RCAF Radar Personnel in WWII -North Atlantic Region
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RCAF Radar Personnel in WWII -North Atlantic Region- Prepared by Douglas Gooderham ,9 North Atlantic Region ,9 North Atlantic Region CONTENTS Items Page(s) Preface...................................................................................................IV-4 Background...........................................................................................IV-5 Orkneys.................................................................................................IV-6 Faroes....................................................................................................IV-7 Shetlands..................................................................................IV- 8 to IV-9 Iceland....................................................................................IV-10 to IV-12 RCAF Radar (Air) Personnel in the North Atlantic...............IV-13 to IV-14 We were there.......................................................................................IV-15 ,9 North Atlantic Region PREFACE This essay focuses on the role played in World War II, in the North Atlantic Region, by RCAF radar personnel. As background to the work and experiences of individuals, a brief outline is provided of the military strategies and events that gave rise to the deployment of the numerous air squadrons and ground radar stations on which Canadian radar personnel served. ,9 North Atlantic Region RCAF Radar Personnel in WWII North Atlantic Region Background: When Germany invaded Denmark and then Norway in April 1940, and rapidly acquired air and sea bases on the Norwegian coast right up to Cape North, the threat to Allied merchant shipping using the high latitude routes across the North Atlantic increased significantly; and Scapa Flow, the Royal Navy’s home base in the Orkney Islands, was within easy range of German long-range aircraft. Extension of ground radar cover northward and northeastward from Scotland became an urgent requirement, as witness a directive* issued by Churchill (then First Sea Lord) dated 16 April 1940: “ . .you should now assume the duty of concerting action to make the Faroes satisfactory for our purposes. Pray make a weekly report. DCNS will supply you with the requirements. We must have an aerodrome and RDF (radar) at the very earliest moment, together with AA defence, and a few coastal guns. This will be a very tempting base for a raid . .” That particular directive dealt only with necessary action on the Faroes, but the need for additional radar cover based on the Orkneys and Shetlands was also recognized. The Inter-Services RDF Committee called for immediate placement of three additional CH (Chain Home) radars on these two island groups, together with complementary CHL (Chain Home Low) radars. Iceland too was of great concern to Allied planners. It was known that, prior to the outbreak of WWII, Germany had sent a large commission to Iceland to negotiate for air bases there. Fortunately, the Icelandic Cabinet had refused to grant any bases; nor would it allow German airlines to establish ‘commercial routes.’ But with WWII underway, Germany was freed from the constraint of “tipping its hand prematurely,” and Allied planners had to assume that German occupation of Iceland was imminent, with dire consequences for Allied trans-Atlantic shipping: the Allies would be denied potentially valuable bases from which to launch attacks on U-boats; and German long-range aircraft would be able to reach Allied convoys sailing on routes previously threatened by only U-boats. Faced with this dangerous threat, Britain acted within a month of the German move into Denmark, sending a force of Royal Marines into Iceland to forestall any German invasion, at the same time pledging to respect Iceland’s independence. A similar treaty between the U.S.A and Iceland, made public in July 1941, enabled the U.S. to augment, and subsequently relieve British forces for service elsewhere. * Churchill’s Second World War Vol . 1 ,9 1RUWK$WODQWL5HJLRQ What follows is a summary of the role played by radar in support of Allied sea and air forces based on the Orkneys, Shetlands, Faroes and Iceland, with special note of the part played by Canadian radar personnel serving on RAF ground radar stations and on RCAF and RAF squadrons. British Air Ministry records* reveal that “...... to increase the range of radar cover over the North Atlantic sea routes, radar sites were selected by radar reconnaissance parties during Dec. 1941 (sic. actually 1940) in the Faroe Islands and in Iceland . .” Orkneys: The Royal Navy’s base at Scapa Flow ensured that the Orkneys had high priority when it came to ground radar coverage and, as early as the second week of July 1940, a CHL radar was operational at Gaitnip, complementary to a CH at Sandoy. *A.M. “Signals” Vol. IV, Chapter 11, page 153 ,9 1RUWK$WODQWL5HJLRQ These events predated the arrival in the UK of RCAF radar personnel, and the writer has seen no evidence that Canadians ever served on these Orkney stations. Nor is there any record of additional ground radars being established in the Orkneys; emphasis was quite rightly placed on potential sites to the North and North-East, i.e., in the Faroes and Shetlands. Faroes: In 1942 an RAF radar siting party selected five sites in the Faroes with primary areas of coverage as indicated : Eide (N), Nolsoy (E), Suduroy (S), Sandoy (W). Each site was to have ASV (Air to Surface Vessels) radar gear coupled to a rotatable Yagi aerial array, to provide early warning (no heights) on aircraft out to medium ranges, and on ships or surfaced submarines out to short ranges. Eide, having a site on an 800 foot promontory, would also have a Navy radar capable of providing accurate plots on ships/surfaced subs at ‘long’ ranges. All six radars were to pass their plots to an RAF/ RN Control Centre in Torshavn, a major town located on the southeast end of Streymoy Island; most, if not all of these six radars became operational by mid-1942. At least six RCAF radar men served on Faroe ground radars at one time or another. Two officers, Hal Cairns of Penticton and Rus Robinson of London, Ont. arrived in Feb. 1943, and initially shared the task of providing technical supervision and administrative support for the five units named above. Robinson left in June of 1943 on assignment to TRE Malvern; Cairns stayed on as ‘O.C. Radar in the Faroes’ until mid Feb. 1944 when the last two units were closed; (ironically, some units were receiving orders to close at the same time as others were being up-graded with new gear!) Some of the NCO’s in charge of the Faroe radar units were Canadians. In early 1942, Sgt. Clarence MacDonald, RCAF, found himself in Torshavn in charge of a 16-man crew comprised of Radar Mechanics and Operators, Cooks, and other admin. support personnel. He and his crew moved by small boat to the Island of Sandoy where they set up an “ASV plus Yagi” at the previously chosen site. Promoted to W01 in 1943, MacDonald remained with the unit, as NCO i/c , until it closed in late 1943. Earl Moore, RCAF, of St Thomas, Ont., has written an account of his service in the Faroes, opening with a graphic description of the ferocious winds encountered in Nov. 1942, enroute from Aberdeen to Torshavn - winds that led to his using the term ‘Radar Dome” in the title of his account. Earl and the 13 other men comprising the crew of his unit traveled from Torshavn to Nolsoy Island over seas so rough that their small boat could not tie up to Nolsoy’s small dock, forcing the luckless passengers to splash ashore and climb, laden with kit, up a steep 20-30 foot cliff, only to find that ,9 1RUWK$WODQWL5HJLRQ the light-keepers houses which were to be their living quarters were on another ledge some 400 feet higher! The houses having been reached, Sgt. Moore could see, at the top of yet another steep rise, “.. .a Yagi array sticking up from the top of a small hut surrounded by an earth bomb blast wall . .” - his assigned radar station! The ASV gear found in the little hut presented an immediate problem - none of his radar mechanics had ever had even theoretical instruction on ‘airborne’ radar gear, and certainly no experience. However, resort to secret documents and considerable ‘trial and error’ eventually got the gear to top performance. Nolsoy radar routinely plotted local shipping and sometimes enemy aircraft - usually ‘Weather Willies.’ One ‘shipping’ plot, however, remained unidentified for some time. A ‘visual’ by Nolsoy’s personnel confirmed that the target was in fact a U-boat; quick reaction by a Norwegian gun-boat and a British corvette resulted in the German sub being “ . blown out of the water . ..” It was ‘thumbs - up’ for the Nolsoy radar crew! Actually, the major enemy at Nolsoy (and at the other radar units in the Faroes) was WIND, which frequently made it necessary to ‘lash’ the Yagi array for protracted periods, with consequent serious loss of radar coverage. However, during set-up trials on some new gear, plots on aircraft were observed despite the fact that the antennae was inside a wooden building. Sgt. Moore proposed that a comprehensive trial be done near the RAF’s flying-boat base at nearby Vagar lake; sheets of plexiglass known to be held in Vagar Stores would be mounted on wooden frames to form a rigid ‘wind-shield’ around the Yagi aerial array. Authorities approved, and an entry in Moore’s diary, dated 18 Aug. 1943, reads “ . .windscreen up, and gear going as good as ever . .” Formal trials, using aircraft of known size as targets, indicated ‘normal performance.’ The plexiglass ‘windshield’ appeared not to be interfering with the radar beam, and it did enable normal antenna rotation despite high winds. Eureka!: Nolsoy had invented the Radome! (the event was later dubbed, somewhat unkindly, ‘Faroe Madness’!). Sgt. Moore was then directed to do similar ‘radome’ installations at other sites before returning to the UK and Canada. Hal Cairns memoirs contain references to two other RCAF radar men who served in the Faroes: Craig Knudsen of Toronto, who served on the Naval radar at Eide, and Peter Moon (his Faroe site and home town not recorded).