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What Is the Obama Doctrine, and Has There Ever Been One?

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What Is the Obama Doctrine, and Has There Ever Been One? Institute for Political Studies UDC 321.01 Obama B.(049.3) Serbian Political Thought Manuscript received: 28.11.2016 No. 2/2016, Accepted for publishing: 29.12.2016. Year VIII, Vol. 14 Review essay pp. 115-120 Mladen Lišanin12 What Is the Obama Doctrine, and Has There Ever Been One? David Unger: „The Foreign Policy Legacy of Barack Obama“, The International Spectator, 51(4), 2016, pp. 1-16. Introduction The last year of President Obama’s second term was strongly marked by the bizarre presiden- tial election campaign and high- ly unexpected electoral results. This has mostly overshadowed Mr. Obama’s own foreign policy legacy, his views and actions. Of Colin Dueck: course, the foreign policy of the The Obama Doctrine. American two Obama administrations was regularly brought up and harshly Grand Strategy Today. Oxford criticized by the republican can- University Press, New York didate, and current president- [NY], 2015. elect, Donald J. Trump. Likewise, 1 Research associate Mr. Obama himself had the op- [email protected] portunity to defend his legacy 2 This paper was prepared within the while actively campaigning for project 179009, funded by the Minis- Ms. Clinton. But campaign rants try of Education, Science and Techno- and quarrels are, more often than logical Development of the Republic of not, far away from rational delib- Serbia. 115 eration and cold-minded analysis. ments. Either way, it is instrumen- For these reasons, some successful tal to analyze what has been done attempts to grasp the complex is- (or failed to be done) and what sue of Barrack H. Obama’s foreign way it’s been done: strategically, policy doctrine and its legacy are tactically, or ad hoc. all the more appreciated. This author’s views regard- During the presidential cam- ing this issues are pretty grim. paign, as well as first days of gov- Although there were some indis- erning, Donald Trump has pre- putable achievements (most no- sented himself and his foreign tably, multilateral deal with Iran policy agenda as radically opposed regarding the country’s nuclear to Obama’s, in virtually every way program), it is without a doubt and aspect. Whether the legacy that international ambient left is considered mostly positive or by Barack Obama is significantly negative, there is no doubt that the more perilous than the one left be- new administration will, for some hind by George W. Bush – which time, have to function within the would have been rather hard to context shaped by the policy of imagine at the time. Furthermore, the last eight years. It is, therefore, it can be stated, with a strong con- particularly important to assess fidence, that no such thing as “the said legacy, and analyze whether Obama doctrine” will be remem- it represents a result of a thought- bered by foreign policy experts or through and systematically ap- international relations historians: plied foreign policy doctrine. think of Monroe, Wilson, Reagan Various authors put forward or Bush Jr. in this context, regard- different assessments and evalua- less of particular doctrine’s suc- tions of foreign policy actions and cess. Rather, there has not been legacy of two administrations led but a rudimentary and/or eclectic by Barack Obama. For Harvard’s grand strategy during Obama’s two Stephen Walt, Obama’s foreign administrations. It would not be policy record can be labeled as unreasonable to regard his foreign nothing short of a failure. Colin policy failures as a consequence of Dueck (2015) would largely agree. lack of strategic thought. All this On the other hand, David Un- in spite of the large number of ex- ger (2016) from Johns Hopkins perienced foreign policy public School for Advanced Internation- servants around the president – or al Studies in Bologna, gives a lot sometimes, it might also very well more credit to President Obama be argued, precisely because of regarding foreign policy achieve- them. 116 adopted list or classification of Doctrine, commission and strategy types. Before proceeding omission to analyze Obama’s grand strategy, Dueck presents six specific types The notion of a president’s of foreign policy strategies: re- foreign policy doctrine usually trenchment, containment, regime represents a succinct formula- change/rollback, engagement (in tion regarding main international the form or either integration or objectives and means for their bargaining), accommodation (i.e. achievement, while implying the appeasement) and offshore bal- reasoning behind the doctrine’s ancing. Areas of interest, where adoption. In foreign policy and the strategy (or rather, strategies) national security practice, as well was to be conducted, according to as academic literature, doctrine is Dueck, are: 1) counterterrorism; embodied in the grand strategy, or 2) nuclear proliferation, including “a calculated relationship on the Iran and North Korea relations; part of a country’s leaders of ends 3) great power competitors, most and means in the face of potential notably China and Russia; 4) com- international opponents” (Dueck plexities of, and relations with, 2016: 14). Functions of a grand the Arab World, and 5) relation- strategy are threefold: to specify ship between US alliance commit- certain national goals, ends and ments, defense spending and the interests; to identify existing chal- new American posture overseas. lenges to those interests, and to Various types of strategies have select and recommend the partic- naturally been used in regard to ular policy instruments or means different key areas. by which challenges are met and There has, for the most part, national goals pursued (Ibid.). not been a rigorous and coherent Grand strategy is not to be doctrine or grand strategy under confused with National Security President Obama. External reason Strategy, which is a formal docu- of such development is, of course, ment usually adopted once per to be found in almost chaotically administration and represents complex global environment that a technical verbalization of the Obama’s administration had in- Government’s strategic beliefs herited from Bush’s. It was, in that and choices. It is also not to be sense, perhaps prudent not to for- confused with particular types of mulate a strategy too rigorous or foreign policy strategies, although too narrow to grasp the many con- it is, by definition, put to life and troversies of international politics. conducted through them. There On the other hand, one internal is, of course, no single, globally factor has represented a particu- 117 larly strong constraint for the and the Taliban to regroup and be foreign policy of Barack Obama: on the rise at the end of Obama’s his own tendency to treat foreign second term. policy as secondary to domestic; Although designed as predom- in other words, to disengage from inantly accommodating strategy international issues in order to of strategic retrenchment, occa- “free up national energy and re- sionally more coercive approaches sources to revive the US economy gave results: apart from the bin and pursue progressive domestic reforms” (Dueck 2015: 35-36). Laden episode, “strategically pa- tient” containment of North Korea This approach, along with and Iran seemed to work at times; some indisputable achievements however, the Iranian issue has not like handling the international fi- moved forward until engagement nancial crisis, taking down Osama in P5+1 was applied. North Kore- bin Laden or negotiating the New an nuclear test in September 2016, START treaty with Russia, seemed on the other hand, has once again reasonable and successful, and demonstrated that this country granted Obama reelection in 2012. can hardly, if at all, be construc- But overall, strategic failures have tively dealt with in the absence of been much more far-ranging than Chinese cooperation. occasional accomplishments. Mis- China itself has, according to handling of the Arab spring, espe- Dueck (2016: 72) been subjected cially regarding Egypt, Libya (with to a mixture of strategies, includ- the use of overt rollback strategy) ing engagement, integration and and Syria, along with incompetent accommodation on the coopera- military retreat from Iraq (which tive side of the strategic spectrum, was planned in advance, but could as well as containment, balanc- and should have been postponed ing and deterrence (e.g. in mari- by Obama), gave room to a new time disputes) on the competi- adversary, far more dangerous tive side. Overall strategy towards than Al Qaeda: the so called Is- China was not, however, coherent lamic State, while strengthening enough: so called Pivot to Asia, hostile elements of the presum- for example, was pompously an- ably moderate Islamic opposi- nounced as an innovative strate- tion in Middle Eastern countries. gic shift, but, along with the TPP Buildup of troops in Afghanistan trade agreement, achieved virtu- didn’t just compromise the Presi- ally nothing. Deep economic in- dent’s announcements of ending terdependence thus remains the the Afghan war, it was also unsuc- main factor that objectively sup- cessful and still allowed Al Qaeda presses the potential for a more 118 open conflict between the US and it is hardly a strategy, even if you China. abide by it. Regarding Russia, Oba ma’s first term has begun with aspira- tions towards the reset of rela- Legacy tions; although some progress was made (including the New START For Professor David Unger, and continued Russian support President Obama’s foreign policy regarding US efforts in Afghani- legacy is “mixed but positive”. stan), relations have deteriorated Unger rightfully emphasizes the significantly with the beginning internal constraints (such as hos- of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. tile legislature) that prevented the Strategically speaking, there were President from fulfilling many of hardly any reasons for America his plans and promises, while ad- to meddle in Ukrainian politics, mitting that, as the highest elected supporting pro-Western forces Democrat, Obama had to share against the pro-Russian govern- the blame for such development ment, thus provoking strong Rus- (Unger 2016: 3).
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