Interests, Identity and Nordicity Explaining Norwegian Mediation Efforts
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This document is downloaded from DR‑NTU (https://dr.ntu.edu.sg) Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Interests, identity and nordicity explaining Norwegian mediation efforts Anna Louise Strachan 2012 Anna Louise Strachan. (2012). Interests, identity and nordicity explaining Norwegian mediation efforts. Doctoral thesis, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/53389 https://doi.org/10.32657/10356/53389 Downloaded on 03 Oct 2021 00:49:37 SGT INTERESTS, IDENTITY AND NORDICITY EXPLAINING NORWEGIAN MEDIATION EFFORTS Anna Louise Strachan G1002348K S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies A thesis submitted to the Nanyang Technological University in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (International Relations) 2012 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank all those who have provided me with invaluable support and assistance throughout the course of my research for this thesis. I am particularly grateful to my supervisor Joseph Liow for his support and advice. I would also like to thank my parents and my sister for their belief in me, and Gustav, whose support throughout this process has been unfailing. 2 CONTENTS SUMMARY 4 LIST OF ACRONYMS 6 CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 9 CHAPTER 2 – The conceptual framework 41 CHAPTER 3 – Norway’s peace diplomacy 71 CHAPTER 4 – Sri Lanka: A complex case? 112 CHAPTER 5 – Norway in the Philippines 145 CHAPTER 6 – Norway and the birth of South Sudan 178 CHAPTER 7 – Conclusions 207 BIBLIOGRAPHY 225 3 SUMMARY This study seeks to unpack the decision-making processes behind Norwegian mediation efforts by undertaking a multi-level analysis within the framework of the foreign policy analysis literature. A greater understanding of the motivations behind third party mediation efforts has the potential to pave the way for a deeper understanding of other aspects of such mediation efforts, most notably whether the motivations behind peace engagement have an impact on the success or failure of an intervention. Norway, as one of the world’s most prominent third party mediators is an excellent candidate for such an analysis. The arguments in this thesis are built around three inter-related hypotheses. It will be argued that the determining factors behind Norwegian mediation efforts are threefold. This study contends that Norway becomes involved in the domestic affairs of other countries in order to further its own interests, both in the material sense and in terms of influence. It will however be argued that Norway’s national identity and its domestic politics are the reasons behind its choice of peace diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy. Moreover, it will be argued that Norway’s broader Nordic identity or ‘Nordicity’ is responsible for the manner in which it pursues its mediation efforts. In this context, emphasis will be placed on Scandinavian ‘norm entrepreneurship.’ In terms of methodology, this study will involve an in-depth quantitative and qualitative analysis of the decision-making processes behind Norwegian interventions in intra-state conflicts. The case studies considered in this study will be the conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), the conflict between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the New People’s Army (NPA) and the conflict in southern Sudan between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The conflicts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka are of particular interest as they rank among the ten conflicts to have received the least UN attention in the period 1996-2005. These conflicts did not 4 result in a single UN Security Council resolution in this period. Sudan is of interest as, despite ongoing tensions, it constitutes a successful intervention, South Sudan having gained independence in July 2011. 5 ACRONYMS ABB – Alex Boncayao Brigade AFP – Armed Forces Philippines AHLC - Ad-hoc Liaison Committee AMRSB - Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines ANC – African National Congress ASG – Abu Sayyaf Group CARHRIHL – Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law CFA – Ceasefire Agreement CHD – Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue CLPA – Cordillera Liberation People’s Army CoW – Correlates of War CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines CSO – Civil Society Organisation DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo ECF – Ecumenical Bishop’s Forum ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States EIC – Economist Intelligence Unit FARC – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia FDI – Foreign Direct Investment GDP – Gross Domestic Product GOP/GRP – Government of the Philippines GOS – Government of Sudan GoSL – Government of Sri Lanka ICG – International Contact Group IGAD – Intergovernmental Agency for Development IGADD – Intergovernmental Agency for Drought and Development INGO – International Non-governmental Organisation IPA – International Peace Academy IR – International Relations 6 JASIG – Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees JVP - Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna LTTE – Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs MILC – Managing Low-Intensity Intra-state Conflict MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front MNLF – Moro National Liberation Front NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCA – Norwegian Church Aid NCCP - National Council of Churches in the Philippines NDA – National Democratic Army NDFP – National Democratic Front of the Philippines NEPP – Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform NGO – Non-governmental Organisation NORAD – Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation NOK – Norwegian Krone NPA – New People’s Army OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OLS – Ordinary Least Squares PCEC - Philippine Conference of Evangelical Churches PEPP – Philippine Ecumenical Peace Platform PHP – Philippine Peso PKK – Kurdish Worker’s Party PKP – Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organisation PLOTE - People’s Liberation Organisation of the Tamil Eelam PNOC – Philippine National Oil Company PRIO – Peace Research Institute Oslo PSD – Private Sector Development RAM – Rational Actor Model RPA – Revolutionary Proletarian Army RPMP - Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas SLMM – Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission SPLM/A – Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army 7 TIPH - Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron TULF – Tamil United Liberation Front UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program UN – United Nations 8 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Despite its great distance from those parts of the world in which the deadliest conflicts are played out, Norway is frequently hailed as one of the key players in non-military conflict resolution in the world. This study seeks to establish why Norway frequently fulfils the role of third party mediator, given that many of the country’s peace efforts have been unsuccessful. The Norwegian led peace process in Sri Lanka was ultimately abandoned in favour of a military solution and while the Oslo Accords were groundbreaking at the time of signing, we are still very far from seeing a peaceful resolution to the Israel/Palestine conflict. Norway’s efforts to foster peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea caused much resentment and as yet there are no signs of a permanent resolution to the conflict between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC). Norway has of course had some successes - its reputation is not based upon conjecture alone. Norwegian representatives succeeded in bringing peace to Guatemala in 1996 and to Mali in the same year. Moreover, they played an active role in the South Sudan peace process, which culminated in the recent referendum on South Sudan’s independence. Following the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka, there have been a growing number of assessments of Norwegian peace efforts, although the majority have focused on the Sri Lanka case alone. The end of the Sri Lanka conflict has also seen a shift away from analyses, which are limited to lauding the country for its humanitarian efforts, without ever really addressing the question of what motivates those living in one of the most peaceful regions of the world to become so deeply involved in the troubles of other nations. This study seeks to contribute to this growing literature. However, much of the writing on Norwegian peace engagements remains uncritical. The praise heaped on Norway is undoubtedly warranted in those cases where the country’s representatives have facilitated lasting peace. As highlighted above, however, the number of successes is relatively small. Therefore, the perception that Norway can solve all the world’s conflicts, whether promulgated by Norway itself or whether the product of enthusiastic commentators seeking to offer quick solutions to complex problems, is clearly inaccurate. It is therefore important to go beyond superficial assessments of 9 Norway’s activities in order to fully understand what drives its peace diplomacy. There is a need for a comprehensive analysis of Norway’s “peace diplomacy” in order to further understanding of the motivations behind the country’s choice of foreign policy strategy. There is also a broader need to understand the motivations behind third party mediation efforts. In recent years academics and practitioners alike have called for a move away from the heavy reliance on quantitative