IPCS Issue Brief 39 October 2006

INDO-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ARE WE THERE YET?

Lalit Mansingh Even though they shared common “Americans always do the right values, India and the United States thing,” said Winston Churchill, “after had divergent views on their they have tried everything else”. In the respective roles in the world. The US contest of India, it took the Americans saw itself as the leader of the Free five decades to do the right thing. World, fighting a crusade against the These were the five decades of the evil forces of international Cold War, described by the late communism. India had no such Senator Moynihan, a former American phobia against communism and Ambassador to India, as a “half preferred to remain non-Aligned. An century of misunderstandings, enduring image of the Cold War, in miscues, and mishaps. “Former Indian minds, is that of John Foster External Affairs Minister Jaswant Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of Singh called them “the fifty wasted State. Issuing a fatwa against non- years”. Alignment, Dulles pronounced it immoral and declared it incompatible INDIA’S STRATEGIC1 with friendship with the United States. IRRELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES Dulles was reflecting what the US Joint Chief of Staff had concluded-that India was strategically irrelevant for Ambassador Mansingh is currently an the United States. Their ally of choice Executive Committee Member, IPCS. He in the region was Pakistan. As Dulles was earlier India’s Foreign Secretary and pursued his ‘Pactomania’ and got Indian Ambassador to the US. Pakistan admitted to CENTO and SEATO, the political distance between This paper was originally delivered as a Delhi and Washington continued to keynote address at the Army War College, grow. Mhow on 25 September 2006. The Indo-US relationship, according to 1 Defining ‘strategic’: The loose and Strobe Talbott was “a victim of indiscriminate usage of this term has made it difficult to define. “Strategy” originated as a incompatible obsessions-India’s with military expression describing the science and Pakistan and America’s with the art of planning victory in a war. Hence Soviet Union.” Both were Guilty of strategic planning was differentiated from being on best terms with “each other’s tactical or day-to-day deployment. Currently, principal enemy”. 2 the term is used in international affairs as a global, long term and comprehensive relationship between two countries. In a slightly narrower sense it also refers to a security relationship, including military 2 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, cooperation. I have used both concepts in this Democracy and the Bomb (New Delhi: Viking, paper. 2004) p.7

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IPCS Issue Brief 39 October 2006

EFFORTS AT IMPROVING of the process by which the US RELATIONS DURING THE COLD approach towards India evolved from WAR estrangement to engagement. Talbott writes that India was cropping up There were nevertheless brief periods frequently in Clinton’s conversations of warmth and understanding, even in the very first year of his presidency attempts at forging strategic ties. At and the Clinton regarded India a least three of these are worth nothing. potentially important power for the In 1962, following the Chinese US. It indeed Clinton felt that way, aggression on India, there was a clear Delhi did not see much evidence of it. convergence of strategic interests India felt the heat of Clinton’s zeal in between India and the US. Setting pursuing nuclear non-proliferation. non-Alignment aside, Pandit Nehru The move to indefinitely extend the sought urgent military support from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the United States, including two dozen (NPT) was the last straw for India. In squadrons of B-47 bombers, a dozen Talbott’s words, the NPT represented squadrons of fighter aircraft and air for Indians “the three Ds of US nuclear defence radars. The US responded policies: dominance, discrimination with sympathy, but the military and double standards”. assistance offered was symbolic rather than substantive. The US On the Kashmir issue, Washington administration was divided on India, continued to tilt towards Pakistan with the Pentagon warning against a Clinton’s newly appointed Assistant dilution of its strong ties with Secretary of State for South Asia, Pakistan. India continued to be Robin Raphel, even questioned the strategically irrelevant to the US. legality of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India. Charges of human There were two other short periods of rights abuses against India were political cooperation-in the mid-80s getting more strident. There was and the early 90s, when Indian and the skepticism in India when Under US set aside their frictions to discuss Secretary of State, Tom Pickering technology transfer and military offered a strategic dialogue with India, cooperation. The MOU on transfer of which he said, would cover the Technology of 1985and the Kicklighter “whole gamut of relations”. proposals of 1991, which outlined “a common strategic vision”, paved the And then, India’s nuclear tests in May way for the Agreed minute of defence 1998, made such a dialogue irrelevant. cooperation signed during US Defence Washington reacted by slapping Secretary, William Perry’s visit to punitive sanctions and took the lead in India in 1995. The failure of such condemning India from the forums of sporadic attempts to take bilateral the UN Security Council and the G-8. relations to the higher plane suggests that they were still ahead of their time. From India’s nuclear defiance, ironically, emerged the most intense, THE CLINTON YEARS the most serious and the most A BREAKTHROUGH extended set of exchanges between the two counties. I am referring to the Former Deputy Secretary of State, Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott dialogue, Strobe Talbott’s book, “engaging which took place over two years in India”, provides a fascination account fourteen sessions in seven countries.

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Bush, starting from where Clinton had The dialogue helped to clear much of left, converted the same policy into a the debris of past misunderstandings spectacular success. and made Washington aware of India’s national and global aspirations There are three major reasons that and its rationale for the nuclear tests. explain why Clinton did not In Talbott’s words, “India had put on eventually succeed with India. Firstly, notice that it was now unambiguously, in Clinton economics-driven global unapologetically and irrevocably, a vision, China was a much bigger prize nuclear armed power.”3 It was this to be pursued than India. Clinton even realization which forced the Clinton sought to bring China into the South administration to abandon its declared Asian equation, by suggesting that goal to “Cap, Rollback and Eliminate” China could join the US to enforce India’s nuclear programme. peace in the region. India found this insensitive and deeply offensive. The US offered India a grand bargain Secondly, the insistence on under which it would withdraw its benchmarks made India resentful that nuclear and technology sanctions the US Continued to treat it as a global provided India met four benchmarks: delinquent. The benchmarks were • Sign the CTBT seen as a penalty India had to pay in • Negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off order to free itself from US sanctions. Treaty (FMCT) India felt no moral or legal obligation • Enforce world class export controls to pay such a price. And finally, what on nuclear and missile and Clinton was offering to India was technology and America’s friendship, not a • Observe a non-threatening defence partnership on equal terms- and that posture. too with a price tag. India was prepared to wait and see what his Although India had no serious successor had to offer. problems with any of these requirements, the dialogue remained On the face of it, there was a seamless stuck on the benchmarks like a broken continuity of US policy towards India record and eventually ended in under George W. Bush in 2001. In fact, deadlock. Talbott conceded with some it appeared to be the only segment of disappointment the Jaswant Singh Clinton’s foreign policy that Bush did managed to achieve his objectives not repudiate and demolish. Beneath whereas his own targets remained the surface however, there was an unfulfilled. important change of approach.

FAILURE FOR CLINTON; Firstly, Bush did not perceive India as SUCCESS FOR BUSH a lesser prize than China. Influenced no doubt by the Neo-Cons, Bush and his team considered India a counter- It is important to understand why the weight and not a lightweight, against Clinton Administration’s bold China. departure on India ended in self- confessed failure, and how George W. Secondly, India was no longer regarded to be in the dock and there 3 ibid, p.51. was no penalty to be paid for alleged 3 INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDES B-7/3, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 91-11-4100 1900 (Tel); 91-11-4165 2560 (Fax)

IPCS Issue Brief 39 October 2006 misdeeds. India was seen as entitled to The 2004 elections in both countries its rightful place in the world order. produced a new government in India Condoleeza Rice proclaimed that the under Dr. Manmohan Singh and a United States would facilitate India’s second term for George W. Bush in the quest for global status. Finally, Bush US. The common message emerging was offering more than a hand of from both capitals after the elections friendship: he was keen to make India was continuity of foreign policy. In a strategic partner of the United States. fact, both countries decided to take This was truly a new beginning. their strategic dialogue to the next level. Defining the contours of the strategic partnership, the US National Security There have been three notable bilateral Strategy, 2002, declared that “the exchanges in the past eighteen months United States had undertaken a during the visits of Condoleeza Rice to transformation of its bilateral Delhi in March 2005; of Manmohan relationship with India based on a Singh to Washington in July 2005 and conviction that US interests require a of George W. Bush to Delhi in March strong relationship with India.” The 2006. document stressed the shared values of the two countries and their common Condoleeza Rice brought with her an global interests, which included (i) the outline of the second Bush free flow of commerce, especially in administration’s Grand Strategy for the “vital sea lanes of the Indian India. The US, she told the Indian Ocean,” (ii) fighting terrorism and (iii) Prime Minister, was willing to help creating “a strategically stable Asia”. India became a major power in the 21st century. And as a first step, the While the US strategic vision was US would reverse three decades of its fixed on the long range and defined in oppositions to India’s nuclear global terms, the Indian outlook was programme and make civilian nuclear focused on immediate priorities and cooperation the centerpiece of the new tangibles. The negotiations were long relationship. While India responded and difficult, often abrasive. In the favourably, it took time for the full end, an agreement was reached in impact of the American offer to sink January 2004 in the form of the “Next in. No one understood better than Dr. Steps in the Strategic Partnership” Manmohan Singh that this was a (NSSP). To the satisfaction of the historic opportunity for India to shed Indian side, it covered the trinity of the burdens of the past and strike a issues of priority to India: Space, new path to the future. Nuclear Power and High Technology. With the conclusion of the NSSP, the India formally accepted the American bulk of the technology sanctions on offer during the Prime Minister’s visit India were removed by the Bush to Washington in July 2005. The administration. agreement announced on 18th July that year was more or less on India’s terms. India was recognized as a “responsible state with advanced THE BUSH-MANMOHAN SINGH nuclear technology” i.e. a de facto STRATEGIC DIALOGUE nuclear weapon power. Both sides would take reciprocal steps to make their nuclear cooperation operational.

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The US undertook to amend its energy options for India and projected domestic laws and persuade the nuclear energy as a viable source of Members of the Nuclear Suppliers power for its expanding economy. Group (NSG) to resume nuclear cooperation and commerce with India. Finally, in strategic terms, the agreement of July 2005 gave India The joint statement issued during the enormous global leverage as a partner visit of President Bush to India in of the United States, especially in March 2006 was a follow up of the July ensuring India’s security in a turbulent 2005 agreement. It was a neighbourhood. demonstration of India’s seriousness in pursuing the strategic dialogue with LOSS OF AUTONOMY? the US. There is persistent criticism that the SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JULY July 2005 agreement has turned India 2005 AGREEMENT into a satellite or a junior partner of the United States thus compelling The July 2005 joint statement has been India to subordinate its foreign policy analysed threadbare by Think Tanks, to the global interests of the US. political leaders and media India’s track record since commentators in both countries. I Independence makes it an unlikely have been openly partisan in candidate for being the satellite or supporting the deal and will therefore subaltern of any power of the world. spare you a catalogue of the pros and cons of the debate. Let me therefore Despite the generous assistance given offer a few observations on the by the Soviet Union to India in almost political, economic and strategic all fields, Mrs. Indira Gandhi had the implications of this historic agreement. courage to say “no” to Breznev when he urged India to join the Asian Politically, the July 2005 agreement is Security Union. In 1994 and 1998, by far the most significant and far India defined the big powers reaching understanding that India has collectively to conduct nuclear tests. reached with any major power, not More recently, India turned down and excluding the Indo-Soviet Treaty of American request to send its troops to Peace, Friendship an Cooperation of Iraq. As Ashley Tellis told a committee 1971. It recognize India as a de facto of the US Congress on 16 November nuclear power, clears the way for it to 2005, “India’s large size, its proud become a global power and history, and its great ambitions, ensure strengthens India’s claims for that it will likely march to the beat of permanent membership of the its own drummer.” Security Council. THE CHINA FACTOR From the economic point of view, it removed three decades of There is speculation on whether or not technological sanctions on India and China has been a factor in the offered multi layered cooperation with emerging strategic relationship the world’s most powerful economy. between India and the United States. Most importantly, it widened the Official denials notwithstanding, both

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IPCS Issue Brief 39 October 2006 countries have reasons to be rescue operations, anti-submarine concerned about the future role of warfare, air combat, airlift operations, China on the global scene. India’s mountain warfare, jungle warfare, national psyche still bears the scars of disaster management and peace- 1962, despite the efforts to normalize keeping operations. China-Indian relations since 1988. China has proliferated missile and The US has, in contrast with the past, nuclear technology to Pakistan, and opened its doors to India to procure continues to be a major source of state-of-the-art military weapons and weaponry for that country. Further, technology. This includes fire-finding India is deeply troubled by China’s radars, GE 404 engines for the Light “string of pearts” policy of setting up Combat Aircraft and electronic ground military and naval facilities in India’s sensors for use on the LOC in Jammu vicinity, especially in Myanmar and and Kashmir and counter-terrorism Pakistan. equipment for our Special Forces. On offer as well are advanced jet fighters The Americans are equally concerned for the Air Force, the US-Israeli about China’s unpredictable Phalcon early warning system, the behaviour. The Quadrennial Defence Patriot PAC-3 missile defence system Review (QDR) published recently by and many others. the Pentagon identifies China as the only potential long-term military The conclusion of a 10-year framework threat to the US. agreement on defence cooperation during Defence Minister Pranab While nobody is suggesting that India Mukherjee’s visit to Washington in and the US should join in militarily June 2005 is further evidence of the “containing” China, there is obvious expanding scope of military convergence of interests in both cooperation with the US. countries exchanging notes and in keeping a wary eye on China’s policies and actions. Hence, the significance of STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: ARE the reference in the US National WE THERE YET? Security Strategy 2002 to the common interests of both countries in “a The question at this critical phase in strategically stable Asia.” the strategic partnership with the United States is, are we there yet? GROWING MILITARY RELATIONS Not quite. The partnership will be effective only when it is more visible An account of the Indo-US strategic on the ground in both courtiers. There relationship will be incomplete is still a wide gap between the without a reference to the remarkable declarations and their implementation. growth of military cooperation Action in many of the declared areas between the two sides. This is indeed seems to be faltering. For example, the the most visible manifestation of the Indo-US Global Democracy Initiative, new partnership. In a complete announced with great fanfare in July reversal of their Cold War attitudes 2005 remains a dead letter. Similarly, the two countries have conducted in the US Proliferation Security Initiative joint military exercises covering (PSI), which seeks to Monitor and maritime interdiction, search and interdict clandestine movement of

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WMD material, is yet to find a remains a “status-quo” nation while response from India. Terrorism, India, which has never been another core area of cooperation, comfortable with a world dominated remains in limbo. by Washington, is in many ways a revisionist state.”4 This is echoed by It would be more accurate therefore to Professor Varun Sahni, who says that describe the current period of our “the interests of an emerging power bilateral relations as a phase of and that of a hegemonic power are transition towards a strategic likely to be incompatible in the partnership. There are still medium-to long term.” Thus there will outstanding issues, which, if not be, “natural limits” to the security addressed, will not only prolong the cooperation between “natural allies.”5 transition, but may even threaten the very concept of partnership. Two of For three specific issues that remain these issues are general in nature; outstanding are Pakistan, Terrorism others are single issues on which and India’s aspiration for permanent difference persist. membership of the UN Security Council. OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES For over five decades Washington’s The first is the historical legacy of policy towards South Asia was a zero suspicion and mistrust in both sum game, which hyphenated India countries, which remains amongst with Pakistan. The Bush influential pockets of political leaders, administration has declared an end of civil servants and commentators. It is a both the hyphenation and the zero residual mindset of the cold war years sum game. It claims that US relations that surfaces from the time to time have improved dramatically with both with fierce intensity, as during the India and Pakistan, neither of them debates on the 2005 agreement. In resenting its close ties with the others. India, antipathy to the US has brought This is somewhat exaggerated. together mutually opposed political groups like the Communists, the BJP Throughout the Cold War, the United and Islamic Groups. In the absence of States was accused by India of a national consensus, there will be stiff practicing double standards. While the political opposition at every step of the US condemned India for practicing road towards the strategic partnership human rights abuses, of hostility with the US. towards Israel and engaging in nuclear proliferation, none of the same The second general issue relates to the issues seemed to matter in America’s divergent visions of the two countries and the way they view their respective 4 Rubinoff, Arthur “Incompatible Objectives global roles. The American scholar, and Shortsighted Policies: US Strategies Arthur Rubinoff has commented: Towards India”in “US-Indian Strategic “Ironically, now that the United States Ccooperation into the 21st Century” Ed. Sumit Ganguly et al. (Routledge, 2006) p.54 recognizes a regional imperative in a 5 nuclearised South Asia, India Varun Sahni “Limited Cooperation between Limited Allies: India’s Strategic Programs and considers itself a global rather than India-US Strategic Trade”, in “US-Indian regional power. The United States Strategic Cooperation into the 21st century, Ibid. p. 188 7 INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDES B-7/3, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi 91-11-4100 1900 (Tel); 91-11-4165 2560 (Fax)

IPCS Issue Brief 39 October 2006 approach towards Pakistan. population (iv) military capacity (v) Washington turned a blind eye as financial contributions to the UN (vi) Pakistan developed a nuclear weapon contribution to UN peace keeping and program and proceeded to export its (vii) record on non-proliferation and technology to North Korea, Libya and counter terrorism. Iran. I recall commenting at that time that Washington current policy of equi- the criteria seemed to be drafted in distance and equi-friendship with south Block, New Delhi, considering Pakistan still smacks of double how closely they fitted India. Why standards for India. Proclaiming India then does the US not endorse. India a strategic partner and Pakistan a when Britain, France and Russia have major non-NATO ally may be clever publicly extended their support? The diplomacy, but that does not inspire standard US response has been that trust in India. the hence the time for endorsing potential members has not arisen as Related again to Pakistan are yet. In that case, why is Washington fundamental difference on the issue of projecting Japan as a potential terrorism. In November 2001, member of the Council? President Bush, addressing American troops in Kentucky, declared, CONCLUSION “America has a message for the nations of the world. If you harbour Though they appear formidable, none terrorists…train or arm a of these problems are insurmountable. terrorist…feed and fund a In the last six years, India and the terrorist…you are a terrorist and will United States have learnt to deal with be held accountable by the United their differences with sensitivity, States.” Pakistan continues to do all patience and understanding. More of the above and is nevertheless the same will be required by the rewarded with military and economic leadership of both countries in the largesse by the United States. years to come. Coalition politics will Washington’s refusal to treat “jehadi” continue to generate pressure on the terrorism in India at par with global government in India and slow down terrorism reinforces the charges of the decision making process. The double standards. prospects of a presidential election in the US after two years is bound to Finally, India finds it hard to raise concerns about the continuity of appreciate the reluctance of the US to the current administration’s policy on support India’s bid for permanent India. I nevertheless remain convinced membership of the Security Council. that closer bilateral cooperation will be insulated from partisan politicies in In September 2005, the US announced both countries. The destinies of our at the UN General Assembly that the two great countries are interlinked US would join in reconstituting a and the strategic partnership between Security Council that “looks like the them will be one of the defining world of 2005.” It then listed the seven features of the 21st century. criteria by which the US to would judge potential members: (i) commitment to democracy and human rights (ii) size of economy (iii) size of

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