The State of Environmental Migration 2013

TYPHOON BOPHA AND PEOPLE DISPLACEMENTS IN THE ULRIKE JULIA WENDT

1. INTRODUCTION will follow. It is important to note that, at the time of writing in , policy responses are still being , locally known as Pablo, made implemented and are changing. Policy recommen- landfall in the southern part of the Philippines on dations are discussed in the conclusion.  December . It was not only the sixteenth and strongest typhoon that hit the country in , but it was also the most powerful and southern typhoon 2. THE PHILIPPINES: A COUNTRY that was recorded in the Western Pacific in the FAMILIAR WITH NATURAL past  years, a worrying indicator how climate change could affect the Philippines in severe DISASTERS AND CONSEQUENTIAL ways (IOM Philippines, ). Considering that PEOPLE DISPLACEMENTS the Philippines is a country familiar with natural disasters and consequential people displacements, The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone this paper examines the extent to which Typhoon countries in the world. According to the World Risk Bopha has caused large-scale displacements of Report , it was ranked third out of  coun- people and significantly contributed to decreased tries, meaning the third most exposed and vulner- standards of living. In so doing, the paper will able country to disasters (Alliance Development refer to “displaced people” as those who have been Works, : ). Between  and ,  forced or obliged to leave their homes as a result natural disasters occurred in the country, which of the threats or impacts of Typhoon Bopha. This is nearly a third of the total number of disasters comprises of people who were evacuated or fled by that occurred in the South-East Asian region in themselves before or after the onset of the event. this period (GFDRR, : ). Typhoons are the It also includes situations where people lost their most common and detrimental disasters. Between homes or livelihoods and now stay in different June and December, an average of  typhoons sites (Yonetani : ). hit the country annually, usually accompanied by The first section of the paper will provide a short intense rainfall and flooding, causing the death of background about the Philippines’ long history hundreds of people and damaging the country’s of environment-induced displacements. It then economy significantly (GFDRR, : ). elaborates on Typhoon Bopha and its detrimental impacts, which forced many people to leave their .. The Philippines homes before and after the storm. The next section geographical vulnerabilities examines these displacements in greater detail. Subsequently, a critical study of the major policy Natural disasters strike the Philippines due to responses that have been implemented to address various reasons. Its geographical situation contrib- the particular needs of the displaced population utes to the high vulnerability that is further exacer- bated by the risks resulting from climate change. In . The description used in this paper to identify “displaced fact, the Philippines have recorded its most detri- people” is informed by the Guiding mental, largest and deadliest typhoons in the past Principles Document that defines Internally Displaced  years (GFDRR, : ). Furthermore, envi- People (IDPs) as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or ronmental degradation has increased the coun- places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of try’s risks of disasters. Poor land-use, planning and or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situa- population growth contribute to the enormous tions of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not damage of the environment and lead to the defor- crossed an internationally recognized state border”. estation of large regions (GFDRR, : ). As a This paper refers to people that were displaced due to result, landslides and flash flooding have increased Typhoon Bopha without differentiating between those and some areas that have significantly lost their who have been displaced internally or across border. The available data suggests that the majority of people dis- woodland have become more vulnerable to the placed due to Bopha have been displaced internally. damage caused by typhoons (GFDRR, : ).

IDDRI STUDY 09/2013 33 The State of Environmental Migration 2013

The high occurrence of natural disasters has , the Philippines have supported the Hyogo caused the displacement of millions of people in Framework for Action (HFA), which is a ten-year the Philippines. Between  and , more plan that aims to explain, illustrate and specify than twelve million people were displaced due the work that is needed from different fields and to natural disasters (Yonetani : ). After Ty- stakeholders to better address issues related to phoon Washi, locally known as Sendong, hit the disasters (NDRRMP, : ). In , the Filipino country in December , about  per cent of the Government signed the Philippines Disaster Risk population of the city and about Reduction and Management Act (PDRRM) that  per cent of the population of the city in aims to reform the country’s main laws and poli- the country’s southern part were displaced (Gin- cies in line with the HFA (Ginnetti et al., : ). netti et al., : ). Clearly, these numbers help In order to specifically address issues related to explain why the Internal Displacement Monitoring Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the country Centre (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Coun- has formulated a number of laws and bills, such as cil (NRC) have identified the Philippines as one of a bill to protect the rights of IDPs that was passed the countries with the highest number of people in February  (UNHCR, ). The PDRRM has displaced due to natural disasters. In , they since included a provision on IDPs as well (Ginnetti have ranked the country third; in , seventh; et al., : ). and in , fourth (Yonetani, : , , ; Yon- Despite the governmental attention given to etani : ). DRR and IDPs and the consequent adoption of do- A number of factors highly increase the risks of mestic policies based on international standards, the displacement of people. For example, homes Typhoon Bopha has caused large-scale people dis- and buildings are often not built to the same placements and significantly contributed to their standards as in developed countries (Ginnetti et decreased standard of living. al., : ). Consequently, the risk of them being destroyed is far greater and can lead to the peo- ple’s displacement. Poor urban governance and 3. THE TYPHOON AND ITS weak political accountability are the underlying DETRIMENTAL IMPACTS reasons for this because they often lead to un- successful and/or unenforced land planning and building standards (Ginnetti et al., : ). Fur- .. Formation and path thermore, Ginnetti et al. (: ) cite that a lack of of Typhoon Bopha understanding of the effects of climate change and unsatisfactory early-warning systems for natural The origins of Typhoon Bopha were first sighted disasters contribute to the country’s high risk of around  November  (Gutro, ). Bopha people’s displacement. formed in an uncommon and distinctive manner because it developed fewer than five degrees north . Policy adaptation to of the equator (Met Office, ). This is an area the high level of risks where tropical storms do not typically emerge due to the low Coriolis force that helps typhoons to Given this high risk of natural disasters and its form by causing their rotation (Haeseler, ). consequences on people’s displacement, the Phil- In the following weeks, Bopha steadily increased ippines have enacted a variety of policies and legis- in its size and intensity. On  December, it hit the lations on disaster risk reduction (DRR). In fact, southern part of the archipelago (around similar efforts have a long history in the country. , km east of the Philippines) where it devas- As a colonial power starting in the th century, tated several areas, caused power outages but no Spain set up a record system to keep informa- casualties (OCHA, a). tion on environmental events. Interestingly, the On  December at . am, Bopha made landfall records of the environmental events that occurred over Bagaga in , which is in eastern between  and  have informed today’s in the southern part of the Philippines early warning systems (Ginnetti et al., : ). (NDRRMC, ). Bopha recorded wind strengths Since the end of the th century, laws on disas- of about  km/h in its center, gusts of up to  ters associated with natural and human-induced km/h and rainfall of - mm per hour within its hazards and institutions on disaster manage- diameter of  km (IOM Philippines, a). This ment have increasingly been enacted. In , was three times the wind strength and twice the President Marcos issued Presidential Decree  rainfall than had brought that remains the basis for the country’s disaster to the Philippines in  (OCHA, : ). In the management (Ginnetti et al., : ). Since following days, Bopha traversed the landmasses

34 STUDY 09/2013 IDDRI The State of Environmental Migration 2013

Map 1. The path of Typhoon Bopha

Source: OCHA 2013: iv. Map provided courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

IDDRI STUDY 09/2013 35 The State of Environmental Migration 2013

of Mindanao and turned north while it weakened on  December, to  on  December and to , (NDRRMC, ). As noted earlier, Bopha moved on  December (IOM Philippines, ; OCHA, along the most southern course of a typhoon that b; OCHA, c; OCHA, d; OCHA, e). has been recorded in the Western Pacific in the Many factors explain this increase in numbers: it past  years. Bopha was downgraded to a tropi- took several days until Bopha completely left the cal depression when it left the Philippine area on  country and thereby killed people in the days after December (NDRRMC, ). The typhoon’s great  December. In addition, Bopha hit many remote strength and its uncommon trajectory was a ma- communities where it was challenging to obtain jor reason why it had a detrimental impact on the comprehensive data on causalities. Mindanao region and its population. Bopha affected various specifically vulnerable groups. Some reports revealed that up to  per .. Affected regions cent of the affected population lived below the poverty line (Protection Cluster, ). Poor peo- With high winds along coastal areas, mudslides ple were often dependent on income generating in highland villages and flash in low-lying activities, such as subsistence farming, and lived areas, Bopha damaged vast regions during its in houses built with less robust materials (IFAD, course through Mindanao (Shelter Cluster, ). : ). Given that Bopha particularly destroyed In particular, it affected the eastern part of the farmland and housing, which will be later ex- island, which is one of the poorest regions of the plained in greater detail, poor people were excep- Philippines. About . million people live in this tionally vulnerable to the typhoon. Other reports area that encompasses the Davao and Caraga using different criteria to identify the most af- region (OCHA, : ). Out of the country’s  fected people disclosed that more than  per cent regions, these regions are respectively the th ( were indigenous people (Protection Cluster, ). persons per square meter) and th ( persons Indigenous people frequently live in the isolated per square meter) most populated areas (National regions of Mindanao. Therefore, they may not Statistics Office ). Specifically, Bopha had have been informed early enough to evacuate be- detrimental effects on the provinces of Davao fore Bopha’s landfall and were less likely to obtain Oriental, Compostela Valley, Suriago del Sur and humanitarian assistance in a relatively quick man- Agusan del Sur, each of which it destroyed and ner (Protection Cluster, ). Women and chil- impacted in their particular way. For example, dren also belonged to the most affected groups. Davao Oriental especially suffered from the UNICEF () reported that about one third of all damages to its agricultural lands and Compostela affected people were children. They often experi- Valley experienced a particularly high number of enced profound stress due to the death or injury casualties. The high level of deforestation that of their loved ones, which can have significant ef- characterized Mindanao before Bopha may have fects on their well-being and future development contributed to the extent to which these effects (UNICEF, ). Furthermore, many women were were so damaging (Morrison, ). affected because they had become the main pro- vider for their family. Their men had often left .. Human cost of Bopha after the storm to look for employment elsewhere (Protection Cluster, ). Bopha affected over . million people (OCHA, a: ). According to the Inter-Agency Standing .. Agriculture damages Committee (n.d.), this includes “all people whose lives have been affected in some way by the crisis” Bopha had devastating impacts on the agriculture beyond those in need of humanitarian assistance. of eastern Mindanao. National authorities reported More specifically, the typhoon left , people that thousands of hectares of banana and coconut dead,  missing and , injured (OCHA, plantations were destroyed, mainly in the provinces e, OCHA, a: ). These numbers have of Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental (DSWD et constantly and drastically risen since Bopha hit al., ). Small growers were particularly affected the country on  December. The reported number and had lost between  and  per cent of their of affected people increased from about , total farming areas (DSWD et al., ). The overall on  December, to  million on  December, and damage costs to agriculture were estimated to be at to . million on  December. Similarly, the about USD  million (OCHA, f). number of people killed increased from about  Before the typhoon, the majority of the popu- lation of eastern Mindanao was dependent on . Interview with IOM Communications Specialist, con- subsistence farming of basic commodities, includ- ducted on  March  via Skype. ing coconuts, bananas and rice (OCHA, : ).

36 STUDY 09/2013 IDDRI The State of Environmental Migration 2013

Picture 1. Aftermath of Typhoon Pablo (Bopha)

Credits: Cateel, Davao Oriental, Creative Commons, Photo: Sonny M. Day, 5 December 2012. Available: http://www.flickr.com/photos/89715795@N02/8289315117/in/pho- tostream/, Accessed: 27 August 2013., Accessed: 21.05.2013.

In addition to growing parts of their own food, even iron roofs had been carried through the wind households purchased food items from local mar- like ”flying machetes” (Mullen, ). Damages to kets (OCHA, : ). However, Bopha had dam- infrastructure were estimated to amount to over aging impacts on this mixed food economy. After USD  million (OCHA, ). Power and elec- its landfall, many people were no longer able to tricity were only slowly restored in the following grow their own food and buy food from the mar- months, which may have contributed to communi- kets. Not only was their agricultural land com- ties being slowly informed of the current situation pletely destroyed, but also market supply chains (OCHA, : ). had been cut off (OCHA, : ). Furthermore, the damages to agricultural lands contributed to .. Education, health a loss of income for many people. People had to and safety impacts look for other jobs elsewhere to make their living; however, these coping strategies were often not Large numbers of schools were destroyed or used sufficient to cover all food needs (OCHA, : - as evacuation centers, which made it impos- ; DSWD et al., ). These detrimental impacts sible for many children to attend school (Center contributed to food insecurity and dramatically for Disaster Philanthropy, ). Indeed, the increased the need of food assistance. Addition- Government was able to re-establish the daily ally, given that crops like banana and coconut take school routine within only one month. However, years to grow, the gravity of the agricultural dam- many challenges remained, such as the lack of ages is tremendous (Shelter Cluster, ; OCHA, electricity, school records and teaching mate- : ). rial (OCHA, ). Many health care facilities were also destroyed, decreasing dramatically the .. Housing and infrastructure number of available health care providers in the light of the high number of physically injured and The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Manage- psychologically distressed people (OCHA, ). ment Council (NDRRMC) reported that more than Bopha had also detrimental impacts in regards , shelters were affected by the typhoon to safety issues. An increased number of gender- (IOM Philippines, ). Given that many houses based violence cases was reported (OCHA, b). were built with wood and other vulnerable mate- Additionally, many people, particularly indig- rials, numerous houses lost their roofs or were enous people, living in the hinterlands were not completely flattened. Yet, it was reported that able to access basic government services, such as

IDDRI STUDY 09/2013 37 The State of Environmental Migration 2013

social welfare programs, because they had never .. Number and location possessed birth certificates (Protection Cluster, of people displaced ). from their homes

The reported number of people displaced from 4. THE VARIOUS FORMS their homes significantly increased after Bopha AND IMPACTS OF PEOPLES’ hit the Philippines on  December. Initially, news articles, international organizations and national DISPLACEMENTS authorities reported that tens of thousands people had been evacuated or fled by themselves to .. Preventive evacuations various evacuations centers (The Telegraph, ). The peak was achieved shortly after Bopha’s land- Before Bopha hit the country, many people had fall (OCHA d). The reported number of people already left their homes to flee the threats of displaced from their homes further increased to typhoon. Between  November and  December, about one million by taking into account people national and international disaster authorities who were inside evacuation centers and outside encouraged communities to take responsibility for evacuation centers as Bopha had, for instance, their safety and ordered pre-emptive evacuations damaged their houses (OCHA ). The latest in areas that were expected to be hit the hardest figures report that Bopha induced the displace- (IFRC, ; Escalante, , OCHA, :  ). As ment of more than . million people in total a response, residents were evacuated or fled by (Yonetani : ). themselves to safer grounds, which included evac- uation centers set up in schools, bus terminals and Figure 2. Displaced People inside and outside Evacuation gyms. People also fled to relatives who lived on Centers higher ground to prevent being affected by flash Number of People displaced from their homes floods and landslides that were expected to result 1,000,000 from the typhoon (Escalante, ; NDRRMC, a). 800,000 Officials have struggled to measure the scale of the pre-emptive evacuations and escapes. On the 600,000 one hand, authorities stated that more people had Outside Evacuation Centers been encouraged to leave typhoon-hazardous ar- 400,000 eas compared to the previous year when Typhoon 200,000 Washi hit the country (Mullen, ). On the other Inside Evacuation Centers hand, they emphasized that there were important differences between areas. In the more northern 4 Dec 11 Dec 18 Dec 25 Dec 1 Jan 8 Jan areas, where Washi hit Mindanao, the number of Source: OCHA, 2013: 3. Map provided with the courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The boundaries and names shown and the people who left their homes was much larger than designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by in the southern areas, where Washi had not made the United Nations. landfall in . Ortigas () reported that the population in the north had taken the warning More specifically, in January , the Philip- signals more seriously because Bopha had been pines’ Department of Social Welfare and Devel- expected to hit this area strongly and people were opment (DSWD) estimated that, at the height of still traumatized through Typhoon Washi. In con- the disaster, about , families, or , trast, the population in the south paid less atten- people, stayed in about , evacuation centers tion to the warning signs because Bopha had been (OCHA, : ). Indeed, these numbers exceed expected to hit this region less and people “didn’t those that the Office of the Coordination of Hu- even know what the warning signals meant (…)” manitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported and are illus- because “typhoons always happen somewhere trated in figure . OCHA (d) estimated a peak else, not here (…)” (Ortigas ). Eventually, Bo- of , evacuees staying in  evacuation pha hit the south stronger than anticipated, caus- centers on  December . Many reasons could ing a higher number of deaths than in the north explain this significant difference in data, such as (Ortigas ). that the DSWD may have used additional sources that were not known to OCHA in December .

. Personal communication with OCHA Head of Office, . Ibid. conducted on  June  via email.

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Evacuation centers were increasingly established people from their familiar environment, which in different locations, including local government would make it difficult for them to get back into buildings, gyms and stadiums (OCHA, : ). their normal life once they have left these tempo- Soon after Bopha had hit the country, the number rary solutions. of people who stayed in these evacuation centers While many people were displaced in evacu- started decreasing (IOM, a). By February ation centers and transitional sites, the over- , less than , people remained in about whelming majority, numbering about , one hundred evacuation centers (OCHA, e). people as of February , remained with host Many factors explain why these numbers started families and in so-called “spontaneous settle- declining quickly. First, numerous families wanted to ments”, where people have set up their own return to their homes to start rebuilding their houses makeshift shelters (OCHA, e; IOM Philip- and save whatever they could (IOM, a). Second, pines a). This number had stayed relatively many people left because of the bad conditions that consistent from mid-December , as shown in often prevailed in evacuation centers. Many centers figure . However, one may observe a significant were overcrowded and could not provide adequate drop in the number of people staying outside protection that people required, such as material for evacuation centers around  December. OCHA emergency shelters, adequate sanitation and pota- had used only data that was available at the ble water (IOM, a). Several evacuation centers time. However, data from some municipalities were also roofless after having been hit by the ty- had not arrived, which explains the sudden drop phoon and some evacuation centers in Compostela in numbers. The non-supply of the data could Valley were badly flooded (IOM, ). These condi- have been due to numerous reasons, such as lo- tions also led some people to move to other places, gistical challenges to obtain data. Spontaneous such as to transitional sites (IOM, ). settlements were mainly found along roadsides, Transitional sites included tent cities and bunk- near the original houses of displaced people houses that were set up immediately after the ty- and in affected communities after the - phoon in order to provide a sanctuary for displaced water receded (IOM Philippines, a). While people. By March , IOM Philippines () re- people received similar assistance as those who ported that  bunkhouses were built in Davao remained in registered sites, providing the nec- Oriental and Compostela Valley. The construction essary aid to them was more challenging (IOM of bunkhouses mainly happened under the con- Philippines, a). trol of national authorities, with the financial and technical support of international and national . Migration and trafficking humanitarian organizations and the assistance of local people who were hired to build these houses After  December, an increasing number of people (IOM, ; OCHA, : ; OCHA, d). left their homes to better deal with the impacts However, transitional sites were a highly contro- of Typhoon Bopha. In order to cope with the versial topic. Similar to many evacuation centers, financial difficulties, for example, several people, transitional sites were often in bad conditions and particularly men, migrated to other areas to look lacked, for instance, adequate water, sanitation for work. Although this implied that many were and hygiene facilities (IOM, ). In addition, separated from their families and usual environ- newspapers criticized the construction of bunk- ments, they saw this as their duty. As noted earlier, houses and accused the government of managing women who stayed home consequently emerged this process in a corrupt manner (Escalante, ). as the main provider for their families (Protection For instance, local newspapers reported that the Cluster, ; UNICEF, ). Similarly, adolescent payments of those who were hired to build bunk- boys and girls started going to cities to look for houses were dubious because some workers had jobs. Given the high incidence of child labor in the received more money than they were entitled Philippines, this was not considered an unusual (Romero, ). Furthermore, the construction of phenomenon. However, travelling as child laborers transitional sites had often not been regarded as a to other regions made children more vulnerable to best practice. Specialists on post crises and emer- violence, abuse and trafficking (Protection Cluster, gency issues noted that efforts should have been ; UNICEF, ). directed toward making people stay in their trust- ed environment so that they can recover as quickly  . Interview with IOM Regional Emergency and Post Crisis as possible. Transitional sites would disconnect Specialist at IOM Thailand, conducted on  March  via Skype. . Interview with IOM Regional Emergency and Post Crisis Special- . Personal communication with OCHA Humanitarian ist at IOM Thailand, conducted on  March  via Skype. Affairs Officer, conducted  June  via email.

IDDRI STUDY 09/2013 39 The State of Environmental Migration 2013

Hence, UNICEF () raised the concern that complicate whether people will be able to rebuild the incidence of trafficking could increase as a their houses. Assessments show that many of the result of Typhoon Bopha. Already before Bopha, worst affected people were living in informal ar- trafficking had been a common issue in the Mind- rangements without any legal documentation on anao region (UNICEF, ). Due to the clandes- land ownership. However, such documentation is tine nature of trafficking, however, reliable and important in order to receive government assis- up-to-date data have not yet been available that tance to rebuild houses; but it may take “some time” would allow better assessment of whether or not to obtain them (Kelly : ). Additionally, going the issue of trafficking has increased due to Bopha. back to normal will be difficult for everyone who Nevertheless, the concern is reasonable because suffered a loss, especially for dependents. Whole children that resulted from the typhoon are likely communities will also need to be rebuilt to enable a to be more vulnerable to child trafficking. For ex- similar life before Bopha. The question of whether ample, the rising number of migrating child labor- the Government will actively support people return ers due to Typhoon Bopha could add to the issue of to their homelands and, instead, relocate them to child trafficking (UNICEF, ). Furthermore, the less disaster prone areas is of high importance. growing number of women and girls who were left behind or looking for work could exacerbate the problem of sex trafficking. The fact that traffick- 5. POLICY RESPONSES ing increased by about  per cent after Typhoon AND CHALLENGES Washi had devastated the Philippines in  in- dicates that trafficking could intensify (UNICEF, ). Consequently, several humanitarian actors .. The questioned efficiency have mainstreamed awareness-building programs of preparedness measures on trafficking issues amongst governmental offi- cials and regional anti-trafficking networks since Many actions that aimed to prepare for any eventu- Bopha (IOM Philippines, a). alities related to Bopha started on  November  when the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and . Return of the Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) displaced people and the NDRRMC began to issue regular updates on the typhoon. Bopha was expected to reach the The question of when and whether displaced country by  December with wind strength between people can go back is difficult. Indeed, several  km/h and  km/h. Local authorities also people returned to their trusted environment expected that Bopha would have more devastating to continue their life, or start a new life, as early impacts than Washi and therefore, aimed to inten- as possible. However, even if people were able sify preparation and evacuations efforts. (IFRC, to return and live in their houses, the conditions ; PAGASA, n.d.; OCHA, ) in which they live are often very poor. A study Both governmental and non-governmental ac- conducted by REACH in March  had shown tors implemented emergency preparedness ac- that  per cent of families, or nearly a half a tions. This included that PAGASA and NDRRMC million people, lived in houses that were classified classified different regions under different public ”uninhabitable” (Bamforth, ; Reach, ). warning signals. In the view of these signals, au- Updated data suggests that, as of  April , thorities directed pre-emptive evacuations of fami- , people displaced by Bopha still remain in- lies that resided in areas that were anticipated to side evacuation centers and , outside of be hit the strongest. Furthermore, they advised the evacuation centers (OCHA, a: ). While population to take precautionary measures, which many live in tents and bunkhouses, the majority included cancelling travel and outdoor activities, remains in spontaneous settlements (IOM Philip- seeking shelter in stronger buildings, evacuat- pines, ). Those who live in spontaneous settle- ing to safer areas, calling off school classes and ments are often considered more likely to return staying in shelters until the typhoon completely to normality than people residing in other sites. passed (IFRC, , PAGASA n.d.). Furthermore, Many spontaneous settlements are close to the humanitarian stakeholders established evacuation original homes of displaced people where families centers, pre-positioned relief items and mobilized can live together and the community life can start the emergency responders (IFRC, ). People again (Bamforth, ). Yet, it may take years until all the people will be . Interview with IOM Communications Specialists, Inter- able to return and live in their homes as it was be- view with IOM Regional Emergency and Post Crisis fore Bopha. For example, land tenure issues might Specialist

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generally took the warnings seriously and fol- : -). lowed the recommended precautionary measures. As planned by the responsibility sharing of the Given the high number of casualties that Bopha cluster approach, specific actors were in charge of caused, it appears that the implemented prepar- specific sectors, according to their mandate, com- edness measures were insufficient and ineffec- petences and field presence. The DSWD and the tive. Therefore, one may interogates the extent to United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which the Philippines could still be seen as a mod- took the lead for the early recovery cluster (OCHA, el in addressing issues related to DRR (Ginnetti et : ). Cluster outputs included the distribution al., ). However, Bopha happened in a region of food packs and the realization of cash-for-work where a typhoon of such great strength had no such as hiring workers to clear debris, rebuilding precedent. This raises the question as to whether homes and infrastructure (OCHA : ). Bunk- people can be expected to effectively and success- houses were constructed and emergency shelter fully prepare for something that never happened kits were distributed to address the needs for shel- before and that no one genuinely expected to ever ter (OCHA, ). happen. However, significant gaps remained in the pro- vision of shelter (OCHA : , OCHA d). A .. Declaration of the “state comprehensive shelter policy for Bopha had still of national calamity” to be drafted in March  (Scheidler & Hilmi, ). This lack of policy hampered humanitarian On  December, after Bopha’s landfall, the Presi- assistance because local authorities, communities dent of the Philippines signed Proclamation No. and other humanitarian stakeholders were await-  to declare a state of national calamity. In doing ing clarity in how to address certain shelter issues. so, he aimed to speed up the rescue, relief and However, a comprehensive shelter policy could rehabilitation plans implemented by the national have significantly accelerated the provision of as- and international humanitarian assistance sistance to those living in evacuations centers, tran- (OCHA, ; Kelly ). While President Aquino sitional sites, spontaneous settlements and in other stressed that government actors would take the vulnerable conditions (Scheidler & Hilmi, ). lead in addressing the needs that had resulted This had been seen in the previous year when Ty- from Bopha, he also emphasized the importance of phoon Washi hit the country. In its aftermath, a Lo- a coordinated approach between different human- cal Inter-Agency Committee (LIAC) had been cre- itarian actors (OCHA, : ). ated that developed a shelter strategy to coordinate and leverage national and international assistance .. Humanitarian response more effectively (Scheidler & Hilmi, ), and the clusters approach The environmental disasters that happened in the months after Bopha added to the challenge By supporting the UN clusters approach to address of implementing the clusters approach and ad- the particular needs of the displaced population, dressing the needs of the displaced population. In the Philippines aimed to strengthen the effective- particular, rains did not stop for months and dan- ness of the humanitarian response by making sure gerous floods occurred in Bopha-affected regions that high standards of predictability, account- in January  (IRIN, ). The monsoon and ability and partnership in all activity sectors were typhoon season that started in May/June were ad- achieved (DRC, n.d.). Needs assessments were ditional challenges (Scheidler & Hilmi, ). conducted by national authorities in coopera- The inaccessibility of areas, politicization of aid tion with other humanitarian organizations and and security have also been major challenges to ad- completed on  December (OCHA, : , ) and equate and nondiscriminatory aid provision. Many identified key clusters to be implemented - camp areas were hardly accessible and sometimes only coordination and camp management (CCCM), accessible with helicopters due to the destruction early recovery, food security and agriculture of numerous roads and bridges. Additionally, local (OCHA, ). The clusters approach was imple- groups and typhoon survivors argued that the pro- mented at the regional, provincial and municipal vision of aid would have been politicized due to the levels on a needs basis. This was significant given elections in May . This would have meant that that the majority of the local governments in the those who were considered potential voters would affected areas had little experience in addressing have been provided with humanitarian assistance both natural and man-made disasters (OCHA, before others that were not considered potential

. Interview with IOM Regional Emergency and Post Crisis . Ibid. Specialist.

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voters (IRIN, a). Furthermore, humanitarian programs, local governments have to obtain an assistance had to take special security measures due authorization from the MGB to ensure that these to the conflict-related situation in the region. areas are safe (Kelly, : ). If areas have pre- Funding has been a last major challenge to hu- viously been classified as a NBZ, authorization manitarian response efficiency. Even though con- forms are not issued. stant appeals were made to the international com- A major reason why the demarcation of NBZs is munity, the humanitarian response to Bopha has still an unofficial policy is that it is a highly contro- generally been underfunded, especially for emer- versial topic. This has been discussed at numerous gency shelter needs (OCHA, d). Out of the levels within the Philippines for many years and nearly one hundred thousand people who were Bopha has, all over again, clarified the contentious helped by agencies in the shelter cluster, for ex- nature of this topic. On the one hand, the realiza- ample, only half had obtained a tarpaulin because tion of NBZs could significantly lessen Mindanao’s of the agencies’ inability to obtain the sufficient risk of people displacements because of natural financial resources (Bamforth, ). disasters. On the other hand, important challenges to implement such policy exist. .. No-Build-Zones (NBZs) For example, challenges can be associated with indigenous people. Many indigenous communi- Besides the clusters approach that has particularly ties live in areas that are likely to be classified as focused on addressing the needs of the displaced NBZs. However, they may be reluctant to move population in the short-term, the Government has from their land due to their ancestral relation- implemented actions that aim to reduce the risk ship with the land (Kelly, : -). In addi- of people’s displacement due to natural disasters tion, their land and property rights are legally in the long-term. A particularly interesting and recognized by the Indigenous People’s Rights Act controversial strategy has been the identification (IPRA) of , complicating issues around relo- of so-called ‘No-Build-Zones’ (NBZs). To do so, cating them (Kelly, : -). Indeed, Section the Government’s Mines and Geosciences Bureau  of the IPRA that shows that indigenous people (MGB) has conducted geo-hazard risk assessments are only entitled to return to their land if the State in Bopha-affected provinces. In these assessments, considers it to be “safe”. However, many indige- areas are classified either as low-risk areas where nous people are likely to not accept this clause if it is safe to build, medium-risk areas where miti- it is to be enforced. Numerous field consultations gation measures may be appropriate or high-risk conducted after Bopha revealed that indigenous areas where it is unsafe to build. High-risk areas people have an extremely strong desire to return are interpreted as NBZs. Depending on the risk to their land. Although indigenous people went category, the MGB recommends actions that can through trauma, experienced severe losses and be either moderate or radical. For example, in are aware that such disasters can happen again, some cases, it is recommended to move houses they still want to go back to their old homes and for a few meters away. In other cases, it is recom- regions that their ancestors have inhabited for mended to relocate whole communities. (IRIN, centuries. ; Kelly, : ) People’s reliance on certain livelihoods and Until today, the Government has not yet released their willingness to change particular life patterns a NBZ policy. The MGB recommendations are not can also complicate the creation of NBZs. Given compulsory and cannot be legally enforced on lo- that many people rely on subsistence and com- cal governments (Kelly, : -). Neverthe- mercial farming, their relocation to land unsuit- less, the identification of NBZs has had important able for such activities can be devastating (Schei- consequences. For example, President Aquino dler & Hilmi, ). Furthermore, several people has urgently advised local governments to adopt have expressed their unwillingness to transform the recommendations issued by the MGB (Kelly, their life styles because as migrating would re- : ). In addition, several national authori- quire them to do so (Kelly, : ). For example, ties have avoided providing rebuilding assistance people who have a long family tradition of farm- to areas that were classified as NBZs (Kelly, : ing may now have to be a fisher due to the new ). Furthermore, in order to realize resettlement living circumstances.

. Interview with IOM Communications Specialist. The . Interview with IOM Communications Specialists, Inter- rural-based guerrilla force, New People’s Army (NPA), view with IOM Regional Emergency and Post Crisis which is the military wing of the Communist Party of Specialist. the Philippines (CPP), has been fighting in eastern Min- danao against the Philippine government for decades . Interview with IOM Communications Specialist. (OCHA, : ; BBC, ). . Ibid.

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Furthermore, there are important logistical and of people due to natural disasters. Indeed, many cost challenges. In some instances, the MGB has have considered the country as a global leader in identified many and wide-ranging areas as NBZs. enacting policies and legislation to reduce the risk For example,  per cent of has been of natural disasters. However, given the detrimen- classified as such. Clearly, this raises questions tal impacts that Bopha had, more efforts need to around whether the relocation of a great number be taken to address the issue of natural disasters of people is feasible to implement and if there is and its consequences on the displacement of peo- a viable alternative to which they could be relo- ple more effectively. cated. Another challenge is that the relocation Policy recommendations are suggested to ad- of people is often a slow process. In particular, the dress how to more efficiently prepare and manage identification of relocation sites has seen signifi- forthcoming disasters, and address the particular cant delays. While government land has been ac- needs of those displaced. quired relatively fast, negotiating relocation sites that are privately owned has taken far longer (Kel- Scale up current policy responses ly, : -). In addition, past experiences have The humanitarian assistance should scale up the shown that the relocation of people has been a current policy responses. Still today, there are very costly policy (Scheidler & Hilmi, ). Given many gaps that need to be filled in order to address that the Philippines are ranked as lower-middle in- the needs of the displaced people in a more effec- come country, associated costs can be a difficulty tive and efficient manner. The implementation of to finance (World Bank, ). a comprehensive shelter policy should be consid- Finally, political issues can represent obstacles ered as a priority. Furthermore, it should include to put a NBZ policy into practice. Although the increasing the financial support for the different national government is generally in favor of im- clusters, especially for the shelter cluster that has plementing NBZs, local governments do not often experienced insufficient funding (OCHA, c). agree with the realization of NBZs, mainly because this would complicate the usual voting proce- Implement standardized preparedness dure. In particular, population shifts may mean measures that certain voting districts will cease to exist. As Standardized preparedness measures should a consequence, the existence of local governments be implemented countrywide. In an interview, in these areas may be affected. specialists on post crises and emergency issues noted that the Philippines were prepared for a typhoon of such great strength; however, it was 6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY not prepared for a typhoon that hit the country RECOMMENDATIONS so far in the south in such enormous power. To implement such measures, offices that exclusively This study has shown the extent to which the handle issues related to natural disasters could Bopha typhoon has caused large-scale displace- be established in each province; governmental ments of people. These displacements have been actors from the regional, municipal and village complex because they occurred before and after level should participate in regular and compulsory the typhoon in many different forms. Further- trainings; and national campaigns that inform more, the typhoon has decreased standards of the population on appropriate preparation meas- living of the displaced people both in the short and ures and emphasize that early warning systems long term. The economic status of the Philippines must be taken seriously should be conducted in all may drag out the negative impacts of the storm provinces. The case of could serve as an because of the country’s financial limitations. This example of how a best practice approach could be already difficult situation is additionally compli- implemented, given that this country has realized cated because climate patterns are changing and a standardized way of response.  similar disasters may increasingly happen in the future in the country. Develop clear strategies that address the The above-explained situation has confronted needs of those who live in so-called ‘NBZs’ the Philippine government with new challenges It is recommended to develop clear strategies that that are related to the issue of the displacement address the needs of those who live in areas that are to be classified as NBZs, which still appears . Ibid. to be a grey area in existing policy responses. . Ibid. . Interview with IOM Regional Emergency and Post Crisis Specialist. . Ibid.

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Strategies should include developing clearer legal changing climate patterns affecting the Philip- instruments that describe the process of declaring pines. Indeed, in February , the Philippines’s and enforcing NBZs (Kelly, : ). Furthermore, Congress took already the right step in the right people living in NBZs should be clearly informed direction by launching a landmark bill that spells about the risks they face and receive appropriate out the particular rights of IDPs before and after assistance that support their decision – whether it displacement and allows IDPs to claim monetary is to remain in the NBZ area or move away (Kelly, assistance and compensation (UNHCR, ). The :). challenge is now one of its implementation. 

Ensure that mechanisms to protect the rights of people displaced by environmental events are put into action . National and international actors praised this bill, which represented the first of its kind in Asia, as a milestone for It is imperative to ensure that appropriate mecha- the protection of IDPs in the Philippines (UNHCR ). nisms to protect the rights of people displaced However, in June , the President of the Philippines by environmental events are put into action. vetoed the Rights of the IDP Act (NRC&IDMC ). People displaced by natural events do not only Clearly, this emphasizes both the challenge to implement mechanisms to protect the rights of people displaced by have particular needs, but their numbers may environmental events, as well as the need to continue also be increasing in the coming years due to the campaigning for it.

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