereas donor agencies and multinational administrators cited nostalgia for Liberia’s partners (e.g. USAID, World Bank) stress lo- pre-war agriculture and suggested that re- calization and a decentralized democratic turning the nation to that model of exten- process as a means of promoting good gov- sion should be the MoA’s goal (Moore, 2014). ernance, the post-conflict Liberian govern- This mindset was common among the ‘old ment may not be willing to expand the guard’ within the MoA. rights and power of peoples or regions that In contrast, younger members of the previously fought against the prior regime, MoA were eager to modernize the extension destroyed government property and targeted system, with support from donors, the INGO public servants. This mindset, however sector and other domestic partners. The need obscure, is likely to contribute to slow decen- to adapt to post-war conditions has slowly tralization shifts in Liberia. gained traction, despite ongoing resistance Another area of policy discord relates from senior officials. The Modernizing Exten- to participatory, capacity-building extension sion and Advisory Services (MEAS) project that promotes farmers’ empowerment. The Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 7

heavy influx of donor dollars and programs developed anew and policy review must be providing free seeds, tools and inputs to conducted by individuals with the requisite farmers in the emergency phase is thought capacity or experience. Furthermore, policy to have created a ‘dependency syndrome’ review, and especially review practices that among Liberian farmers that compromises include feedback from diverse stakeholders, current capacity-building programming may also be viewed as a threat to stability. (Chronic Poverty Research Center, 2011). Inviting opposing parties (often headed by Farmers have avoided programs that do not former warlords), leaders of different ethnic include material or financial compensation groups, rural farmers or other influential for participating and are reluctant to engage stakeholders to critique policy of the ruling in training that might produce longer-term government could be more contentious than capacity building and more sustainable de- beneficial in post-conflict Liberia. Given velopment (Moore, 2014). Changing this these conditions, reticence to actively pursue mentality has been a challenge to organiza- policy review is not unexpected. tions implementing participatory extension models and requires a unified effort among service providers. This shift is particularly complicated by a ‘victim mentality’ or sense Funding of powerlessness to control one’s own well- being, which developed among many Liberians Funding is a central issue affecting the quality as a result of conflict (Bar-Talet al., 2009). and effectiveness of extension. The overall In addition, while the MoA and many budget of Liberia in the post-conflict period donors/INGOs have committed to capacity- is compromised by an economy that is in building strategies, a number of other organ- the rebuilding phase coupled with a poor izations still actively distribute free inputs tax base, while threats of instability deter to farmers. These programs undercut long- foreign investment and poor institutional term capacity building and sustainable de- capacity and governance concerns limit velopment of the sector. Progress was being donors’ willingness to provide direct lending made after several years of post-conflict de- (MoF, 2013). As a result, the Liberian govern- velopment and better coordination between ment faces considerable challenges related to extension actors (Moore, 2014), but emergency funding its public advisory services. Des- aid stemming from the Ebola epidemic has pite committing 10% of the national budget reversed this trend (World Bank, 2015b). to agriculture through the CAADP agree- Extension policies lack formal review ment, evidence suggests that the actual allo- processes to allow for revision and updating cation for agriculture is approximately 3%, as circumstances change (Moore, 2014). or US$14 million dollars (IFPRI, 2013; MoF, The MoA struggles to evaluate the impact of 2013). An even smaller amount is dedicated its policies and programs, as do many domes- to agricultural extension, with rural infrastruc- tic NGOs (McNamara et al., 2011). Larger ture development (e.g. roads, irrigation sys- donor projects and INGOs have effective tems) accounting for much of agricultural monitoring and evaluation processes to guide spending (Moore, 2014). their operations and strategic planning (DAI, As a result, shortfalls in public agricul- 2012), but no mechanism exists for these tural funding restrict services to farmers. evaluations to affect overarching policy at The MoA is unable to hire sufficient officers the national level. As a result, the extension to provide adequate coverage and to rebalance system lacks timely revisions to extension the gender and age of its officers. Retention policies. of talented personnel is also a challenge due Evidence suggests that poor policy re- to low salaries and high job-related expenses. view within public extension is directly McNamara et al. (2011) reported that nine tied to post-conflict socio-political dynamics of 81 officers left the MoA between 2008 (Moore, 2014). First, much like the policies and 2011, because of issues related to salary. themselves, revision procedures must be Moore (2014) also cited multiple complaints 8 A. Moore

from MoA officers about low salaries and the Hanrahan, 2011) and focuses on providing desire to leave for more lucrative opportun- extension services and developing rice, ities elsewhere. Officers often seek other cassava, vegetable and livestock value income-generating opportunities to supple- chains (DAI, 2012). The budget of FED ment their salaries, yet these are few in alone (US$76 million over 5 years) exceeded post-conflict Liberia compared with other that of the Liberian government (Moore, countries with greater stability and a stronger 2014). Other donor agencies and organiza- private sector (Moore, 2014). Those officers tions, such as ACDI/VOCA, FAO, Winrock who remain with the MoA lack resources to International and the World Bank, have also conduct training and have insufficient fuel operated highly funded projects to develop allocations for travel to engage with farmers staple and cash crop production (World (McNamara et al., 2011). Bank, 2015a). Insufficient funding also impacts the These funding levels allow donor pro- MoA’s technical capacity. The ability to re- jects and INGOs to hire and retain the most construct CARI, and thereby to conduct highly skilled extensionists available, and research domestically, is compromised even to attract those displaced by conflict back (USAID, 2008a), and lack of computers and to Liberia. These organizations can also pro- other technologies limits officers’ access to vide pre- and in-service training to their web-based information (Swanson, 2011). As workers, supply and maintain vehicles to a result, many officers struggle to provide allow operations in remote rural areas, and up-to-date information to their farmers. produce print and ICT-based training mater- Also, funding limits the capacity to pro- ials. All of these factors provide a significant duce print materials or to effectively in- advantage that is reflected in the quality of corporate information and communication extension services and the corresponding technologies (ICTs) into extension service preference by farmers for working with delivery, despite the potential of these donor-led projects and INGOs, as opposed channels to address poor coverage and in- to with the Liberian government (Moore, form a wider audience (McNamara et al., 2014). Funding is therefore the single largest 2011; Zinnah and Perry, 2011; Asenso-Okyere factor influencing extension service delivery and Mekonnen, 2012). in post-conflict Liberia. In contrast, sizeable investments were made by donor agencies to provide extension services in the post-conflict period. Donor-led initiatives proliferated in Liberia, Pluralism and coordination as in many post-conflict and post-disaster countries, due to the vacuum in public ser- As discussed, the early post-conflict period vices as the government rebuilt and the dire saw a range of extension providers acting need for basic agricultural programming. without coordinated policy and strategic A similar influx of donor funding and donor- plans. More recent policies have promoted led programming has followed the recent pluralism, and the MoA has sought to foster Ebola epidemic (World Bank, 2015b). an effective pluralistic extension system. Several large donor projects and INGOs The 2007 Comprehensive Assessment of now operate in the country, with a combined the Agriculture Sector stated this goal: ‘The annual budget of more than US$100 million extension system needs to transform from (Moore, 2014). USAID’s funding to Liberia the transfer of technology model to a pluralis- has been reported as the highest total within tic extension system that involves multiple Africa, despite the country’s small size and public and private sector service providers’ population (DAI, 2012). The largest single (MoA, 2007: xvii). initiative is the FED project managed by DAI. The Liberian MoA actively promotes This project represented the Obama admin- itself as a central facilitator and monitor. istration’s Feed the Future initiative for The government holds Agricultural Coordin- global hunger and food security (Ho and ation Committee (ACC) meetings that gather Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 9

service providers at the national and county many donor-led or INGO extension providers levels to help coordinate extension activities, began operating during a period in which avoid duplication of programs, share chal- national policy was absent and the govern- lenges and lessons learned, and maximize ment lacked the capacity to operate, many resources (Zinnah and Perry, 2011; Moore, international organizations became accus- 2014). Stakeholders from the MoA, donor-led tomed to operating independently. At the projects, INGOs, domestic NGOs and the same time, donors/INGOs recognize that the civil sector all cited the value of these forums MoA is reliant on their involvement, that in working towards an effective pluralistic they are driving the extension system and system (Moore, 2014). that correspondingly the MoA does not have However, the practical realities of imple- the authority to significantly affect their menting pluralistic extension in post-conflict operations. Convincing these organizations Liberia remain challenging. Power dynamics to foster pluralism in a more active manner, developed after the conflict that significantly share resources and information, coordinate affect pluralism in extension provision. with the national government and adhere to Specifically, the MoA and the donor/NGO overarching policy or strategic plans is a sector are not equal partners. International major challenge. In fact, some donor-led pro- agencies took the lead in providing emer- jects and INGOs (e.g. ACDI/VOCA, FED) have gency food aid and extension services in the questioned whether pluralism really bene- early post-conflict period (MoA, 2007). Even fits their organizations or whether it instead after a certain level of institutional capacity represents an unnecessary use of their time and governmental stability had developed, and resources (Moore, 2014). the MoA still relies heavily on international Nevertheless, most donor programs have actors to serve Liberian farmers (Moore, 2014). increased their efforts to collaborate with the Funding differences in particular create Liberian government in recent years. Donor this need. Simply put, the extremely well- programs and INGOs now provide consider- funded donor-led and INGO programs have able support to the MoA. ACDI/VOCA, the the capacity to hire and train talented officers, FED program, ZOA and other INGOs fre- develop effective training curricula and ma- quently invite MoA personnel to participate terials, provide comprehensive services and in in-service trainings, provide technical in- inputs to farmers, and travel to serve farm- formation and offer transportation to project ers in remote areas, while the MoA struggles sites (Moore, 2014). Unfortunately, despite in all these respects. intentions of equal collaboration by admin- Although policy asserts the need to istrators, unequal capacities and roles at the work together at the field level, collaboration field level often create a top-down relation- and partnership dynamics are quite skewed ship between MoA and donor project/INGO and heavily reliant on the donor/INGO sector officers, which leads to tension and further to buoy the MoA in conducting extension complicates partnerships (Moore, 2014). activities. Limited resources and capacities Similar dynamics were found between donor leave most MoA officers unable to offer projects/INGOs and their domestic NGO much assistance to their counterparts work- partners, where again disparities in skills and ing with donor-led and/or INGO projects. In funding can lead to a top-down arrangement. many cases, these officers and MoA officers As a result, pluralism is not functioning have conducted joint training, but more properly in post-conflict Liberia. commonly the capacity gap has repositioned officers with donor/INGO projects as leaders and MoA officers as learners at the level of client farmers (Moore, 2014). Coverage Both the MoA and donor/INGO sectors are acutely aware of these power dynamics, An estimated 1 million smallholder farmers and consequently have different levels of are active in post-conflict Liberia (CIA, n.d.), motivation to pursue pluralism. Because creating a huge audience for extension and 10 A. Moore

advisory services. However, poor coverage in addressing coverage challenges. As a by extension providers remains a major component of partnership and pluralism weakness of the system. As discussed, the policies, some projects, INGOs and local MoA employed only 72 field-level officers NGOs coordinate activities with the MoA to in 2014. All 15 counties employed a CAC operate in areas where the government lacks but only half of Liberia’s 68 districts had a the capacity to serve. For example, officers dedicated DAO (USAID, 2008a). This results employed by the FED program help to serve in extremely high farmer-to-officer ratios in remote rural areas of Nimba and Lofa (1000:1 to 5000:1). County that are otherwise understaffed by Poor coverage, while certainly not unique the MoA (DAI, 2012). However, these organ- to post-conflict countries, is tied to Liberia’s izations generally work intensively with conflict. Vacant posts are often distributed small groups of farmers, meaning their over- along ethnopolitical lines, specifically with all contribution to coverage is small (MEAS, regard to the role of different groups in the 2011). conflict. The ‘breadbasket’ counties of Bong, Many local NGOs and civil society Lofa and Nimba, the site of several rebel organizations (e.g. CHAP, FUNL) also pro- movements and home to a number of post- vide short-term services. This group of service conflict parliamentarians, are generally well providers is still growing and has limited stocked with extension officers and receive capacity to contribute, but has been success- considerable development attention. In ful in working with otherwise marginalized contrast, southeastern counties, home to the audiences, such as female farmers, youth Krahn ethnic group and the indigenous rebel and farmers in remote areas of the country leader Samuel Doe, who initiated the 1980 (including the traditionally underserved coup, have many fewer officers and receive southeastern counties) (Moore, 2014). Still, considerably less development attention despite these efforts, there are not enough (Moore, 2014). Safety and security concerns extension personnel to serve all Liberian also affect officer placement (Moore, 2014), farmers, a factor that severely compromises largely depending on different regions’ feel- the development of the agricultural sector. ings of ‘insiderness’ versus ‘outsiderness’ with The ongoing capacity to expand coverage respect to the Liberian government. may also change when donor funding tied Even in areas where its personnel are to post-conflict reconstruction—and later to present, other factors have left MoA officers Ebola response, which is a primary source simply unable to serve all potential clients. of operational funding for domestic NGOs— Vehicles issued to CACs are used heavily to is reduced in the future. attend central administrative meetings and sparingly for projects (McNamara et al., 2011). A handful of DAOs were issued motor- cycles, although the low fuel allocations left Extension Approaches/Models many officers unable to use them. DAOs have reported spending their own salaries Demand-driven extension (participatory to hire transport to reach farmers or relying extension models) on INGOs for occasional transport to their client communities (Moore, 2014), which Making the transition to demand-driven and was not considered a sustainable operating participatory models, based on farmer-led model. As a result, Moore (2014) found that priority setting, hands-on and demonstration- virtually all farmers interviewed never inter- based teaching and peer-to-peer learning, acted with government extension officers, has proven difficult for the Liberian MoA and that rural, female and youth farmers (MEAS, 2011; Swanson, 2011). As previously were the least likely to receive services from described, an unwillingness to empower the MoA. regions or ethnic groups with ties to the Donor-led projects and international Liberian conflict to ‘demand’ services from and domestic NGOs play an important role the government is possibly a product of the Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 11

civil war, even though the Liberian government incorporating participatory extension methods verbally promotes such bottom-up extension into their work with farmers: approaches. 1. These organizations do not face the same Placing emphasis on participatory and post-conflict concerns. Empowering farmers learner-centric extension has also been a to better dictate extension programming is challenge. Consequently, many MoA per- seen as a positive endeavor to promote dem- sonnel, especially older officers who served ocracy, transparency and good governance, in extension before and through the conflict whereas the MoA has shown reluctance to and were trained during the technology fully engage in demand-driven models for transfer era when workshops and lectures the same reasons (Moore, 2014). were emphasized, have struggled to adapt 2. These organizations benefit from an op- to this philosophical shift (USAID, 2008b). erational strategy that is more conducive to Liberia’s agricultural institutions (e.g. participatory extension. Whereas the MoA Cuttington University, University of Liberia) is tasked with serving as many Liberian similarly fail to prepare younger officers with farmers as possible, donors and INGOs stra- participatory skills (McNamara et al., 2011; tegically focus on providing regular, com- Moore, 2014). Agricultural institutions in prehensive and longer-term services to fewer countries emerging from conflict often lack farmers. This level of interaction and respon- quality instructors due to displacement and siveness allows officers to develop trust attrition, use outdated curricula and strug- with their farmers and to better understand gle with issues of social cohesion—all factors their challenges and needs, which is essen- that compromise the quality and relevance tial for participatory extension to be effect- of the education received by graduates ive (Swanson et al., 1997). (Buckland, 2005). This phenomenon also 3. Donor-led projects and INGOs also have affects the knowledge and skills of Liberian the resources to better prepare their person- graduates, who learn production and tech- nel in participatory extension methodolo- nical skills but lack capacity in participatory gies. Field-level FED officers receive thorough extension (Moore, 2014). pre- and in-service training that includes Lack of professional development is not only crop-specific technical information also a factor. While recent policies and ad- but also facilitation, agribusiness and coopera- ministrative decisions have repositioned tive management skills (DAI, 2012). They field-level MoA officers as facilitators, com- do not rely on the aforementioned agricul- munity mobilizers and communicators tural universities and colleges to develop (Sulaiman and Davis, 2012; Ganpat, 2013), these skills and are therefore more capable no corresponding pre- or in-service training and effective when working with farmers has been provided to retool these officers (Swanson, 2011; Moore, 2014). for their new responsibilities, due to funding and logistical limitations. MoA officers In recognition of this gap, many donor pro- therefore lack capacity in participatory jects and INGOs (e.g. ACDI/VOCA, FED) extension (McNamara et al., 2011). have made officer training available to The legacy of conflict may also create members of the MoA. Unfortunately, with- reluctance on the part of field-level officers out funding for transportation, lodging and to empower farmers to demand services. daily expenses, the participation levels re- Some officers indicated that this reposition- main low and the potential benefits of free, ing of power dynamics affected perceptions high-quality professional development train- of safety and security but also social standing ing are not maximized by the Liberian gov- (Moore, 2014). Combined with lack of train- ernment (Moore, 2014). ing, this mindset severely compromises This capacity gap also impacts the use attempts to move towards demand-driven of demonstrations and hands-on teaching. extension. The use of demonstrations is heavily advo- In contrast, donor-led projects and cated by extension service providers (MoA, INGOs have proven to be very successful at 2007). MoA administrators and field-level 12 A. Moore

extensionists consistently acknowledge the Certain regions also have cultural ten- benefits of ‘learning by doing’ in retaining dencies to work together or work apart. For information and adopting new practices. example, the counties of Bong, Lofa and However, the MoA lacks the tools, seeds Nimba practice a kuu system whereby farm- and other resources to perform effective ers arrange themselves into groups and ro- demonstrations, making the model difficult tate between farms to complete otherwise to implement for most field-level officers time-consuming tasks. Kuus have leaders and (Moore, 2014). share information among members more Land for demonstration sites is limited. readily (Moore, 2014). On the other hand, In 2011 the MoA intended to create demon- there is a cultural reluctance in some regions, stration farms to accompany each county such as the Krahn-dominated Liberian south- office, for conducting farmer field days and east, to be ‘grouped’ by the government or trialing new crop varieties and farming other extension providers. The perception methods (McNamara et al., 2011; Swanson, is that farmers in this region view exten- 2011). However, by 2014 only one county sion information as a competitive advan- had a functional demonstration farm (Moore, tage and do not readily share with neighbors 2014), suggesting the approach was more (Moore, 2014). Inability to practice group- easily verbalized than operationalized. based approaches has deterred some pro- The donor/INGO sector took a different viders from working there. However, approach that proved more successful. post-conflict ethnopolitical factors may Rather than creating and operating their also be involved, especially since the heav- own sites, donors and INGOs identified ‘lead ily indigenous region produced Samuel farmers’ from within their client base and Doe and was central to initiating the Liber- obtained permission to use a portion of ian conflict. Negotiating group dynamics those individuals’ land to conduct demon- and tailoring extension programming to cul- strations and trials (Moore, 2014). This tural differences has been a challenge and model placed the demonstration site central remains a point of focus in the post-conflict to where farmers worked, helped promote period. local buy-in by allowing the lead farmer to Another prominent peer-to-peer learning benefit from the innovations tested with- strategy is the Farmer Field School model, out risk to his/her own production and which the MoA promotes heavily (MoA, reduced maintenance costs to implement- 2007; USAID, 2008a). Farmer Field Schools ing organizations. involve central training sites that enroll and The demonstration farm approach also train lead farmers in a range of production tied in closely with the promotion of peer-to- skills to share with their respective commu- peer learning and information sharing within nities, thereby spreading information to farmers’ groups. The formation of strong and new audiences (Davis et al., 2010). functional farmers’ groups has been compli- Where social cohesion and group-based cated in post-conflict Liberia. Social cohesion farming is effective, the Farmer Field School issues arising from the displacement and re- approach has been quite successful in Li- integration of rural peoples present chal- beria. In an analysis of farmers’ perspec- lenges (Fearon et al., 2009), as do concerns tives, Moore (2014) found that participant that farmers’ groups are more easily mobil- farmers described considerable knowledge ized (Unruh, 2009). Early aid programs that and skill acquisition and routinely expressed provided seeds, equipment and other inputs their intention to train their neighbors. Efforts frequently resulted in the ad hoc creation of to tie Farmer Field Schools to existing kuus groups of farmers who were not traditionally has particular promise, as recent efforts to affiliated, only to separate after input distri- identify kuu leaders as lead farmers and bution was complete (Moore, 2014). This ten- encourage their participation in Farmer dency made it difficult to conduct longer-term Field Schools have been extremely effective group projects that required cohesion and in spreading new varieties and methods continued participation. (Moore, 2014). Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 13

However, the MoA has limited capacity considered. Despite administrative support, to implement the approach. Lack of demon- the MoA does not have a clear understand- stration sites, poor technical capacity of ing of how to implement the value chain trainers and insufficient resources to oper- approach at the field level. Similar to capaci- ate the schools remain problematic (USAID, ties in participatory extension, MoA officers 2008a). Again, donors, INGOs and specific- do not receive adequate training on value ally the FED program are the leaders in chain development and are therefore unable the Farmer Field School model in Liberia to incorporate key components (e.g. market- (Moore, 2014). ing, post-harvest handling, record-keeping) needed by farmers (Swanson, 2011). Most Market-driven extension (value commonly, MoA officers promote higher chain approach) quantity and quality of production with the assertion that this product will be attractive Efforts to modernize extension in post- to buyers. However, lack of pre-established conflict Liberia also include broadening the markets is a major obstacle. Liberia, like many focus on production to include a full value post-conflict countries, struggles to access chain approach (Zinnah and Perry, 2011). export markets due to a poorly developed Following the absence of cohesive policy trade infrastructure, minimal private sector and development strategy in the early post- involvement, and post-conflict and now conflict period, this objective is now a near Ebola-related stigma facing Liberian produce consensus among public, donor-led and NGO (Agwu et al., 2012). Farmers who target do- service providers. Market-driven extension mestic markets often overproduce and over- was included as a priority of the MoA’s estimate demand, which leads to unsold 2008 policy (MoA, 2008b). Value chain de- and spoiled produce and causes financial velopment is also a key component of the loss (Moore, 2014). Ebola further comprom- Feed the Future initiative and therefore the ised the viability of local markets as buyers FED program (Ho and Hanrahan, 2011; and producers alike lacked the mobility to DAI, 2012). With the two most influential trade (World Bank, 2015b). service providers promoting ‘agriculture as One District Agricultural Extension Offi- a business’ (Moore, 2014: 148), other donor cer pre-arranged a buying agreement with projects, INGOs and civil society organiza- the World Food Programme (WFP) to distrib- tions have refocused their strategies to fol- ute beans grown by his farmers’ groups to re- low suit. gional refugee camps. This relationship Agreement on this priority helps to closely mirrored the WFP’s Purchase for Pro- avoid competing agendas in service delivery. gress (P4P) program, which exists in Liberia Coordination at the national level, in policy but on a small scale. Social cohesion con- decisions and through the ACC meetings cerns, inability of farmers’ groups to meet has allowed extension providers to priori- production quotas and lack of rural infra- tize specific value chains to avoid duplica- structure were cited as reasons (WFP, 2014). tion (Moore, 2014). The government is fo- As a result, this case is unfortunately the ex- cusing on rice and cassava value chains, ception and not the rule among MoA value supported by the FED program, which focuses chain programs. This individual had partici- on the two main staples plus vegetables pated in a unique MoA exchange program and goats (DAI, 2012; Moore, 2014). BRAC that sent him to India to study agribusiness, programs center on poultry, while ACDI/ and the experience provided the motivation VOCA, Winrock International and the to pursue this buying arrangement. World Bank emphasize cocoa, coffee, palm Donor projects and the INGO sector oil, rubber and other cash crops for inter- were far more effective at promoting the national markets. value chain approach. Officers receive pre- However, verbal consensus on value and in-service training in the range of skills chain development leads to different out- needed to teach different components of the comes when the capacities of providers are value chain (Moore, 2014). Again, the MoA 14 A. Moore

is invited to send its officers to these train- (DAI, 2012; Moore, 2014). The impending ings. ACDI/VOCA, FED and other projects/ end to many project and funding cycles INGOs also train specialists to emphasize may also have served as a call to action. different areas of the value chain. FED’s However, strategic planning towards business extension officers teach record- this objective is largely informal, and con- keeping, marketing and other agribusiness crete activities to build the administrative skills on a rotational basis, while crop pro- capacity of the MoA are lacking. In addition, duction specialists guide farmers’ groups disparities in skills and funding lead to a through growing specific crops (DAI, 2012). top-down arrangement. Many donor organ- Donors’/INGOs’ model of long-term in- izations and INGOs attempt to include the volvement with smaller groups of farmers MoA in their operations as a teaching strat- also allows different trainings and interven- egy. Other efforts include disseminating tions held at different stages of the agribusi- technical information to the MoA, inviting ness chain, from planning, predetermining MoA personnel to participate in in-service markets and record-keeping to post-harvest trainings and joint planning sessions, and processing, storage and sales (Moore, 2014). providing transport assistance when feas- When possible, organizations collaborate to ible (McNamara et al., 2011; Moore, 2014). maximize different agencies’ relative strengths However, donors and INGOs still remain within the value chain. For example, while the drivers of planning and operations. FED is effective in teaching agribusiness In many ways, these efforts echo earlier skills to farmers, the overall value chain is emergency-phase models of distributing backstopped by equipment and processing inputs to farmers. Providing access to tech- training supplied by the FUNL, German nical information does not increase the Agro Action and the World Bank. The re- MoA’s capacity to conduct its own research, sult is that farmers are linked to markets and distributing donor/INGO extension (Moore, 2014). materials does not enable the MoA to create its own print or online resources. These strategies may pay short-term dividends, but their long-term impact is questionable. Institutional Capacity Building Stronger efforts to incorporate MoA personnel into professional development train- In any post-conflict situation, strengthening ings could have far greater long-term bene- the capacity of local institutions allows fits. This training could potentially build more effective and sustained development sustainable administrative and technical while also promoting governmental stabil- skills within the public sector. Indeed, ad- ity (Arthur, 2011; Cunguara and Moder, ministrative training in Monrovia is effective 2011). When the MoA was incapable of pro- and frequently attended, since transporta- viding extension services during the early tion and lodging are not concerns for MoA emergency phase, donors and INGOs oper- participants. Unfortunately, MoA personnel ated in parallel with, or sometimes counter are far less able to participate at the field level to, the MoA in addressing pressing needs due to the aforementioned financial and logis- (MEAS, 2011). These actors prioritized tical barriers. Donors and INGOs have not emergency aid and service provision and shown adequate efforts to remove barriers and did not emphasize or devote much time or maximize capacity-building opportunities resources to building institutional capacity. (Moore, 2014). Without direct support, Liberia’s public ex- Donors and INGOs also have a loose tension capacity increased slowly but still mandate to develop the capacity of domes- remains low. Following 2008 policies that tic NGOs and civil society organizations. called for collaboration and partnership, The Feed the Future initiative and major many large donor projects and INGOs (e.g. multilateral donors (e.g. Gates Foundation, ACDI/VOCA, FED) have included a mandate World Bank) have advocated partnership to build MoA capacity in their programming between international and domestic NGOs Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 15

in serving farmers (Ho and Hanrahan, 2011). Each component requires individual dis- In Liberia, many donors and INGOs delegate cussion, as follows: field-level operations to local organizations but retain management over funds and ma- 1. Extension providers in post-conflict terials. This model places domestic NGOs settings must be capable of working in an between clients and donor agencies, and environment without set policies, willing to sometimes makes aligning donor and client engage in collaborative policy creation and agendas difficult (Schuller, 2012; Moore, 2014). review processes, and flexible enough to ad- Furthermore, access to technical informa- here to new national policies and strategic tion and inclusion in professional develop- plans when these are put in place. Post- ment trainings was insufficient to build the conflict countries should expect a certain capacity of domestic NGOs, which strug- lack of synchronicity in extension during gled greatly with administration, financial the early period as policies are developed, management, fundraising and advocacy especially when donors and INGOs act au- skills that were not adequately addressed by tonomously and independently of govern- donor partners (Blagescu and Young, 2006). ments to deliver emergency services. As government capacity allows, all stakeholders involved in extension service delivery Implications and Recommendations should be prepared to engage in policy creation and planning efforts. Inclusive policy making is critically Liberia provides several important lessons important to post-conflict extension. It is es- and implications for other post-conflict coun- sential to synchronize philosophies, strat- tries. While many of the specific details are egies and objectives to avoid competing relative to the Liberian context, the overall agendas that undercut one another. Govern- themes are likely to be common to other ments that do not include other providers in nations practicing agricultural extension policy making may face problems when following violence and warfare. Similarly, policies are installed that do not align with key elements can be identified to effectively existing donor/INGO strategies. For example, rebuild agricultural extension systems and models of giving inputs versus building programs in post-conflict settings. These are: capacity affected outcomes in Liberia (Moore, • Flexibility to adjust to changing policy 2014), and similar instances should be environments and willingness to engage avoided. Also, while post-conflict govern- in policy creation and review. ments should be central to policy making, • Sufficient, consistent and creatively donors and INGOs can help to create policy utilized funding to support effective ex- that is mutually beneficial, while simul- tension strategies and programs. taneously building institutional capacity • Genuine commitment to and action to- in policy creation processes. Likewise, in- wards pluralism in service delivery. put from beneficiaries can allow policies • Innovation in addressing coverage gaps to better represent the needs of farmers and balancing personnel to meet farmers’ (Swanson, 2013). needs. In addition, donor organizations and • Conflict-sensitive extension approaches. INGOs must be receptive to policy shifts • Appropriate pre- and in-service train- and support the implementation of policy, ing to support transitions in extension even if this means changing operational philosophies. strategies. Failure to do so undercuts the • Balanced coverage of all value chain efficacy of extension policy, leads to coun- elements to promote livelihood devel- terproductive power dynamics, undermines opment. burgeoning governments and affects stabil- • Commitment to and efforts towards ity (Collier, 2006; Arthur, 2011). institutional capacity building by inter- Policy also needs to be flexible and national agencies. allow for revisions as circumstances change. 16 A. Moore

Regular and systematic policy reviews must field-level operations. Providers must do a be planned and implemented in post-conflict better job of identifying and utilizing the extension systems. This requires governmen- relative strengths and weaknesses of actors tal, non-governmental, private and civil soci- within the system. For example, the Liber- ety providers to conduct regular evaluation ian MoA recognized donors’/INGOs’ tech- and to use adaptive management strategies, nical advantage but did not adequately so that policies and year-to-year operating plans leverage this resource to its own benefit best represent the rapidly changing context (USAID, 2008a; MEAS, 2011). Partners must found in post-conflict settings (Swansonet al., seek ways to address any detrimental weak- 1997; Rossi et al., 2004). nesses. This may involve donors/INGOs 2. Funding levels and trends are central and the MoA working together to remove to the effectiveness and sustainability of ex- barriers to participation in professional de- tension systems. In Liberia, and likely in velopment trainings. other post-conflict settings, funding levels Ministries of agriculture should also be determined coverage, capacity of person- wary of deferring too much of service deliv- nel, access to technical information and ery to donors, INGOs and the private sector. other aspects of the system (USAID, 2008a; In Liberia this led to problems when the MEAS, 2011). Funding trends are also tied MoA attempted to implement policy and to the ‘bubble’ phenomenon of emergency strategic planning in an environment where aid, which is extremely high immediately donors and INGOs had previously operated following conflict or a major disaster but autonomously (Moore, 2014). Also, many then declines (Schuller, 2012). When gov- international organizations operate on short- ernments are underfunded, extension ser- term funding cycles (Schuller, 2012), which vices available to farmers wax and wane affects the availability of services when agen- with donor funding levels. For example, an- cies’ funding decreases or contracts end. ticipated reductions in donor funding in Li- Expecting that privatized extension beria called into question the sustainability will become available to fill this void is not of present service levels. a viable strategy. Private sector development Large funding disparities between exten- is often slow in post-conflict countries, due sion actors also create issues of power and to instability, inefficient governments, poor accountability (Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010). infrastructure and a suboptimal business cli- These are particularly problematic when mate. In Liberia, the current model is to quickly governments and domestic agencies are dis- commercialize groups of farmers so that empowered within their own countries. they can eventually pay for private services Post-conflict governments face additional (MoA, 2007). Unfortunately, there is little challenges soliciting direct funding due to evidence to suggest that the private sector minimal track records of responsible borrow- will be ready to take over in the near future. ing, perceptions of poor governance and low Instead, ministries of agriculture should institutional capacity. Multilateral donors are be more involved in activities that foster a often hesitant to lend to post-conflict govern- sustainable pluralistic system with multiple ments due to stability concerns and uncertain service providers. Facilitating effective economic growth potential (Collier, 2006), coordination and removing barriers for out- even though these nations are likely the most side actors to operate is a vital role for post- in need of capital. To avoid directly funding conflict governments faced with low capaci- government ministries, one option is to sup- ties to provide direct services. Monitoring port the operations of field-level officers by better-funded donor projects or INGOs can addressing MoA funding shortfalls (e.g. trans- help to ensure that extension activities portation, materials), thereby leveraging fund- follow national policy and move towards ing to provide better public services while development objectives (Swanson et al., also building local capacity. 1997). Profit-driven private extension ser- 3. Commitments to pluralism must be vices should be encouraged through the extended beyond the boardroom and into removal of barriers to their operation, but Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 17

must also be monitored to prevent them represent a way to reach huge numbers of from disproportionately benefitting finan- farmers in Africa and across the developing cially successful farmers with the capacity world with important extension information, to pay, while underserving poor, female or post-conflict countries still face challenges. other marginalized farmer populations Often this results from the destruction of (Feder et al., 1999). Without governmental infrastructure during conflict. In Liberia, oversight, this could potentially lead to the destruction of the national hydropower same levels of disparity that contributed to plant has made the availability of electricity conflict in the first place. a limiting factor. A potential solution in 4. Considerable coverage limitations and contexts of extreme infrastructure limita- high farmer-to-officer ratios are common to tions is radio. Rural radio has been expanded extension in the developing world and are in recent years and now provides extension particularly unlikely to be addressed in messaging to multiple counties (Swanson, post-conflict countries (Birneret al., 2011). 2011). Distribution of low-cost solar radios Even with donor and INGO funding and may be a feasible alternative and has been personnel numbers at peak levels, most successful in other post-conflict settings Liberian farmers do not receive direct ser- (e.g. Timor Leste) where physical infrastruc- vices from providers. Alternative means are ture was destroyed. needed to minimize coverage gaps in Liberia While not addressing overall coverage, and other post-conflict settings. post-conflict countries that rebalance per- Although direct funding that allows sonnel can better serve target demographics. ministries to employ more officers is unlikely, Extension officers who work with youth, one potential avenue is to use community- women and other marginalized farming based extension volunteers. The FED pro- populations are essential to promoting de- gram employs youth in this role (Moore, 2014), velopment, peace and stability (Blattman and a number of other countries advocate and Annan, 2012). In Liberia, many MoA the coverage benefits of farmer-to-farmer extension personnel are older and nearing extension approaches (Franzel, 2015). Of retirement age. At the same time, a large course, issues of social cohesion, safety and pool of talented young extension officers security, funding sustainability and indi- may become available as donor programs vidual capacity must be considered before withdraw, including many highly trained mobilizing community extensionists in female officers who are effective in working post-conflict settings. with women farmers (Meinzen-Dick et al., Similarly, informal youth officers, espe- 2011). A short-term influx of money from cially those who are lightly subsidized, can the Liberian government could fund retire- be a major boon. They are already present in ment packages and signing bonuses, to the community and know the context, people entice younger officers to join the MoA. and local language. They can also receive Younger officers can better relate to youth basic information from central extension per- farmers. sonnel/institutions by phone, which they 5. Public extension systems in the develop- can then disseminate to farmers for a small ing world often strive to be more modern, fee. Also, employing rural youth as extension decentralized and participatory, and to pro- officers may attract these young people to vide demand-driven services to farmers remain in or return to agriculture. Providing (Swanson and Rajalahti, 2010). While these them with nominal employment can also re- approaches may be beneficial in stable coun- duce their susceptibility to mobilization and tries, decentralization and demand-driven willingness to engage in further conflict. extension in particular may not be appro- The use of ICT to spread information priate in the short term for post-conflict messages remains underutilized across the countries. Empowering local leaders and developing world but especially in post- farmers to form groups and have a greater conflict countries (Asenso-Okyere and capacity to make ‘demands’ of newly estab- Mekonnen, 2012). While mobile phones lished governments may be seen not as a 18 A. Moore

path towards more effective extension but production of a few crops (e.g. rice, cassava, instead as a threat to peace and stability. In cash crops) without considering demand Liberia, this may contribute to differences in and market conditions. Export markets may the actions taken by the MoA and those taken be a more feasible long-term objective, with by the international community. Therefore, a focus on local markets a more realistic ap- hesitation by extension administrators in proach. Greater efforts to engage producers post-conflict Liberia to embrace decentral- in P4P programs that supply refugee camps ization and demand-driven extension is not and school feeding programs would be es- only understandable but expected. Policy pecially beneficial in post-conflict settings makers and agenda setters must take these where the demand for food aid is high (WFP, dynamics into account when selecting 2014). Coordinated local marketing can also extension models and pursuing extension avoid local markets being flooded with reform. commodities, thereby driving down prices 6. Philosophical shifts in extension ap- received by farmers while increasing the proaches cannot be effective at the field level prices of other foods that those rural com- without corresponding retraining of exten- munities consume (FAO, 2013). sion personnel. Training of extensionists Market-driven extension must also pro- often ends during conflicts, meaning that of- vide adequate training on processing and ficers in post-conflict periods may possess storage while simultaneously implementing skills and information that are years out of programs or lending schemes that allow date (Birner et al., 2011). Additionally, ex- farmers to purchase necessary equipment or tension officers undergo a process of skill de- materials. Transportation issues related to terioration termed ‘forgetting by not doing’ post-conflict infrastructure conditions, se- when extension services are suspended. curity concerns, low post-conflict private This further exacerbates capacity decline sector involvement and distance to markets (Collier and Duponchel, 2013: 67). must also be considered when advocating In Liberia, government extension officers production schemes for farmers. These gaps need to be retrained in both participatory in the value chain approach lead to high and market-driven extension to address post-harvest loss in Liberia (Moore, 2014) these objectives, yet efforts towards this re- and should be better addressed to truly en- main insufficient (MEAS, 2011; Swanson, hance livelihoods. 2011). Some MoA administrators assume 8. Capacity-building agendas must focus that trained officers would migrate to the on developing institutions and civil society MoA after donor projects in Liberia end, organizations, rather than focusing exclu- thereby closing the capacity gap without re- sively on developing the capacities of bene- quiring the MoA to provide its own training ficiaries. Donors must recognize that low (Moore, 2014). However, this belief ignores governmental capacity is an inevitability of the maintenance factors (e.g. low salary, post-conflict settings, and that enhancing lack of materials, poor upward mobility rather than circumventing local institutions within the organization) that deter many of can build institutional capacity to promote these individuals from working for the MoA sustainable growth. Strong domestic actors in the first place. Instead, Liberia needs to can also provide a better and more sustain- take better advantage of donor or INGO able level of service to farmers over the long training that is available, especially since term, rather than the peaks and valleys that this opportunity will not last forever. Other accompany donor initiatives and funding post-conflict countries should also capital- cycles (Abi-Ghanem et al., 2013). Also, de- ize on available avenues to contemporize veloping the ability of ministries of agricul- the skills of their officers. ture and local NGOs to serve farmers effect- 7. Market-driven extension can only be a ively can foster positive farmer–government step towards improved rural livelihoods if interactions that promote peace and stability no gaps remain in the value chain approach. (Collier, 2006; Arthur, 2011). Strengthening In Liberia, extension programs emphasized the public and civil sectors could have Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 19

this effect in Liberia as well as in other er-driven extension that should provide divi- post-conflict countries. dends well beyond the agricultural sector. It is the responsibility and challenge of individ- Clearly many challenges exist in post-conflict ual post-conflict countries to consider and extension systems. However, successes and adapt the Liberian case to local conditions. opportunities remain abundant even in this This will require innovation, flexibility, col- difficult period. Liberia has made consider- laboration and political will, yet the benefits able progress and has taken many important can be fundamental to promoting peace, sta- steps towards modern, pluralistic and farm- bility and long-term development.

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