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The Sigur Center Asia Papers U.S.-India Relations: Ties That Bind? by Deepa Ollapally Previous Issues 22.U.S.-India Relations: Ties That Bind? China: A Preliminary Analysis Deepa Ollapally, 2005 Ren Xiao, 2000 21. India-China Relations in the Context of Vajpayee’s 8. Creation and Re-Creation: Modern Korean Fiction and 2003 Visit Its Translation Surjit Mansingh, 2005 Young-Key Kim-Renaud, and R. Richard Grinker, eds., 20. Korean American Literature 2000 Young-Key Kim-Renaud, R. Richard Grinker, and Kirk W. 7. Trends in China Watching: Observing the PRC at 50 Larsen, eds., 2004 Bruce Dickson, ed., 1999 19. Sorrows of Empire: Imperialism, Militarism, and the 6. US-Japan Relations in an Era of Globalization End of the Republic Mike M. Mochizuki, 1999 Chalmers Johnson, 2004 5. Southeast Asian Countries’ Perceptions of China’s 18. Europe and America in Asia: Different Beds, Same Military Modernization Dreams Koong Pai Ching, 1999 Michael Yahuda, 2004 4. Enhancing Sino-American Military Relations 17. Text and Context of Korean Cinema: Crossing Borders David Shambaugh, 1998 Young-Key Kim-Renaud, R. Richard Grinker, and Kirk W. 3. The Redefinition of the US-Japan Security Alliance and Larsen, eds., 2003 Its Implications for China 16. Korean Music Xu Heming, 1998 Young-Key Kim-Renaud, R. Richard Grinker, and Kirk W. 2. Is China Unstable? Assessing the Factors* Larsen, eds., 2002 David Shambaugh, ed., 1998 15. European and American Approaches Toward China: 1. International Relations in Asia: Culture, Nation, and Different Beds, Same Dreams? State David Shambaugh, 2002 Lucian W. Pye, 1998 14. Assessing Chen Shui-bian’s First Year: The Domestic & International Agenda Conference Report, 2001 13. Reflections of “Misunderstanding” in China Allen S. Whiting, 2001 12. Christianity in Korea Young-Key Kim-Renaud, and R. Richard Grinker, eds., 2001 11. The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis Stephen Haggard, 2001 10. The US Factor in Cross-Straits Relations Conference Report, 2000 9. The International Relations Theoretical Discourse in Single issues are complimentary; additional copies are $5.00. About The Sigur Center Asia Papers The Sigur Center Asia Papers are occasional publications written by the faculty, visiting scholars, and affiliates of The Sigur Center for Asian Studies. The series provides the informed public and policy community with engaging analysis and context for issues of Asian Affairs and US-Asian relations. The views expressed herein are solely that of the authors. The Sigur Center for Asian Studies is an international research center of The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. The Center’s institutional goals include increasing the quality and scope of scholarly research and publication on Asian affairs; promoting US-Asian interaction; and preparing a new generation of Asia students, scholars, analysts, and policy makers to assume leadership positions in a world in which Asia and the Pacific Rim is of ever increasing importance. The Center, founded in 1991 out of the former Sino-Soviet Institute, is the largest such institution in the Washington, D.C. area and among the strongest in the United States thanks in large part to the world-class Asian Studies faculty of The George Washington University. The Center’s programs include research projects, study groups, conferences, and lectures concerning Asian political, economic, and security issues. In addition, The Center coordinates a Visiting Scholar/Visiting Research Associate Program, which brings eminent scholars and top policy planners to The Center from universities and government organizations around the world. The Sigur Center for Asian Studies 1957 E Street, N.W., Suite 503 Washington, D.C. 20052 Tel.: 202-994-5886 Fax: 202-994-6096 http://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/ Preface wide-ranging conference on “U.S.-India Bilateral Cooperation: Taking Stock and Moving For- ward,” was hosted by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University on April 1-2, 2004. I would like to thank the Asia AFoundation for sponsoring the conference, as well as acknowledge the critical inputs of my colleague, Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth. The assumption of the conference was that sufficient time had elapsed since bilateral relations between India and the U.S. turned a corner in 2000, to assess how far relations had progressed and what kinds of impediments were still apparent. This paper will consider relations between the two countries, bringing out the most salient aspects from the conference, but also going well beyond it, especially on the Indian side. This more extensive analysis is based on research conducted by the author in India between July and November 2004. In this connection, the author would like to express her sincere appreciation to a number of current and former senior officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, Defense Research and Development Or- ganization, Indian Space Research Organization, the Prime Minister’s Office, and former colleagues from the National Institute of Advanced Studies for offering their candid views and time so generously in background interviews. The conference convened a distinguished group of American and Indian policymakers and ex- perts, who looked at both strategic and economic realms. (See Appendix for the conference program.) There were also more focused roundtables on two critical issues in U.S.-India relations: cooperation in high technology/dual use technology and counter-terrorism. The conditions of April 2004 have dramatically changed with a new government in New Delhi since May, and a high visibility easing of export controls by the U.S. for India in September. The Indian elections that swept the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee out of office and brought in the United Progressive Alliance, led by the Congress Party, caught nearly everyone by surprise. On the American side, there is greater continuity with the re-election of George W. Bush, but it is not yet clear whether the administration’s first term priorities will remain constant or change in the second term. A dominant theme at the conference was the continuing need for building stronger “trust” between the countries despite improved ties. The differing perspectives aired by many of the American and In- dian participants and interviewees simply underlined this sentiment. The direction and robustness of Indo-U.S. ties are considered in this paper by focusing on how India and the U.S. have dealt with two critical, but rather difficult spheres of cooperation: “terrorism” and dual use technology. U.S.-India Relations: Ties That Bind? Deepa Ollapally t took more than a decade after the end of the tries into a series of dialogues for the first time, Cold War for the U.S. and India to break out providing an opportunity to go beyond existing of their previous mode of interaction despite biases and toward better mutual understanding. Ihaving no direct conflict of interest. The rhetoric The chief negotiator on the American side, Depu- of shared democracy did not prove strong enough ty Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, has described to elevate their relations immediately, and it has these fourteen-odd meetings with his Indian taken an enormous amount of diplomatic and counterpart, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh over non-governmental effort to realign their view- a period of two and half years, as “civilizational points. By 2004, ties between India and the U.S. dialogues,” revealing greater comprehension of had grown remarkably, especially in the defense the Indian psyche and the depth of their inter- area, and there was little fear that their relations actions. Although the U.S.’ objective of the dia- would backslide significantly. The context of a logue was to press India on non-proliferation and stronger relationship does not, however, mean a narrow the gap between them, the results turned problem-free relationship. Part of the strain has out quite differently. As Talbott puts it, for India, to do with the way the two countries invariably the nuclear tests were geared “to simultaneously look at themselves and at each other. stand up to the United States and sit down with Traditionally, Indian elites have tended to view the United States.”2 India’s weight in international politics partly in While President Bill Clinton’s March 2000 civilizational power, which is formidable. Ameri- trip to India paved the way for jettisoning the cans take a more material approach to power, and past, the meetings between his successor George thus in relative terms, always saw India as a mi- W. Bush and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpay- nor global player. India’s rise as an economic and ee were crucial in defining the future path, with strategic force since the mid 1990s, epitomized by Bush calling relations a “strategic partnership,” the success of its information technology sector at and Vajpayee suggesting that India and the U.S. the global level, has had a resounding effect on the were “natural allies.” By 2004, summit diplomacy U.S. Although India’s nuclearization undoubtedly had set the foreign and defense establishments on contributed to serious attention by the U.S., it is a course that led to significant progress, particu- unlikely that the nuclear tests alone would have larly in military-to-military relations. Indeed, the led to the same level of engagement.1 What the progress was particularly remarkable given that tests unmistakably did was to force the two coun- informed opinion held, as of summer 2000, that U.S.-India Relations: Ties That Bind? “there was no defense relationship to speak of.”3 security. According to one expert with high-level Still, there have been periodic reminders of experience in the Pentagon, “You cannot have the constraints and limits to their partnership, any kind of defense relationship unless you un- leading to some deflation of expectations on both derstand how it works within an overall national sides.