Closing Keynote Address
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CLOSING KEYNOTE ADDRESS THE MIRANDA CASE FIFTY YEARS LATER ∗ YALE KAMISAR I. A LOOK BACK AT MIRANDA ............................................................. 1293 II. THE THREE DISSENTS IN MIRANDA ................................................... 1296 III. WHAT IS WRONG IF THE POLICE ASK ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS? .... 1298 IV. THE ROLE OF TELFORD TAYLOR ...................................................... 1299 V. THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE LAWYER ................................................ 1299 VI. THE “COMPROMISE” STRUCK IN MIRANDA ....................................... 1299 VII. SHOULD THERE BE MORE WARNINGS? ............................................ 1300 VIII. ONE REASON FOR SAYING THAT MIRANDA HAS FAILED .................. 1300 IX. WHAT THOSE WHO STUDY HOW THE WARNINGS ARE DELIVERED TELL US ........................................................................ 1301 X. SALINAS V. TEXAS ............................................................................... 1302 I. A LOOK BACK AT MIRANDA A decade after the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona,1 Geoffrey Stone took a close look at the eleven decisions the Court had handed down “concerning the scope and application of Miranda.”2 As Stone observed, “[i]n ten of these cases, the Court interpreted Miranda so as not to exclude the challenged evidence.”3 In the eleventh case, the Court excluded the evidence on other grounds.4 Thus, Stone noted, ten years after the Court decided the case, “the Court ha[d] not held a single item of evidence inadmissible on the authority of Miranda.”5 Not a single item. To use baseball terminology, in Miranda’s first eleven “at bats,” it went zero for eleven. ∗ Clarence Darrow Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan School of Law; Professor Emeritus of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. 1 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 100; see also United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 3 Stone, supra note 2, at 100. 4 Id. (citing Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619). 5 Id. at 100-01. I agree with Frank Allen, who stated that: 1293 1294 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1293 For those of us who welcomed Miranda, this turned out to be deeply disappointing. But it would not have come as much of a surprise to those who remember the four Justices President Nixon appointed to the Supreme Court during his first term of office: Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist.6 Before being appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, then-Judge Burger of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit left no doubt, both in his dissenting opinions7 and in public speeches,8 that he was extremely unhappy with the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases.9 Chief Justice Burger may have been the most police-friendly Supreme Court Justice of all time—only with the possible exception of another Nixon appointee, William Rehnquist.10 In fact, shortly after Rehnquist became Assistant Attorney [S]urely the most fundamental reasons for the [Warren] Court’s loss of impetus lies in the social and political context of the Court in the late 1960’s. That period was a time of social upheaval, violence in the ghettos, and disorder on the campuses. Fears of the breakdown of public order were widespread. Inevitably, the issue of law and order were [sic] politically exploited. In the presidential campaign of 1968 the bewildering problems of crime in the United States were represented simply as a war between the “peace forces” and the “criminal forces.” The decision in Miranda evoked a chorus of criticism of the Court, ranging from the excited to the psychotic. Congress responded with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, some provisions of which were obviously retaliatory. These events combined to create an atmosphere that, to say the least, was unfavorable to the continued vitality of the Warren Court’s mission in criminal cases. Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 538-39 (footnotes omitted). 6 See Stone, supra note 2, at 99 n.2; see also Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 974-91 (2012). 7 See, e.g., Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Burger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“We are well on our way to forbidding any utterance of an accused to be used against him unless it is made in open court. Guilt or innocence becomes irrelevant in the criminal trial as we flounder in a morass of artificial rules poorly conceived and often impossible of application.”); Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J., dissenting) (“I suggest that the kind of nit-picking appellate review exhibited by reversal of this conviction may help explain why the public is losing confidence in the administration of justice. I suggest also that if we continue on this course we may well come to be known as a society incapable of defending itself—the impotent society.”). 8 See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (1964) (“We can all ponder whether any community is entitled to call itself an ‘organized society’ if it can find no way to solve this problem except by suppression of truth in the search for truth.”). 9 See Kamisar, supra note 6, at 976-98 (chronicling then-Judge Burger’s contempt for the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, and describing how his views caught the attention of President Nixon). 10 See id. at 980-91 (describing the prominent roles Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist played in “the downsizing and dismantling of Miranda”). 2017] THE MIRANDA CASE FIFTY YEARS LATER 1295 General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, he urged the President to appoint a commission to consider whether such cases as Miranda needed to be corrected by a constitutional amendment.11 As for Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell, neither one’s appointment to the Court should have come as much of a surprise either. Chief Justice Burger had recommended then-Judge Blackmun, a close friend since their childhood days, to President Nixon for a nomination to the Court.12 It was widely assumed that Justice Blackmun would follow the new Chief Justice’s lead.13 As for Justice Powell, when the National Crime Commission issued its report in 1967, the future Justice turned out to be one of seven members of the Commission to sign a supplemental statement underscoring the need to return to the pre-Miranda “voluntariness” test14—even “[i]f, as now appears likely, a constitutional amendment is required.”15 In retrospect, I think it is fair to say that Miranda never recovered from Nixon’s four Supreme Court appointments.16 11 Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John W. Dean III, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. (Apr. 1, 1969). 12 See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 9-46 (2005). 13 See JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 129 (1982) (noting that Justice Blackmun “could be expected to follow closely the new Chief Justice’s lead”). Indeed, in his first five years on the Court, Justice Blackmun voted with Justice Burger in over eighty-five percent of the closely divided cases. GREENHOUSE, supra note 12, at 186. In the next ten years, however, Justice Blackmun voted more often with Justice Brennan than with the Chief Justice. Id. (“By the next five-year period, 1975 to 1980, Blackmun was joining Brennan in 54.5 percent of the divided cases and Burger in 45.5 percent. During the final five years that he and Burger served together, he joined Brennan in 70.6% of the close cases and Burger in only 32.4 percent.”). 14 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 303 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https://perma.cc/FUT4-UC2N]. 15 Id. at 308. The supplemental statement also emphasized the need to allow “for comment on the failure of [a defendant] to take the stand” in his or her own defense. Id. 16 I should recognize, however, that some thoughtful commentators have reached very different conclusions than I have regarding the impact of President Nixon’s four appointments. See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 398 (1994) (“With the appointments of Burger and Blackmun and the later addition of Powell and Rehnquist, the conservatives had a decisive majority on most questions of criminals’ rights. But to the distress of some and the relief of others, there was no sudden about-face. The conservative majority generally accepted the achievements of the Warren Court—but refined them, constrained them, and reduced their scope. The result was a new synthesis, based partly on the insights and innovations of the Warren Court and partly on the doubts and objections of its critics.”). 1296 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1293 II. THE THREE DISSENTS IN MIRANDA Returning to the case itself, four Justices wrote three separate dissenting opinions in Miranda.17 In one way or another, each dissent assumed that Miranda would be a criminal justice disaster—that very few suspects, if any, would waive their rights.