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Jewish Tourism in Morocco Hilloulot As a Case Study Jewish Tourism in Morocco Hilloulot as a Case Study Hanane Sekkat Abstract Is it possible to bring together Jews of Moroccan origin wherever they may live and con- vince them to keep in touch with Morocco? This is not merely a question of visiting the country for tourism but, above all, of convincing Moroccan Jews to serve as promoters of Moroccan diplomacy. To achieve this aim, it was imperative to make brave decisions, which is indeed what King Hassan II has done. To give more consistency and significance to the ties of loyalty, the Moroccan state is taking remarkable measures, organising hill- oulot (Hb. ‘pilgrimages’), moments of intense spiritual experience evoking a long Jewish presence in Morocco spanning two thousand years. Keywords: diaspora, hilloula, Moroccan Jewish heritage, quest for identity, religious tourism Jewish tourism in Morocco: hilloulot as a case study his article discusses how the Moroccan state made remarkable efforts Tto reconnect with its Jewish children scattered all over the world and to make the country an emotional attraction for them. In order to achieve this, Morocco capitalised on a long-standing political, religious and symbolic legacy, used various marketing techniques and resorted to the indispensable support of several ‘transmitters of the Jewish heritage’. The organisation of hilloulot (Hb. ‘pilgrimages’, sing. hilloula) to the burial sites of the tsaddikim (Hb. ‘revered saints’) is one of the most notable aspects of such efforts. It is remarkable that ritualistic traditions such as these have been perpetuated and kept alive by a now signifi- cantly reduced community made up of some four thousand Jews still living in Morocco. As is well known, the Moroccan state, being theo- cratic, attaches particular attention and importance to religious events, European Judaism • Volume 52, No. 2, Autumn 2019: 156–164 berghahn© Leo Baeck College N E W Y O R K • O X F O R D www.berghahnbooks.comdoi: 10.3167/ej.2019.520212 Hanane Sekkat • Jewish Tourism in Morocco whether Muslim or Jewish. In this respect, the hilloulot are in many ways a permanent link that connects a diaspora population to its country of origin. This bond requires support and preservation. Morocco needs its Jews not only to promote its sustainable development projects but, espe- cially, to lobby in favour of its ‘sacred’ causes, foremost of which is ter- ritorial integrity (the Sahara question). The late King Hassan II liked to say that few countries could boast of having 750,000 ambassadors living in Israel, as is the case with Morocco. Far from mere rhetoric, he was referring to the visceral attachment of Moroccan Jews to the kingdom and its symbol, the Alawite monarchy. Morocco’s Jewish ambassadors are not limited to residents of Israel. Moroccan Jews who have settled in Western Europe and North and Latin America are also considered part and parcel of the Moroccan nation. Together they constitute the Moroccan Jewish diaspora. The revival of Moroccan Jewish tradition In 1986 the Council of the Jewish Communities of Morocco launched a major initiative to organise a travelling moussem (Ar. ‘gathering’, ‘fair’) that would bring together a large number of Jewish pilgrims from various countries, including Israel, to participate in a journey that would connect the sanctuaries of at least six Jewish saints. The tour spans more than a thousand kilometres, crossing several major regions and giving the pil- grims the opportunity to relax, sightsee, and reconnect with their country of origin. The brochure advertising this event is unremarkable and is similar to those found in the tourist offices of major Moroccan cities. It contains the standard phrases and images used to market Morocco as a tourist destination: sun, mountains, beaches, friendly people, legendary hospi- tality. However, it highlights one exception. The last two pages have a relatively religious tone. The penultimate page features a photo of Rabbi Yahia Lakhdar’s mausoleum together with a short biography of the saint, as well as an icon of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yahia. The last page extols the greatness of these tsaddikim, their faith and their ability to perform mir- acles. The brochure closes with the following sentence: ‘If you think like us that it is essential to keep alive the memory of our masters of Judaism, fly. It is easy, fast, and pleasant’.1 As can be imagined, this package is the outcome of carefully con- ducted market research involving several government departments and agencies. In fact, the project had been approved prior to its launch by dif- ferent ministries, especially the Ministry of the Interior, whose approval European Judaism • Vol. 52 • No. 2 • Autumn 2019 157 Hanane Sekkat • Jewish Tourism in Morocco and support guaranteed both the reception and protection of prospective tourists.2 It should be noted that the celebration of hilloulot has suffered only slightly from the mass departure of Jews from Morocco during the course of the twentieth century. Since the first years of Moroccan independence, the Sharifian authorities have taken numerous measures to support reli- gious activities, both orthodox and popular. The hilloulot became the occa- sion on which to affirm Jewish national belonging. The regular presence of representatives of the state at hilloulot is a token of the benevolence of the king, amir al-muminin (Ar. ‘Commander of the Faithful’). Hilloulot have never fallen out of use. Even at times of crisis, they continued to be celebrated, even if that meant modifying the rules. As for the communi- ties themselves, the celebration of the hilloula became the expression of a refusal ‘to die’. It must be stressed that economic imperatives also nour- ished this determination of community officials to keep it alive: profits from the hilloula became a substitute for taxes on wine, meat and other kosher products, a unique opportunity to increase communal funds. Since 1986, hilloulot have become institutionalised. Their organisation is largely the responsibility of the Council of the Jewish Communities of Morocco (CCJM). Local committees are responsible for matters such as safety and catering although, in some cases, it is the descendants of the saint who are in charge of ensuring that the event goes smoothly. The central rabbinate has set up a schedule that aims at extending the dura- tion of the pilgrimage to an eight-day circuit so that pilgrims can attend a maximum number of hilloulot. However, few pilgrims have shown interest in this, preferring instead to celebrate the hilloula of their own particular saint, counting on his baraka (Hb. ‘blessing’) to gain salvation both in this world and the hereafter. The oldest hilloula, and indeed the most prestigious thanks to its simplicity and popularity, is that of Rabbi Amran ben Diwan in Asjen, near Ouazzane. The hilloula of Rabbi David ben Barrouk in Ouled Berhil (Taroudant province) is gaining in importance and attracting growing numbers of pilgrims. The hilloulot of Rabbi Yahya Lakhdar (Ben Ahmed region, province of Settat) and the rabbi of Ouled Ben Zmirou (province of Safi) have also survived, each attracting thousands of pilgrims. In the north of the country, especially in Tetuan, we are witnessing the revival of Rabbi Itshak Ben Gualid’s hilloula, with three hundred people attend- ing in 2013. In Meknes, however, the hilloula is celebrated in a private apartment while in Fez the community club serves as a meeting place. The most popular hilloulot are the rural ones (Ar. beldi).3 They have a special flavour or smell as candles are burnt throughout thehilloula and are thought to increase the intensity of the prayer. The more candles 158 European Judaism • Vol. 52 • No. 2 • Autumn 2019 Hanane Sekkat • Jewish Tourism in Morocco are lit, the wider the doors of heaven will open. One prays for oneself, for loved ones, for the king, for peace and, in one’s inner self, for Israel. Everyone remembers at least one anecdote about some miracle that has been fulfilled. Demonstrating their fervent and sincere faith, men and women pray for the end of this or that person’s suffering, or pray for those who have become blind, deaf, mute, sterile, paraplegic, insane or possessed, hoping that when the pilgrims leave the saint that individual will be able to see, hear, speak, have children, be wise or exorcised. Some even claim to have personally witnessed such miracles. In its present form, the hilloula confirms the desire to identify with one’s ancestors. It is intended to reproduce, albeit in a crude way, the rituals and customs that highlighted the authenticity and rootedness of Jewish values. Except for a very observant minority, most pilgrims are not religious. Nevertheless, during the hilloula they return to a stricter observance of religious tradition. Communal joy stimulates the spiritual ego and brings out the Jew in them. The hilloula responds to the pil- grims’ yearning for the supernatural, providing a palliative for the pain caused by nostalgia. Hilloulot also serve an important function for those Jews still living in Morocco, symbolising their union with the wider Moroccan Jewish community outside Morocco. Needless to say, for the makhzen (Ar. ‘state’), it is the Moroccan Jewish diaspora that counts the most. The baraka of the saint in the service of the state: indispensable Jewish support The interest Morocco has shown in Jewish communities of Moroccan origin, and its quest to reconnect with those who are constantly consid- ered its children and eternal subjects of his majesty, is justified by several imperatives. The most decisive of these is the political and diplomatic stalemate that has resulted from the deterioration of the situation in the Moroccan Sahara. The Sahara Affair, which the government has rightly used as a powerful tool to reinforce national cohesion and make the Alawite throne the only nationalist pole of attraction, has plunged the country into a difficult situation both economically and militarily.
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