Unready Scotland. the Critical Gap in Our Response to The
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UNREADY SCOTLAND the critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons Ministry of Defence - “The consequences of such an incident are likely to be considerable loss of life and severe disruption both to the British people’s way 1 of life and to the UK’s ability to function as a sovereign state” 1 Internal Review of FOI request 4 May 2006 by David Wray, MOD UNREADY SCOTLAND : The critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons 1 UNREADY SCOTLAND the critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons A report by Nukewatch UK into nuclear weapons transport and community safety in Scotland. Nukewatch monitors and tracks the movement of British weapons of mass destruction from the atomic weapon factories in Aldermaston and Burghfield in Berkshire to Coulport on Loch Long, where the warheads are stored and loaded onto the Trident submarines. Nukewatch also monitors the movement of nuclear weapon-related materials. Nukewatch is not a membership organisation. It is a network of individuals who campaign against nuclear warhead convoys, mainly because the convoys are part of a system of weapons of mass destruction, but also because we believe that communities which could be potentially affected by the convoys should be aware of their existence and the risks they pose. The information we gather from the monitoring process is used to inform the public, to provide elected representatives with the data that can help them ask important parliamentary questions, and to share information about nuclear weapons at international level. Written by David Mackenzie and Jane Tallents June 2017 Acknowledgements We would like to thank Mark Ruskell MSP and his staff for enquiries to local authorities, the results of which are the basis for this report, Peter Burt from the Nuclear Information Service for advice and guidance, Jeanne Brady for proof reading and all Nukewatchers who have monitored nuclear convoy movements and raised concerns about them for the last 34 years. 1 UNREADY SCOTLAND : The critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons 2 UNREADY SCOTLAND : The critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons Contents 1. Introduction 5 2. Emergency Planning and Nuclear Weapons 7 3. The Civil Contingencies Act 8 4. Local Authorities and Emergency Services Information 13 5. The Scottish Government 20 6. Conclusions and Recommendation 22 7. Appendix – Local Authorities survey 23 SCOTTISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON NUCLEAR CONVOY ROUTES 3 UNREADY SCOTLAND : The critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons 4 UNREADY SCOTLAND : The critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons UNREADY SCOTLAND the critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons 1. INTRODUCTION The Problem warhead would have an impact radius of 600 Up to eight times a year, a convoy of heavy metres. The radioactive material in the trucks travels between the Aldermaston and warheads includes both plutonium and Burghfield atomic weapon plants in Berkshire uranium, with a potential dispersal range of at to RNAD Coulport on Loch Long. Apart from least 5 kilometres. In addition to this, warhead the occasional training run, or when carrying materials include a number of toxic and weapon material such as tritium, these trucks hazardous substances. will be carrying nuclear warheads in at least one direction of the trip. The movement of The risk acceptability gap between civil warheads could be for maintenance or transport and the nuclear weapon convoys is replacement. therefore vast. Further, the unique nature of this risk to community safety rationally entails Unique Traffic specific attention among the range of threats This traffic is unique on Scotland's roads, to public safety. because the nuclear warheads transported in these convoys consist of nuclear materials Response of the Public Authorities surrounded by high explosives – a dangerous The other dimension of the problem lies in the combination. response of the relevant civil authorities. Regulations governing the civil transportation Community safety and emergency planning in of radiological material explicitly forbid the Scotland is covered by the Civil Contingencies 3 carrying of explosives in the same vehicle as Act (Scotland: 2004). The Act identifies a radiological material 2 for the obvious reason number of organisations as Category 1 that a detonation of the explosive would Responders: Police Scotland, Fire and Rescue disperse the radioactive material. The MOD Services, the Scottish Ambulance Service, Local itself says that the high explosive in a Trident Authorities and the Health Service. As regards the Category 1 Responders, the focus of this report is on the local authorities on or near 2 The Radioactive Substances (carriage by Road) (GB) Regulations of 1974 (No. 1735), known convoy routes in Scotland, on the Section 6h states “No person shall ... carry in a grounds that local authorities are the agencies vehicle which is carrying radioactive material that residents will expect to be active in and any explosive substance within the meaning of the explosives act 1875” 3 www.legislation.gov.uk/ssi/2005/494/made 5 UNREADY SCOTLAND : The critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons informed about community safety in their information, nowhere rules that defence- area. Responsibility to ensure compliance with related threats are outwith its scope. The the Act rests with the Scottish Government, as public authorities in Scotland, including the exercised through its Resilience Division. The Scottish Government, have devoted much time contention of this report is that local and effort into the Ready Scotland framework authorities are failing in their duties under the for responding to civil emergencies, but they Act in respect of nuclear weapon convoys and also have a clear duty to face up to this that the Scottish Government is in turn failing contradiction. to ensure compliance. This report is based on three main resources: a The situation is complicated by the Scotland survey of Scottish local authorities on or near Act. Defence issues are reserved to the known convoy routes, conducted in the Westminster Government. Taken at face value, autumn of 2016 by the office of Mark Ruskell this will mean that neither local authorities nor MSP; a number of other smaller-scale the Scottish Government have any say enquiries, and the observations and research whatsoever on the question of warhead by Nukewatch and other related campaigns transport. However, there is an inherent and over the years. Although the focus of this relevant contradiction within the devolution report is on Scotland because of the particular settlement. Community safety is a devolved circumstances of devolution as well as matter and the legislation governing it, the increased public awareness here, communities Civil Contingencies Act, while it does mention on or near convoy routes in England are facing “national security” in the context of public exactly the same risks. 6 UNREADY SCOTLAND : The critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons 2. EMERGENCY PLANNING AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS The Origins of Local Authority bombing, with the added roles of radiation Responsibility for Public Safety monitoring and scientific advice within the During the First World War, bombs were local headquarters. By March 1956, the Civil dropped onto civilian areas of Britain from Defence Corps in Great Britain had 330,000 airships and planes for the first time and in personnel but was stood down in 1968, partly 1924, the Air Raid Precautions Committee as a result of an understanding within (ARP) was set up to look at how to protect government of the futility of attempting to use residential areas from aerial attacks. In 1938, conventional civil defence techniques to cope the UK Government went on to establish the with the immense destruction expected during Civil Defence Service. In addition to the ARP, a nuclear war. However, civil defence the Civil Defence Service included fire services, continued to be funded to protect central fire watchers, first aid posts and industry. The government functions – about £45 million a organisation of civil defence was the year by 1983/84. responsibility of local authorities and during World War II, thousands of volunteers were Protect and Survive involved in preventing injury by issuing gas In the late 1970s, the government produced masks and pre-fabricated air-raid shelters and Protect and Survive, a public information series maintaining the blackout as well as putting out on civil defence intended to inform British fires, rescuing people from bombed buildings citizens on how to protect themselves during a and administering first aid after air raids. nuclear attack, and consisting of a mixture of ‘Report and Control’ teams gathered pamphlets, radio broadcasts and public information and directed rescue, medical and information films. It was intended that these decontamination teams to the scenes of would be distributed and broadcast only if a reported bombing and if necessary requested nuclear attack was imminent but after a lot of extra resources from neighbouring areas. Due requests for information, the pamphlet 4 to these measures, the number of deaths and “Protect and Survive” was made publicly casualties fell dramatically. available in 1980. It had very little scientific information about radiation, but included The Cold War advice on such things as building a shelter The Civil Defence