SAMECSAMEC Perspective Series JUly 2014 NO: 4 Perspective Series ORMER SAMEC JULY 2014, NO: 4 EUROPEAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN AND VIRTUAL RADICALIZATION TUNCAY KARDAŞ & ÖMER BEHRAM ÖZDEMIR

he Syrian crisis continues to be a of jihadists in Syria is the most signif- Assoc. Prof. Sakarya hotbed of international politics icant phase in comparison to ‘every University Center for T Middle Eastern Studies and a matter of national security in other instance of foreign fighter mo- and Department of Europe ever since the emergence of bilizations since the Afghanistan war International Relations. He received his BA thousands of European fighters who in the 1980s’. The matter is also a hot and MA degrees from joined Syria’s civil war. The European topic for the European media which Bilkent University; governments are particularly fran- MsEcon (Security regularly pumps fear with the stories Studies) and PhD from tic about the prospects of return of of “European suicide bombers” in the the Department of their “radical-extremist” rebel citi- ranks of Syrian rebels. International Politics at Aberystwyth University zens. Such fears are not unwarranted It is not just the media that airs these in 2006. He is the co- as many British citizens have already fears, senior officials and top politi- editor of “The Borders of Islam: Exploring Samuel returned home from the Syrian war cians share and spread such fears. Huntington’s Faultlines, theatre3. Their alarming return back For example, British Prime Minister from Al-Andalus to Virtual Ummah”, from the battlefield to European David Cameron has said those British (New York: Columbia home countries is sending shivers, citizens and other nationals fighting University Press, 2009). igniting debate and indignation all alongside Islamist insurgents such Research Assistant, across the European establishments. as ISIS in Iraq and Syria ‘posed the Sakarya University Center for Middle The London-based ‘International biggest threat to Britain’s national Eastern Studies. Centre for the Study of Radicalisation’ security’ claiming that ‘the number holds that the current mobilization of foreign fighters in that area, the EUROPEAN FOREIGN FIGHERS IN SYRIA AND VIRTUAL RADICALIZATION

number of foreign fighters includ- continent, these fighters are truly It is crucial not to ing those from the UK who could try global and their reach stretch from generalize all the to return to the UK is a real threat Britain to China. For example, it available figures 4 to our country’ . Foreign Secretary emerged in March 2013 that Bo Wang under some cliché William Hague has warned that ‘ji- (Yusuf al-Sini) a Han Chinese con- typologies. It is hadists who had become experienced vert to Islam was featured in a rebel unhelpful to use “in weapons and explosives” in war- YouTube video released by Jaysh al- terms like “pro al- torn Syria could return to Europe to Muhajirin wal-Ansar, while in anoth- Qaeda”, “jihadist”, carry out terror attacks.’5 The British er example, the Uighur-led ‘Turkistan “Islamist” all Home Office’s annual report titled Islamic Party’ explained why it was interchangeably to ‘The United Kingdom’s Strategy for involved in the Syrian conflict in its portray European rebel fighters in Countering Terrorism’ claims that magazine ‘Islamic Turkistan’ by as- Syria. ‘There are now hundreds of foreign serting that “If China has the right to fighters from Europe in Syria. And support al-Assad in Syria, we have the when UK residents return here there right to support our Muslim Syrians.”9 is risk that they may carry out attacks It is better to start with a definition: using the skills that they have devel- the European foreign fighters here oped overseas.6 Growing numbers of are taken as violent private volunteers young European men who joins espe- taking part in wars or civil insurgen- cially ISIS7 or Jabhat al-Nusra8 means cies in which they have otherwise no a possible homeland security threat pre-given proclivity based on mate- for European governments. rial interest, organizational or civic There are a number of important affiliation. These contingents dis- questions that analysts, academics seminate a form of ‘populist pan-Is- and state officials are trying to answer. lamism’ rather than generic Islamism. Who are these young men joining ji- They can hardly gather under such had in Syria? What are their motiva- umbrella terms as ‘jihadists’ or ‘salafi tions? What is the role of social media jihadists’ since theirs is a ‘discrete ac- A research foreign in their radicalization and recruit- tor category distinct from insurgents fighters finds that ment? What are the possible threats and terrorists’.10 potential recruits for European governments? This brief Why do they join in? ‘have an unfulfilled discusses these questions in the order need to define of questions posed here. A research on 2032 foreign fighters themselves’, which finds that potential recruits ‘have an Who are they? help them turn to unfulfilled need to define themselves’, violence because It is crucial not to generalize all the which help them turn to violence be- of what they have available figures under some cli- cause of what they have been seeking: been seeking: ché typologies. It is unhelpful to use revenge seekers, status seekers, iden- revenge seekers, terms like “pro al-Qaeda”, “jihadist”, tity seekers.11 These are partly what status seekers, “Islamist” all interchangeably to por- fighting in Syria offers: for ‘revenge identity seekers. tray European rebel fighters in Syria. seekers’ it is an outlet for venting frus- Although we focus on the European trations regarding the oppression of

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Muslims at the hands of their rulers. officials to find out the motivations of Experts such For ‘status seekers’ it provides repu- foreign fighters. as Thomas tation and prestige both in the Syrian What are the threats? Hegghammer, war theatre and European homelands thinks that Western through duplicating the images of Do the European fighters present a fighters mostly war fighting in the Internet. For ‘iden- homeland security threat? According prefer to fight far tity seekers’ it provides recognition to an ICSR study, the flow of west away from home in and beyond local community. For European fighters into Syria has in- and that they do not ‘thrill seekers’ it fulfills an appetite for creased particularly since April 2013 18 have a tendency to adventure in distant places instead of from 590 fighters to 1937 fighters. fight in the West. the monotonous and dry daily rou- According to UK officials nearly 250 tine of European life.12 British returned from Syria and MI5 The first case of suicide attack by a is now working to deal with pos- 19 British citizen in Syria took place in sible threats. A possible extremist Aleppo in February 2014 according spillover onto Europe has become a to the UK officials. Abdul Waheed nightmare for the European powers. Majid (nom de guerre Abu Suleiman Except the possible new 9/11 enthu- al-Britani) committed a suicide attack siasts it should be stressed that not against the Assad forces in a joint op- all the foreign fighters in Syria want eration by Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic or plan to attack their home countries Front to free Aleppo Central Prison.13 upon their return. It would, therefore, He was not the first to shock the be inaccurate to presume all the fight- British public by getting himself killed ers would necessarily turn against the in action. British citizens Mohammed authorities of their home countries. al-Araj (23), Ibrahim al-Mazwagi Some of them clearly feel the UK is (21),14 Ifthekar Jaman (23)15 and Anil their home and that the idea of jihad 20 Khalil Raoufi (20) a.k.a. Abu Layth in UK is surreal. And experts such al-Khurasani16 were all killed in Syria as Thomas Hegghammer, thinks that in the last six months. Furthermore, Western fighters mostly prefer to fight two French citizens Nicolas Bons and far away from home and that they do However, events his brother Jean-Daniel Bons recently not have a tendency to fight in the such as the died fighting in Syria on the frontlines West21. However, events such as the shooting attack at of ISIS.17 Unlike the British examples shooting attack at Jewish Museum in Jewish Museum above, Bons brothers were raised Brussels did spread fears of potential in Brussels did in a Catholic family and had ethnic “native” radical terrorism again be- spread fears of French parents. Furthermore, they cause the attacker had spent over a potential “native” were Christian Frenchmen who con- year in Syria with radicals, carrying radical terrorism verted to Islam and travelled to Syria an ISIS flag when he was arrested.22 again because the to fight for one of the most extremist According to the Financial Times attacker had spent Jihadist groups. It is the incidents like European intelligence agencies have over a year in Syria the Bons brothers or British suicide handed a list which includes 5000 with radicals. bombers that further push European European citizens who may become

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potential radical rebel recruitments. it.27 Experiences on the battleground With its 911 km border with Syria surely shape minds of the fighters. In Turkey becomes a particularly con- other words, a fighter who just wants venient route for foreign insurgents to help rebels may turn into a radi- and collaboration with Ankara on cal fighter having other goals during counterterrorism becomes a top issue fighting. Both being exposed to ‘dis- between European governments and proportionate military force against Turkey. 23 civilians’ and the radical ideology of some of the rebels constitute two What are their powerful sources of radicalization.28 motivations? Similarly, self-identification with and Free floating gruesome images of the re-authentication of da’wa through civilian casualties from Syrian civil the Internet that proliferates jihadi- Experiences on the war, merciless massacres by the Assad battleground surely Salafist lexicon such as ‘jahiliyya’ regime and the lack of contrition or ‘martyrdom’, ‘ jihad’ and ideological shape minds of the empathy by western and Muslim fighters. In other primers such as the resurrection of countries are some of the reasons that the ideal of political ‘Caliphate’ all words, a fighter motivate these men to fight in Syria.24 who just wants to have the potential to serve a power- An adviser to the French government help rebels may ful alternative to both western ‘man- Mathieu Guidere is also of the same turn into a radical made legal systems’ and despotic view thinking that horrific images fighter having Muslim leaders of the region who are and videos from Syrian conflict avail- other goals during blamed for the . able on the Internet have a mobiliz- fighting. ing impact on the young French citi- Social Media and Virtual zens.25 This helps explain why such Figures extremist groups as ISIS are very ac- Social jihad by foreign fighters should tive and shrewd on the use of social be seen as a ‘genre of symbolic com- media with updated Facebook pages, munications’ rather than a simple YouTube videos and pro-organization military tactic.29 The relevance and Twitter accounts. Hussam Najjar significance of social jihad as ‘genres a.k.a. “Irish Sam” – a half Libyan a of symbolic communications’ are half Irish fighter- who first fought readily granted by the Salafists them- against Colonel Gaddafi in Libya be- selves. For example, al-Qaeda’s chief fore fighting Assad was also subject Ayman al-Zawahiri claimed that to such a jihadi-Salafist radicalization ‘more than half of this battle is tak- process on the net. Najjar surmises ing place in the battlefield of the me- that he joined into the ranks after dia’ while its chief propagandist and seeing of rape as a war tool used by the emir of the Global Islamic Media Gaddafi forces.26 Front (nom de guerre, Saladin II) Equally important is the fact that urged the faithful Muslims to unite ‘war makes jihad’ in its conducive to ‘Set up squadrons of media jihad environment shaping those who join (holy war) to break Zionist control

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over the media and terrorize the en- (a.k.a. Deso Dogg) became a sensa- emies’.30 tion for the young European fighters. The specific avatars used by Syria’s As a ‘gangsta rapper’, the former pro- foreign fighters are particularly in- duced four albums and was famous structive in this regard. Most of them for his anti-American position before use a nom de guerre starting with an he abandoned his musical career af- Arabic name, ending with identifi- ter conversion to Islam. Importantly, cation. “Abu X al-Britani” or “Abu Z his strong relations with the Salafist al-Turki” could be such examples. groups in such as Millatu Using letters (as in “Abu X”) gives the Ibrahim helped to lead him into the fighters the clout of secrecy and pro- Syrian civil war. Using his nom de vides shelter against possible future guerre “Abu Talha al-Almani”, Cuspert threats directed to the person or fam- did not just join the war as a foot- ily. Identifications, on the other hand, soldier; he also transformed his pop- Identifications, on such as “al-Britani” could rather be fame into a sensational cyber-weapon the other hand, read as the need to accentuate the for use in the Syrian war.33 While his such as “al-Britani” universal projection of jihad from the photos from the frontlines hand- could rather be European homeland. European iden- ily circulated in the social media, his read as the need tifications notwithstanding, it is strik- ‘nasheeds’ that praise the Syrian jihad to accentuate ing that the effect and tone of Arabic have been even more venerated in the the universal in such usages are strong. In addition Salafi internet forums. Even though projection of jihad to the chosen nom de guerre, there are Cuspert’s story was very attractive by from the European also other Arabic terms which must itself, it was Deso Dogg’s social media homeland. European be taken into account to understand experience that made the story all the identifications the role the Islamic lexicon plays for more popular and potent. notwithstanding, building bridges among otherwise In all, rebels fuse jihad with social it is striking that anonymous individuals. For example, media. Internet websites like ‘Sham the effect and tone foreign fighters also make use of such Center’ are zealously involved in what of Arabic in such adjectives as ghurabaa (strangers) or can be called ‘social jihad’ by produc- usages are strong. muhajir (immigrants) highlighting ing effective visuals and spreading such a connection.31 the idea(l) of fighting in Syria. 34 The Research shows that foreign fighters European fighters post almost every- are mostly young men at their twen- thing from the frontlines including ties and rather well educated.32 It is the capture of military vehicles with therefore not very surprising that guns however, they also make sure the fighters produce some popular the whole incident is framed within front names or figures, which are a sensational storyline and passion- media savvy using social media out- ate narrative frame.35 Both the rebels lets to gain supporters. Pop figures and the foreign fighters in Syria have prove particularly attractive for the significantly utilized social media fighter-wannabes. For example, the to such a degree that the potent use German ex-rapper Denis Cuspert of the Internet sites such as Twitter,

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Instagram, Ask.fm and Facebook has standing, the platform for spreading been a very effective tool of war pro- their cause is a very modern one: paganda. social media. Successful popular ji- hadi figures partly represent the an- Conclusion swer given to the gruesome images All in all, young Muslim men from of Assad regime’s brutal policy to- European countries do not make up wards civilians. These are the factors one single standardized, monotype. that feed foreign fighter flow. With Some of them seek a journey which the speed and clout of online propa- can shape one’s identity while some ganda unmatched, European govern- others seek revenge for the slain ci- ments are facing an uphill struggle vilians and casualties from the Syrian to address this modern homeland War. While some fighters have only security threat which is decked with one goal-helping civilians-there are social and religious markers. It is un- also others who dream of establishing clear whether all these young men an Islamic state or caliphate. They es- will pose a threat to their homes in tablish and entertain a discursive so- Europe. However, it is clear that the cial space with the help of traditional European governments must refocus Islamic terminology such as “jihad” on this new phenomenon without and “caliphate” in order to connect falling back to clichés and unhelpful with otherwise anonymous co-fight- typologies to understand and tackle ers. The traditional lexicon notwith- it.

SONNOTLAR

1 “Al-Qaeda training British and European ‘jihadists’ in Syria to set up terror cells at home”, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ syria/10582945/Al-Qaeda-training-British-and-European-jihadists-in-Syria-to- set-up-terror-cells-at-home.html , 19 January 2014. 2 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/17/uk-iraq-security-britain- idUKKBN0ES1VL20140617 (04.07.2014) 3 Ibid. 4 http://rt.com/news/syria-british-extremists-terrorism-814/ (02 April 2014). 5 Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Most extremist group of Syrian civil war. Ex-al Qaeda affilliate in Iraq. No ties with al-Qaeda since February 2014. 6 Only official al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. 7 http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12826- increasing-numbers-of-central-asian-jihadists-in-syria.html (04.07.2014) 8 Thomas Hegghamer, The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Global- ization of Jihad’ International Security, 35(3), 2010-11, p. 9 John M. Venhaus, ‘Why Youth Join Al-Qaeda’, US Institute of Peace Special Re- port, 236, 2010, pp. 8-11. 10 ‘Gruesome video of European jihadists in Syria shocks France’ http://www. france24.com/en/20140327-syria-french-jihadist-video-shocks-france/ (03 April 2014).

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11 “Syria crisis: ‘First UK jihadist’ in suicide attack”, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-26139884 , 11 February 2014. 12 “Briton from Notting Hill killed fighting Bashar al-Assad in Syria”, The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10463849/Briton- from-Notting-Hill-killed-fighting-Bashar-al-Assad-in-Syria.html , 20 November 2013. 13 “Briton Ifthekar Jaman ‘killed fighting in Syria’, family says”, BBC, http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/uk-england-25415113 , 17 December 2013. 14 “Anil Khalil Raoufi killed in Syria ‘was jihadist’” BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ uk-england-manchester-26181501 , 13 February 2014. 15 “Syrie : quelques mois après son frère, un jihadiste français meurt en kamikaze”, Le Parisien, http://www.leparisien.fr/international/syrie-quelques-mois-apres-son- frere-un-jihadiste-francais-meurt-en-kamikaze-06-01-2014-3466999.php , 6 Janu- ary 2014. 16 http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise- among-western-europeans/ 17 “British jihadist warns life is hard in Syria and hundreds return to UK”, The Tele- graph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10644586/ British-jihadist-warns-life-is-hard-in-Syria-and-hundreds-return-to-UK.html , 17 February 2014. 18 “Who are the British jihadists in Syria?”, BBC, 19 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting”, American Po- litical Science Review, February 2013, p.12. 20 “Brussels Jewish Museum killings: Suspect ‘admitted attack”, BBC, 1 June 2014. 21 “Western focus turns to homegrown jihadis as terror threat grows”, Financial Ti- mes, 6 June 2014. 22 Aaron Zelin, “European Foreign Fighters in Syria”, The Washington Institute, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/european-foreign- fighters-in-syria , April 2013. 23 “French brothers seek jihad in Syria”, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-eu- rope-23766892 , 20 August 2013. 24 “More and More Europeans Are Flying to Syria to Fight Assad”, Vice, http://www. vice.com/en_uk/read/europeans-are-fighting-and-dying-in-syria , 14 May 2013. 25 James Hughes, ‘Chechnya-How War Makes Jihad’, in Stig Hansen, Atle Mesoy and Tuncay Kardas (eds.), The Borders of Islam: Exploring Samuel Huntington’s Fault- lines, from Al-Andalus to the Virtual Ummah London: Hurst, 2009, pp. 173-189.

26 Ibid, p. 187. 27 Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessey and Paul R. Baines, ‘Selling Terror: The Symbolizati- on and Positioning of Jihad,’ Marketing Theory 9(2), 2009, pp. 227-41. 28 ‘Al-Qaeda Takes Jihad to Media Four Years after 9/11: Al-Qaeda Fighters Become Producers, Film Directors, Video Cameras Have Become Their Most Potent Wea- pon,’ Middle East Online, 9 Sept 2005, www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id= 14500=14500&format=0 (05 April 2014). 29 “Foreign Fighters in Syria”, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, December 2013, p.7. 30 Ibid. p.28-29. 31 Martin Armstrong, “The Search For Deso Dogg, The German Rapper Turned Jıhadı Poster Boy”, Vice, http://www.vice.com/read/the-search-for-deso-dogg-ger- man-rapper-turned-jihadi-poster-boy , 20 September 2013.

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32 “Social networking sites promote ‘jihad duty’ for foreigners in Syria”, Setimes.com, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/fea- tures/2013/11/15/feature-02 , 15 November 2013. 33 “Jihad Selfies: These British Extremists In Syria Love Socıal Media”, Vice, http:// www.vice.com/en_uk/read/syrian-jihadist-selfies-tell-us-a-lot-about-their-war , 5 December 2013.

ORMER SAMEC

Center for Middle Eastern Studies (SACMES) is part of Sakarya University, Turkey. It is one of the largest concentrations of Middle Eastern scholars in Turkey. Founded in 2013 to further the sys- tematic study of the Middle East region, SACMEC is responsible for teaching as well as research. With its more than 25 staff, the SACMEC organizes different graduate programs.

Sakarya University Esentepe Kampüsü 54187 Serdivan / SAKARYA / TÜRKİYE +90 264 295 3602 [email protected]

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