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Implementing pollution control in federal Russia: How context matters and why multi-level implementation has a long way to go.
Paper to be presented at:
International Conference on Public Policy
Milan, Italy, July 01-04, 2015
Elena Gorianova
Department of Politics and Contemporary European Studies
School of Law, Politics and Sociology
University of Sussex
Abstract
With environmental policy taking the centre stage of this academic investigation, this paper concentrates its analysis on the federal system of Russia. A focused comparative analysis takes up the under-researched field of pollution-control regulation in the Post-Soviet extraction industry and explores it through a case-study of two very different Russian regions – Republic of Tatarstan and Nenets Autonomous Okrug. The analysis reveals a range of problems presented by regional contextual differences and how these can influence the “beyond compliance” efforts in different regions. It is also revealed why certain instruments may work in one region and not in another. The paper concludes that the local level is most suited for analysis if significant advance is to be made with implementation of the environmental policy objectives.
Key words: environmental regulation, Russian Federation, beyond compliance, regional context.
Introduction
The traditional approaches to analysing implementation have overly focused on the assumption of a top-down model of implementation. Using compliance as a measure of implementation has further exacerbated the top-down perception of the process in academic research and in government analysis alike. However, non-compliance does not necessarily imply poor implementation, just as successful implementation cannot always guarantee full compliance. This is especially the case in multi-level implementation, where the policy makers are far removed – physically and structurally as well as potentially ideologically – from the street-level bureaucrats responsible for policy delivery and from the conditions in which the latter group works.
In such complex, hierarchical systems of implementation even a well-designed and -written policy cannot always hope to achieve success if the context of various target areas has not been taken into consideration and if the implementation structure is too inflexible. On the other hand, some lower tiers of the implementation hierarchy might find themselves to be more capable - financially, methodologically and ideologically - to strive for higher results than those required in the official policy from the top level. In these cases, these lower tiers might choose to move beyond compliance without superordinate obligations to do so.
It is the purpose of this paper to examine a case study of each above-mentioned situation to illustrate why a top-down implementation analysis focusing on compliance cannot always be efficient or even useful in analysing processes and outcomes. Two Russian federal subjects are examined – the Nenets County in the Russian European north, and the southern Republic of Tatarstan. Both territories have their special circumstances, which have impacted very differently on how each approaches implementation and what extra steps each is prepared and is capable of taking. Both have chosen to move beyond compliance.
These findings are discussed in the context of a broader academic study seeking to analyse regional variations that assist implementers in regulating local oil industries vis-à-vis the latters’ environmental impact. The countries under examination are transitional states, moving from one economic, political or social regime to another, since a significant portion of the world’s oil is today found in such uncertain circumstances. Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan had been selected for closer examination given the high level of similarity at the national level, yet there is a high degree of differentiation at the local level. Given the sheer physical territory, the three offer impressive variation on socio- economic, climatic, geographical, social, developmental and other characteristics.
Given the predominant approaches in academic literature, three explanatory variables were selected – state capacity, foreign presence (oil firms, NGOs and IGOs) and economic diversification. Over a hundred interviews will be conducted with representatives of the various stakeholder groups at the federal and regional levels. These include current and former government officials, implementers, academics, experts, employees of domestic, foreign and joint venture oil firms, their subcontractors, members of the judiciary, activists and members of domestic and international non-governmental organisations, members of international governmental organisations and members of the press. Ninety-nine of these have already been completed across Russia and Kazakhstan. Interview data is supplemented with documentary analysis of governmental, NGO, IGO and media reports and data.
This study also aims to go beyond the traditional approaches to analysing the environmental problems of Russia, which too often focus either on the federal level1 or on the impact of federal events on subnational levels23, and which increasingly appears to have given up on the analysis of formal practices altogether4, instead increasingly favouring the arguments for informal practices and the potential power of environmental civil movements 5 6 7 8 and environmental governance910.
By focusing on moderate successes rather then big failures through the analysis of two regions and their governmental capacity in relation to their contextual peculiarities, this study offers an in-depth look into how regional variations shape the strengths and opportunities of the local governing structures, and how the latter find ways to take advantage of their contexts. In such a move away from the traditional top-down analysis, the paper hopes to contribute towards the existing literature that dispels the perception that the state capacity has become redundant in the Federal Russia, for the policy and implementation at the central level do not reflect or necessarily cause the minor or the significant achievements of the sub-national levels.
In order to illustrate this the next two sections will set the context by providing a brief overview of the Russian federal and regional situations in relation to environmental regulation. The following two sections will examine the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (AO) and the Republic of Tatarstan (RT) respectively in greater detail. The concluding section will summarise the lessons from the case studies as well as compare their achievements and underline the problems with multi-level implementation.
1 Peterson, D.J. and Bielke, E.K., (2001), ‘The reorganization of Russia’s Environmental Bureaucracy: Implications and Prospects’, in Post-Soviet Geography and Economicsm 42(1): 65-76. 2 Crotty, J., and Rodgers, P., (2012), ‘Reorganization of Russian’s Environmental Bureaucracy. Regional Interpretation and the Response of Key Actors’, in Problems of Post-Communism, 59(4): 15-26. 3 Honnerland, G. and Jorgensen, A.K., (2002), ‘Implementing Russia’s International Environmental Commitments: Federal Prerogative or Region Concern?’, in Europe-Asia Studies, 54(8): 1223-1240. 4 Tokunaga, M., (2010), ‘Environmental governance in Russia: the ‘closed’ path to ecological modernization’, Environment and Planning, 42: 1686-1704. 5 Crotty, J., (2009), ‘Making a difference? NGOs and civil society development in Russia’, in Europe-Asia Studies, 61: 85–108. 6 Henry L. A., (2002), ‘Two paths to a greener future: environmentalism and civil society development in Russia’, in Demokratizatsiya, 10: 184–206. 7 Henry, L.A., (2010), ‘Between transnationalism and state power: the development of Russia’s post-Soviet environmental movement’, in Environmental Politics, 19(5): 756-781. 8 Yanitsky, O.N., (2012), ‘From nature protection to politics: the Russian environmental movement 1960- 2010’, in Environmental Politics, 21(6): 922-940. 9 Oldfield, J.O., (2002), ‘Russian environmentalism’, in European Environment, 12(2): 117-129. 10 Wernstedt, K., (2002), ‘Environmental Protection in the Russian Federation: Lessons and Opportunities’, in Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 45(4): 493-516.
Multi-level implementation of the environmental law in Federal Russia
The first environmental laws in Russia appeared in the 1990s following the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent creation of the Russian Federation. In effect, the environmental legal sphere came to Russia 30 years after the development in this field first started in the United States of America. However, today Russian environmental legislation has become a voluminous, complex body of legal literature, which addresses most of the environmental problems faced by the modern economy11 and in some cases even exceeds internationally recognised and endorsed requirements12. Russia is a signatory to most of the key international environmental protection treaties and conventions. Furthermore, Russia has supposedly opted out of the Kyoto Protocol’s second round on the basis of a criticism that the document does not go far enough13.
To be effective, however, a law needs be complied with, and for that an effective administrative structure capable of law enforcement is required. Arguably, the administrative transformation has not been as successful as the developments in the legal sphere. The initial reforms in the sphere of environmental protection suffered a fragmented and inadequately coordinated implementation across more than ten uncooperative government bodies, which were simultaneously and thus paradoxically responsible for economic growth and environmental protection with regards to their respective areas of the natural world14. The engrained, ideological prioritisation of production over efficiency had caused several attempts at structural reorganisation to miss their objectives.
Since then the Russian administrative structure for environmental management and protection has undergone many more reorganisations, transformations and renaming. Many areas are no longer regulated15. Regulatory entities have been reorganised and continually downsized16 and downgraded17, their powers have been taken away18 and funding has been cut19. After being elevated to ministry status, environmental issues once again started to fall in priority in the second
11 OECD, (2006), Environmental Policy and Regulation in Russian. In Implementation Challenge. Available online from:
As of today, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation is responsible for environmental elements in relation to the subsoil use, water quality, air quality, flora and fauna. The main regulatory bodies are listed in the table below.
Source: Practical Law A Thomson Reuters Legal Solution20
However, beyond these governmental bodies environmental protection functions are also partially carried out by, but not limited to:
– Rospotrebnadzor – Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights and Human Well-Being – Gosgortechnadzor – Federal Industrial Supervision Service – Rosselhoznadzor – Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance, a subdivision of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation – Rosrybolovstvo – Federal Service for Fishing, a subdivision of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation
20 Practical Law, (2012), Environmental law and practice in Russian Federation: overview. Available online from:
Regional Environmental Protection
Significant changes also occurred at the sub-national levels. Firstly, this happened due to the 1992 ‘Treaty of Delimitation of Objects of Jurisdiction and Powers between the Federal Bodies of the State Authority of the Russian Federation and Bodies of Authority of the Republics within the Russian Federation’. The powers previously enjoyed by the central committees, departments and ministries were delegated to the sub-national levels, allowing for a more targeted approach towards solving environmental problems specific to individual Russian territorial subjects.
The transformation of the independent Ministry for Environmental Protection into a subordinate of the Ministry for Natural Resources did not necessarily affect the structure at the regional level as the regions continued to enjoy their new powers. The regional committees might have changed their names due to the reorganisation, but continued to perform the same regulation and control functions21.
However, along with the potential benefits came the traditional disadvantages of a decentralised system – too many and poorly coordinated points of jurisdiction 22 23 with shared and overlapping powers and responsibilities 24 , which slowed down the regulators’ reaction time, fostered responsibility evasion and decreased accountability25. The inflamed number of regulatory bodies has also increased the competition for the public budget, and in so doing fostered competition rather than cooperation vis-a-vis implementation work, as well as further contributing to the inefficient use of allocated resources.
Environmental protection was enforceable simultaneously at the federal and sub-national levels. Different objects of the natural world were subject to different combinations of jurisdiction and could fall under the auspices of federal and regional jurisdictions, federal and municipal, municipal and regional, or only federal / regional / municipal. Different operations of one private firm, or indeed different stages of a same project could be subject to regulation by different regulatory bodies, different levels of jurisdiction, and / or require the approval of several regulatory bodies at different levels at once.
The system was simplified in 2003 and 2004 when several responsibilities were taken away from the subnational levels. Subsoil, water and air became objects of
21 Crotty and Rodgers, 2012. 22 Crotty, J., (2002), ‘Economic transition and pollution in the Russian Federation: Beyond Pollution Intensification?’, in Europe-Asia Studies, 54(2): 299-316. 23 Bell, R.G., (2000), ‘Building Trust: Laying a Foundation for Environmental Regulation in the Former Soviet Bloc’, in Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 42(2): 20-32. 24 Henry, L.A., and Douhovnikoff, V., (2008), ‘Environmental Issues in Russia’, in Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 33: 437–60. 25 Kotov, V., and Nikitina, E., (2002), Reorganisation of environmental policy in Russia: the decade of success and failures in implementation and perspective quests. Fond. Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Ser. Available online from:
This simplified matters from the point of view of the private sector but made implementation of environmental protection more difficult by further weakening the enforcement structures. For example, the subnational levels remained responsible for the overall environmental situation on their territories, but lost the legal power to regulate key polluters, such as the extraction industry. However, should the federal regulator perform poorly, it is the region that will suffer the consequences.
Nevertheless, the subnational levels do reserve the power to pass their own legislation. Such legislation may not contradict the federal law, but can supplement it and fill in the gaps in order to tailor the general direction to the specific circumstances of the area. Clearer directions and guidance can be included for implementation efforts, and additional requirements can be put on the target group. This approach has long been advocated in the academic literature, for it allows for appropriate laws to be created at the spatial scale and administrative level of the environmental problem itself2829.
What is more, it has become a common and legally required practice to hold public hearings for each future project planned by a private firm, which might have a potentially negative impact upon the environment, as well as commencing an official Environmental Impact Assessment. This means that each future action of a polluter has the opportunity to be carefully scrutinised by those who will be most affected by the proposed work as well as by the “scientifically sophisticated activists” of the environmental NGO sector30. In so doing, the local government opens up the decision-making process to the public by creating a formal arena where grievances on the relevant topic can be voiced and answers received directly from the polluter. Although this format of participation is not in practice strictly binding upon the local government or the polluter, it does undoubtedly rebuild some of the trust in government lost at the end of the previous century31 and goes some way towards improved implementation.
However, some territorial subjects of the Russian Federation have chosen to take steps even beyond these measures and it is to two such cases that this paper now turns its attention.
26 Richter, J., (2009), ‘The Ministry of Civil Society? The Public Chambers in the Regions’, in Problems of Post- Communism, 56(6): 7–20. 27 Crotty and Rogdgers, 2012. 28 Newig, J. and Fritsch, O., (2009), ‘Environmental Governance: Participatory, Multi-Level – and Effective?’, in Environmental Policy and Governance, 19: 197-214. 29 Young, O.R., (2002), The Institutional Dimensions of Environmental Change: Fit, Interplay, and Scale, Global Environmental Accord. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 30 Wernstedt, 2002, p.493. 31 Bell, 2000.
Nenets Autonomous Okrug
Overview
Nenets AO is located in the north-west of Russia, on the coast of the Barents Sea, which it shares with Finland and Norway. The physical area of the okrug is almost exactly half that of Germany. Its physical geography is dominated by Arctic tundra – a treeless expanse of land with permanently frozen subsoil (permafrost). Winters last for approximately eight months a year when the surface of the land remains frozen and covered with snow. During the other four months the surface snows melt to reveal marshland. The okrug is subject to polar nights (two months with no sun) and polar days (two months without sunset) in winter and summer respectively.
Due to the severe geographic conditions there is no infrastructure in the okrug. The few, centralised human settlements are connected by a few kilometres of road, but there is no railroad, and access to the okrug and (for the most part) around it is possible only by air. Snow going vehicles can be used during the winter months, but given the size of the region they are impractical for long- distance travel.
Despite the severe climate, the Arctic tundra is an extremely diverse and very fragile eco-system; any upset to which could make the territory uninhabitable for human population as well as causing stark damage to the world’s biodiversity. Due to the extent of potential risks carried by environmental mismanagement, and perhaps also owing to the fact that the okrug shares borders with such environmental leaders as Norway and Finland, the okrug has attracted much attention from international non-governmental and intergovernmental organisation. WWF and the Norwegian Barents Secretariat have offices in the okrug capital city of Naryan-Mar. Greenpeace shows frequent interest in the region, and UNDP and Global Environmental Fund run joint environmental programmes in the area in partnership with the governing structures.
In terms of economic sectors, the okrug plays host to large herds of reindeer and their herders – the ethnic minority, Nenets people, which constitutes 15% of the okrug’s approx. 45,000 strong population32. Deer husbandry remains a key industry 33 but the other traditional sector – fishing – has deteriorated significantly. Today, fuel-related sectors make up 97-98 per cent of all the industry in the okrug, which include power plants and oil and gas extraction works3435, as well as geological exploration. Consequently, Nenets AO can be
32 The Norwegian Barents Secretariat, (nd), Nenets people in Nenets Autonomous Okrug [online]. Available from:
Nenets AO is a donor okrug, meaning it contributes more to the federal budget than it received via the re-distribution of national resources. The okrug has consistently had one of the highest average per capita incomes in the Russian Federation, and has taken first place among all Russian territorial subjects in 200837 and 201238. Furthermore, the okrug has not been spending all of the taxes it collects, despite getting only 5% of royalties from the Kharyaga PSA and no share of taxes on the extraction of fossil fuels3940. Between 2010 and 2013 the okrug has been in budget surplus ranging from 3.4% to 17.3%4142 of the budget – some of the highest budget surpluses among Russian regions43. A slight deficit was suffered in 2014, but it was significantly lower than what was agreed in the budget plan for that year (although, different data sets disagree by how much)4445.
The okrug is rich in fossil fuels, hosts one of the only three Production Sharing Agreements in Russia, represents Russia’s first attempts at offshore oil
35 Henry, et al., 2013. 36 Glotov, A.S., executive director for the Fund for Support of the environmental programs of the Pechora Sea Basin. Naryan-Mar, Nenets AO, Russian Federation. Interviewed in November 2014. 37НАО Экономика, (nd). 38 РИА Рейтинг, (2012), В Ненецком автономном округе самые большие заработки в РФ [online] 11:45, 23 November. Available online frfom:
Implementation – obstacles
Despite the abundance of natural resources, weak regulation enforcement structures and the relative wealth of the region, the academic literature on resource curse would hold little explanatory value for the situation in the Nenets AO. There are other factors that intentionally and coincidentally limit the local capacity of the regulatory bodies, whereas the local government, the citizens and the existing civil society remain highly conscious of the need for environmental protection. This section will discuss the various existing barriers to implementation and illustrate how they combine to make “compliance” with regulation strategy redundant as a measure of implementation.
Starting with the local government, the main barrier to implementation can be attributed to the peculiar nature of an okrug as a territorial subject. Although formally “autonomous”, the okrug falls geographically within the domain of the neighbouring Archangelsk Oblast (see Appendix 1), with which until recently the okrug has had to share much of its legal powers and responsibilities, including those in relation to environmental protection. Those powers have been shifted to the Archangelsk Oblast in mid-2000s arguably to limit the powers of the overly active Nenets local government, which participated too aggressively for the centre’s liking in the local oil politics, while the central levels were still divided over the future direction for the okrug47.
The shift of powers was significant also because with administrative responsibility comes money. The environmental protection legislation obliges the user of natural resources to make payments to both federal and local budgets as compensation for pollution48. With the transfer of power, the money went to Archangelsk rather than to Nenets AO. In practice, this meant that the okrug had lost its legal ability to enforce environmental regulation as well as losing a part of its funding, which could have been directed towards environmental protection needs. Furthermore, Archangelsk Oblast is poor in relation to the Nenets AO, which – as remarked upon by many of the interviewees – resulted in the Oblast using the additional funds to first and foremost sort out its own problems, treating the needs of its new subordinate as an after thought.
The powers have been returned as of the 1 January 2015. However, the years of official neglect towards environmental regulation will take their toll. Skilled
46 Krysiek, T.F., (2007), ‘Agreements from Another Era. Production Sharing Agreements in Putin’s Russia, 2000-2007’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Available online from:
However, the main bulk of implementation of environmental protection legislation in actual fact today rests not with the local government but with federal structures in territorial subjects like the Nenets AO. This is because the main polluter by far is the extractive industry, which is subject to federal oversight and regulation. Prior to the transfer of regional powers to the centre (described in the previous section of this paper), the gubernators in resource rich regions reserved “a third key” – their agreement was required as well as the federal decree for a subsoil user to be granted a license. This afforded relatively a lot of power to the local level as well as creating favourable conditions for corruption. Since then, licensing for deposit fields had passed to the federal level and the two regulatory bodies that had become directly responsible for environmental regulation in this field are now also federal – Rosprirodnadzor (RPN) and Rostechnadzor (RTN). This move centralised the power over key strategic regions and limited corruption at the subnational levels. These two regulatory bodies were unaffected by the recent changes of powers between Archangelsk and Nenets territorial subjects.
However, their effectiveness at implementation is severely hampered by other factors, peculiar to the region, as well as by the structural problems of the regulatory bodies themselves. If we consider the latter first, then the structure of RPN is fairly straightforward – it has a regional department responsible for regulating the Nenets AO, which is under the operative control of the Department for Northwest Federal District, which then comes under the control of the centralised office in Moscow49. RTN, however, is much more complicated. It does not have a Department in Nenets – it has an office which is overseen by the Pechora Department. As an office, RTN does not enjoy the same kind of legal power as a Department in Nenets AO. Furthermore, the Pechora Department oversees two territorial subjects at onces and is physically located in the Republic of Komi 50 . Nenets AO is also overseen by the North-European Interregional Territorial Department located in St Peterburg and responsible for 13 territorial subjects 51 . The chain of command is long, cumbersome and confused. Moreover, RPN and RTN share environmental protection functions with the other regulators responsible for different types of entities being
49 Росприроднадзора по Ненецкому автономному округу, (2011), ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ об Управлении Федеральной службы по надзору в сфере природопользования (Росприроднадзора) по Ненецкому автономному округу. Available online from:
Focusing on the key regulators, RTN has only five people staffing the Nenets AO office. RPN has only marginally more staff. Neither have a laboratory to analyse contaminated water or soil samples on the basis on which to administer penalties. One representative of an oil firm operating in Nenets AO even complained that the firm has to provide the employees of RTN with equipment for the latter to be able to carry out environmental damage assessment. The same interviewee complained that the regulatory bodies have been demanding that the firm provide them with helicopter travel to oil sites in order to carry out inspections.
This brings us to the barriers to implementation posed by the regional specificities. Envrionmental inspectors cannot access the oil works sites by any other transport than air. There are specific requirements for extracting firms to provide transport to inspectors for routine inspections, but not for one-off visits which might be prompted by a presence of sufficient evidence for a regulator to believe a violation may have occurred. One hour of helicopter flight costs approx. US$ 3,000 (before the drop in the Russian rouble at the start of 2015), where roughly 2.5 hours are required to fly to the site, carry out an inspection and fly back53. Federal budget cannot allocated sufficient financial resources to support such expediture of its environmental inspectors, which means that the regulators may indeed inspect an oil spill only if the oil firms provide transport; but such help is trecherous for it gives firms leeway to conceal the violation54.
Furthermore, given the large physical area and such low population density (with half the population located in one city), violations often go unnoticed. A number of interviewees mentioned that the deer herders play a big part in reporting environmental misconduct and are well equiped with radios and phone numbers to make sure that the information reaches the right authorities in the right format. Since there is no positive correlation between oil development and the economic well-being of this group 55 the deerherders represent a great opportunity to supplement the federal regulator ranks with nuetral and financially disinterested additional eyes and ears. Even so,
52 A prosecutor, Prosecutor Office of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Naryan-Mar, Nenets AO, Russian Federation. Interviewed in November 2014. 53 Popov, A.I., Director of Scientific-technical enterprise Rubus. Naryan-Mar, Nenets AO, Russian Federation. Interviewed in November 2014. 54 Henry, L.A., Tysiachiouk, M.S. and Tulaeva, S.A., (2013), ‘Reindeer, Oil, and Climate Change: Pressures on the Nenets Indigenous People in the Russian Arctic’, Working Paper, National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, Seattle: University of Washington. 55 Dallmann, W.K., Peskov, V.V. and Murashko O.A., (2010), ‘Monitoring of Development of Traditional Indigenous Land Use Areas in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Northwest Russia’, Project report, Norwegian Polar Institute and the Association of Nenets People Yasavey. Norway: Norwegian Polar Institute. knowledge of only 20% of violation at most reaches the environmental regulators56.
Firms are legally required to report accidents and other violations 57 , but penalities for non-compliance are small and there is little enough risk of being caught. Therefore, inspector reports about these 80% never see the light of day, and the absence of sufficient transportation and equipment means that the reports for the known 20% of cases also struggle to materialise. In a highly bureaucratised system like that of Russia no report means no incident, meaning no violation. What is more, the annual reports that the inspectors send to the central levels are based on the reports provided by the extracting firms. The inspectors often have no means of checking whether these reports are accurate and extracting firms seem to frequently downplay the extent of any violations they do report58. In such a context “full compliance” is technically possible on paper, but is absolutely meaningless in practice.
The bright side – beyond compliance
Despite the various limitations on the state capacity for implementing environmental protection in the okrug, and the relative legal powerlessness of the local administration to participate in the process, the latter has not been idle. Indeed, if one can believe the Federal Service for Government Statistics, the okrug has been performing fairly well in relation to the environment. As can be seen from the graph below, the okrug’s spending on environmental protection has been increasing and emissions have declined.
Nenets Autonomous Okrug Environmnetal Expenditure vs Emissions
809.8 648.3
272.7 272.7 274.8 282.1 291.1 216.7 260.3 146.9 165.6 176.3 144.7 141.4 176.3 158.1 75 91.3 65.3 69.3 7.9 9.7 15.7 8.2 21.9 17.8 15.1 36.8 63 55.9 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Environmental expenditure vs emissions Emission into air from stationary pollution soucres (thousands of tonnes)
56 Employee, Department for Natural Resources and Environment. Naryan-Mar, Nenets AO, Russian Federation. Interviewed in November 2014. 57 Employee, Rosprirodnadzor. Northwest Federal District. Interviewed in November 2014. 58 Ibid. Source: based on data provided by the Territorial Federal Service for Government Statistics on Nenets Autonomous Okrug59.
In light of the discussion in the previous section, it is wise to question the validity of such statistics. Furthermore, there is no corresponding data on water or soil pollution. Nonetheless, the almost unilateral consensus among the interviewed participants has been that the enviornmental situation in the okrug is not particularly bad, even if that is mostly due to the area being still new to industry, meaning that pollution has not yet accumulated; and because the industry that is present had arrived at a time when environmental concerns were growing on the government agenda and the international extraction sector had already made significant steps in developing more environmentally friendly methods and technologies.
However, the achievements of the local government should not be overlooked. It has been successfully cooperating with UNDP/GEF intiatives, signing a multilateral agreement with the latter as well as the regulatory bodies on the development of an integrated, digitalised environmental database. When complete, the system will be able to pool environmental data from all available sources by obliging all stakeholdres to use it. The accumulated data will go a long way towards helping regulatory bodies with implementation and enforcement.
At this point the common criticism against Russian environmental regulation bears repeating – that its key objective often appears to be penalising the polluter rather than changing the polluter’s behaviour or in fact improving the environment60. In this respect the Nenets administration has gone a long way beyond compliance by aiming to protect the environment by, for instance, supporting the WWF initiative to expand the natural conservation area on the territory of Nenets AO and effectively barring extraction firms from particularly fragile environments61.
The okrug is also actively trying to affect the behaviour of the oil firms by exposing them to environmental expertise and public and international opinion. In 2013 Nenets AO had successfully attracted and played host to the International Conference on Prevention and Liquidation of Emergencies in the Arctic62. Nenets AO also organises and hosts its own International Conference on Environmental Managements in the Artic (Eco-Pechora) every two years. The fourth conference took place in October 201463.
59 Available online from:
In light of the above, on the one hand it is problematic to say that the Nenets Autonomous Okrug is going beyond compliance firstly because the okrug clearly cannot ensure enforcement of the existing laws and regulations; and secondly, because it is impossible to accurately measure the level of compliance either way. On the other hand, this is also the reason that has forced the okrug to find other ways of improving compliance – not necessarily through enforcement but rather through softer incentives such as knowledge exchange and cooperation with experienced, international groups that have influence in the sphere of environmental protection. These methods can be called “going beyond compliance” because other territorial subjects do not necessarily choose to or are able to take these extra steps.
The Republic of Tatarstan
The Republic of Tatarstan draws a sharp contrast to the Nenets AO. Firstly, it is located in the southern part of the Russian European territory and therefore enjoys average continental climate conditions. Secondly, it is landlocked and does not share borders with other countries. However, the river Volga flows through Tatarstan, which eventually reaches the Caspian Sea shared by five countries including Russia. Thirdly, Tatarstan is significantly smaller than the Nenets AO and has a much higher population density. Forests and forest-steppe dominate the Republic’s geography. Sufficient infrastructure connects residential areas across the Republic and the situation is especially good around the capital city of Kazan, whose entire infrastructure was revamped in preparation for the 2013 Summer Universiade sports competitions.
Tatarstan has a very large number of water bodies on its territory including rivers, lakes, marches and bogs. Some of these have unique ecosystems, and any pollution entering the Volga River carries the potential of transnational consequences. Already the fish stocks are under danger, since many of the
64 Zolotoi, S.A., Director of the State Conservation Area “Nenetskii”, Iskatelej, Nenets AO, Russian Federation. Interviewed in October 2014. 65 See footnote 50. species use Tatarstan’s section of Volga as breeding grounds66. Nevertheless, this territorial subject has not attracted the attention of international environment- related projects or organisations other than an occasional talk at a university from WWF or the dubious project with the UNDP/GEF, which is mostly funded by the local government but details for which are inaccessible to the general public67.
Unlike the oil scene of the Nenets AO, which serves as a playfield to some 25 different oil firms68 – both Russian and foreign, the Republic of Tatarstan only has one, local oil firm – Tatneft69. Tatneft is a vertically integrated firm, which means that it extracts and refines oil and turns it into oil products. This instantly adds more economic sectors to the Tatarstan’s economy in relation to the mono- economy of the Nenets AO. Furthermore, Tatarstan houses many well-developed economic sectors including machinery building, aviation, agriculture and various chemical and light industries70 . This creates multiple sources of pollution, supplemented further by emissions from the substantial traffic of cars and other vehicles, which does not exist in the Nenets AO. Consequently, unlike the relatively virgin Nenets AO, Tatarstan is no stranger to industrialisation, and the turbulent economic development underlined by environmental ignorance of the Soviet era has left its dark mark. In the 1990s the environmental situation in Tatarstan could be described as severe71 and given the significant volumes of accumulated pollution 72 , environmental improvements have been understandably slow.
In terms of its economic performance, Tatarstan can be described as a rich territorial subject. Despite a consistent deficit in the Republican budget 73 , Tatarstan is nonetheless a major donor for the federal budget74 and in 2010 was
66 Employee of the judicial biological and environmental expertise. 67 Representative of an NGO, Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation. Interviewed in December 2014. 68 Dallmann, et al., 2010. 69 Some 20 smaller firms also exist, often working just one field each, but these are daughters of Tatneft and have some informal connection to the local giant. Therefore, Tatneft can be said to have a monopoly in the local oil sector. 70 Pro-spo.ru, (1999), Экология Республики Татарстан, Government Report. Available online from:
Beyond compliance
In contrast to NAO, it is difficult to discuss purely regional obstacles to implementation of environmental regulations in the Republic of Tatarstan. Apart from the downfalls of the federal level, over which the Tatarstani government has no control, the Republic has performed consistently well. For this reason, this case study will skip the implementation barriers section. However, first – a few words about the status of the Republic in relation to the federal level.
Being a Republic, Tatarstan can endow itself with additional responsibilities, which may contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation as well as the federal law76. This gives Tatarstan significant leeway over its own affairs – a situation of which the Republic has made good use, which will be discussed below. Furthermore, the Republic of Tatarstan has a long history as a territorial entity with its own culture, language, customs and traditions. So much so, that during the political crisis of the 1990s Tatarstan resolved to stop paying federal taxes77 and wanted to introduce its own currency78. Failing that, the Republic established Tatarstani citizenship instead, which is a clear violation of the constitutional equality of the territorial subjects of the Russian Federation79.
What this has meant for the implementation of environmental protection is that the Republic has had substantial freedom to set its own goals and implementation structures. Having the status of a Republic, Tatarstan has its own president and ministries, and the Ministry for Environmental Protection of RT was created in Tatarstan in 1992 (later renamed Ministry for Environment and Natural Resources of RT, from now on Ministry). The first Minister was a scientist-ecologist who – during his time in office up until 2001 – had created a whole system of legal documents, which allowed for a quick solution of the most pressing environmental problems80. What is more, Tatarstan was the first and
Федерального Собрания РФ. Available online from:
Moreover, Higher Education Intuitions (HEIs) have been interested in and actively developing disciplines related to the environment, environmental safety and environmental impact. The Republic of Tatarstan was the first in the country to open an Environmental Departmental at a HEI, after the founding professor was turned down by the Moscow State University for advocating such an unpopular and unprestigious research area. Today Tatarstan bolsters 29 HEIs just in Kazan (whereas Nenets AO still has none) and most have a department, school or institute specialising in matters related to the environment. That, and the ability to train the local population in accordance with the needs of the local industry has allowed the local economic sectors to hire their labour force at all levels locally. At the same time, the research done by HEIs (and their impressive knowledge of Western technologies) has allowed the industry to keep in line with leading technologies and minimise its environmental impact. Furthermore, the native nature of the employees has also put pressure on industrial sectors to behave – no one wants to pollute the area where they have to live. That is not to say that violations and the resulting pollution do not occur, but the level of motivation for enforcement and compliance would appear to be higher than that in the Nenets AO.
Technology, as well as other resources, is also readily available for the regulatory agencies. RPN and RTN have access to state of the art laboratories81; have well staffed offices in Kazan and smaller offices in the sub-regions of Tatarstan. They are further supplemented by 70-80 civil inspectors, which have been created and endowed with limited power by the Ministry82 and the prosecutors’ office. This gives Tatarstan a much larger number of regulators than in the Nenets AO, on a much smaller territory. Abuse of powers has been known to occur at lower levels of different environmental protection structures, but the Ministry puts on seminars for members of the industry responsible for their respective firm’s compliance, the aim of which is to teach the industry its environmental rights and how to comply with regulation correctly83. In this way the Ministry works with the federal regulatory structures and improves compliance as well as enforcement.
Furthermore, given the large population and the high population density in Tatarstan the Ministry has been able to take some innovative approaches towards environmental awareness and education. Various school programmes are aimed at children in order to educate the new generation in accordance with environmentally sound practices, as well as to influence the environmental awareness and behaviour of adults through their children. Examples include the urok chistoty (lesson in cleanliness) initiative, which organises for
81 Employee of the Central Specialised Inspectorate for analytical control. 82 Today it is the Ministry for Environment and Natural Resources, rather then a Ministry for Environmental Protection. 83 Adviser, Ministry for Environment and Natural Resources, Republic of Tatarstan, December 2014. representatives of all governmental environmental protection bodies to teach at some 1000 schools across the Republic on special days four times a year. Another example is the School Environmental Control, which invites school children to report environmental violations via a downloadable smartphone application for an opportunity to win a prize. For adults, the Ministry created a digitalised live map of the Republic and instituted the project in the Tatarstani law – citizens can log environmental violations with photographic evidence on the map online and government officials are obliged to resolve the situation and log a post-clean-up photo of the area as proof that the situation has been addressed.
These actions by the Ministry have a number of aims. Firstly, the practice of narodnyj kontrol (civil regulation) invites and encourages the population to take responsibility for monitoring the environment, and in so doing it encourages the development of an environmental culture throughout the society. Secondly, it utilises the potential of a large population in supplementing government work. As stated by the Head of Division for Environmental Education and Cooperation with NGOs when talking about the school programs,
"It's just a huge army of school students. We just can't walk past such a resource because first of all, it is our eyes and ears, and secondly, these are the people that will grown up and make some decisions themselves even if that decision is as simple as whether to litter or not".84
There is evidence that the initiatives are popular with the public. The School Environmental Patrol had attracted over a thousand reports just between 1st September and 11th December 201485.
Furthermore, the Ministry also aims to utilise civil groups’ potential by allocating NGOs to specific areas and supporting their work in those locations86. This disperses the geographically concentrated NGOs while organising for different environmental objects to have a responsible group overseeing local conditions and reporting violation to the relevant regulatory body. Arguably, this is an effective form of cooperation between the governmental, regulatory and non- governmental bodies, for it ensures that areas in most need of environmental protection have additional unofficial regulators for the regulatory implementation. Implementation is further helped by the Ministry’s coordination (and awareness) of other events in the Republic related to the environment and a readiness to utilise them for policy goals. For example, the Ministry invited the record breaking Dinamo divers87 to record a video message while on their pole expedition for the winner of the RT EcoLeader88 competition.
84 Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation. Interviewed in December 2014. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 RT Dinamo divers of the Russian Geographical Society broke a world record on the 1 February 20138787, submerging to the bottom of the lake Labynkyr in the Oimyakon Valley - the coldest part of the world - at the coldest time of the year87 as a part of the research project “The unique underwater exploratory dive to the Pole of Cold". The average surface temperature in January at
It is worth noting that the Head of Division mentioned above is a young and enthusiastic recruit, with a background at the Republican Agency for Press and Mass Communications. As such, he has substantial experience and the relevant skills to keep in line with the latest communication technology developments and is thus well suited to catch the public’s interest. In so doing, the resulting programmes successfully further the local government’s education and awareness policies in the sphere of environment. The age of the man in question is a further bonus, for it allows a better understanding of the new generation, while breaking the stereotype of patronage-directed allocation of jobs within Russian governing structures. The selection of this particular candidate for the post shows a measure of foresight and a commitment to policy goals on the part of the local government.
Apart from the examples mentioned above, perhaps the brightest demonstration of direct “beyond compliance” action by RT can be seen in the local government’s reaction to a federal initiative of making 2013 a Year of Environmental Protection. Not only did the Ministry of RT create a clear strategy, set up the necessary institutions with adequate staff and allocate the necessary resources, but it also went a step further by making the 2013 the Year of Environmental Culture and Environmental Protection, with extra events and thus additional funding. By comparison, in Nenets AO not a single interviewee mentioned this federal initiative, or what the okrug did to meet it. This shows that not all territorial subjects take federal initiatives seriously, and certainly not all choose to go beyond compliance.
In retrospect, the beyond-compliance efforts in Tatarstan might be in large part due to the significant industrial developments (and their consequences) in RT in the 20th century and RT’s financial ability to rectify these in the 21st century. This is combined with the feeling that the federal regulation does not go quite far enough to address the particularly severe environmental problems of RT, which requires the Republic to go beyond mere compliance with the directions from above.
"With substantial industrial developments you can't go without a more aggressive protection of the environment. But we can't make do just with fines alone – that's just getting rid of the symptoms. But if we want to fight to win at the root – a more global aspect of affecting an individual, some of whom might become company directors – then we need to engage in education"89.
lake Labynkyr is -56.3С, the temperature of the water at the bottom of the lake is between +1.3C and +2C. 88 An annual competition held by the Ministry for Environment and Natural Resources of RT for firms working in RT. A winner must demonstrate the most significant investment in environmentally friendly technologies and process over the course of the previous year. The award represents a sign of prestige and distinction. 89 Interview with the Head of Department for Environmental Education and Cooperation with NGOs, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of the Republic of Tatarstan. Conclusion
Considering the above discussion, the Russian environmental protection law has come a long way, but it is either: • too general to address the specific needs of individual territorial subjects, which is why some choose to go beyond compliance as in the case of RT; or • as in the case of Nenets AO, it is still held back from effective implementation by the administrative structures responsible for its enforcement. Whereas the Russian environmental law is often praised as coherent, broad and stringent, even if still sometimes vague, its administrative structure, on the other hand, appears to be the reverse90.
It would be unjust to say that significant improvements have not also been made in the administrative structures but not all of them have been positive and more and faster changes are needed for the environmental law to reach its potential. On the other hand, regional laws try to polish the imperfections of the federal provisions and create more clarity for the purposes of implementation. Nonetheless, at times even this is not enough, and territorial subjects are forced to look for new, innovative ways to influence the target groups of the implementation efforts.
En route to achieving environmental policy objectives different territorial subjects encounter very different obstacles, which make the measurement of implementation close to impossible, as in the case of Nenets AO where severe climate conditions and the absence of infrastructure interfere with the regulators’ work. In this case, implementation cannot be measured by compliance, since compliance cannot be documented. At the same time, the okrug has the advantage of foreign environmental organisations, on whose experience and resources it can rely in looking for other implementation strategies. Combined, they encourage the okrug to look for new solutions to the policy problem and go beyond the official command-and-control regulation coming from the federal level.
RT, on the other hand, faces a very different context. Strong capacity of the local government allows RT to supplement the work of the federal regulatory bodies in ensuring implementation and compliance. However, given the substantial damage to the local environment wreaked by the Soviet industrialisation, the federal requirements for pollution control do not address existing problems in the Republic. As a result, RT has sought and succeeded in finding new ways to go above and beyond compliance, by looking for new ways to influence the behaviour of the target groups. In this way, RT’s strategy is similar to that of the Nenets AO. However, the RT chose to focus on education of children and adults, some of whom already hold high positions in the polluting industries, or might grow up to hold one.
90 Henry, L. A., and Douhovnikoff. V., (2008), ‘Environmental Issues in Russia’, in Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 33: 437–60. At the same time, a bottom-up approach to policy creation would not work for the Russian Federation. If we take the bottom-up approach to mean a development of a regional implementation strategy, which – if successful – can be picked up by the top level and implemented across the national level, then such approaches would likely fail. Russian territorial subjects are subject to very different conditions and a strategy that works for one subject would fail in another. For example, a focus on education would miss the mark in Nenets AO since the population is not stable – younger generations aim to leave the harsh northern geography for regions with softer climates and better employment opportunities. This intellectual flight would not improve the local conditions. Furthermore, the local industry prefers to employ its workers from other regions since it is cheaper and there are no HEIs locally to provide the industry with trained labour. On the other hand, Tatarstan lacks the same support of the international community to be able to push the expansion of conservation areas to the top of the local government’s agenda, or to utilise their expertise to arrange international scale cross-sectoral forums. For instance, RT wishes to hold a World Congress on Environmental Management Systems but lacks the experience of organising or hosting such a large-scale event, having to rely heavily on IUCN advice91. On the other hand, RT arguably does not need this, since this function is fulfilled by its burgeoning Higher Education sector.
For these reasons the paper concludes that multi-level implementation – whether top-down or bottom-up – is not appropriate to meet the specific needs of individual sub-national geographical areas, especially in such a diverse country as the Russian Federation. Therefore, the focus of implementation strategy, as well as of academic analysis, should be directed to the sub-national, local levels as the most suited for finding the right solutions for their unique problems.
91 Head of Division for Environmental Education and Cooperation with NGOs
Appendix 1