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CEO Preferences and Acquisitions*
CEO Preferences and Acquisitions* Dirk Jenter Katharina Lewellen Stanford University and NBER Tuck School at Dartmouth [email protected] [email protected] This draft: October 2013 * We are grateful for comments and suggestions from Kenneth Ahern, Jeffrey Coles, Jess Cornaggia, John Graham, Charles Hadlock, Jarrad Harford, Simi Kedia, Kai Li, Kevin J. Murphy, Francisco Perez- Gonzalez, Adriano Rampini, Myron Scholes, Geoffrey Tate, Ralph Walkling, Ivo Welch, Rebecca Zarutskie, Jeffrey Zwiebel, seminar participants at Arizona State University, Duke University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Indiana University, the London School of Economics, Michigan State University, Nanyang Technological University, National University of Singapore, Singapore Management University, Stanford University, the Stockholm School of Economics, the University of Alberta, the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and conference participants at the 2011 Econometric Society Meeting, the 2011 Western Finance Association Meeting, the 2011 Duke-UNC Corporate Finance Conference, the 2011 SFS Cavalcade, and the 2012 University of Washington Summer Finance Conference. CEO Preferences and Acquisitions This paper explores the impact of target CEOs’ retirement preferences on takeovers. Mergers frequently force target CEOs to retire early, and CEOs’ private merger costs are the forgone benefits of staying employed. Using retirement age as a proxy for CEOs’ private merger costs, we find strong evidence that target CEO preferences affect merger patterns. The likelihood of receiving a successful takeover bid is sharply higher when target CEOs are close to age 65. Takeover activity is elevated in a narrow window around age 65, with only a small gradual increase as CEOs approach retirement age. -
Economic Consequences of CEO Reappointments Michael Erkens
Welcome back? Economic consequences of CEO reappointments Michael Erkensa Ying Ganb Hervé Stolowyc aErasmus University Rotterdam, Accounting Research Group, Postbus 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands; [email protected] bErasmus University Rotterdam, Accounting Research Group, Postbus 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands; [email protected] cHEC Paris, Department of Accounting and Management Control, 1 rue de la Libération, 78351 - Jouy-en-Josas, France; [email protected] This version: December 5, 2014 Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Thomas Jeanjean, Ayse Karaevli, Wayne Landsman, Luc Paugam, Joshua Ronen and David Veenman for helpful comments. We appreciate comments from workshop participants at ESSEC (2015), HEC Paris (2015), NYU (2014) and WHU (2014). Hervé Stolowy is a member of the GREGHEC, CNRS Unit, UMR 2959. He expresses his thanks to HEC Paris (research funding 4F73ASTOLOWH). The authors also acknowledge Clara Boecher, Matthieu Lagarde, Markan Tsurkan, Mario Vaupel, Jiayue Zhou and Katy Zhou for their valuable research assistance. Welcome back? Economic consequences of CEO reappointments Abstract We analyze reappointments of former CEOs of U.S. listed firms over the period 1992 – 2013. For a sample of 117 CEO reappointments, we find that shareholders of these firms experience statistically significant negative stock valuation consequences. Our findings are robust to multiple return measurement windows and alternative definitions of abnormal returns. We also document that market reactions depend on certain executive-specific attributes, such as whether she is the founder of the firm or whether she is also appointed as chairman of the board of directors. Finally, we show that firm performance deteriorates after a former CEO is appointed relative to appointing a non-former CEO. -
Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors
Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Li, Feng, and Suraj Srinivasan. "Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors." Journal of Financial Economics 102, no. 2 (November 2011): 454–469. Published Version 10.2139/ssrn.1014157;http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/pii/S0304405X11001462 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:29660922 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#OAP Corporate Governance when Founders are Directors Feng Li Ross School of Business University of Michigan Phone: (734) 936-2771 Fax: (734) 936-0282 Email: [email protected] Suraj Srinivasan Harvard Business School Phone: (617) 495 6993 Fax: (617) 496-7363 Email: [email protected] December 2010 Forthcoming: Journal of Financial Economics Abstract: We examine CEO compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms. -
Public Comments October 30 to November 12, 2013
Public Comments October 30 to November 12, 2013 From: Ron Conway Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2013 3:03 PM To: Nancy Bechtle Subject: Join me in supporting the Lucas Cultural Arts Museum in the Presidio in SF To the Board of the Presidio Trust: As you know, I have a passion for making and keeping San Francisco at the forefront of innovation. Through sf.citi, the nonprofit organization I founded to help promote San Francisco as the country’s 21st century capital of technology and forward thinking, I watch every day the work of countless artists, technicians and talented people that keep this city at the top of its game. I believe that the Lucas Cultural Arts Museum is the perfect addition to San Francisco’s cityscape: not only an attraction that will generate interest in and support for the Presidio (not to mention millions of dollars each year in revenue for the Presidio through land rents) but specifically as a beacon that says to the world that San Francisco is, and will remain, this country’s capital of innovation. Certainly, there is no greater innovator around than George Lucas. His films and his vision have transformed cinema. His businesses have transformed the tech sector, specifically digital technology. And, his passion for education has resulted in a world-class collection of art (still growing) that is second to none. San Francisco deserves this museum. It demands it. I, along with those listed below, are supporting this museum not because of George Lucas, but rather because of the promise it represents. -
Innovation in Founder-Run Firms: Evidence from S&P 500 Md
Innovation in Founder-run Firms: Evidence from S&P 5001 Md Emdadul Islam2 Abstract One important element of a firm’s organizational environment that may influence innovation is whether the CEO of the firm is its founder. Popular perception is that the inherent venturous spirit of the founders creates an environment that fosters innovation. This study investigates whether founder-CEOs are more innovative than non-founder CEOs. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms from 1995-2005 and the NBER patent database for measuring innovation output, the study’s baseline results suggest that founder-CEOs are actually associated with fewer patents (quantity of innovation) and fewer citations (quality of innovations), a finding that is contrary to popular perception. However, to reveal the true picture of the innovativeness of founders, evaluating the effect of innovation output on overall firm valuation is necessary. Thus, the study considers the effect of innovation output on firm valuation and suggests that founder-CEOs add more value by innovation. The market greets the innovation output of founder-run firms more favorably than the innovation output of non-founder-run firms. This value addition holds even after controlling for strategic investments such as R&D. This finding helps to identify a probable channel-innovation that bridges, at least partially, the gap in the literature that shows that there is a ‘founder-premium’ Keywords: Founder-CEO, Innovation, Patents, Citations, R&D JEL classification: G32,G34,O31,O32,O34 1 The author would like to thank Professor Dr. Renée Adams, Commonwealth Bank Chair in Finance at UNSW Business School, UNSW Australia and Dr. -
210205-Jeff-Bezos.Pdf
Breaking News English.com Ready-to-Use English Lessons by Sean Banville “1,000 IDEAS & ACTIVITIES Thousands more free lessons FOR LANGUAGE TEACHERS” from Sean's other websites breakingnewsenglish.com/book.html www.freeeslmaterials.com/sean_banville_lessons.html Level 3 - 5th February, 2021 Jeff Bezos stepping down as Amazon CEO FREE online quizzes, mp3 listening and more for this lesson here: https://breakingnewsenglish.com/2102/210205-jeff-bezos.html Contents The Article 2 Discussion (Student-Created Qs) 15 Warm-Ups 3 Language Work (Cloze) 16 Vocabulary 4 Spelling 17 Before Reading / Listening 5 Put The Text Back Together 18 Gap Fill 6 Put The Words In The Right Order 19 Match The Sentences And Listen 7 Circle The Correct Word 20 Listening Gap Fill 8 Insert The Vowels (a, e, i, o, u) 21 Comprehension Questions 9 Punctuate The Text And Add Capitals 22 Multiple Choice - Quiz 10 Put A Slash ( / ) Where The Spaces Are 23 Role Play 11 Free Writing 24 After Reading / Listening 12 Academic Writing 25 Student Survey 13 Homework 26 Discussion (20 Questions) 14 Answers 27 Please try Levels 0, 1 and 2 (they are easier). Twitter twitter.com/SeanBanville Facebook www.facebook.com/pages/BreakingNewsEnglish/155625444452176 THE ARTICLE From https://breakingnewsenglish.com/2102/210205-jeff-bezos.html The founder of Amazon.com, Jeff Bezos, will step down from his role as CEO (Chief Executive Officer). Mr Bezos, 57, announced he will finish as CEO later this year. Instead of being CEO, he will take on the new role of Amazon's executive chair. He will pass on the position of CEO to Andy Jassy. -
How Does the Influence of Founders and Investors Relate to Employee Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms?
How Does the Influence of Founders and Investors Relate to Employee Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms? Ola Bengtsson* and John R. M. Hand** First draft: May 2010 This draft: November 2010 Abstract Employment in entrepreneurial firms is often associated with non-pecuniary benefits and access to unique technologies. We provide evidence that these work motivators are higher when the founder has more (and outside investors have less) influence over the firm’s decision-making. In particular, we show that the degree of control exerted by venture capital investors helps explain the design of non- CEO employee compensation contracts. Across 18,935 employee compensation contracts from 1,809 U.S. firms, we find that those with more VC / less founder dominance pay their employees higher cash salaries, provide stronger cash and equity incentives, and have more formal pay policies in place. However, the differences in cash pay and incentives only apply to hired-on employees and not to founders. Founders are special in that they receive similar compensation contracts regardless of the company’s degree of founder/VC dominance. Our results are consistent with the argument that investor control changes the nature of hired-on employment in innovative, high-potential small businesses. We thereby shed new light on how innovative small businesses evolve into professionalized companies, the role that venture capitalists play in this evolution, and the determinants of entrepreneurial compensation. *University of Illinois and ** University of North Carolina. We are grateful to VentureOne and Brendan Hughes for providing the survey data to us, and for valuable comments from workshop participants at Drexel University. -
ARE FOUNDER Ceos MORE OVERCONFIDENT THAN PROFESSIONAL Ceos?
ARE FOUNDER CEOs MORE OVERCONFIDENT THAN PROFESSIONAL CEOs? EVIDENCE FROM S&P 1500 COMPANIES Joon Mahn Lee Krannert School of Management Purdue University 403 W State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907 [email protected] Byoung-Hyoun Hwang 1 Cornell SC Johnson College of Business Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management Cornell University Warren Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 [email protected] and Korea University Business School Korea University Anam-dong, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, Korea 136-701 Hailiang Chen Department of Information Systems City College of Business University of Hong Kong Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong [email protected] Keywords: Overconfidence, Founder CEOs, Professional CEOs, Corporate Governance 1 All authors contributed equally. Corresponding author: Byoung-Hyoun Hwang, [email protected]. ABSTRACT Research Summary We provide evidence that founder CEOs of large S&P 1500 companies are more overconfident than their non-founder counterparts (“professional CEOs”). We measure overconfidence via CEO tweets, CEO statements during earnings conference calls, management earnings forecasts, and CEO option-exercise behavior. Compared with professional CEOs, founder CEOs use more optimistic language on Twitter and during earnings conference calls. In addition, founder CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts that are too high; they are also more likely to perceive their firms to be undervalued, as implied by their option-exercise behavior. To date, investors appear unaware of this “overconfidence bias” among founders. Managerial Summary: This paper helps to explain why firms managed by founder CEOs behave differently from those managed by professional CEOs. We study a sample of S&P 1500 firms and find strong evidence that founder CEOs are significantly more overconfident than professional CEOs. -
5-16 BOD Addition.Pdf
Shutterstock Announces Appointment of Deirdre Bigley to Board of Directors NEW YORK, NY, May 11, 2016 -- Shutterstock, Inc. (NYSE: SSTK), a leading global provider of commercial imagery and music, today announced Deirdre M. Bigley, Chief Marketing Officer for Bloomberg L.P, has been appointed to the company’s board of directors. Ms. Bigley will also serve on the compensation committee and nominating and corporate governance committee of the board. “Deirdre brings with her a wealth of expertise and understanding related to marketing global technology businesses,“ said Jon Oringer, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Shutterstock. “Her insights in managing a variety of marketing and sales services and her profound knowledge of driving brand strategy in a B2B environment will prove valuable as we continue to grow and build the company.” As Chief Marketing Officer for Bloomberg L.P., Deirdre oversees the marketing for all Bloomberg businesses including financial products, media and vertical industries globally. Prior to joining Bloomberg in 2009, Bigley spent 13 years at IBM, serving in her final years as Vice President of Worldwide Advertising and Interactive and Vice President of Worldwide Brand. Deirdre currently serves as a member of the Ad Council Board of Directors and as a New York member on the Business Marketing Association Board of Directors. “I am delighted to be joining Shutterstock’s Board at such an exciting time in its evolution,” said Ms. Bigley. “Shutterstock’s dynamic business model, history of growth and continued investment in its technology signal exciting times ahead. Through my board participation, I plan to help the company enhance its competitive advantage and help build long-term brand value for customers, contributors and shareholders.” Deirdre has been honored with a number of awards throughout her career, including AWNY Top 50 Women in Advertising, the Gertrude Crain Award for Top Women in Business Marketing, B2B Magazine Top Marketer and Top Integrated Campaign and Working Mother Magazine's Top "Established Mom" Award. -
The Effectiveness of CEO Leadership Styles in the Technology Industry
The Effectiveness of CEO Leadership Styles in the Technology Industry Sean Dougherty, Andrew Drake Advisors: Dr. Jonathan Scott and Professor Katherine Nelson Temple University Explanation of research The purpose of this research is to determine the impact of leadership style on financial success. A great deal of research has been done on the factors that affect the financial success of a company, but leadership is one factor that tends to be overlooked. That is due to the nature of leadership; like other aspects of human resources management such as company culture, leadership is not easily quantifiable. In order to study leadership’s effect on company success, we needed to make leadership less abstract and more concrete. We needed a means of distinguishing the way one person leads in comparison to another person, and the solution was presented to us upon reading Primal Leadership. Authors Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee make the detailed claim that the way a person leads can always be categorized into at least one of six distinct emotional leadership styles. We seek to build on the research of Goleman, Boyatzis, and McKee by analyzing the effectiveness of each of these styles in terms of driving financial success. To measure financial success, we looked at the behavior of stock price in the time following an initial public offering. For our data set, we chose to study 60 companies in the technology industry that have gone public since the year 2000. With each company, we researched the CEO who led the company during the IPO and assigned him or her one to two leadership styles that he or she exhibits. -
From Zero to $1B in Less Than Five Years
CRAIN’S® NEW YORK BUSINESS VOL. XXX, NO. 41 WWW.CRAINSNEWYORK.COM OCTOBER 13-19, 2014 PRICE: $3.00 50 They run New York’s From zero fastest-growing companies MEET ALL 50 OF THEM, INCLUDING #1, STARTING ON PAGE 16 to $1B in #14 less than YEXT: Howard Lerman found a five years big opportunity #4 correcting outdated NEOSTEM: information about Acquisitions have businesses online. helped Dr. Robin L. First billion-dollar Smith grow her cell-therapy startups prove startup 7,998%. New York firms can grow at warp speed BY MATTHEW FLAMM When Kevin Ryan was building DoubleClick in the late 1990s, he #47 couldn’t persuade a single West SHUTTERSTOCK: Jon Oringer’s customers Coast executive to quit his job and downloaded 100 million move to New York to work at the pictures last year. ad-tech pioneer. There are many reasons why he and other local en- trepreneurs don’t have that prob- lem now, but a summary might boil down to the growth in New York’s billion-dollar valuation club. Granted, private-company valu- ations can be fleeting, subject to hype and the whims of the market, and this is one more area in which Silicon Valley vastly overshadows New York. Most IF THESE members of the FAST 50 so-called unicorn ARE SO club—billion-dol- GREAT, WHY lar startups being ARE NEARLY rare beasts—are A THIRD PROFITLESS? based in Califor- PAGE 31 nia, where they barely warrant mention unless their valuations touch double- digit billions, like Dropbox ($10 billion) or Uber ($18 billion). -
Ronald Conway and Family - Committee Summary Based on Data Exported from the Ethics Commission Campaign Finance Database - 1/1/2010 Through 10/28/2012
Ronald Conway and Family - Committee Summary Based on data exported from the Ethics Commission Campaign Finance Database - 1/1/2010 through 10/28/2012 Filer/Committee Total Amount SAN FRANCISCANS FOR FAIR TAXES AND BETTER CITY SERVICES, YES ON E, A $275,000.00 BROAD COALITION OF SMALL BUSINESSES, LABOR UNIONS, AND TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES San Franciscans for Jobs and Good Government, Supporting Ed Lee for Mayor $105,693.62 2011 YES ON B, SAN FRANCISCANS FOR CLEAN AND SAFE NEIGHBORHOOD PARKS, $100,100.00 WITH MAJOR SUPPORT FROM SAN FRANCISCO PARKS ALLIANCE, RON CONWAY AND THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND SAN FRANCISCO WOMEN FOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND A RESPONSIBLE $69,000.00 SUPERVISOR OPPOSING CHRISTINA OLAGUE 2012 Coalition For Civil Sidewalks $65,000.00 San Francisco Alliance For Jobs and Sustainable Growth PAC $60,000.00 Mayor Ed Lee for San Francisco Committee $49,000.00 Cunnie for Sheriff 2011 sponsored by the San Franc $35,000.00 Coalition for Sustainable Housing, A Committee in Support of Proposition C $25,000.00 San Franciscans United for Pension and Health Reform, Yes on C, No on D, a $25,000.00 coalition of public employees, taxpayers and business groups SAVE HETCH HETCHY, NO ON F, A COALITION OF BUSINESS, LABOR AND $25,000.00 TAXPAYERS, WITH MAJOR FUNDING BY THE SAN FRANCISCO FOUNDATION, DIGNITY HEALTH, AND THE BAY AREA COUNCIL Why Tuesday San Francisco $25,000.00 San Francisco Parent Political Action Committee $20,000.00 A New San Francisco Majority in Support of the Democratic County Central $15,000.00 Committee 2012 * YES ON PROPOSITION B, supported by Public Defender Jeff Adachi, author $15,000.00 Harriet Heyman, business investors Michael Moritz & Warren Hellman, Basic American Goods executives…(Complete Name See Form 410) San Franciscans For A Better Muni, A Coalition Of Muni Riders, Concerned $10,000.00 Citizens, And Supervisor Sean R.