DOCSLIB.ORG

4501 Joseph S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
4501 Joseph S Tribunal Arbitral du Sport Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration CAS 2016/A/4501 Joseph S. Blatter v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), award of 5 December 2016 Panel: Mr Manfred Nan (The Netherlands), President; Mr Patrick Lafranchi (Switzerland); Mr Andrew de Lotbinière McDougall (France) Football Disciplinary sanctions for infringements to the Code of Ethics Principle “tempus regit actum” and prohibition against retroactivity Admissibility of a witness statement of a witness not appearing at the hearing Potential conclusive and preclusive effects of a previous award rendered in a closely connected case Burden of proof Standard of proof of “personal conviction” Prohibition of bribery Conflict of interests Limited discretion to review sanctions imposed by disciplinary bodies of federations 1. Pursuant to the legal principle of tempus regit actum or non-retroactivity, procedural matters are governed by the regulations in force at the time of the procedural act in question. The prohibition against retroactivity is a fundamental principle of Swiss law and forms part of international public policy (ordre public). An exception in this respect may however be if more recent regulations than the one in force at the time of the violation are more favourable to the accused (lex mitior). 2. According to article 4(7) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, “[i]f a witness whose appearance has been requested pursuant to Article 8.1 fails without a valid reason to appear for testimony at an Evidentiary Hearing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall disregard any Witness Statement related to that Evidentiary Hearing by that witness unless, in exceptional circumstances, the Arbitral Tribunal decides otherwise”. 3. For an arbitral award to have conclusive and preclusive effects it must comply with the traditional triple identity test (identity of the claims, of the causes of action and of the parties), and if there are different parties in the further arbitration proceedings, the prior award will not have conclusive and preclusive effects on a different party. There are however several published awards in which arbitral tribunals have given some effects to a prior decision, even though it did not qualify as res judicata. This was typically done in situations where the prior decision involved a case that was not identical but was closely connected to the case before the arbitral tribunal. The effects given to such prior decisions varied among arbitral tribunals. While some tribunals considered themselves bound by a prior decision that was not res judicata, others were more cautious holding that they would take the prior decision into consideration. In a case where only a media CAS 2016/A/4501 2 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, award of 5 December 2016 release but not the reasoning of the previous award was available at the time of the hearing, the press release and previous award were not submitted into evidence and were not relied upon by the parties in making their submissions and requests for relief in the further arbitration proceedings, the panel shall not be bound by the previous award. 4. The principle of burden of proof applies if the requisite degree of conviction that an alleged fact is fulfilled is not reached. In such a case, the principle of burden of proof defines which party has to bear the consequences of such a state of non-conviction on the part of the arbitral tribunal with respect to the establishment of an alleged fact. Except where an agreement would determine otherwise, the arbitral tribunal shall allocate the burden of proof in accordance with the rules of law governing the merits of the dispute, i.e. the lex causae. 5. The standard of proof is defined as the level of conviction that is necessary for a panel to conclude in the arbitral award that a certain fact happened. Article 51 of the FIFA Code of Ethics (FCE), 2012 edition, determines that the standard of proof to be applied should be one of “personal conviction”. In practical terms, this standard of proof of personal conviction coincides with the “comfortable satisfaction” standard widely applied by CAS panels in disciplinary proceedings. According to this standard of proof, the sanctioning authority must establish the disciplinary violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the judging body bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation. It is a standard that is higher than the civil standard of “balance of probability” but lower than the criminal standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 6. Irrespective of which version of the FCE comes into play, the general prohibition against bribery does not only cover undue gifts given by a FIFA official to external third parties, i.e. persons “outside FIFA”, but also encompasses undue gifts or benefits given by a FIFA official to another FIFA official, i.e. a person “within FIFA”. Any other reading would suggest that FIFA officials are able to give each other unlimited gifts without any justification whatsoever being required, which cannot be accepted as a reasonable interpretation of the provision. No culpable intent is required in order for a violation of the provision to be established. 7. By approving a payment on behalf of FIFA without any contractual basis and failing to fully inform FIFA’s Finance Committee about the circumstances of the payment, a FIFA official creates a conflict of interest between himself and FIFA as an organisation. This indeed constitutes a violation of the FCE. 8. CAS panels have limited discretion to review sanctions imposed by disciplinary bodies of federations when such panels make similar findings and such discretion should only be exercised when the sanction is evidently and grossly disproportionate to the offence. CAS 2016/A/4501 3 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, award of 5 December 2016 I. PARTIES 1. Mr Joseph S. Blatter (the “Appellant” or “Mr Blatter”) was President of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association between 1998 and 2015. Before being elected as President, Mr Blatter had already served the same organisation in various positions for twenty-three years, including as its Secretary General from 1981 to 1998. Mr Blatter is of Swiss nationality. 2. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (the “Respondent” or “FIFA”) is an association under Swiss law and has its registered office in Zurich, Switzerland. FIFA is the governing body of international football at a worldwide level. It exercises regulatory, supervisory and disciplinary functions over continental federations, national associations, clubs, officials and football players worldwide. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. Background Facts 3. Below is a summary of the main relevant facts, as established on the basis of the parties’ written submissions and the evidence examined in the course of the present appeal arbitration proceedings and during the hearing. This background is set out for the sole purpose of providing a synopsis of the matter in dispute. 4. On 25 September 2015, the office of the Swiss Federal Attorney General opened criminal proceedings against Mr Blatter. These proceedings were initiated in connection with an alleged “disloyal” payment by FIFA to Mr Michel Platini, Vice-President of FIFA and member of the FIFA Executive Committee as well as President of the Union des Associations Européennes de Football (“UEFA”), a confederation recognised by FIFA in accordance with article 20 of the FIFA Statutes. Said payment in the amount of CHF 2,000,000 was made in early 2011 and was allegedly remunerating work performed by Mr Platini for FIFA between January 1999 and June 2002. 5. On the same day, Mr Blatter was questioned by the Swiss Federal Attorney General as an accused person. Mr Platini was questioned by the Swiss Federal Attorney General also on the same day, as a person providing information in accordance with article 178 of the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure. B. Proceedings before the Adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee 6. Based on the opening of said proceedings by the Swiss Federal Attorney General, the Deputy Chairman of the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee (the “Investigatory Chamber”) initiated preliminary investigations against Mr Blatter in accordance with article 62(3) of the FIFA Code of Ethics (the “FCE”). 7. On 28 September 2015, the Deputy Chairman of the Investigatory Chamber determined that there was, based on the findings of the preliminary investigation, a prima facie case that Mr CAS 2016/A/4501 4 Joseph S. Blatter v. FIFA, award of 5 December 2016 Blatter had committed violations of the FCE. Mr Blatter was notified that formal proceedings were opened against him relating to possible violations of article 13 (General rules of conduct), 15 (Loyalty), 18 (Duty of disclosure, cooperation and reporting), 19 (Conflicts of interest) and 21 (Bribery and corruption) of the FCE (2012 edition). Justice Robert Torres, Member of the Investigatory Chamber, was assigned as Chief of Investigation. 8. On the same day, formal proceedings were also opened by the Investigatory Chamber against Mr Platini. 9. On 1 October 2015, Mr Blatter was interviewed by the Chief of Investigation, by video- conference. 10. On 7 October 2015, Mr Blatter was provisionally banned from taking part in any football- related activity at national and international level for a period of 90 days. 11. On 5 November 2015, the Chief of Investigation sent Mr Blatter a list of questions, with a deadline to reply. 12. On 12 November 2015, Mr Blatter was informed by the Investigatory Chamber that there was a prima facie case that he might have committed additional FCE violations, namely possible violations of article 17 (Forgery and falsification) and 20 (Offering and accepting gifts and other benefits) of the FCE (2012 edition), as well as article 4(3) (Failure to comply with the FCE or severely fail to fulfil, or inadequately exercise duties and responsibilities) of the FCE (2009 edition).
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1196-Bidding-For-The-Fifa-Futsal-World
    100 YEARS FI FA 1904 2004 For the Came. For the World. TO THE MEMBER ASSOCIATIONS OF FIFA Circular no. 1196 Zurich, 20 July 2009 DSG/jbr-jya Bidding for the following FIFA World Cups: o FIFA Futsal World Cup 2012 Dear Sir/ Madam, FIFA is pleased to open the bidding for the above listed FIFA World Cups. We invite all the member associations who have an interest in hosting a FIFA World Cup to join the bidding process by submitting the attached Declaration of Interest form . Also accompanying this invitation to bid is the corresponding timeline. As can be seen from the accompanying documentation, these events w ill follow a similar hosting­ decision timeline. As you review the information please keep in mind that you are allowed to bid for more than one event, however please note that FIFA will only award one event per bidding association. We strongly encourage the member associations to seriously consider hosting one of these World Cups. The signed Declaration of Interest form must be received at FIFA by 1 September 2009 at the latest. Should you have any questions about the bidding or need assistance in completing the process, please do not hesitate to contact the FIFA Competitions Division who w ill be pleased to assist you. Yours faithfully, FIFA n . /c~P1 Markus Kattner Deputy Secretary General cc. FIFA Executive Committee Futsal and Beach Soccer Committee Confederations Federation Internationale de Football Association FI FA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland Tel.. +41-(0)43-222 7777 Fax: +4 1-(0)43-222 7878 www.FIFA.com 100 YEARS F FA 1904 2004 Bidding timeline For the Came.
    [Show full text]
  • FIFA Governance Regulations.Indd
    FIFA Governance Regulations (FGR) Fédération Internationale de Football Association President: Gianni Infantino Acting Secretary General: Markus Kattner Address: FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland Telephone: +41 (0)43 222 7777 Fax: +41 (0)43 222 7878 Internet: FIFA.com FIFA Governance Regulations (FGR) NB: Terms referring to natural persons are applicable to both genders. Any term in the singular applies to the plural and vice-versa. Index 3 Chapter Page I. Introduction and general provisions 4 II. Duties, powers, responsibilities and organisation of FIFA bodies and holders of key positions 7 Annual member associations conference 7 Council 8 President 13 Secretary General 15 Standing committees 20 – A: General rules 20 – B: Specifi c rules for individual committees 25 Independent committees 39 III. Election of the President 48 General provisions 48 Proposal and announcement of candidatures 53 Election format 54 Jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee and Disciplinary Committee 57 Role of the Governance Committee in the context of election procedures 58 IV. Election of the Council 59 V. Auditing 64 VI. Final provisions 65 Annexe 1 – Eligibility checks 66 Annexe 2 – Related-Party Declaration 71 4 I. Introduction and general provisions 1 Purpose and scope of these regulations 1. These FIFA Governance Regulations (FGR) contain the basic principles and detailed regulations regarding FIFA’s corporate governance. 2. In particular, they specify, based on the fundamental structure as set out in the FIFA Statutes, general principles regarding the internal organisation of FIFA. They further specify, within the framework of the general regime of competences as set out in the FIFA Statutes, general principles regarding the duties, powers and responsibilities of certain bodies, units and other entities of FIFA as well as of the members of those bodies and of the FIFA employees.
    [Show full text]
  • Q3 2016: Regulatory Round-Up
    October 2016 Alert Q3 2016: Regulatory Round-Up White Collar This round-up contains a summary by sector of certain key global regulatory developments which occurred during the third quarter of 2016. The sectors Defense & covered in this round-up include: Investigations Financial Services Energy Cyber/Data Transport Sport “Other” Detail contained within is publicly available information. This Alert does not contain any legal commentary on the aforementioned. Financial Services On 17 August, a former Deutsche Bank (“DB”) employee and whistleblower refused to accept his portion of the whistleblower award ($16.5 million) from the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). The whistleblower, Ben-Artzi, provided information which enabled the SEC to fine DB $55 million in May 2015 for false accounting. Ben-Artzi rejected the award stating that the corporate fine should be paid by individual executives, not shareholders.1 On 21 July, the FCA published a thematic review aimed to address concerns about the operation of “dark pools” in the UK. The report concluded that trading platforms with no pre-trade transparency and where the price and volume of orders are hidden have made significant progress in addressing conflict of interest issues. The FCA has outlined certain areas in which improvements could be made, including the provision of more information about the design and operation of dark pools to users, and improving the monitoring activity of the pools.2 On 19 July, the new head of the FCA, Andrew Bailey, set out his vision of the regulator’s future. In his speech, Mr Bailey paid tribute to the introduction of the senior managers regime which expands the FCA’s scope of enforcement against individual executives for wrongdoings within their area of responsibility.
    [Show full text]
  • Why the United States Should Have Jurisdiction Over Those Being Charged in the FIFA Corruption Scandal
    Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review Volume 40 Number 1 Summer 2017 Article 3 Summer 6-1-2017 Where Should They Go? Why the United States Should Have Jurisdiction over Those Being Charged in the FIFA Corruption Scandal Mike Leary Loyola Law School, Los Angeles Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Mike Leary, Where Should They Go? Why the United States Should Have Jurisdiction over Those Being Charged in the FIFA Corruption Scandal, 40 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 51 (2017). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol40/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2017 6:26 PM Where Should They Go? Why the United States Should Have Jurisdiction over Those Being Charged in the FIFA Corruption Scandal MIKE LEARY* I. INTRODUCTION On May 27, 2015, Swiss authorities arrested seven Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”) officials at the Baur au Lac hotel in Zurich on the eve of an important organizational meeting the next day.1 The Swiss authorities arrested the individuals at the behest of the United States government,
    [Show full text]
  • Decision Adjudicatory Chamber FIFA Ethics Committee
    Decision of the adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee Mr Vassilios Skouris [GRE], Chairman Ms Margarita Echeverria [CRC], Member Mr Melchior Wathelet [BEL], Member taken on 26 July 2019 in the case of: Mr Ricardo Teixeira [BRA] Adj. ref. no. 14/2019 (Ethics 150972) I. Inferred from the file 1. Mr Ricardo Teixeira (hereinafter “Mr Teixeira” or “the official”), Brazilian national, has been a high-ranking football official since 1989, most notably the president of the Confederação Brasileira de Futebol (CBF) from 1989 until 2012. He was a mem- ber of the FIFA Executive Committee from 1994 until 2012 and a member of the CONMEBOL Executive Committee. Additionally, he was a member of several stand- ing committees of FIFA, such as the Organising Committee for the FIFA Confedera- tions CupTM, Organising Committee for the FIFA World CupTM, Referees Committee, Marketing and TV Committee, Futsal and Beach Soccer Committee, Ethics Commit- tee and Committee for Club Football. 2. On 27 May 2015, the United States Department of Justice (hereinafter “DOJ”) is- sued a press release relating to the Indictment of the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York also dated 27 May 2015 (hereinafter “the Indictment”). In the Indictment, the DOJ charged several international football executives with “racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among other of- fenses, in connection with their participation in a twenty-four-year scheme to enrich themselves through the corruption of international soccer”. The Indictment was fol- lowed by arrests of various persons accused therein, executed by state authorities in Europe, South America and the United States of America.
    [Show full text]
  • Dr. Cornel Borbély Deputy Chairman Investigatory Chamber FIFA Ethics Committee
    REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S. BID TEAM Dr. Cornel Borbély Deputy Chairman Investigatory Chamber FIFA Ethics Committee CONTENTS 1 REPORT ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE US BID TEAM .............................................. 1 2 Decision from the US Bid to run .......................................................................................... 1 A. Structure of the Bid – persons involved ...................................................................... 1 B. Link with United States Soccer Federation ................................................................. 3 C. Reasons to Bid ............................................................................................................... 4 D. Budget of the Bid .......................................................................................................... 6 E. Government Support of the US Bid ............................................................................. 7 F. Support of the US Bid through private persons/entities ............................................ 8 3. Evaluation of the US Bid ...................................................................................................... 8 4. Investigations .......................................................................................................................... 9 A. Steps undertaken by the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee ............................................................................................................. 9 B. Documents and Information
    [Show full text]
  • P19 Layout 1
    WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 2016 SPORTS Infantino eyes regional World Cup if elected FIFA president LONDON: The World Cup could be honor and benefits of hosting the World tions will be handed $40 million to invest has to be an objective assessment based spread across entire regions, emulating Cup,” Infantino’s manifesto says. in development projects and their on the best interests of football.” the continent-wide 2020 European The first World Cup bidding after the regional offshoots in Asia, Africa, the The International Football Association Championship, if Gianni Infantino wins Feb. 26 election is for the 2026 tourna- Caribbean and Central America can Board is already preparing to approve tri- next month’s FIFA presidential election. ment. The launch of the contest has been request another $4 million to organize als with a type of video replay system for The UEFA secretary general used his stalled since last year when FIFA was youth tournaments. The amounts are all referees. One idea Infantino proposes, manifesto, which was published Tuesday, swept up in a global soccer corruption within a four-year cycle. “If the target of which seems unique in an election cam- to say FIFA should not limit the tourna- scandal, which led to Sepp Blatter 50 percent of distribution of FIFA’s paign with few differences between the ment to be being held in one or two announcing plans to quit before being income is reached, these amounts will candidates, is starting a globe-trotting countries. The 2002 World Cup in Japan banned. Infantino, who is Swiss, is one of further increase significantly,” Infantino team of the game’s greats.
    [Show full text]
  • In World Soccer
    GOVERNANCE Wanted: By Kasper Lindberg and Play the Game REAL TRANSPARENCY in world soccer Though Swiss authorities have proven that international soccer leaders took bribes, FIFA refuses to answer important questions about its fi nancial matters FIFA rejected debate with these investigative reporters: From the left Andrew Jennings, Ezequiel Fernandez Moores, Ian Hughes and (separate photo) Jens Weinreich. Since 2001 a three-letter-word has caused much “In February 2004 it came to a mysterious “Some people – football offi cials in football anxiety in the top of world soccer. It is spelled: arrangement between the ISL senior offi cial Jean- blazers – are making hundreds and sometimes I-S-L. The three letters indicate the world’s once Marie Weber and Mr Bauer, the ISL liquidator. An thousands of dollars from every single ticket,” so dominant marketing and tv rights holders ISL, amount of 2.5 million Swiss francs was transferred Jennings said. which went into bankruptcy in May 2001, leaving to the liquidator’s account,” Weinreich said. He drew a picture of widespread corruption football’s world governing body in a struggle for This deal ensured that some of the bribes and pointed the fi nger directly at the top: Though survival. were paid back to the insolvent estate of ISL. It the Swiss authorities in 2002 decided not to take The liquidation procedure has disclosed some also made the liquidator abandon some of the FIFA’s president Sepp Blatter to court after many facts that are indeed troubling for FIFA: charges against the ISL. of his allies in FIFA’s Executive Committee had Swiss authorities have proven that leading Surprisingly, it also seemed to infl uence FIFA reported him to the police, Blatter could not claim soccer offi cials took bribes, but the highest court that in June 2004 secretly tried to stop its own to be acquitted of any wrongdoing, Jennings said.
    [Show full text]
  • FIFA Beach Soccer World Cup 2015 and FIFA Futsal World Cup 2016
    FIF~ Far the Came. Far the WarLd. TO THE MEMBERS OF FIFA Cireular no. 1316 Zurich, 9 August 2012 DSG/mfa/ial Bidding for FIFA Beach Soccer World Cup 2015 and FIFA Futsal World Cup 2016 Dear Sir or Madam, FIFA is pleased to open the bidding for the following FIFA World Cups: • FIFA Beach Soccer World Cup 2015 • FIFA Futsal World Cup 2016 We invite all member associations to join the bidding proeess by completing and submitting the attached Declaration of Interest form. As you review the information, please bear in mind that while you may bid for more than one event, FIFA will only award one event per bidding association . FIFA World Cups open for bidding: FIFA Beach Soccer World Cup 2015 This World Cup is held every two years and 2015 will be the eighth edition. 16 teams will participate in the final competition and one stadium will be required. The duration of the competition is approximately ten to 12 days. The loeation of the venue should reflect the sun, sea and sand of the Copaeabana beach, the birthplace of beach soccer. FIFA Futsal World Cup 2016 This World Cup is held every four years and 2016 will be the eighth edition. 24 teams will participate in the final competition and as a result, three to six stadiums that fulfil FIFA's specifications will be required. The duration of the competition is approximately three weeks and is expected to take place between October and November. The bidding timeline is as folIows: 14 September 2012 Declaration of Interest - deadline for the member associations to declare their interest in hosting by submitting the completed and signed Declaration of Interest form 12 Oetober 2012 FIFA Hosting Agreements - deadline for FIFA to send out the corresponding Hosting Agreements to those associations who have declared an interest Federation Internationale de Football Association FIFA-Strasse 20 P.O.
    [Show full text]
  • Zirkular Nr. 1377 Zürich, 16. August 2013 SGS/Den Ticketinginformationen Für Mitgliedsverbände Sehr Geehrte Damen Und Herren
    FIF~ Far the Came. Far the Warld. AN DIE MITGLIEDER DER FIFA Zirkular Nr. 1377 Zürich, 16. August 2013 SGS/den Ticketinginformationen für Mitgliedsverbände Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, die FIFA heisst alle Mitgliedsverbände bei der FIFA Fussball-Weltmeisterschaft Brasilien 2014™ willkommen. Die FIFA Fussball-Weltmeisterschaft 2014™ ist eine einzigartige Veranstaltung. Fussballfans aus aller Welt werden ihre Lieblingsteams in Brasilien anfeuern und gemeinsam ein riesiges Fussballfest feiern. Um dieses Erlebnis noch grossartiger zu machen, hat die FIFA ein Kartenverkaufs- und Vertriebssystem entwickelt, das Sie nach der Qualifikation Ihres Teams unterstützt und Ihren Fans dabei hilft, teamspezifische Tickets zu erwerben. Die beiliegende Broschüre erklärt dieses System ausführlich, ebenso die weiteren Ticketingvorkehrungen, die für die 209 FIFA-Mitgliedsverbände getroffen wurden. Mit freundlichen Grüssen FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION Markus Kattner Stellvertretender Generalsekretär Kopie an : - FIFA-Exekutivkomitee - Konföderationen Federation Internationale de Football Association FIFA-Strasse 20 PO. Box 8044 Zurich Switzerland Tel.: +41-(0)43-222 7777 Fax: +41-(0)43-222 7878 www.FIFA.com FIFA WORLD CUP * & il 1814 fifA MlerlcJ Cup 8r4zil™ Member Association Ticketing Information OEUTSCM Ii\ 't! ~. Einl2i~un9 Das FIFA-Generalsekretariat ist für die Ausführungsaufsicht über alle Belange der konstituierenden FIFA Ticketing-Gruppen einschließlich der Entwicklung und effektiven Umsetzung der entsprechenden Richtlinien
    [Show full text]
  • Diplomatic Subjectivity of Fifa in the Context of Selecting World Cup Host
    vol� 64(4)/2019, pp� 216–231 DOI: 10�15804/athena�2019�64�13 www�athenaeum�umk�pl ISSN 1505-2192 DIPLOMATIC SUBJECTIVITY OF FIFA IN THE CONTEXT OF SELECTING WORLD CUP HOST* DYPLOMATYCZNA PODMIOTOWOŚĆ FIFA W KONTEKŚCIE WYBIERANIA GOSPODARZA MISTRZOSTW ŚWIATA W PIŁCE NOŻNEJ Michał Marcin Kobierecki** — ABSTRACT — — ABSTRAKT — The goal of the research was to investigate FIFA, Celem pracy jest zbadanie jednej z najważniej- one of the most important international sports szych organizacji sportowych, jaką jest FIFA, organisations, from the perspective of its diplo- z perspektywy jej dyplomatycznej podmioto- matic subjectivity� It is a case study concerning wości� Badanie stanowi studium przypadku the process of selection of the World Cup hosts poświęcone procesowi wybierania gospodarzy by FIFA, in reference to the engagement of presi- mistrzostw świata w piłce nożnej w kontekście dents, prime ministers and other representatives wspierania poszczególnych kandydatur przez of national authorities of states that hosted FIFA prezydentów, premierów i innych przedstawicieli World Cup in bidding for the tournament within władz państw, którym ostatecznie przyznano last the 30 years� The hypothesis that was verified organizację mistrzostw świata w ostatnich 30 within the research assumed that through select- latach� Hipoteza, która została poddana weryfika- ing World Cup host FIFA obtains diplomatic cji, zakładała, że poprzez wybieranie gospodarzy subjectivity� This refers to research questions mistrzostw świata w piłce nożnej FIFA uzyskuje concerning
    [Show full text]
  • A Player's Perspective on the Need for Reform to Enhance Transparency and Integrity in Sports
    This content is drawn from Transparency International’s forthcoming Global Corruption Report: Sport. For more information on our Corruption in Sport Initiative, visit: www.transparency.org/sportintegrity 6.6 A player’s perspective on the need for reform to enhance transparency and integrity in sports Louis Saha1 As demonstrated by the arrests of Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) executives in late May 2015 and the subsequent resignation of FIFA’s president, Sepp Blatter, a lack of transparency can mean nasty surprises with all sorts of skeletons coming out of the closet. This can potentially involve offshore dealings, bribery, electoral fraud and agents and managers taking cuts from transfers. All too commonly, however, it is not until a major incident happens that people start talking about transparency and why the sports industry urgently needs to address the lack thereof. The scope of the problem of corruption in sports The scandal over the awarding of the 2022 men’s World Cup to Qatar and FIFA’s refusal to publish the full report prepared by Michael Garcia,2 who was commissioned to look into the bidding and awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, raised even more concerns that corruption was taking place within the organisation, yet the most severe allegations of corruption died off fairly quickly in the minds of many in the global football community. Unethical agents and intermediaries are also a concern when discussing corruption and sport. These powerful individuals often benefit from payoffs that come about as a result of doing business in a ‘hidden’ and complex environment.
    [Show full text]