1 Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia: Progress Made and Lessons Learned

1 Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia: Progress Made and Lessons Learned Austen Moore* University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, USA Background to the Conflict and Rajalahti, 2010). Liberia received World Bank funding to expand its extension work- Conflict and agriculture have been intertwined force and place officers in every county, district in the Republic of Liberia since the country’s and klan (township), dramatically increas- formation by repatriated slaves from the ing the number of farmers reached by exten- USA and subsequent independence in 1847 sion information (MoA, 2007). Funding was (Pham, 2004; CIA, n.d.). Early in its history, also used to enhance domestic agricultural Liberians of American descent dominated research through the Central Agricultural the political process and began to annex Research Institute (CARI) in Bong County lands that traditionally belonged to indigen- and Cuttington University, Liberia’s leading ous groups (Humphreys and Richards, 2005; agricultural institution (FARA, n.d.). MoA, 2007). The Americo-Liberian minority However, benefits were not felt by all eventually controlled many of the nation’s Liberians. Highly productive plantations and most productive agricultural lands and nat- lucrative export agreements allowed the ural resources (Unruh, 2009). Americo-Liberian minority group to accumulate Many Americo-Liberian landowners prac- further wealth and prosperity (Sawyer, 2005), ticed a plantation-style agricultural model, while indigenous Liberians became dispro- while most indigenous farmers either served portionately poor (Pham, 2004; Humphreys as labor on large-scale plantations or practiced and Richards, 2005; GRC, 2007). Notably, small-scale farming. The plantation model the Liberian government authorized the lease led to relative productivity in staple and of 100,000 acres of prime agricultural land cash crops into the late 1970s (MoA, 2007). to the US-owned Firestone Company in Liberia became a net exporter of sugar cane, 1926, an arrangement that was subsequently cocoa, palm oil and rubber. criticized for benefitting ‘elite’ Americo- This period also represented the peak Liberians while displacing indigenous farmers of agricultural extension in Liberia. During (Saha, 1988). the late 1970s, the World Bank heavily funded Similarly, extension services did not training-and-visit extension to spread Green reach all Liberians equally. The Green Revo- Revolution technologies in Africa (Swanson lution model and corresponding technology * Corresponding author e-mail: [email protected] © CAB International 2017. Building Agricultural Extension Capacity in Post-Conflict Settings (eds P.E. McNamara and A. Moore) 1 2 A. Moore transfer approach encouraged large-scale and reported that agriculture was the main agriculture, and services were often directed income-generating activity of 74% of Liber- towards plantation-style farming systems ians. In 2013, the agricultural sector still made (Saha, 1988; Pham, 2004). Indigenous farm- up 76.9% of the national gross domestic ers’ role as laborers or practitioners of small- product (GDP) (CIA, n.d.). scale subsistence agriculture meant that Liberia also has significant potential for extension services were seldom tailored to agricultural growth. The country contains their needs (MoA, 2007). This disparity con- huge amounts of arable lands and fertile tributed to mounting tensions, especially in swamps due to topsoil accumulation (FAO, rural areas where food security was lowest. n.d. b). Liberia receives 240 cm (94 inches) Political, economic and ethnic tensions of precipitation annually (FAO, n.d. a), an ultimately led to full-scale conflict in 1980, extremely high amount relative to other West when indigenous military leaders led a coup African countries. Improved water manage- that toppled the Liberian government. The ment and usage of arable land could increase following 25-year period saw ongoing internal production, food security and livelihoods for conflict, widespread human rights violations Liberian farmers (MoA, 2007). and devastating destruction (Humphreys Despite its importance and potential, the and Richards, 2005; CIA, n.d.). Peace was agricultural sector was also devastated by the re-established in 2003 under a transitional Liberian civil war. Overall production government, followed by elections in 2005 levels of rice, cassava and maize were much (MoA, 2007; World Bank, 2013). lower than before the war (FAO, n.d., c), and The Liberian civil war devastated the food security dropped to crisis levels for many country, erased years of development (UNDP, Liberians. During the early post-conflict 2005) and crippled the Liberian economy period, food aid was provided to address (Humphreys and Richards, 2005). Post- emergency shortages, but little was done to conflict Liberia had few options to promote improve domestic production. By 2007, food development, economic growth and poverty insecurity still affected 80% of rural house- reduction or to address other effects of the holds (MoA, 2007), with people displaced by war (Blattman and Annan, 2012). conflict up to 20% more food insecure Liberia’s recent Ebola epidemic further (Ghimire et al., 2013). Female-headed house- complicated post-conflict challenges. A total holds, the number of which increased due to of 10,666 cases and 4806 deaths were recorded conflict, also showed lower productivity per during the outbreak, which occurred from hectare and correspondingly lower food secur- 20 March 2014 to 9 May 2015 (WHO, 2015). ity and income levels (Ghimire et al., 2013). The epidemic had considerable implica- Staple crop production declined for tions for Liberia’s development, agricultural several reasons. Large landholdings and productivity and economic growth. In fact, plantation systems were targeted during the Ebola is expected to cause development in- conflict as symbols of oppression and mar- dicators (e.g. Human Development Index, ginalization (Unruh, 2009). Plantations were poverty, life expectancy) to decline for the often abandoned as owners and laborers first time since 2005 (UNDP, 2015). were displaced, and post-war land-rights issues made restarting plantation agriculture problematic. Efforts to restart large-scale production Post-Conflict Agricultural Context have centered on farmers’ groups and produ- cers’ organizations. However, virtually all ex- As other post-conflict economic sectors strug- isting farmers’ groups dissolved as farmers gled to rebuild, many Liberians reverted to were displaced during the conflict, and a slow small-scale agricultural production. In a 2007 and difficult reintegration and reconciliation report, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) process made their revival and rehabilita- described food crop production as Liberia’s tion during the early post-conflict period dif- ‘most important source of livelihood’ (p. 13) ficult (Fearonet al., 2009). Farmers’ groups Agricultural Extension in Post-Conflict Liberia 3 are more viable today, but are still affected period. Even in 2012, 94% of roads in Liberia by community dynamics and post-conflict remained unpaved, and many become im- tensions. passable during the rainy season (Shor, 2012). The conflict also changed the character- Currently a major road project is underway istics of rural labor. Rebel movements primar- connecting Liberia’s ‘breadbasket’ counties ily originated in rural areas and also in the to the capital (Moore, 2014). However, in the three counties (Bong, Lofa and Nimba) con- meantime farmers struggle to take produce sidered the nation’s breadbasket (Humphreys to market, which reduces their returns and acts and Richards, 2005; Stack and Brabazon, as a disincentive to large-scale production. 2008). Since these were the epicenter of Other infrastructure was also affected. fighting, rural peoples in this region were Irrigation infrastructure was widely des- displaced and fled towards neighboring troyed, especially in swamp-based rice sys- Guinea or the coastal capital of Monrovia. tems in the rural north. In 2013, only 5% of Nearly half (45.5%) of Liberians displaced farmers had access to irrigation infrastruc- from these areas fled to Guinea, where many ture (Ghimire et al., 2013). Government build- resettled or remain in refugee camps (Ghimire ings, including those of CARI and other et al., 2013). As a result, many rural areas were agricultural extension facilities, were looted underpopulated when the fighting ceased. and burned. Liberia’s main energy source, the Prior to the war, young men had com- Mount Coffee hydroelectric plant in Mont- prised much of the agricultural workforce. serrado County, was damaged in the conflict However, many rural youth were displaced and is still being rebuilt (IFC, 2013), which or mobilized into armed groups (Stack and limits processing and storage capacities and Brabazon, 2008). Post-conflict youth are accelerates post-harvest loss. largely uninterested in agriculture, prefer- Agricultural tools and inputs were stolen, ring economic activities in other sectors or in lost or destroyed during the war, as people urban areas, and often lack the requisite fled rural areas. Farmers operating after the skills to succeed in the sector, even if they war lacked even the most basic tools to pre- do express a desire to join the workforce pare fields, weed and harvest. They also ( Blattman and Annan, 2012). lacked the seeds, rootstock and plant mater- As a result, the overall demographics of ial needed to quickly resume production. the rural

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