SECURITY IN MELANESIA

FIJI, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, SOLOMON ISLANDS & VANUATU

A report prepared by

Ray Anere, Ron Crocombe, Rex Horoi, Elise Huffer Morgan Tuimaleali’ifano, Howard Van Trease, Nikenike Vurobaravu

for the

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

for the

FORUM REGIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE (FRSC) MEETING 25-26 June 2001

Suva May 2001 2

CONTENTS

Page

Preface 3

Summary 4

Threats facing Melanesia as the 21st Century begins 6

Influences from other Melanesia and the Pacific Rim 12

Suggestions for consideration 13

Country reports

Papua New Guinea 24 Solomon Islands 31 Vanuatu 37 Fiji 43

Bibliography 48

The authors wish to acknowledge the advice, information and wisdom of many politicians, officials and others in government service, international agencies, NGOs, churches and other walks of life. We also benefited from many reports and publications. As much of the information was given to us frankly on condition of anonymity, we thank them all collectively rather than individually. 3

PREFACE

We were asked to prepare a report on: ethnicity, land disputes, economic disparities and the quality of governance, and other factors that may lead to instability and/or conflict in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; the interaction of factors, and ways in which the risk of conflict or instability may be reduced, and peace and prosperity enhanced. We were also advised that the report should facilitate the implementation of the Biketawa Declaration (adopted by Forum heads of government in 2000 to provide for regional cooperation in response to security threats). That declaration broadened the terms of reference by referring to socio-economic rather than only economic disparities (presumably including education, health, housing etc), and to the erosion of cultural values. Values are basic to the issues we were asked to study. All four issues involve internal and external differences between, changes in, or disagreements over, what values apply in the management of these four Melanesian nations. (Even greater differences apply in relation to the other four Melanesian entities – West Papua, East Timor, New Caledonia and the Torres Strait Islands). Values are diversifying in Melanesia as they are world-wide, making national cohesion more difficult to achieve. Given the terms of reference we do not discuss environmental security, food security or other important topics such as intergovernmental or criminal disputes that may arise over future exploitation of seabed resources. Only passing mention is made of external threats from organized crime or from industries that are prone to corruption. No overt aggression from foreign governments has occurred since World War II. Occasionally, however, security problems in the region may be aggravated by well-meaning but misguided friends. Nor do we deal with immediate control responses in which Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) members have expertise and experience. However, unless security forces do more to improve their own efficiency and ethics, they will lose public confidence and be unable to provide security. This is a major threat in Melanesia today. What happens in one country of the Forum region, positive or negative, impacts on all the others – in investment, employment, international standing etc. This is especially true of Melanesia, as most Pacific Islanders are Melanesians. Nothing in this report is new. We have drawn on the wisdom and advice of many people in the four countries, and on many writings and other sources. We began by writing a separate report on each country, but we found so many issues and problems in common that, to avoid unnecessary repetition, we have presented the overall situation first, followed by country reports.

4

SUMMARY

The four nations of Melanesia have suffered from a deteriorating security environment in recent years. No easy solutions are available but unless effective remedial action is taken, the potential for further instability is considerable.

A secure and growing economy is basic to resolving the problems. That aspect is being tackled by the Forum Economic Ministers Meeting and is not dealt with here.

A high priority is to enhance the quality, integrity and impartiality of the disciplined forces and judicial processes. Public confidence in them has declined and must be restored if security and prosperity are to be achieved. We do not seek to blame the disciplined forces, for they are part of a wider picture of economic stagnation, growing population and unemployment, increased criminal and other negative influences from abroad, and uncertainty about the future. All these make the task of the disciplined forces more difficult.

Quality of training is important, but in small populations with strong commitments to kin and community, we feel quality could be improved by a proportion of staff from outside the nation. The precedent of courts of appeal is one way forward.

We are concerned that persons in the disciplined forces in all four countries have been excused from serious crimes they have committed. We understand the role of forgiveness, but fear the negative impact on the forces themselves and on public confidence in them.

Constitutions and systems of government can themselves be a security hazard, if aspects of them are likely to lead to violence and instability. We feel that structures of government in Melanesia, which were modeled to a large degree on colonial precedents, and with inadequate study of relevant values and practices within the nations, merit deep reconsideration.

Land tenure systems which were designed for subsistence in small autonomous societies, and modified for the conditions of the colonial era, have been little changed since. They now cause considerable conflict and low productivity, and need to be rethought by Melanesians to better meet their needs in the 21st century.

Ethnic tensions have been a major cause of conflict in Melanesia, both between different Melanesian language/cultural groups, and between Melanesians and non-Melanesians. Schools and universities have assumed that being educated in the same institution would lead to inter-cultural harmony. It did not. Such institutions, and the disciplined forces, need to provide specific training in learning to live with people whose values, customs, languages and religions are different. 5

The same institutions need to give more emphasis to integrity, for the record in management of funds and other areas, shows too much emphasis on the academic side and too little on the ethical.

The role of non-governmental organisations (including those of women and youth) in maintaining harmony and achieving reconciliation is increasingly recognised by Melanesian governments. However, and given the shrinking proportion of total resources available to governments, we feel that closer consultation and more mutual assistance would help.

Values are basic to the issues we were asked to study. Many conflicts result from differences between, changes in, or disagreements over the values of the conflicting parties. Encouraging greater awareness of the underlying values that cause tensions could help in their resolution. Scholars, theologians and others could help in this, but everyone needs to be alert to the issue.

We also discuss ways in which the Forum Secretariat could contribute to conflict resolution.

Each of the four country reports also ends with some brief recommendations for consideration by the FRSC. 6

THREATS FACING MELANESIA AS THE 21ST CENTURY BEGINS

We begin with some comments which apply to all four countries. Ethnic and other social tensions Ethnic classification, like most social classification, changes with circumstances. Various categories will come together in the face of a common perceived threat. But if the threat subsides, each side is likely to fragment into its component parts. So whereas Gualis (people of Guadalcanal) united to confront Malaitans, and vice versa, once the peace agreement was signed the subdivisions within each side became more apparent. The same is apparent in Fiji and elsewhere. Nowhere else in the world has such extreme cultural diversity, with less than 6 million people divided into over 1,000 different language groups and at least as many culture groups. Despite harmonious interaction between some traditional cultures, there was also hostility and, as elsewhere in the world, generally negative stereotypes about one’s neighbors. All these differences tend to be greater in respect of the diverse immigrant Asian and European cultures and interests. However, they are minorities in these four countries of Melanesia (though not in West Papua or New Caledonia). Many cultural misunderstandings occurred in the colonial era. But there was no shortage of misunderstanding between communities or disputes over land from time immemorial. However, some common elements of culture, religion, education, life experience, and goals, provide bases for workable compromises. Since independence, much has been achieved in national integration, but it takes time. Fortunately, no challenge is insurmountable.

Land disputes Most of the land that was bought or otherwise acquired by Europeans or Asians, has been returned to Melanesian ownership. This reduced conflict over land between indigenous claimants and others. Now the main disputes are between indigenous owners. Even land transferred between indigenous communities hundreds of years ago in some cases remains subject to dispute. Traditional transfers are a common cause of conflict because in most traditional arrangements, land made available to others was for subsistence only and immigrants (even those from more distant parts of the same language and culture group) were expected to respect and help those who provided the land. Arrangements are not precise, usually verbal, and misunderstandings are frequent. The other main pattern of land dispute in Melanesia is between indigenous landowners and governments or land-using (but not owning) corporations. 7

Now, with rising populations and commercial activity, tenure systems and cultural values which were designed for a different context all lead to growing dissatisfaction and dispute over rights to land. This lowers productivity and living standards. People are attracted to towns seeking work, services and diversity. Most of those on lower incomes acquire rights to land for housing and/or gardening by customary arrangements or by unauthorized squatting. It often gets hard to distinguish between the two. Many who made customary arrangements later find their rights challenged. Higher priority is needed for the survey and registration of customary lands, and for any lands with a potential for high productivity, for productivity throughout the region is much higher on land which is registered and where the producers’ rights are respected. Transfers need to be checked by an appropriate authority. Land is politically sensitive everywhere, but security problems will be greater if the issue is not confronted. There is no perfect tenure system, but even small changes could enable higher standards of living and improve the security situation. Registration need not deprive the traditional right-holders of land (unless they are willing sellers) but should give all parties greater security and enhance investment. As it is a major task requiring extensive consultation, it will not be completed quickly. However, unless priority is given to it, the costs to security and productivity will be even higher. Some people see survey and registration as foreign, but it is not - all humans do it in one form or another. All Melanesian communities had ways of marking boundaries and of determining who had what rights to what land. However, with the increase in population, mobility and monetisation, new forms of land use and other changes, appropriate technology needs to be used to record boundaries and rights. One important point about land registration and survey, however, is that it is of no value (in fact it is counter-productive) unless the government has the financial and technical resources, and staff of the necessary integrity to maintain and enforce records of high integrity.

Socio-economic disparities These are made worse by ethnic and other social tensions, land disputes, low productivity from most land, and problems of governance. It is pointless to consider disparities without also considering how to generate wealth in order to meet people’s aspirations for more goods and services. Unless personal income and opportunity are seen to be growing, even slowly, this alone can cause instability. Throughout the region, people want money - in most cases from paid work. This requires changes in traditional patterns of work and time allocation that some find 8 difficult to make. But many young people in Melanesia (as in the rest of the world) will migrate to towns whether work is available or not. All four countries have higher rates of population growth and inflation than their economies have been able to sustain without lowering the living standards of most people. Slower population growth will help economic and social progress. And it should reduce inter-community tensions over jobs, land and other benefits. However, on average, the more energetic, innovative and educated converge on the towns (or migrate abroad) into more elite suburbs and prestigious occupations. This is a world-wide pattern. If these people are also ethnically different, the potential for misunderstanding is increased. The tendency to favor large-scale, foreign-owned enterprises is understandable, but in many cases more long-term benefit will come from emphasis on smaller scale and more widely distributed benefits and opportunities.

The quality of governance The quality of governance throughout Melanesia eroded during the 1990s. The leadership crises in Melanesia seems to result from: i. Concentration of political power in too few hands and for too long, with competition for power provoking violence and unethical management. ii. Pressures to fulfill traditional obligations to kin and community over national interests (sometimes “stretching” tradition to include criminal acts). iii. Limited effectiveness of restraining institutions, both government and non- government, including churches and media. In the parliamentary system, little use is made of committees, with public accounts committees often existing in name only. The Speaker too, in many cases lacks independence. A reduction in the effectiveness of legal, judicial and audit services is apparent in Melanesia due to politicization or political control (e.g. by the government cutting the funds of institutions that try to constrain government breaches of the law). iv. Exploitation of the public by state enterprises which provide inefficient services, lack accountability, or are subject to political or criminal interference. v. Pressures from abroad. This includes those from other governments and interest groups which are well-intentioned but naïve. The imposition of foreign ideology and dogmatism does not help. Pressures also include those from corrupt or criminal sources. vi. Inadequate civic education for the public, and inadequate participation of civil society, including women and youth. vii. Failure to rethink or restructure institutions which are not achieving their goals. 9 viii. Politicization (associated with a lack of professionalism and ethics) in public services. Savenaca Siwatibau, former director of ESCAP for the Pacific and now vice- chancellor of the University of the South Pacific, recently said that some leaders were “sabotaging” national development, such that their people could not achieve their reasonable aspirations (Wansolwara, 6(1), p. 1, April 2001). Much evidence confirms this view, although we must also acknowledge the tremendous positive efforts of other political leaders and officials. Much debate occurs about degrees of local, district or provincial government as a means of reducing internal tensions and improving government effectiveness. Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu responded to problems at the center by decentralization, then found much of that to be inefficient and centralized again. The problems of central government in Solomon Islands and Fiji are leading to new demands for decentralization. There are pressures for some nations to divide, or to be restructured into federations of multiple provincial states - although they would still be multi-ethnic because of the small size of Melanesian language/culture communities. This trend is especially marked in Solomon Islands. The possibility of a Federated States of Melanesia, including all or at least the central parts of Melanesia, was discussed in the 1960s but shelved. The aim was for a high degree of devolution, but also the benefits of wider central services. The pros and cons of this possibility may be worth exploring further for the longer term. In much of Melanesia we hear calls for restrictions on resettlement within the nation but outside one’s language/culture community or province. On the other hand, the Melanesian Spearhead Group has spoken of facilitating freer movement throughout Melanesia. There is also some demand for freer movement within the Forum region and beyond. Obviously, flexibility is the key. Although most want free movement in principle, there may have to be some constraint where resettlement is likely to cause major disruption. At the same time, freer movement of those who can be absorbed in employment or on vacant land, needs to be encouraged. Tertiary institutions in the region need to give more training in good governance, conflict resolution, and preventive diplomacy locally, nationally and internationally. And they must practice them more themselves. Preaching what they don’t themselves practice is counter-productive. Conflict resolution in particular should be taught in teachers’ colleges, drawing on both traditional and other precedents.

The erosion (or transformation) of cultural values This is a complex topic owing to the diversity of values among the many language/culture communities of Melanesia, and to the influence of the cash economy, formal education, population movement, media, changes in life-styles, values, beliefs, and forms of government over the past 100 years. More changes 10 are coming. However, major changes have been absorbed, such as the incorporation of Christianity into the various cultures. Some people spoke of the need to return to traditional values. This is a matter of degree. Those values were designed for a very different context. Nevertheless, some weaknesses in the present system of governance may be due to inadequate integration of traditional and introduced leadership, values and systems. Perhaps the biggest challenge is reconciling values which were designed for subsistence living in autonomous villages, with some of the very different values needed to run a successful national government. Traditional values are based on obligations to relatives and reciprocity for favors. When applied at national level, they become nepotism and corruption. This reduces motivation, productivity, and living standards. Values change with the context, but some change more readily than others, and faster among young people than old, town-dwellers than rural, non-traditional (elected political leaders, appointed administrators, team leaders etc) more than traditional or church leaders. Values in a nation with a central government, money economy, and many international connections, inevitably differ from those in autonomous villages living by subsistence. Values are seldom effectively preserved by laws unless those laws are congruent with the values of most people. We are dealing here with three aspects of culture change: i. What broad principles are workable in small-scale, self-sustaining, family- based, village societies; ii. The nature and speed of value change when rural people move to town; and iii. What broad principles are workable in nations with central governments and globalizing economies. Within each there is considerable variation in the styles that are acceptable or established. But there is a huge gap between the first and third types. Bridging that gap and evolving principles and practices that will be acceptable and effective in achieving people’s goals are the biggest tasks facing the region. Globalization has been going on for 5,000 years at least. But it has sped up greatly with advanced technology. Values that impinge on Melanesia from abroad are also relevant. The main ones have been from the United Kingdom and countries whose most influential populations and institutions derived from there (Australia, New Zealand and USA). Values from East Asia, however, are becoming increasingly relevant, and are likely to become more so. Some but not all of those are more congruent with current patterns in the Islands. Broad differences exist between the present value patterns from Europe and those from countries of Asia that influence the Pacific. 11

Because of the predominance of European values in the formation and management of the international system, those values have become the main determinant of what is sometimes referred to as the collective view of the “international community”. However, given the growing influence of Asian and other nations, we expect that the views of “the international community” are also likely to change. Within each of the European and Asian value patterns that impact on Melanesia we might distinguish between those that come from: i. governments, ii. commerce, and iii. criminal organizations (dealing with drugs, gun-running, smuggling of goods and people, money laundering, illegal sale of passports and licenses, cyber-crime etc.); and also those whose activities would be illegal at home, but are undertaken in the Pacific because some Pacific governments have been persuaded by that industry to adopt laws which make what is illegal elsewhere, legal in that Pacific state. These very influential industries include money havens, flags of convenience, sex phone lines, internet gambling, selling spurious citizenship and licenses, video and CD piracy, etc. All these foreign activities are having a growing influence in Melanesia. Some have permeated high levels of government and reduced their effectiveness. Cultural values are a matter of concern throughout Melanesia, and steps are needed to address this concern. Melanesia is getting an international reputation for eroding values (“bad ethics” as one leading Melanesian put it). Much of that erosion is generated by persons and pressures from abroad, but stronger defences against it are needed if national security is to be enhanced and living standards of the majority raised. One vitally important dimension of security issues in Melanesia which we do not deal with in this report is the supernatural. Beliefs in sorcery, witchcraft, magical spells, and other supernatural phenomena are pervasive in political and other arenas throughout Melanesia. Established religions are also a major factor. Christianity is often used or misused as a cover for political and sometimes criminal ends. We leave it to those who know more about this important dimension to fill this gap.

Positives as well as negatives Integration in all four countries has been facilitated by bringing students from all over each nation together for higher education in national high schools, theological, technical and teachers colleges, marine and police training, universities etc. Those trained outside their own countries often form even closer bonds with others from their own country than they do at home, because their numbers are fewer and they are surrounded by citizens of other countries. 12

The common religious tradition through various Christian denominations provides a further basis for mutual understanding within the nation, as does national sport, work (especially in government or nation-wide firms or organizations), a shared new national lingua franca (PNG Tok Pisin, Solomons Pijin, Bislama, English – and in Vanuatu, French); and other interactions. As a result, intercultural marriage among Melanesians within each country became much more common and many young people have links to various cultures. However, this integration, and with it a sense of nationhood, occurred mainly among the elite. Inevitably, it takes times to solidify, and is easily set back by inter-ethnic violence. The media has developed tremendously over the past decade or so. More newspapers, radio, television, journals, newsletters, and Internet services are permeating the region. Quality media coverage is essential for good governance, which is essential for security. All media have their own agendas, whether of their owners, editors, journalists, political parties or otherwise. This is also true of the region’s journalism training centres. No information source, including governments, can guarantee truth or perfect balance. The advantage of many sources providing diverse information and interpretation, is that it reduces concentration of power and helps ordinary citizens to decide their preferences from a broader perspective. Civil society too has evolved tremendously in the recent decades, in Melanesia as in most of the world. Each organisation has its own agenda, but the diversity of interests generally provides a wider range of options and helps enhance the quality of governance. This is not to suggest that all NGO activities are necessarily positive, for they too can cause security problems for the nation. (So can politicians and governments for that matter). Trade and economic exchanges have contributed to national unification and mutual understanding. The status of women in Melanesia has seen some improvements although a vast gap remains. We believe that security will be enhanced by the improved status and participation of women.

INFLUENCES FROM OTHER MELANESIAN COUNTRIES AND PACIFIC RIM Over 150 overt conflicts have occurred in the world since 1990 but only two of them have been between nations. Almost all have been within a nation. Most involve ethnic, religious, political and social issues. However, this should not blind us to influences other than military attacks on Pacific Islands nations. External responses to recent national crises in Melanesia, most markedly that in Fiji, tend to have fallen into three very different categories. 1. Other Pacific Islands nations have generally followed a policy of minimal involvement in the affairs of other Island member states (but not of all others). The first two attempts to get further regional commitment (the 13

Honiara Declaration of 1992 and the Aitutaki Declaration of 1997) resulted in only limited action. The third, the Biketawa Declaration of 2000 (which like the first two was initiated by Australia and New Zealand) does not apply to current conflicts in Fiji or Solomon Islands, and has limited powers. Its effectiveness is yet to be tried. 2. The nations with European majorities (which sometimes present their views as those of ‘the international community’), and particularly Australia and New Zealand, take an active role. This is often positive and appreciated, but at times so ideological, vocal and categorical as to be seen as neo-colonial posturing and therefore counter-productive. 3. The countries of East Asia, which are a major and growing source of trade, aid, investment and diplomatic influence in Melanesia, keep a low public profile. However, they remain active in aid and political diplomacy, often apparently intended to reduce Australian and New Zealand (and European and American) influence. The Melanesian Spearhead Group has inadequate resources and insufficient cohesion to be of much help in resolving the security concerns of Melanesian neighbors. Papua New Guinea’s border with West Papua remains a serious source of threats, and the eastern border also may cause continuing irritations. The extent to which external forces can be effectively managed, whether those influences are from governments, international media, and legitimate or criminal commerce (or a mix of the last two), depends on the extent of internal cohesion and prosperity. The Biketawa Declaration calls for the Secretary General of the Forum to consult with the government of any country in which a security crisis has occurred, or is thought likely to occur. Prevention is better than cure, and usually much less costly, but external attempts to prevent what the Secretary General assesses to be a security risk may not be welcomed. When we consider the security crisis in the region in recent years, we expect that in most cases countries would have resisted Forum involvement before the crisis erupted. Nevertheless, it may work in some cases and is therefore a provision worth having.

SUGGESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION The increasing interaction with the rest of the world inevitably weakens the internal cohesion of individual Melanesian nations. The demands on people’s time and attention - from television, video, advertising and other sources, reduce the focus on the nation and nationalism. 1. In most of the region the first priority is to ensure effective government. For the FRSC, this necessitates enhancing the quality, integrity and impartiality of the disciplined forces and judicial processes. Only that way will public confidence be restored, and security enhanced. 14

Ten years ago a steady progression towards better governance was generally assumed. This requires high quality disciplined forces, and reliable and effective parliamentary, judicial, accounting and other systems, and a growing economy to enable people to live meaningful lives. People with hope and opportunity seldom cause security crises. However, we leave that to the economic development programs of the Forum Economic Ministers and related institutions. The FRSC will not be surprised to know that we have seen and heard extensive evidence of reduced public confidence in the security forces. Disciplined forces are given extraordinary powers, and weapons, to protect the public and the national interest. It is the public right to define that interest. Throughout Melanesia, however, there has been a growing tendency for the disciplined forces to redefine it. In some cases they have had little choice and their intervention may have been beneficial (e.g. the army’s restoration of order after the 2000 coup in Fiji), but in all cases this is debated. Whether a particular action is beneficial or not in the short term, and however sincere the intent, this usually leads to those forces having enhanced political leverage and a larger share of public resources thereafter. This can lead to reduced standards of living for the people, and more arbitrary forms of government. Relations between the police and the military (or within the paramilitary arms of the police) have often been tense in the four countries. We do not know the solution, but any action that can be taken to improve the relationship will enhance efficiency, national security and public confidence. 2. Excessive localisation within a small national population can have high costs. There is a better chance of enhancing the quality and stability of services to the public if a proportion of senior staff come from abroad. We are aware of the sensitivity of national staffing, especially in such crucial areas of government as security, justice, audit etc. However, we believe that one major problem is achieving objectivity in a situation of obligations to kin and community. In controversial posts such as that of auditor-general, registrar of land titles, etc, justice must not only be done, people must have confidence that it is being done. That confidence will probably be higher if a proportion of the leading persons in such fields come from outside the nation. Judicial appeals provide one precedent for this. Judges from many Pacific Islands nations and from Australia and New Zealand sit on the courts of appeal of many countries of the region. This reduces allegations of bias or favoritism, and enhances the quality and integrity of the judiciary. We believe this precedent should be evolved further and apply also to some posts in the disciplined forces, accounting/audit, and other fields. 15

Shortly after the South Pacific Forum began, some inter-country exchanges of senior staff were initiated, but the scheme was later dropped owing to limited success. High level staff were then in shorter supply. We consider it is time to look at this option again. 3. The granting of amnesty to persons who have committed treason and other serious crimes (which has been done in all four nations studied), increases the possibility of more treasonable acts. In Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu at least, rebellion by the security forces was triggered by their claims for pay and conditions that had been promised but not met. On that ground they got some public sympathy, but that cannot be used to condone their violent attempts to achieve their entitlements. Otherwise, teachers and nurses whose promised pay and conditions were delayed, would have a precedent for burning the schools and hospitals. Letting members of the security forces get away with major crimes, as has occurred in all four countries, sets dangerous precedents. There is a case for amnesties and other forms of forgiveness, but it may be wise to grant them only after very careful consideration of their long- term implications. 4. Deep consideration of structures of government in Melanesia is needed. Constitutions themselves can constitute a security hazard. Ideological addiction to particular interpretations of the word democracy, particularly external force-feeding of such interpretations, need to be overcome. A leading Melanesian who was involved when his country’s constitution was written, by expatriate lawyers, said they were shown many examples of constitutions of other recently formed governments. They were not told that most of them had been designed by lawyers appointed by, paid by and/or trained in the departing colonial powers. Nor did the advisers have any understanding of Melanesian values and leadership systems. Nor was any serious attempt made to discover such values and principles, and incorporate them where appropriate. They were led to believe that the paradigm they were given was “the way to do it” and they had to fit within that framework. Despite radical change since independence, some of those pre- independence values and principles still influence or determine people’s behavior. Security may be enhanced if some of them are more adequately accommodated in constitutions and laws. The assumption that entitling everyone to a vote leads to governments which reflect the wishes or interests of the people, is naïve. It has led to a number of senior politicians and even heads of government in Melanesia being elected not because the public consider them ideal leaders, but because they have been given more money by often foreign, corrupt and criminal businessmen in return for misuse of government powers. The 16 political use of such ill-gotten funds has often been the key determinant in who is elected. Many studies, such as those by Dr Joe Ketan of the University of Papua New Guinea and Dr Bill Standish of the Australian National University, show that many MPs in Papua New Guinea owe their election to the control of guns, drugs, corrupt use of public resources, bribery, extortion, intimidation and other processes. The change of government in Solomon Islands in 1992 was not a reflection of public wishes or interests, but the opposite of both. It was done within the “democratic” constitution. Foreign investors who wanted certain changes of policy to enrich themselves and impoverish the public, successfully “persuaded” ministers to cross the floor. A number of MPs had been elected because of the same foreign funding and motivation. Ombudsman reports and other evidence in Vanuatu show many similar instances. The cases we have cited are mere tips of icebergs. The issue is not confined to Melanesia. North Korea, USA and Zimbabwe are among the nearly 200 countries that describe themselves as ‘democratic’. The President of USA received the votes of 19% of eligible voters, got fewer votes than his main rival, the recounting of crucial votes was stopped, and he would have received fewer votes still were it not that he was financed by the super-rich. His party campaign was run by a machine in which ordinary people have only nominal say. The image given to the concept of ‘democracy’ as selecting leaders who reflect the views and interests of the people is not very evident in Melanesian politics either. The 1997 Fiji constitution, although a masterpiece in some of its features, contains other features which so antagonise a sufficient number of its citizens that it is likely to cause further security problems unless modified. We may make more progress in creating a more secure political environment if we avoid the mantra of ‘democracy’ and concentrate on finding ways to more accurately represent the public interest, keep leaders (both elected and appointed) honest, and reduce foreign interference in politics. We have no panacea to offer, but feel that a workable solution is only likely once thinking is allowed to evolve past the barriers currently erected by some (but far from all) members of the ‘international community’. The renowned writer on thinking, Edward De Bono, said in a public address in Rarotonga in 2000 (and touches on it is his latest book – De Bono 2000), that the present forms of democracy and the rule of law were a tremendous step forward in the evolution of mankind. But like the equally devoutly believed philosophy which preceded it, that of the divine right of kings, it has now outlived its usefulness. 17

The ‘democracy’ model divides leaders into two teams, whereas issues are now vastly more complex. Likewise judicial systems which are required to classify things into simple boxes of true or false, right or wrong, are in many cases too simplistic for today’s world when many things are a little of all of those things and more. We need to be thinking through new paradigms which are better suited to the 21st century. The present democracy model was geared to electing leaders whose actions were to be determined mainly by the interests of their electors. Now much more in Melanesia depends on an aspiring leader’s dramatic talents on television, and the extent to which he/she represents the interests of those often foreign interests who supply money and access. Fortunately the technology which allows the concentration of financial and political power (and thus reduce public influence on decision-making) can also be used to facilitate wider public participation, consultation and influence. Future structures of governance need to be much more diverse, less confrontational and divisive, and more geared to equitably accommodating the ever-widening variety of interests that is emerging in Melanesia and the world. Fifty years ago most of the world’s airlines, power supplies, telecommunications etc were matters for governments. In many Pacific Islands that applied also to produce marketing, shipping, and a range of other functions. That is, their policies were determined by persons who won national elections. Though good at winning elections, they were not so good at running those organisations – and often very bad at it. Leadership in those organisations is now chosen on other criteria. In communist societies sport and religion were matters for control by elected leaders in the central government. But in most countries people choose their own leaders by their own processes. Further deconcentration of power and wider public participation may facilitate more security. For example, in earlier times when change was slower, the aged and the young shared values and cultures much more. Now the life experience of the older generation is radically different from that of the younger. Yet the security breaches in the region are mainly made by youth who are not well represented. There may be a case for specific representation of youth in the halls of power in Melanesia. [And unlike Polynesia, in Western Melanesia traditionally, leadership was often by young men]. There is a case for some representation by interest groups (e.g. the national council of churches, the trade union movement, chamber of commerce, the professions, youth etc) as well as those chosen by direct election. Many other possibilities exist. One proposal put to the Cook Islands Commission of Political Review was that parliaments need not have any fixed term of years. Members can be those persons who hold the individual votes of a certain number of people. Their vote in parliament is 18

worth that total of votes. That person ceases to be a member when enough voters inform the registrar that their vote will from now on be cast by so and so. This is how shareholders votes are cast in companies. Alternately, one may decide not to give one member one’s total voting power, but only that in relation to, say, education issues. You may give your vote on security issues, or finance, or health, to someone else whom you trust more in that field. Issues are now so complex that seldom is any one person fit to exercise power on a range of them. We commend the proposal of the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific International (FSPI) for a long-term initiative exploring and implementing ways to improve patterns of governance and accountability in the region. It aims to begin at community level and encourage the ethics and habits of service and accountability. This will hopefully be reflected at higher levels in time. 5. A related issue is how to distribute political power when most other benefits are unevenly distributed. As a result of deep-seated cultural differences, this critical issue in Melanesia is most marked in Fiji. Because of their different values, on a ‘level playing field’ the average Indian, Chinese or European will outstrip Fijians in education, high level employment, accumulation of money, cars, houses, insurance, savings and other assets (much of it held abroad), ability to travel, and almost all other things which all the communities value. Rural land is a low and reducing proportion of total assets in Fiji. A few Fijians have high incomes, mostly from ‘rents’ of property or patronage, but they are exceptions; and there is a growing Fijian urban middle class. Since democratic politics is about representing one’s electors, and gaining maximum benefits for them, if political power is also on a “level playing field”, Fijians are likely to be still worse off. There is no shortage of similar examples around the world. Indeed, it is possible for leaders or parties to look after the interests of the disadvantaged irrespective of who they voted for. This is particularly likely when those in power fear a backlash which will cause them to lose power. But in the long term, politicians look after those who voted them into power more than those who did not. And in Fiji, voting is predominantly on ethnic lines. It is understandable that members of the cultures who win from level playing fields (and countries whose governments are dominated by such people) will try to perpetuate them. It is equally understandable that those who lose from this approach will question it. Of course cultures and values change. But they seldom change overnight. Those who are disadvantaged by the present commitment to whatever happens as a result of the present ‘level playing field’ system, rather than effective approaches to achieving equitable outcomes, will naturally resist - sometimes violently if no other effective outlets are functioning. 19

On a smaller scale, the same is apparent in Papua New Guinea. The Highlanders, who are accustomed to much longer hours of work and expenditure of more energy (which was necessary for survival in their mountainous environment), and a more entrepreneurial approach to life, outdo coastal people in many activities in the coastal cities. The resultant tensions are strong. They have been the basis of many security breaches. Likewise, the people of Malaita, with its higher population density, more rugged terrain, and greater competition for survival, have a reputation for being on average, more competitive, assertive and entrepreneurial than most Solomon Islanders. Their penetration into Guadalcanal over the past 50 years was the basic cause of the civil war of 1998-99. The ideological assumption that whatever result is yielded by a one person one vote system must be the best, is not only too simplistic, but can lead to disaster. It is not a matter for the FRSC to solve, for it needs deep consideration ‘outside the box’ by people in all walks of life. Unfortunately, however, the disciplined services and social services have to deal with the fragments of broken societies (and often get fractured themselves) when imposed ideologies have tragic consequences. Those who help impose the simplistic models do not suffer. 6. The priority in relation to land in Melanesia should be on rethinking the systems of tenure and production with the aim of reducing tensions within and between communities, and raising sustainable productivity. Both will have long-term security benefits. This is a major task. Customary systems today are very different from those of the traditional past and in many cases ill-suited to the needs of the future. Those systems were built on community self-sufficiency and self-defense and on relatively stable population numbers with low mobility. This is no longer the case for the majority of people in the countries concerned. Proposals for adaptation must be within the capacity of governments or other institutions to administer securely on a long-term basis. They must also involve full consultation with the communities concerned, and relevant information and education. 7. There is a demand for more economic development on customary land under the present customary tenures. This will entail less social adjustment, but also less productivity and prosperity because converting subsistence farmers to commercial farmers on their own land has a very poor record of success in the Pacific and the world. High productivity is much more often achieved by self-selected farmers who have moved away from their customary environment. For such resettlement to succeed, however, needs more attention to be given to socio-cultural integration in the new environment.

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8. Higher priority is needed to facilitate inter-cultural understanding and awareness in schools, colleges, universities, police and other government offices, churches and other institutions in Melanesia. Ethnic identification (both within racial categories and between them) is likely to reduce slowly, and inter-ethnic relations to improve. However, anyone interested in long-term national security needs also to be aware of less attractive scenarios and ways to avoid them. As a worst case scenario we need to be conscious of situations like Rwanda, where 800,000 were killed in three months in ethnic clashes between two African tribes. Few guns were involved, most of the killing was with knives. Little organization or money was needed. Both sides were Christian, and many belonged to the same churches. Intermarriage was extensive (Gourevitch 2000). While the killing in East Timor was planned, equipped and financed by Indonesia, that by Dayaks evicting Madurese from Borneo was not. It was a case of mobilizing people on ethnic lines to use their own knives. While such scenarios are not likely in Fiji or elsewhere in Melanesia, they are possible. Hiding heads in the sand or denying ethnic differences only increases the possibility. Most people in the many countries where these things have happened, including Europe and Asia as well as Africa, thought “it can’t happen here”. That is almost always the assumption until it does. Positive action is needed to face the issue and reduce the possibility of open conflict. For example, relations between Fijian and Indian students at the University of the South Pacific and some other institutions of higher education seem to have been better in the 1970s than they are today. Persons familiar with Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea institutions report similar experiences. Educational institutions have given the overwhelming emphasis to academic training. The highest possible quality of academic education is vital, but equivalent priority is needed for inter-cultural understanding and integrity issues. 9. More emphasis is needed on ethics and integrity in all institutions. Personal integrity as reflected in mismanagement of funds etc in the region’s governments, universities, colleges, and other institutions seems not to have improved. Many of them give little attention to integrity issues in their training programmes, although the technical training is counterproductive unless provided and implemented in an ethical context. 10. Higher priority needs to be given to the growing and potential role of non-government organizations, including women’s organizations and youth, in maintaining harmony and security within nations. The shrinking proportion of total resources available to governments reinforces this, as does the growth of national and international NGOs in Melanesia - as everywhere in the world. So does the fact that governments have in many cases not been able to make optimum and cost effective use of resources. Some Members of Parliament and officials feel that the 21

elected and appointed officials have the right to make all decisions without ‘interference’ and see this as the essence of democracy. This is surprising as some of the same politicians and officials are heavily influenced by external interests. Fiji’s Tripartite Forum of government, unions and the private sector was a positive step in the direction of better communication between various sectors of the nation. Similar initiatives in other countries are becoming more common. Such consultations allow wider participation and better mutual understanding by diverse interest groups, and that enhances internal security. We recommend that they become institutionalised and regular. 11. More external assistance is essential as many needs are beyond the financial or other capacity of those inside the nations. That of voluntary organizations including volunteers is for many purposes more cost-effective than those on international rates and should be used for a greater proportion of the external assistance. Wide gaps in remuneration and privileges undermine confidence and security. 12. Would institutions for reconciliation and conflict avoidance be useful in Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu? Following disastrous ethnic-based conflicts, a ministry was set up whose primary task is ‘National Unity, Reconciliation and Peace’ (Solomon Islands) or ‘National Reconciliation and Unity’ (Fiji). Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu may wish to consider setting up an institution (preferably involving government, churches and NGOs) with similar responsibilities. It would aim to avoid the enormously destructive and costly inter-cultural violence that has occurred in the other two countries, and could easily occur in all four. 13 Further consideration should be given to the evolution of Melanesian value systems. Some people feel that a return to ‘traditional’ values would solve the problems, but we doubt the extent to which this is feasible. Some traditional values remain effective and relevant, others are not. Warfare was a noble art, sorcery a valued skill, and derogatory stereotypes about other language-culture groups were usual. There was no traditional precedent for national government, no equivalent of international organized crime (which has a growing influence on Pacific security), and no precedent for the international flow of information. Some of those who most strongly recommend traditional values, themselves choose to live much more by non-traditional ones. The challenge to resolve the erosion of cultural values, and to guide their evolution, is more an internal matter within nations than for regional organizations. However, regional organizations can play a positive role in promoting discussion of options and potentials. Cultural values, practices and ideologies should be the object of more open national and regional debate and research. Some traditional values/epistemologies can be useful in finding ways out of crises, but they are also vulnerable to being 22

hi-jacked by self-serving politicians or swamped by churches. Having those values defined and more widely diffused would make them more difficult to manipulate. That is a long-term task which scholars and theologians might like to take up. 14. The role of the Forum and the Secretariat. The Biketawa Declaration by Heads of Forum Governments in 2000 reaffirmed the principle of non- interference in the domestic affairs of another member state, commitment to good governance, equal rights for all citizens, and upholding democratic institutions which reflect national and local circumstances. The Declaration also favored equitable economic development, and respect for indigenous rights and cultural values. The Declaration stated that in time of crisis or in response to a member government’s request, the Secretary General would consult the Forum chair and other Forum Leaders as appropriate, as well as national authorities. If necessary he would facilitate a meeting of Forum Foreign Ministers, which might arrange a Ministerial Action Group, a fact finding mission, an eminent persons group, or support other ways of resolving the problem. This may include a high level Forum Regional Security Committee meeting and/or a special meeting of Forum Leaders.

Appendices to the Declaration note that a reasonable degree of consensus must exist, and that any intervention must be cost-effective.

The Declaration was not to apply to current difficulties in Solomon Islands or Fiji.

The Declaration notes that the Secretary General may act ‘in time of crisis or in response to member’s request.…’ Although this authorizes the Secretary General to act, the Forum commitment to non-interference in the domestic affairs of another member country implies that no action would be taken without the approval of the government concerned. Until now, some member countries have imposed sanctions, threatened to destabilize the economy and reduce the living standards of the people unless the government concerned followed policies of which the other government approved. Presumably this no longer applies under the Biketawa Declaration unless it approved by the government of the country concerned and the governments of the region.

To make the Biketawa Declaration work, the Secretariat has drafted an implementation strategy. The Secretary General needs a senior specialist to maintain familiarity with security in the region, and relations with member governments.

To carry out functions that may facilitate peace-keeping, preventive diplomacy and other consultations, the Secretariat will need some additional funds. In situations of potential conflict there is a case for 23 regular consultations involving governments, churches, NGOs and commerce.

In view of the policy of more involvement of NGOs in peace-keeping, and the important contribution of the Melanesian Brotherhood and some other voluntary agencies in Solomon Islands, the Secretariat may consider it appropriate to involve and support them more fully.

Peace-keeping can also be facilitated by mobilizing unemployed youth into labor-intensive tasks which have long-term value even if no short-term economic value. Forest replanting and similar tasks may be used to absorb the attention of those who might otherwise be tempted to direct their energies negatively.

It has been suggested for many years that more State of Forces Agreements would facilitate cooperative action in security issues in the region. Some progress has been made in this area but higher priority may be merited.

Although there is a good case for consultation as provided for in the Biketawa Declaration, it may sometimes preclude the opportunity for a surgical strike, which could stop problems developing. For example in Santo (Vanuatu) in 1980, when the Vanuatu government asked Papua New Guinea forces to put down the rebellion, the PNG forces landed, shot one man dead and made it clear they were serious, and the rebellion collapsed. Without such a rapid and decisive strike, that rebellion would probably have caused massive loss of life and destruction of property, as well as possibly destroy the national integrity of Vanuatu.

We feel, as some Solomon Islanders have said to us, that if one of the neighbouring countries had responded to their government’s call for similar action early in the conflict in Guadalcanal, the number of casualties would have been much less, as would the economic cost, the social and political disruption. Inter-ethnic tensions too, would not have fallen to their present low ebb. We do not blame the countries, which declined the assistance, as there is a financial and political cost to them too. However, the cost to them may in the long term be greater in view of the need to assist Solomon Islands to return to positive growth.

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COUNTRY REPORTS

Beginning with Papua New Guinea as much the largest of the nations considered, we follow with Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, which have most in common with it. Although Fiji has much in common with the other members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, it also has more distinct characteristics.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Bougainville The Bougainville crisis has cost PNG immensely in lives and resources. With the closure of the mine in 1989, 17% of the Government’s revenues were lost. Relative peace has reigned for the past three years, but Bougainville remains a real threat to the country’s security. Weapons issues are especially difficult— even if the bulk are returned, some will remain in civilian hands and new sources can be obtained from abroad.

Likewise, recent progress has been due in part to the trust, which has developed between the Bougainville negotiators and the current Minister for Bougainville affairs. Should political instability within the government result in a change of ministers at this crucial point, this could result in a major setback.

No agreement between the BRA and the PNG Government can guarantee a total solution. The possibility of payback and reprisals is real. Likewise, it remains to be seen how elements in Bougainville will respond to the development of Buka as an alternative focus of provincial administration and the position its leaders have taken in support of the national government in opposition to the BRA.

If agreement is reached and the ¾ vote required in Parliament to change the Organic Law is obtained, other provinces are likely to want similar decentralization of power. The Papua Besena movement and many leaders in the New Guinea Islands provinces have long wanted more autonomy. There is a need for continued debate on the issue—the national and regional governors’ conferences being the appropriate venues. How PNG’s leaders respond to this inevitable demand to renegotiate the relationship between levels of government and the exercise of power will influence the degree to which peace and stability can be maintained.

Good governance In 1996, two decade after independence, former Governor of the Reserve Bank and now Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta, described the situation:

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Despite the five-fold growth in government expenditure and revenue, the country’s infrastructure is breaking down. Government services have declined to the point of being non- existent in many areas. Public assets, whether they be schools, hospitals, offices, roads or bridges, are all in a state of disrepair. Our exports earn more than three billion kina each year, yet we have an underlying shortage of foreign currencies. GDP has grown five time but the distribution of income is more skewed and less equitable than in 1975. Nominal per capita income has more than doubled, but 80 per cent of the population actually earn less than the 1975 average. Corruption, both petty and profound, permeates society today. Society is ravaged by crime. There is a general inability to enforce or maintain law and order. Social inequity and poverty are rampant (Morauta 1996, 70)

Part of the explanation for this deterioration can be attributed to the Government’s inability to deal effectively with the economy. High public expectations have been met with low levels of growth and a decline in the real value of foreign assistance. The closure of the Bougainville mine in 1989 was a disaster for the country. With expenditure growing and income declining, government borrowing expanded resulting in a massive financial crisis by the mid-1990s. Unfortunately, there has been little success in implementing the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which began in 1995 (Nelson, 2000, 48). The concept of good governance must address institutional reform and develop appropriate policies to achieve the required improvements. Moreover, for the SAP to succeed, PNG needs an informed citizenry—in particular, to better understand how privatisation will benefit Papua New Guineans. Should improvements not result, combined with a further deterioration of Government services, more instability is likely. Economic mismanagement has been coupled with widespread corruption at all levels—bribery, misappropriation of funds, failure to follow proper procurement and tendering procedures, skimming of superannuation funds, nepotism and wantokism. Such practices breed a lack of discipline within government, poor management and a drop in the quality of services. The practice by those in power to use their position to reward their supporters at the expense of the wider community, compounds the executive instability.

In PNG (and Melanesia generally), leaders are traditionally obliged to transfer resources to their constituents. This code of behaviour has established itself in the modern political arena with the result that PNG politicians are expected to squeeze as much as possible out of the public sector to reward those who voted for them. Moreover, politicians and bureaucrats alike are expected to reward their wantoks with services, and seek favours in return. The conflicting codes of behaviour make it ‘difficult to distinguish between what is legal and illegal, right and wrong’ (Nelson 2000, 48).

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The national government and parliamentarians have the reputation of looking after themselves first and neglecting the working people. Recently, Parliament rejected the recommendation of the Minimum Wages Board to raise the minimum wage from K60 to K120 per fortnight, but then voted themselves hefty salary increases. The public outcry was loud, but to no avail (The National 19 April 2001, 1-2).

The Leadership Code and the Ombudsman Commission have had a restraining effect, but corruption is now entrenched and the level increasing. Some say that the Leadership Code does not go far enough as it only applies to judges and constitutional office-holders, departmental heads, statutory body heads, ministerial staff and politicians. It does not apply to deputy secretaries and divisional heads in the Public Service, who can only be investigated when complaints are received. Nor does it cover the private sector.

Likewise, the Leadership Tribunal can only dismiss and bar individuals from holding an ‘elected’ leadership position for three years, which can be appealed to the National Court and, if a constitutional issue, to the Supreme Court. The Tribunal can also impose a fine. Moreover, the disqualification period only refers to ‘elective’ leadership positions. Individuals can and have been appointed to a non-elective position during the three years. Tightening the procedures for dealing with abuses of power would seem to be necessary as well as strengthening the Ombudsman Commission with additional investigative resources.

Instability of the parliamentary system has plagued Papua New Guinea with constant reshuffles of government and votes of no confidence. Reforms in the mid-1990s restricted the period when votes of no-confidence could be considered. The recently passed Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates is intended to stabilise the party system by reducing party- hopping and strengthening coalition governments, which are the norm. The new law may not stabilise the party system, however, because political horse-trading may undermine the executive and the integrity of government in the long-term.

Socio-economic disparities Of Papua New Guinea’s 5 million people, an estimated 84% live in rural areas, the highest concentrations in the Highlands. The road network is poorly developed—concentrated around the main urban centres—and deteriorating. The effect is that a large segment of the population in the rural areas will remain isolated for many years, hampering social services and limiting economic development. Most rural people are engaged in subsistence agriculture with limited cash cropping, but Government assistance to agriculture has fallen due to under-funding. Fisheries has been neglected with the bulk of the catch being taken by foreign operations (Economic Intelligence Unit 2000, 21).

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Providing quality education is difficult, due to a shortage of skilled teachers and poor infrastructure. More young people are reaching the final years of high school, but tertiary institutions have not been able to increase their intake. In 1999, only 37% of children were enrolled in school (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2000, 13). Technical education needs to be expanded to meet the long-term requirements of the job market.

Health indicators are not positive. In 1999, 30% of children under age five were underweight, though chronic malnutrition is not prevalent—a positive effect of widespread subsistence agriculture. The UNDP reported that life expectancy was only 57.9 years and infant mortality at 73 per 1,000 births. The report also noted that only 32% of Papuan New Guineans had access to safe water and there were only 18 doctors per 100,000. Of major concern is the growing evidence of an HIV epidemic. The PNG Institute of Medical Research estimates that more than 15,000 Papua New Guineans have HIV and that it is spreading rapidly, with three quarters of known cases in Port Moresby.

Crime and violence Violent crime in both urban and rural areas has reached an epidemic state. The break-down of law and order in the extreme takes the form of raskol gangs which wreak havoc on the lives and property of Papua New Guineans and expatriates alike. A recent vicitimisation survey by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute produced comparative statistics showing that PNG had higher rates of assault and robbery than surveyed cities in developing countries of Africa and Latin America. The survey found that 10% of respondents had been the victim of an assault in the previous year and 31% in the previous 5 years; and 12% of women 16 years and over had been sexually assaulted in the previous year and 32% in the preceding 5 years (Levantis 2000, 131-2).

The police and the defense force have been unable to control the surging criminal activity. Besides the impact on the human rights of its citizens, crime is having a catastrophic effect on economic development with investors reluctant to expand or develop new projects, fearing for the safety of employees and threats to equipment and infrastructure. Ten years ago, prospecting for minerals and oil contributed K160 million a year. Now it is less that K10 million. Likewise, in 1995, losses due to crime amounted to an estimated K191 million—3 % of GDP (Levantis, 2000, 138). The effect will mean even greater difficulty in meeting the growing needs of the rapidly expanding population, i.e. health, education, infrastructure development, etc. The potential for even greater internal security problems is ominous.

The disciplined forces The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (Police) is the main force dealing with crime and disorder. Increasing crime statistics indicate that the Police are not coping. One reason is the failure of governments since independence to 28 provide adequate resources. In 1975, with a population of around 2 million, the police force had around 4,100 personnel. In 1996, police numbers had increased to only 5,000, including around 300 civilian support staff (Dinnen, 1998, 255-6). The impact of the Government’s poor economic management is clearly evident in this regard. Providing adequate resources to the Police must become a high priority if the country’s internal security problems are not to deteriorate further. In particular, the working conditions for the police must be improved in order to avoid dissatisfaction, a deterioration in morale and an inevitable decline in quality of policing.

The tactics the Police have employed over the years to deal with suspected criminal activities have given them the reputation for being violent and coercive. Numerous cases of human rights abuses have been recorded. Indiscriminate raids on villages and settlements suspected of harbouring criminals, involving fatalities, rapes, theft, and the destruction of livestock and property have been common, though years of an Australian upgrading programme have begun to show evidence of improvement in overall Police behaviour. Nevertheless, an atmosphere of mutual mistrust exists between the Police and the community which will take a long time to correct and contributes to a sense of insecurity around the country and especially in the urban areas (Dinnen 1998, 257-60).

The Papua New Guinea Defense Force (PNGDF) also suffers from a negative image. Joint operations with the Police against criminal elements and reported incidents of excessive use of force in Bougainville fighting have contributed to the image of undisciplined soldiers out of control.

However, the recent uprising by PNGDF soldiers in Port Moresby, while not excused, seems to have softened the view among officials and within the broader community. The uprising was in response to a report by the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on reform in the Defense Force recommending a 50% reduction in the size—i.e. a retrenchment of around 2000 soldiers. The lack of consultation by the EPG was a contributing factor, but even more significant was the number of grievances among rank and file about their conditions and failure to meet entitlements.

The inability of the Police and PNGDF to provide adequate protection against rising levels of crime activity has led to the dramatic growth in the privatisation of policing. Security firms of varying sizes provide protection to large and small companies, private homes and government facilities. Such operations are unregulated and open to abuse. Some firms are licensed to carry firearms and instances have been reported of pay-back killings by the personnel of security firms being carried out on behalf of their employers (Dinnen 1998, 257).

Indeed, the increasing number of guns in private possession is one of the country’s greatest security concerns. The Police and Defense Force are a common source of weapons and ammunition—an easy means to supplement 29 income for underpaid and disgruntled police officers and soldiers. In addition, the trade in guns for marijuana has increased the number of guns flowing into the country, especially into the Highlands. The inability of government forces to adequately monitor the country’s huge coastline makes it almost impossible to deal with this difficult security problem.

Land and ethnicity Disruptive and inappropriate behaviour often occurs at the village level, associated with demands by landowners for additional compensation from government for land on which schools, hospitals, airstrips, roads, etc. have been built and threaten their destruction or harm to employees if their demands are not met (May 1998, 68). Problems also arise when large pay-outs are received for the exploitation of village resources—e.g. logging, mining, oil and gas. Individuals who feel they have been disadvantaged often direct their anger against those who they feel have received an unfair share or they may attack the company or agency making the payment (Nelson 2000, 48).

Where development projects are identified and the use of land sought (e.g. for oil and gas exploration or logging) there are often problems in identifying the correct custom owners with whom to negotiate or pay royalties. The Government introduced a registration programme to record custom ownership of land. This was perceived with suspicion by many Papua New Guineans as an attempt to remove land from the people, created widespread discontent and was eventually dropped (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 21).

The concept of Incorporated Land Groups, legislation for which is in place, was introduced to overcome the problem of group ownership of land. The relevant Government departments are not, however, adequately resourced to implement it. Moreover, landowners claim the resources below ground (minerals) and rights to reef and lagoon resources. The long-term economic effect will be negative and the resultant inability of Government to finance services within the social sector a major problem for the country.

Another serious land problem concerns the growing number of squatter settlements around the National Capital District and other urban centres—the result of uncontrolled urban drift. Such settlements are springing up on both government and customary land. The situation is viewed by many as a time bomb with clashes between illegal squatters and local land owners a real possibility. Some provincial governments have taken action by sending people back home who are not working and making trouble. Urban politicians are, however, often reluctant to act because they use the squatter settlements as a political base at election time.

The squatter problem is compounded by its ethnic overtones. Highlanders make up the largest group of new immigrants—45% of the squatter settlements around Port Moresby. Life in the Highlands is more difficult—tribal wars, increasing 30 presence of firearms, harsher environment to produce food, etc.—making the coastal areas attractive for settlement. Ethnic groups tend to settle together with the result that integration is slow. Their culture is being implanted—i.e. the use of violence to settle disputes, which conflicts with the current attitude of many coastal people. In an attempt to deal with the problems, some settlements around Port Moresby chose village magistrates to mediate and work with village police. Such policies, as well as efforts to solve the difficult issue of land ownership, need to be encouraged. Registration of custom land may help, but the process is complex due to changes in population and associated rights. In any case, social services need to be expanded to residents of squatter settlements to allow them to become meaningfully occupied and better integrated into the urban community.

Suggestions for Consideration 1. Bougainville continues to be a significant security issue for the country. Care should be taken at the highest level to ensure that the positive momentum in negotiations continues. Strong political leadership is vital in the process. 2. The checks and balances in the political system—the Ombudsman Commission, Leadership Tribunal, Auditor General’s Office, etc. and the media—need to be upheld and strengthened with the view to maintaining the integrity of the institutions of state. 3. Confronting the deteriorating law and order situation must remain a high priority for the Government. Support for the disciplined forces—in particular, their general funding and working conditions— is essential. 4. Land disputes remain a significant problem for the country, limiting development and posing a threat to peace and order in the urban areas. Developing mechanisms to deal with these problems must become a high priority. 5. Ethnic tensions are increasing in the urban areas and require a broad-based approach to deal with them effectively: increase communication between groups, strengthen local leadership in all sectors, improve education and training opportunities, etc. 31

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Leading Solomon Islanders and others have thought about these issues for a long time. In a brief survey we cannot aim to resolve the immediate problems. Our focus, therefore, is on longer-term processes to enhance national security and prosperity.

Ethnic and cultural issues In its first 20 years as an independent nation (1978-98), Solomon Islands was achieving faster integration than most nations in the world. It was steadily incorporating into a growing national consciousness—about 70 different language/culture groups, many of which had been at war within the lifetime of some elders. Common education, religion, work and sport all played their part. None of the frustrations, irritations or misunderstandings that led to the recent conflicts was new. Many were of the kinds that occur anywhere, and more so among communities with differences of language, culture and common interest. The Moro Movement had long advocated return to custom and expulsion of non- Guadalcanal people. But such negative influences were outweighed by the positive ones. There seemed to be broad agreement among people interviewed in Solomon Islands, and in the materials read, that key elements of the deterioration included the interaction of deepening frustrations over: Declining standards of living and deepening poverty, both rural and urban. This is due in part to: Reduced confidence in the government’s ability to solve the nation’s urgent problems, including failure to facilitate more economic growth. This is aggravated by the belief, and in some cases proven knowledge, that some political leaders and officials have used national resources and powers corruptly. Concern over unequal distribution of benefits from development, and in some cases which were widely discussed, bias and corruption in the process. Rapid population growth and continuing internal migration, aggravated the ethnic and other social tensions. Migration in some areas involved inadequate cultural integration, and was at a faster rate than the host culture could ‘digest’. The effects of the conflict in Bougainville, from which 9,000 ‘refugees’ came to the Western Solomons and Guadalcanal. The eviction of mainland Papua New Guineans from Bougainville, and the coups in Fiji, provided models which some saw as victories for indigenous as against immigrant populations. Other examples of ethnic conflict overseas are reported in local media. The enormous cost of that approach is seldom explained. The Old Testament too is often used to justify the view that land was given by God to a particular community and it is virtuous to defend it. 32

Land issues The most acute case was the central east coast of Guadalcanal. After World War II, the capital shifted from Tulagi to Honiara. The government bought land from the indigenous landowners for the capital and for palm oil and other developments nearby. Population density was very low and the land of low value. Then, as always happens, the land value increased due to in-migration and the building of the town and other facilities. The previous landowners felt entitled to the extra value, or much of it, though they did not create it. And they under-rate the benefits they have gained from the capital. Most immigrants were from Malaita, the most populous and crowded island. Malaitans acquired land in Guadalcanal by lease from the government, and by customary arrangements from landowners. If those had been the only two sets of transactions, probably no crisis would have occurred. With hindsight, it now seems generally agreed that the government should have ensured that those transactions were protected, but that other acquisition was strictly prohibited. Some Malaitans were accused of claiming, farming, hunting or foraging on land beyond that which they bought, without permission, and depleting local supplies. As with self-selected immigrants anywhere, the Malaitans were on average more productive, had built better homes and acquired more assets, better education for their children, and other advantages. Resentment had long been evident, but was tempered by extensive intermarriage, friendship, common church activity, trade and other interaction. The frustrations were compounded by accusations of crime, sorcery and other anti-social behavior, much of it on the basis of language/culture communities. During the colonial era some land throughout Solomon Islands was sold to European settlers. During the first 20 years of independence, however, most of that land was again acquired by the communities which had sold it, or by the government. It is now vital to ensure stability in land transactions. This requires: i. Action by police and others responsible for avoiding open conflict over land. ii. Facilitating land registration and survey in areas where tension is present or likely. This is a long-term task, but becomes more difficult and costly the longer it is delayed. The government has been concerned with this issue for years, but it has had a low priority. Some plans are now in hand, but unless more resources are available, the process will be too slow. 33

Socio-economic issues Real income per person was declining well before the coup. Wealth, and the means of earning it, was very unevenly spread. Over 50% of income in Honiara before the recent ethnic tensions was owned by under 1% of households, many of them non-indigenous. In rural areas, most of the money has been generated on the east coast of Guadalcanal or in the Western Province. The money produced led to conflict within and between families and communities owing to disputes over land rights, royalties, or leaders taking the lion’s share. School enrolments declined from 37% in the 1980s to 35% in the 1990s and less again since the civil disturbances. Adult literacy dropped from 52% in the 1980s to 30% in the 1990s. Only just over half as many women are literate as men. Solomon Islands fell from 123rd in the world in Human Development in 1998 to 148th in 1999 (UNDP 1999). It will be lower again now. Most people now feel that too much emphasis was given to large scale operations with inadequate sharing of long-term benefits. This also applies to geographical spread of opportunities. It is never possible to spread opportunities evenly, but people feel that to the extent that opportunities need to be concentrated, more action is needed to ensure that persons from areas with less opportunities can participate in ways that ensure long-term integration. The government is addressing these issues, but the extent to which they can be effectively handled seems limited in the short term at least. The government has not been able (and is unlikely to be able) to meet its promise to pay compensation to most who suffered in the ethnic crisis. However, many claims have been paid that people believe (and senior officials confirm) were fraudulent, exaggerated, or to politically favored persons. This creates security risks. Also, the creation of jobs in various arms of the police is believed to have grossly favored Malaita, and drained funds from essential services.

The quality of governance “So much is uncertain that people are not in the mood to work”, a government official explained. That was apparent in many government offices. The reduced effectiveness of government, and reduced public confidence in it were caused, according to persons interviewed and written materials read, by the misuse of public powers over many years by some national and provincial politicians and officials who: Made deals over logging, fishing and other resource exploitation from which the public lost heavily although the negotiators gained. Diverted foreign aid to personal and political advantage. Gave remissions of taxes and duties in return for ‘favors’. Paid ‘compensation’ for the recent civil clashes unfairly, and often for spurious claims. 34

Gave each MP an extra $20,000 each to ‘speak to their electorates about peace’ recently, at a time of extreme financial crisis. Such actions have caused a climate of public cynicism, apathy, reduced productivity, and crime. They are made worse by knowing that many civil servants have very poor records of attendance and performance. All this has led people to describe many of their leaders as self-serving and corrupt. It is no surprise that many young people follow their example. Fortunately, many other politicians and officials are hard-working, highly principled and effective. Every effort is needed to encourage their example. Before open conflict occurred, some leaders of both Guadalcanal and Malaita provoked and mobilized their young men to violent action. The rewards they were promised have generally not materialised. However, the techniques and practice of criminal behavior are difficult to set aside once the conflict is over. The spread of guns and reduced respect for people and for law has taught many young men that one can get money, power, land and other property more easily by force than by work. The amnesty for the surrender of guns has not been very effective so far, and it is easy to acquire more by the sale of cannabis or otherwise. The presence of armed Bougainvilleans in the Western Province is another dimension of this problem. Some political leaders want to establish an army. However, the record of the present disciplined forces gives little hope for the greater effectiveness of an army. Armies are expensive, and in fragmented societies such as those of Solomon Islands, are likely not to protect the government but to control it, and not to protect the people but to exploit them. With reduced government services, and reduced effectiveness of those remaining, aid agencies need to focus more on direct assistance to those churches, NGOs and companies which provide health, education and other services.

Who lit the fire? This is much debated. But most agree that the growing tensions tempted leaders with axes to grind or grievances to settle (including some who had failed to achieve their aspirations by regular processes), to mobilize violent action. The deprivation of young men at the bottom provided willing manpower to implement it. Once the fire is lit, the energy released to spread it expands. People take the chance to steal and to settle other scores. It takes time before the enthusiasm for destruction is outweighed by the suffering from it. Then the emphasis moves to healing. We hope that stage has been reached, but it may not.

Bases for reconciliation and reconstruction The unifying forces that were evolving long before the crisis, have had a setback. But they are still at work. They include common religious values and institutions, 35 the growing knowledge of Solomons Pijin and English as languages of national communication, shared experiences in higher education, work, sport and social activity, including inter-cultural marriage. When individuals outside and inside government decided to resolve their frustrations with more negative than positive action, it became contagious and exciting for them. Others tried to turn the tide in a more positive direction, but by then neither government nor traditional leaders, nor churches nor NGOs could do it alone. Many institutions and individuals from all walks of life tried and are still trying, some with more success than others. In seeking solutions we need to ensure that resources are used in the most cost-effective way. In the course of this study, more people referred to the contribution of the Melanesian Brotherhood to peace-making, reducing ethnic tension and bringing it down to manageable proportions, than to any other institution, including the government. Yet the Melanesian Brotherhood costs little. It is an organization of mainly young itinerant evangelists set up by the Anglican church a generation ago in Solomon Islands but now spread to many countries. They live on a vow of poverty. They demonstrate the enormous economic value, apart from other values, of commitment, integrity and trust. Different institutions have different capacities and functions. However, although the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) has an important and valuable function, we could not help but be struck by the relative cost-effectiveness of the IPMT and the Melanesian Brotherhood. The IPMT’s contribution is generally appreciated, though the limitations of that kind of exercise were also often commented upon. For the longer term, it should not be impossible to rethink the process and evolve more cost-effective alternatives. This will require thinking outside our current boxes.

Suggestions for consideration Much thought has been given to this by persons much better informed than we are, and who share responsibility for the outcome (eg. the Solomon Islands Experts Group Meeting of 19-20 October 2000, which contains excellent guidelines). It is with humility, then, that we face our obligation to comment and keep our recommendations to a few of the hundreds suggested in reports and discussions. Although everyone hopes that violence is over, many feel it could easily break out again. The example has been demonstrated, and the unresolved tensions and hundreds of guns, particularly under the control of Malaita interests in and out of government, make law and order a top priority. 1. This requires the police and prison service being reconstituted, the judicial system strengthened, and the public service rejuvenated. It may also benefit from having the Townsville peace agreement, which covered only Malaita and Guadalcanal militants, expanded to apply 36

throughout the nation where smaller tensions of a similar nature have taken place. 2. The government, including the police, will not be able to reestablish an effective government and a peaceful, prosperous society without regaining public confidence and thereby greater cooperation of most citizens. This will depend on providing effective government services and on working more closely with civil society, including with women and with youth 3. Because financial and staffing constraints make it impossible for the government to provide a full police service throughout the nation, we recommend further action to link the police service with the customary leadership in the villages (on the lines proposed in 1997). 4. The flow of aid to the nation has been much reduced by donors (both official and private) lacking confidence in the government’s financial management machinery. We believe much of that aid would be restored if an independent financial management fund was set up with representation of the donors and the government. 5. We recommend more equitable sharing of government jobs, especially in the police, as a matter of urgency. A matter of much public concern is that people from some provinces have more than their share of government jobs and other benefits. Partly this is for historical reasons, but it has become a major source of instability. With Malaita having the largest population, they will have more staff. However, while we were unable to obtain accurate figures, almost everyone seems to believe that the present shares are grossly uneven, unjust and destabilizing. No one expects exact proportions, but parameters to be set, and steps taken to ensure more equitable distribution.

A change to state government was agreed at the Townsville meeting. This will create a nation with 9 state governments and 1 federal government. It will cost more, and reduce living standards further. Also, there is an extreme shortage of accountants, information technology experts, and other skilled staff, and 10 governments use many more than one. Although in the short term giving more powers to the states may enhance security, in the long term it may weaken it. We recommend, therefore, that decentralization be kept to the minimum considered necessary to ensure security over the next five years.

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VANUATU

Good Governance Adoption of the Comprehensive Reform Programme (CRP) in 1997 focused discussion and raised awareness in Vanuatu of the importance of good governance for the maintenance of peace and stability. The features of the CRP are: renewal of the institutions of governance, a redefined role for the public sector, improved public sector efficiency, private sector-led growth (including small business and the rural sector), improved equity between sections of the population (Vanuatu 1997, 4). Of prime importance is the strengthening of the capacity of Government to set strategic directions.

The decision to embark on the CRP was the result of increasing political instability and the desire to restore confidence. In 1991, the split in the anglophone Vanua’aku Pati, which had governed since independence in 1980, resulted in the fragmentation of the previous two-party system and a succession of weak coalition governments. Since 1995, there has been more cabinet reshuffles, two changes of government leading to the dissolution of Parliament by the President in late 1997, the kidnapping of the President by members of the Vanuatu Mobile Force in 1996, and two more changes of government since the 1997 election—the last in May 2001. The political situation worsened as Ministers and Members of Parliament from all parties were implicated in inappropriate and even criminal conduct (Huffer and Molisa 1999, 2).

The first Ombudsman began in 1996 to issue highly critical reports on the misdeeds of various politicians. Although widely distributed, the reports did not result in any action against those engaged in financial misdealings or abuse of power. Many such politicians have been consistently re-elected and none have voluntarily resigned. New acts of Parliament are planned to strengthen the Public Prosecutors Office and Police investigative capabilities and to guarantee that findings by the Ombudsman are acted upon. The lack of action demonstrates the need for reform of the legal system, including the strengthening of the Public Prosecutor’s office. The Australian Government has offered to fund an aid package, but the Vanuatu Government has not yet agreed.

The Police and Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) are united as one unit. The reason behind the attempted coup and dissatisfaction voiced by the Police at times was the delay of Government to pay entitlements. There has also been much greater emphasis placed on training of the VMF than the Police, with the result that the latter are weak in community policing. Both forces recruit widely to avoid one particular island or cultural group becoming dominant and run the risk of becoming a tool of unscrupulous politicians.

Following a strike in 1993/94, some 600 public servants were replaced by less qualified or unqualified personnel, thus weakening the capacity of the Public 38

Service in policy making and service delivery. The system of ‘ministerial cabinets’, whereby ministers rely on politically appointed secretaries to advise them rather than career public servants, has led to an artificial separation between ministries and their associated departments. In addition, a weak Public Service Commission means that public servants are at the mercy of ministers and subject to political pressure, compromising the neutrality of public servants. While many officials want to serve the country well, their role is weakened by their fear of loss of employment (Crossland 2000, 2).

As a result of the governance problems the country has faced potential bankruptcy. The most worrying instance occurred in 1996, when Vanuatu issued Bank Guarantees worth US$100 million, which were entrusted to an Australian ‘financial consultant’ who was later convicted of fraud. This grave mishandling of public funds—orchestrated by a prominent politician—was foiled by the Vanuatu Ombudsman and Scotland Yard.

Another instance involved preferential treatment given to senior politicians by the Vanuatu National Provident Fund (VNPF) under the Housing Loan Scheme. When this abuse of power was revealed by the Ombudsman, about 500 VNPF members rioted in Port Vila, seeking to withdraw their funds. The result was a month-long state of emergency in 1998 and a disbursement of funds by the VNPF, which threatened the government financial position. It had to guarantee the shortfall, causing a budget deficit and a ‘run’ on the vatu (Knapman and Saldanha 1999, p. 145). A 20% devaluation announced by the Governor of the Reserve Bank was reversed on the same day by the Minister of Finance, but not without ‘deterr[ing] foreign investors’ (Jowitt 2000, 522).

Another area of concern is the dealings with suspect businessmen. The loan guarantee case described above was the most serious, but the association of the former Prime Minister with the owner of a Thai company, which helped to pay US$42,500 in allowances owed to members of the Vanuatu Police Force is also of concern. To avoid the country becoming vulnerable to unknown influences, salaries of public servants should only be paid from sources which are identifiable and non-compromising. Otherwise, questions arise as to what these businessmen are getting in return and at what cost to the country.

Principles of customary governance Research has shown that many Ni-Vanuatu attribute the breakdown in governance in part to a lack of understanding on their part of the modern political system they have been ‘burdened’ with. They feel alienated from institutions that have not adequately incorporated traditional custom and values (Huffer and Molisa 1999, 2-3). There is growing support for this issue to be raised as part of a review of the Constitution. It has been suggested that customary leaders in particular—who are the ‘custodians of the values of what makes Vanuatu what it is’—need to be brought 39 into the loop (Janet Bolenga interview). The Constitution recognises traditional chiefs through the Malvatumauri (National Council of Chiefs), which was established shortly after independence in 1980, but their role is limited to reviewing matters relating to custom and tradition. The fact that governments have not sought such advice has led to the feeling that Chiefs are losing their power. This problem could be addressed by giving Chiefs a role in the development of legislation by being included in parliamentary and ministerial committees. Involving them more in the judicial system may be an appropriate way to increase their role in national institutions. Associations of Chiefs in Port Vila and Luganville already mediate when problems arise. The concept of justice in custom places more emphasis on the needs of the community, in contrast to the modern legal system, which focus on the individual. In custom, the offender will be punished and—very important—the victim will be paid compensation, which eases tension and reduces bad feelings. This is achieved through various ceremonies, which allow village life to continue in peace. Such judicial functions could be recognised as an alternative dispute resolution option. There is significant interest in looking again at the system of local government. A Decentralisation Review Committee has been set up to review the current system of 6 Provincial Councils, which came into existence in the mid-1990s, replacing Island Councils of which there were 11. The findings indicate a desire to return to a system involving smaller geo-political units as well as giving local Chiefs a significant role in governing and delivery of services.

Socio-economic disparities Socio-economic disparities have been well documented in United Nations (1996), The Government of Vanuatu (1996 and 1998), Asian Development Bank (1997) and others (Bakeo). All these reports show stagnation or worsening of living conditions for many people as economic growth (averaging 2.5% per annum since 1983), has lagged behind population growth, which averages 2.7% per annum (Tevi and Kaun 2001, p. 3). The economy is not expanding rapidly enough to absorb the increasing number of young people entering the job market. About 3,500 school leavers each year compete for 500 new paid jobs (ADB 1997, 232).

Another problem is the unequal distribution of income and services. The cost of living for Ni-Vanuatu is one of the highest in the region and economic disparities between urban Ni-Vanuatu and expatriates and urban and rural Ni-Vanuatu are substantial (UN and Government of Vanuatu 1996 and ADB 1997). In addition, rural cash incomes are low and they have less access to quality services such as proper drinking water and sanitation. As a result, there is growing dissatisfaction and increasing drift into urban areas.

40

Between 30% and 40% of the population of the largest urban centre, Port Vila, live in squatter settlements. The other main urban centre, Luganville on the island of Santo, would be similar. These settlements are expanding (Vanuatu Government, 1996, 108). Squatters lack access to land, proper sanitation and public services (e.g. water and power supplies). They are vulnerable to disease and domestic and other violence. Housing and nutrition are poor. About 30% of school aged children in one settlement of Port Vila do not attend school (Bong, 1995 in UN and Government of Vanuatu 1996), reducing the chance for the next generation to break the cycle of poverty.

Women suffer from significant inequalities. The disparity in number between boys and girls attending school increases with age. In 1994, only one in four tertiary scholarship holders was female, despite the insistence of scholarship donors for gender parity (ADB 1997, 233). Women also have less access to non-formal education and training. Women’s lack of access to higher education perpetuates the cycle of higher population growth rate, lack of education and poverty and reduces the productive potential of women. Women are under- represented in political institutions, with none elected in the 1998 election. Political, social and economic policy at the family, village and national levels are biased towards the welfare of men.

Only around 30% of primary school leavers go on to junior secondary school and fewer again to senior secondary schools. The low number of highly educated Ni- Vanuatu results in the continuing need for highly paid expatriates—a drain on the country’s resources. Most of the 3,500 annual school leavers are under-qualified for the few paid jobs available. The share of the budget devoted to education has decreased in real terms from 1987 to 1996 from 25.4% to 18.7% of the budget.

Shortages of skills and money and political instability have reduced the quality and quantity of health services. Many rural health posts face closure or a reduced staff. The number of doctors and nurses has declined—there were 12 doctors in 1995, which is half the number in 1981. Malaria is the first cause of infant mortality and malnutrition among children is on the rise. Neonatal deaths in 1994 were the second leading cause of mortality. Immunization of children has decreased slightly in recent years, indicating disparities in the distribution of preventive medicine (ADB 1997, 245-9). These deficiencies increase the potential for crime.

Land At independence, Vanuatu’s new Constitution stated that ‘all land in the Republic belongs to the indigenous custom owners and their descendants’ and that ‘the rules of custom shall form the basis of ownership and use of land in the Republic’ (Chap. 12, para 71 and 72). After independence, former owners of freehold title were given the right to apply for leases. Disputes arose between Ni-Vanuatu over the issue of who were the rightful custom owners, necessitating the Minister 41 of Lands in some cases to grant conditional leases, holding in trust earned rent until true ownership can be resolved. Many such disputes continue to this day.

Now, however, disputes between custom land owners are causing difficulty, impacting negatively on economic development and threatening peace and stability. Disputes between Ni-Vanuatu over land that has never been alienated are increasing. What makes the situation especially threatening is that, except for ad hoc attempts by village chiefs to solve local disputes, no formal system has been established, despite the provision in the Constitution that Government would do so (Chap. 12, para. 76[2]).

Legislation has been drafted to enable Land Tribunals comprising local Chiefs at village and island levels to deal with such disputes. They could be appealed from village to island level, but not beyond. The feeling is that such disputes are best dealt with at this level where custom applies and is best understood. A further concern is unregulated bodies or trusts set up to manage land for village people. No legislation or official control exists, resulting in numerous problems. The resultant loss of income and potential for future development which such land trusts can provide could become a source of social unrest if village people continue to be deprived of their share. Disputes over urban land in Port Vila have created tension and violent outbursts in the past and have the potential to do so again. The main issue concerns the rights to land of the four urban villages on which the town of Port Vila has been built. At independence the government saw the need to create a special category to accommodate the needs of Port Vila and Luganville. In effect, the land has been permanently alienated with compensation being paid to the custom owners. At the time of the pay-outs, most people in the four villages accepted the Government’s solution. Certain individuals, however, have used the issue for their own political ends—claiming land within the town boundary, organising demonstrations and intimidating citizens of the town and surrounding area. Some squatter settlements have developed on both urban and rural land associated with the above mentioned villages. At election time residents of such areas have been pressured to vote for particular candidates or run the risk of being driven out.

Ethnic tension With Vanuatu’s great cultural diversity, there is potential for ethnic tension, especially in the urban areas with large squatter settlements and numerous under educated, unemployed young men. The living conditions in the squatter settlements are demorlising and lead to frustration and violence. Two groups in particular, Tongoans and Tannese, have had some difficulties over the years. They have formed an association in Port Vila involving chiefs from their respective communities to try and deal with the situation. 42

Ni-Vanuatu in the urban areas identify strongly with their islands of origin. This has become the means by which positive behaviour based on traditional attitudes and values is re-enforced. Most groups chose from among their number someone who acts as a Chief to guide and represent them. When problems arise between groups, the existence of leaders whose positions are linked to custom helps to defuse difficult situations. Rivalry between Ni-Vanuatu anglophones and francophones, originating from the colonial past, was a problem in the early years after independence. While it seems to be diminishing, it could become a catalyst for instability.

Suggestions for Consideration 1. Maintain the momentum of reform of institutions of government, including the wide participation in the process of officials and citizens. Of prime importance is the capacity of Government to set strategic directions and to follow through in delivery. 2. Support moves to reform and upgrade Vanuatu’s justice system, including the increase in investigative resources for the Public Prosecutor’s office and the Police. 3. Support moves to investigate the importance and role of traditional custom and values in strengthening governance. 4. Support moves to set up mechanisms to deal with land disputes between Ni-Vanuatu and to regulate the operation of village land trusts. 5. As a means to lessen the potential for ethnic conflict, efforts to further communication and understanding between ethnic groups, especially in the urban areas, should be encouraged. 43

FIJI

Ethnic and socio-cultural issues

When the crises of 1987 and 2000 occurred, the working co-existence of the major ethnic communities became more strained. Some said that persons who had attended multi-cultural schools (Marist, Lelean etc) were generally more tolerant of ethnic difference than others. This may be so (although no solid data is available to confirm it), but spending several years together at the University of the South Pacific seems not to have led to greater inter-ethnic understanding between Fijian and Indian students. However, it seems to have enhanced understanding between other Pacific Islands students, partly because their numbers are smaller, and their cultures less different. Simply educating people in the same institutions is not sufficient, as examples around the world show. We do not comment on the massive literature which has been generated about security-related issues in Fiji beyond noting that the vast majority of the views expressed are from the perspective of Europeans, Indians and other non-Fijians. Despite exceptions, a broad correlation exists between the ethnicity of authors and the views they express. Norton (1999:21-50) appears to us to be one of the more balanced reports, but the range reminds us that scholars are no less liable to bias than others. [A sample of the vast range of books, articles, newsletters, Internet reports, newspaper and other sources relevant to Fiji’s recent political and security affairs includes Fraenkel 2000, Lal 1999, 2000, Mara 1997, Ravuvu 1991, Sanjay 1998-2000, Tuimalali’ifano 2000]. Tensions are always varied, and often layered. In both 1987 and 2000, the major confrontation was between the two major ethnic communities, despite various interacting issues. Once that primary challenge was met, the component fractions within the dominant group then tended to lose their cohesion. Given the natural fragmentation of Melanesian societies, finding ways to expand the bases for higher level cohesion is a major task. When non-Melanesian societies are involved, the task is greater, as cultural diversity is anywhere. This is not to suggest that the difficulty is insurmountable, simply that it is more likely to be surmounted peacefully if the complexity of the task is acknowledged, and appropriate plans for improvement are made and carried out. Ignoring ethnic dimensions and hoping they will go away is likely to lead to further political instability.

Land issues The precolonial principles no longer apply, and would not work well if they did. The colonial model, adopted as a temporary adaptation of the then tradition (which was already changing from that of the century before) is not well adapted to the needs of today or tomorrow, with people highly mobile and with aspirations and technology radically changed. Those systems were designed for, and 44 suited to, earlier phases of Fiji’s history. They now limit the success of Fiji and Fijians, and provoke security breaches. Fijians are torn between becoming more autonomous, and their community interests and obligations. Some are short of workable land in suitable places. An even more serious long-term problem is that commercial production on customary land, or in traditional communities, is almost always very low. This is not just a Fiji matter, it is world-wide. High productivity farming, which is needed to attain the living standards to which many Fijians aspire, needs farmers who are self-selected (the average villager anywhere does not make a productive commercial farmer), and who are not constrained by patterns which evolved in subsistence societies. Aporo Rakoto’s research 20 years ago showed that the productive Fijian sugar farmers in western Viti Levu were self-selected, and were mainly “foreign” to the locality, being from Kadavu, Naitasiri, Taveuni, etc. This is a universal pattern. Successful farmers enhance security. It is the failures who are more likely to express their frustrations in violence. Another area of potential security concern is mineral rights. In the 1970 constitution these belonged to the state. In the 1990 constitution all royalties were to go to the landowners, less government’s administrative expenses. The 1997 constitution left the matter for parliament to determine the details of royalty and compensation, but this has not been done. Provincial councils seem to want all benefits to go to the landowners. This uncertainty, and the claims by Monasavu people for massive additional compensation, and claims by former landowners to freehold land at Emperor Gold Mines, has led to mineral exploration dropping to a small fraction of what it was. This will result in fewer mineral deposits being located, fewer jobs and lower living standards. Similar problems arise in relation to the current dispute over the ownership of the mahogany forests which were planted by the government on leased land which landowners now want back with the trees. Likewise with the takeover of resorts such as Turtle Island during the recent crisis. Although the Turtle Island and Monasavu cases seem to have been resolved, hopefully permanently, their resolution was expensive and highly disruptive. Obviously workable compromises are needed, settlements that can be relied on to last. Few long-term investors (whether local or foreign) will create industries and employment if they perceive much risk of similar events happening again. Long-term resolution of land issues is now an urgent priority.

Socio-economic issues Gaps between “haves” and have-nots” have widened. A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study in 1997 showed that although the Fiji economy grew by 25% in the 14 years 1977-91, more people lived in poverty. In 1991 the top 10% received 35% of total income; the bottom 10% less than 2%. The proportion of households living in poverty is estimated to have increased 45 from about 25% in 1977 to about 40% in 2000. Gaps are likely to have widened again since the 19 May 2000 coup which led to reduced trade, employment, investment and tourism. An immediate impact on security includes more theft and violence. Fewer children are being educated and with teachers emigrating, standards are probably falling. Life expectancy fell slightly from 66.9 in 1986 to 66.5 in 1996 (UNDP 1999). The village is no longer an effective “safety net” for most Fijians, and few non-Fijians have such a net. Although there are richer and poorer in all categories, the richer tend to be non- indigenous, despite some exceptions. This is more than statistics show, for the non-indigenous keep more of their assets abroad, and more frequently take themselves abroad with the investment the nation that has made in them (in education, health services etc). Those who migrate are overwhelmingly among the more skilled, educated, productive and successful citizens. They are also likely to be less prone to commit security breaches than the average. One of the reasons they leave is financial but a major reason seems to be lack of security.

The quality of governance At the time of independence very few people had the four criteria then considered ideal for national leadership: 1. High hereditary rank. 2. Extensive experience as senior government administrators, 3. Training in leadership (in addition to that gained in the two previous categories), and 4. Relatively high education. This made selection of candidates for top leadership (whether by election or selection) relatively straightforward. Values have now changed and the first two criteria are no longer considered essential, the third is barely discussed, and the last is widespread. More people aspire to leadership, and few stand uniquely above the rest as they did at independence. This was probably a factor which led many people to speak to us of a “crisis of leadership”. The issue of ethnic criteria remains contentious. It seems that a sufficient number of Fiji citizens feels so frustrated and unjustly dealt with by sections of the 1997 constitution that, despite its many outstanding features, security will be enhanced by modifying selected aspects of it. The main issues seem to be those relating to reserving the presidency, prime ministership and several other key posts for indigenous Fijians. The benefits of doing so for a time were expressed to us by many senior people in many walks of life. Even former Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudry’s deputy, Dr Tupeni Baba and senior Indian and Fijian colleagues have set up a breakaway New Labour United Party and accuse Mr Chaudhry of being the cause of the coup. They will support a Fijian Prime 46

Minister. Clearly, tolerance levels change, and any such provision should be subject to review in no more than five or ten years. Opponents note that provisions to ensure that certain posts are held by Fijians would be opposed by some sections of the “international community”, and perhaps be met by conscious attempts to weaken the economy, reduce employment, and discredit the nation. Many countries achieve the objective of reserving key posts for certain categories of people by one means or another. In our view, the prospects for prosperity and security will be enhanced by some modest concessions to the views of most Fijians, for a time.

The confusion of cultural values Among Fijians the status of chiefs has declined but confidence in officials has not been maintained either. In the Indian community too, confidence in leaders seems not to be high. In all communities politicians seem to be regarded with growing scepticism. Consumerism erodes all ethical systems. We see no short term solution beyond trying to help school children and adults to understand and live with the new diversity.

Suggestions for consideration 1. Probably the most acute security problem facing Fiji is to restore cohesion in the security forces, and to restore public confidence in them. That is a major reason for the loss of investment, employment and income, as well as the loss of skilled and successful citizens by migration. These factors lower income while increasing poverty and insecurity. 2. Educational institutions need to facilitate communication and understanding between ethnic categories as one of their basic functions, permeating the whole program. It is not so much learning facts about others, but understanding others at a deep personal level, and how to learn to live with difference. 3. A major rethink of land tenure systems is needed to avoid further lowering of living standards, and further aggravating tensions between and within communities. The present system reduces productivity on all land, whether Fijian, freehold or government. It reduces investment, employment and national income, and increases the possibility of violence. This applies not only to Fiji’s two major ethnic categories, but to categories within them such as Hindu and Muslim, Lau and Tailevlu, and many others. 4. We feel that reconsideration of elements of the current constitution can help national security. 47

5. We note that the Great Council of chiefs has adopted a policy of including two women among its Senate Appointees. They may be prepared to consider also including two non-Fijians appointees in their allocation, to try to help bridge the divide and demonstrate the chiefs’ role as national leaders rather than only ethnic leaders. 48

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