An Evolutionary Life History Framework for Psychopathology Marco Del Giudice Department of Psychology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico
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Psychological Inquiry, 25: 261–300, 2014 Copyright Ó Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1047-840X print / 1532-7965 online DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2014.884918 TARGET ARTICLE An Evolutionary Life History Framework for Psychopathology Marco Del Giudice Department of Psychology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico In this article, I outline a general framework for the evolutionary analysis of mental disorders based on the concepts of life history theory. I synthesize and extend a large body of work showing that individual differences in life history strategy set the stage for the development of psychopathology. My analysis centers on the novel distinction between fast spectrum and slow spectrum disorders. I describe four main causal pathways from life history strategies to psychopathology, argue that psychopathology can arise at both ends of the fast–slow continuum of life history variation, and provide heuristic criteria for classifying disorders as fast or slow spectrum pathologies. I then apply the fast–slow distinction to a diverse sample of common mental disorders: externalizing disorders, schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, eating disorders, and depression. The framework integrates previously disconnected models of psychopathology within a common frame of reference and has far-reaching implications for the classification of mental disorders. Key words: evolutionary psychopathology, fast–slow continuum, individual differences, life history strategies, life history theory, mental disorders Introduction fragmented (Kennair, 2003, 2011) and lacks organiz- ing principles capable of explaining how disorders Evolutionary psychopathology is the application relate to one another and to the nonclinical range of of evolutionary theory to the study of mental disor- individual differences in personality and behavior. ders, including their etiology, development, and clas- In this article, I outline a framework for the evolu- sification. Evolutionary approaches are gaining tionary analysis of mental disorders based on the con- momentum in both psychology and medicine (Buss, cepts of life history theory (Charnov, 1993; Kaplan & 2005, 2011; Dunbar & Barrett, 2007; Gluckman, Gangestad, 2005; Stearns, 1992). For more than two Downloaded by [University of New Mexico] at 14:39 19 August 2014 Beedle, & Hanson, 2009; Stearns & Koella, 2008; decades, life history concepts have been applied to Stearns, Nesse, Govindaraju, & Ellison, 2010), mak- psychopathology, yielding insight into a broad range ing psychopathology a natural candidate for theoreti- of conditions including psychopathy (Barr & Quinsey, cal integration. Evolutionary-minded researchers call 2004; Figueredo & Jacobs, 2010; G. T. Harris, Rice, for a revision of psychopathological theory and Hilton, Lalumiere, & Quinsey, 2007; Jonason, Li, research, informed by a renewed understanding of the Webster, & Schmitt, 2009; D. N. Jones & Paulhus, evolved functions of mental processes and their neu- 2011; Lalumiere, Mishra, & Harris, 2008; Mealey, robiological substrates (Abed, 2000; Br€une et al., 1995; Mishra & Lalumiere, 2008), autism and schizo- 2012; Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; Kennair, 2003; phrenia (Del Giudice, Angeleri, Brizio, & Elena, Nesse, 2001a, 2004b; Nesse & Jackson, 2006, 2011; 2010), borderline personality disorder (Br€une, Nesse & Stein, 2012; Troisi & McGuire, 2002). Ghiassi, & Ribbert, 2010), attention deficit hyperactiv- Many competing evolutionary hypotheses on the ity symptoms (Frederick, 2012), internalizing and origins and etiology of individual disorders have externalizing symptoms (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, been advanced, and their predictions are being tested 1991; Del Giudice, Ellis, & Shirtcliff, 2011), and eat- in an expanding empirical literature (see Adriaens & ing disorders (EDs; Salmon, Figueredo, & Woodburn, De Block, 2011; Br€une, 2008; McGuire & Troisi, 2009). The framework I present synthesizes and 1998). However, the field as a whole is still highly extends this body of work, based on the idea that 261 DEL GIUDICE individual differences in life history strategy—and on fitness—the differential replication of genes in specifically along the fast–slow continuum of life his- subsequent generations. From the standpoint of an tory variation—set the stage for the development of individual organism, adaptive traits enhance inclusive psychological symptoms and mental disorders. fitness, a function of the individual’s contributions to Central to my analysis is the novel distinction its own reproductive success and that of related indi- between fast spectrum and slow spectrum psychopa- viduals (see Grafen, 1985; West, Griffin, & Gardner, thology. As I show, this distinction is a powerful tool 2007). The biological notions of adaptation and mal- for analyzing and classifying disorders based on deep adaptation contrast sharply with how the same terms functional principles rather than symptom similarity. are usually employed in psychology and psychiatry. The goal of the framework is not to explain mental In these disciplines, the term “adaptive” refers to disorders exclusively in relation to life history strate- traits and behaviors that promote health, subjective gies, nor to replace other functional explanations of well-being, and mutually rewarding social relations; mental disorders. Although the fast–slow continuum socially undesirable, distressing, or health-damaging represents a fundamental dimension of individual dif- traits are viewed as maladaptive. Because natural ferences, any satisfactory explanation of a mental dis- selection promotes reproductive success rather than order must involve multiple levels of explanation, happiness or health (Cosmides & Tooby, 1999; from general functional principles to specific neurobi- Gluckman, Low, Buklijas, Hanson, & Beedle, 2011; ological mechanisms. The present framework aims to Nesse, 2001a, 2004b), biologically adaptive traits capture the broadest and most general level of this may or may not be socially desirable or conducive to explanatory hierarchy. Accordingly, its goal is not to health and well-being. In this article, I always employ replace existing explanations but rather to refine the terms “adaptation” and “adaptive” in their biolog- them, connect them to one another, and ultimately ical sense. integrate them within a common frame of reference. Mental disorders are the main topic of this article, yet the concept of disorder has no straightforward biological definition (Nesse, 2001a). In an influential Overview of the Article article, Wakefield (1992) advanced a biological anal- I begin by introducing the basic concepts of life ysis of disorders as harmful dysfunctions. A condition history theory in nonmathematical terms and present- is a harmful dysfunction if (a) it is caused by the fail- ing an overview of the fast–slow continuum of life ure of a biological mechanism to perform its evolved history variation as an organizing principle of indi- function, and (b) it inflicts some harm or damage on vidual differences. I then review the growing empiri- the affected person, as judged by sociocultural stand- cal literature on life history strategies and individual ards (see also Wakefield, 1999, 2011). Current diag- differences in motivation, self-regulation, and person- nostic systems in psychopathology emphasize harm ality in humans. In the next section, I build on these over biological dysfunction; as a result, diagnosable ideas and findings to outline a general life history mental “disorders” are likely to include harmful dys- framework for psychopathology. I begin by describ- functions but also various other types of undesirable ing four main causal pathways from life history strat- conditions. Although many of those conditions may egies to mental disorders. I then argue that be clearly maladaptive, others may represent the out- psychopathology can arise at both ends of the fast– comes of adaptive biological processes even if they slow continuum and provide heuristic criteria for have undesirable consequences (see Cosmides & Downloaded by [University of New Mexico] at 14:39 19 August 2014 classifying disorders as fast or slow spectrum pathol- Tooby, 1999; Gluckman et al., 2011; Nesse & Jack- ogies. Next, I apply the framework to a diverse set of son, 2006). For the sake of simplicity as well as con- mental disorders: externalizing disorders, schizophre- sistency with current diagnostic systems, in this nia spectrum disorders (SSDs), autism spectrum dis- article I employ the term “disorder” in its conven- orders (ASDs), obsessive-compulsive (OC) spectrum tional sense. Thus, for the present purposes, a condi- disorders, EDs, and depression. I conclude by explor- tion may be labeled as a disorder regardless of ing some implications of the framework for the clas- whether or not it reflects a harmful dysfunction, sification of psychopathological conditions. In and—more generally—whether it reflects biologi- particular, I argue that the fast–slow distinction is cally adaptive or maladaptive processes. both more inclusive and more accurate than the stan- dard distinction between internalizing and externaliz- ing disorders. Life History Theory and the Fast-Slow Continuum Life history theory is a branch of evolutionary Terminological Notes biology dealing with the way organisms allocate time In evolutionary biology, the terms adaptive and and energy to the various activities that comprise maladaptive denote the effects of traits and behaviors their life cycle (see Charnov, 1993;