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RECUSAL AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF

Authored by: Syamsudin Noer*

* PhD Candidate at Brawijaya University, Indonesia

______

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This paper was supervised by Luthfi Widagdo Eddyono, researcher at Indonesian Constitutional Court. Author thanks Mr. Luthfi, who provided insight and expertise that greatly assisted the author in his research, although Mr. Luthfi may not agree with all of the conclusions of this paper.

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ABSTRACT

This article will search about recusal regulations for judges in Indonesia. I found that there are no rules about the recusal at the Constitutional Court of Indonesia meanwhile in other courts there were clear regulations. However, in reality, there are some practices concerning recusal at the Constitutional Court. This paper provides a recommendation of how the recusal is able in due to the request of the constitutional justice seekers, or to be submitted by the constitutional judges who clearly have a direct or indirect conflict of interest in the case.

Keyword: Recusal, Constitutional Judges, Indonesian Constitutional Court.

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INTRODUCTION

The constitutional judges have a very important position in any democratic state based on law (constitutional democracy) or a democratic legal state (democratic rule of law, or democratische rechtsstaat).1 According to Article 24C 1945 Constitution, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has the authority to adjudicate at the first and final instance, the judgment of which is final, to review laws against the Constitution, to judge on authority disputes of state institutions whose authorities are granted by the Constitution, to judge on the dissolution of a political party, and to judge on discussions regarding the result of a general election.

The Indonesian Constitutional Court also shall render a judgment on the petition of the People’s Representative Council regarding an alleged violation by the President and/or the Vice President according to the Constitution. The constitutional judge is a morality enforcer used in the field of justice which is the principal function of the branch of judicial power. In the hands of judges, the final decision and justice create in the dynamics of state.

The decision of the Constitutional judges is a state decision. The judge decided on the basis of the state power mandated to him. The final judgment of the judge is not only to respect to the rights and duties of citizens but also with respect to the right to life and all human rights.2

Although there are no rules about the recusal in the Constitutional Court Law. However, in practices, there is a precedent of recusal at the Constitutional Court. The recusal is due to the request of the justice seekers, or to be submitted by the constitutional judges who clearly have a direct or indirect conflict of interest in the case.

1 Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Pengangkatan dan Pemberhentian Hakim Indonesia”, on Susi Dwi Harijanti (Ed.), Negara Hukum yang Berkeadilan–Kumpulan Pemikiran dalam Rangka Purnabakti Prof. Dr. H. Bagir Manan, S.H., M.CL., Cet. 1., (Bandung: PSKN FH UNPAD, 2011), p. 610. 2 Ibid.

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A. Research Question How is the regulation and precedent of recusal in the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia?

B. Research Methodology This research is a normative legal research or literature study. The material used is the primary legal material, among others, a set of legislation starting from the 1945 Constitution, the Law, the Constitutional Court Decision, the Government Regulation and other regulations. Secondary law materials include handbooks, magazines, journals, newspapers, and scientific works. All data obtained through legal materials analyzed with qualitative analysis that produces a descriptive-analytical data.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

As the view of recusal, the object of this paper as well as the research, should not be understood as the right to choose the judge or justice seekers or the party who has the initiative to file a case at the Constitutional Court. This right must be interpreted as the right to grant the judges which have the independence and impartiality of cases advanced to the panel of judges, in which the panel of judges as if from the outset has no direct or indirect interest in the case.

On the contrary, if the view of the recusal, it is seen that this condition is the right to vote for a judge (appropriate), then the judicial institution suffered a great setback, because any justice seekers who litigate in the Constitutional Court, may choose judges, this condition will lead to intervention on the principles of independence and impartiality of judges in examining, hearing, and deciding cases, consequently the election of judges should make the judge must think how not to disappoint his constituents by justifying and granting what is his petition.

The regulation of recusal, of which are regulated in legislation starting from Article 17 paragraph (1) of Law 48/2009 concerning Judicial Power that the Trial Party has the recusal to disobey the judge to hear the case. Then Article 17 Paragraph (2) is declared the recusal of repudiation as referred in paragraph (1) is the right of a person who is tried to file an objection which is 185 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

ISSN 2455-4782 accompanied by reason against a judge who has tried his case. Article 17 Paragraph (3), there it is rules that a judge shall withdraw from the court if there is any relationship between blood and femininity up to the third degree, or the relationship of husband or wife despite divorce, whether in relation to the chairman, one member judge, prosecutor, advocate, or clerk.

Continued in Article 17 paragraph (4) in the Judicial Power Law that the chairman of the assembly, member judges, prosecutors, or clerks shall be required to withdraw from the court if the family ties up to a third degree, or the husband or wife relationship, tried or advocated. Article 17 paragraph (5) a quo that a judge or clerk shall be required to resign if both have direct or indirect interests,3 either on their own initiative or on the request of justice seekers. Such provision is reinforced in the Court's Implementation Handbook on Duties and Administrative Courts, resignation as a judge, in which a judge is not requested by an interested party to resign from a case in the case of a judge personally having a direct or indirect interest in the case.

While Article 17 Paragraph (6) of the Judicial Power Law states that in the event of violation of the provision as referred to in paragraph (5), the verdict is declared invalid and to the judge or the clerk concerned shall be liable to administrative or criminal sanctions in accordance with the provisions of legislation apply. The provisions of the recusal to disable in the Judicial Authority Law are closed in Article 17 paragraph (7), namely the case as referred to in paragraph (5) and (6) shall be reviewed again with a different set of judges.4

Other provisions on the recusal of disobedience are also stipulated in Article 41 paragraph (1) of Law 14/1985 as amended by Law 3/2009 regarding the Supreme Court declaring that a judge shall withdraw from a trial if there is a family relationship of blood to the third degree or relationship of husband or wife even though it has been divorced by one of the member judges or clerks in the same Assembly intended Article 40 paragraph (1).5

3 Mahkamah Agung RI, Buku Pedoman Pelaksaan Tugas dan Administrasi Pengadilan Buku II, Edisi Revisi, Cetakan ke-5, (: Mahkamah Agung RI, 2004), p. 114. 4 In the Elucidation of Article 17 paragraph (7) stated, "Different" in this provision is means a panel of judges which is not bound by the provisions of paragraph (5). 5 Article 40 paragraph (1) of the Supreme Court Law, in which the Supreme Court examines and interferes with at least 3 (three) Judges. The explanation: If the Assembly convenes with more than 3 (three) Judges the number should always be odd. 186 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

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Article 41 Paragraph (2) of the Supreme Court Law, a judge or clerk shall be required to withdraw from the trial if the family is connected to the blood of a third or third relationship or husband or wife despite having been divorced by the Public Prosecutor, Military Defender, Defendant, Legal Counsel, Defendant or Plaintiff. Then in Article 41 Paragraph (3) it is stated that the family relationship as referred to in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2) shall also apply between the Supreme Court and/or Registrar of the Supreme Court with the Judge and/or Registrar of the Court of First Instance and the Judge and/or Clerk of the Court Level of Appeal, which has adjudicated the same case.

In Article 41 paragraph (4), if a Judge who decides cases in the first instance or level of appeal, then has become Supreme Court Justice, then the Supreme Court is prohibited from examining the same case. On Article 41 paragraph (5), the judge or clerk as referred to in paragraph (1), paragraph (2), paragraph (3), and paragraph (4) shall be replaced, and if not replaced or not resign while the case has been terminated, then the verdict is void and the case shall be immediately tried again with another assembly of the Assembly.

The provisions on improper recusal are passed on Article 42 of the Supreme Court Law stipulates that in paragraph (1) a Judge is not allowed to adjudicate a case which he or she owns the interest, directly or indirectly. Furthermore, in paragraph (2) In the case referred to in paragraph (1) the relevant Judge shall resign either on his own free will or at the request of the Prosecutor, the Military Oditur, the Defendant, the Legal Counsel, the Defendant or the Plaintiff. Then in paragraph (3) if there is any doubt or dissent regarding the matter as referred to in paragraph (1) is: a. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court because of his position of acting as the competent authority to determine; b. In the case of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court itself, the competent authority is a committee, consisting of 3 (three) persons elected by and among the oldest Justices in office. The thorough mapping of the legal norms about the right of disobeying judges can be seen as shown below.

.

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Table 1: Comparative Recusal in Judicial Power Law, the Supreme Court Law, and The Constitutional Court Law

Positive Law Explanation Article Paragraph Article Paragraph Judicial Power Law 17 (1), (2),(3), (4), 17 (5)6 and (7)7 (5), (6), and (7) Supreme Court Law 41 (1), (2), (3), Quite clear (4), and (5) 42 (1), (2), and (3)

Constitutional Court Law Unregulated

Meanwhile, if, examined about the regulation of norms about recusal to judge in the Constitutional Court Act, not found explicitly. That is what drives the researcher to do research related to it, although not strictly regulated in norms, but the embryo of the embodiment of the recusal to judge in the Constitutional Court often raises the desire in the form of an objection on judges who examine, hear, and decide cases in the Constitutional Court, indicating that there should be a clear and unambiguous arrangement regarding the arrangement of the recusal of resignation.

Deviations from a principle can only be made if it is explicitly stated in the law, for example, the judiciary must be openly public, except for other laws. Apparently the Constitutional Court Law 24/2003 jo. Law 8/2011 and Regulation of the Constitutional Court 006/PMK/2005 do not

6 What is meant by "direct or indirect interest" is included where the judge or the clerk or other party has handled the case or the matter has been related to the previous occupation or occupation. (Supplement to the State Gazette Number 5076). 7 What is meant by "different" in this provision is a panel of judges which is not bound by the provisions of paragraph (5). (Supplement to the State Gazette Number 5076). 188 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

ISSN 2455-4782 specifically regulate deviation of the principle, therefore the Constitutional Court has no reason to deviate from the principle, except to rely on the power it possesses.8

Moreover, considering the number of just 9 (nine)9 judges and the quorum10 limits set forth in the Constitutional Court Law, it is necessary to consider, if one of the seekers of justice proposes a recusal against more than one constitutional justice. If the right of repudiation is filed by one of the parties referring to the Supreme Court Law,11 in which the recusal of disobedience to one of the Constitutional Court Justices, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court is granted the authority as the official who sets out to accept or reject the submission.

In a research by the Judicial Commission,12 from the standpoint of procedural law, there were weaknesses to judges' decisions, as follows: 1. The emergence of decisions that tend to disrespect the principle of alteram partem that is indicated by not giving an equal portion to the parties in the judge's consideration; 2. In the verification, the findings of a decision that does not clearly include at least 2 (two) evidence that has been considered and how the judge's conviction can be established through the verification;

8 Tanto Lailam, “Pro-Kontra Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Menguji Undang-Undang yang Mengatur Eksistensinya”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Volume 12 Nomor 4, Desember 2015, p. 807. It should be noted, however, that such power arguments have the potential to generate abuse of power, as further examination of this case is conflict of interest. 9 The judges of the Constitutional Court consist of 9 persons selected through the fit and proper test representing their respective institutions, namely three (3), namely from DPR, President and Supreme Court. The configuration of the source of recruitment of constitutional justices of the three branches of state power reflects the balance and representation of the three branches of state power in the body of the Constitutional Court as an executing agency of the judicial power that strengthens the check and balances system between branches of state power. Read Jimly Asshiddiqie, Menuju Negara Hukum yang Demokratis, Cet. I., (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2008), p. 470-471. The first nine constitutional justices in the history of Indonesia were established on 15 August 2003 with Presidential Decree No. 147/M Tahun 2003. The oath of nine judges was held at the State Palace on 16 August 2003 witnessed by President Megawati Soekarnoputri. 10 The quorum provisions are regulated in Part Two of the Composition of Article 4 paragraph (4a) to verse (4c) of the Constitutional Court Law. Article 4 paragraph (4a) states: The election meeting as referred to in paragraph (4) shall be attended by at least 7 (seven) members of the constitutional justices. 11 Article 42 Paragraph (3) of the Supreme Court Law: "If there is any doubt or dissent regarding the matter as referred to in paragraph (1), then: a. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court because of his position of acting as the competent authority to determine; b. in the case of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court itself, the competent authority is a committee, consisting of 3 (three) persons elected by and among the oldest Justices in office." 12 Komisi Yudisial, Kualitas Hakim dalam Putusan Laporan Penelitian Putusan Hakim Tahun 2012, Cet. 1., (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia, 2014), p. 72. 189 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

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3. The rights of the defendant to be accompanied by legal counsel, particularly those relating to the provisions of Article 56 of the Criminal Procedure Code,13 are still not fully implemented; 4. The existence of this procedural aspect shall be recorded in the case of the defendant of the children who do not give clear and detailed information on whether the defendant is ordered to be detained or not detained; 5. Still the appearance of typing errors, even the inaccuracy in the mention of the place where the occurrence of legal events are still often found; and 6. Although not included in the category of obligations, particularly for cases of "hard cases" the judges should provide sufficient time for deliberation before the verdict is read out before a public hearing.14

Furthermore, the weaknesses in the substantive aspects of are: 15 1. Judges are less able to elaborate on available legal sources, especially sources of jurisprudence and doctrine. 2. The motivation and vigor of judges to elaborate on the legal aspects of the material are limited by the belief that the duty of the parties (prosecutors or legal advisers, plaintiffs, and defendants) and not the judge to determine the legal basis used.16

While from aspects beyond the formal and material aspects,17 aspects of legal reasoning, as well as the exploration of living values, are still many weaknesses, namely:

13 It states in paragraph (1) that in the case of a suspect or defendant suspected or charged with a criminal offense punishable by capital punishment or criminal threat of fifteen years or more or for those who are unable to be threatened with a crime of five years or more who has no legal counsel itself, the official concerned at all levels of examination in the judicial process shall appoint a legal counsel to them. Whereas paragraph (2) states, any legal counsel appointed to act as referred to in paragraph (1), provides his assistance free of charge. 14 In such complex cases, the impression of haste will arise if the day/date of deliberation is carried out simultaneously with the day/date of the decision reading. 15 Komisi Yudisial, Op.Cit., p. 73-74. The scarcity of literature and access limitations can be suspected as a contributing factor. 16 In this context, the judge is tends to his passive position, so that the scope of the interpretation of the substance of the law is fully determined by the parties.. 17 Komisi Yudisial, Op.Cit., p. 74-75. 190 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

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1. The existence of jumping to a conclusion, which arises because the conclusions are drawn based on premises that are not connected in a valid manner.18 2. Some decisions often do not support the principle of legal certainty.19 3. The existence of judges who give unfinished legal considerations.20 4. The existence of an inconsistent judge in seeing a case.21

Judges' rulings are not static because they are related to the reality of various variables such as interests and power. Judges' rulings are always contextual and not value-free. The judge's verdict is essentially a struggle of a judge, either with himself, other judges or his environment in understanding reality. This gives the impression that the depletion of the judge's energy while performing his duties must undergo an inner struggle and must make the choices that are not easy. As Satjipto Rahardjo explained, the judge should represent the silent voice of the unrepresented and unheard.22

The pros-cons are preceded by the existence of conflicting procedural law, namely the principle of ius curia novit with the principle of nemo judex idoneus in propria causa. The principle of ius curia novit is the principle that the court should not refuse to examine, hear and adjudicate a case filed under the pretext that the law is absent or unclear, whereas the judge should examine and adjudicate him. While the principle of nemo judex idoneus in propria causa (niemand is geschikt om als rechter in zijn eigen zaak op te treden) that no one can be a judge in his own case is one of the legal principles of the Constitutional Court's manifestation of impartiality (impartiality) of judges as the giver of justice.23 The choice of the principle that raises the problem, on the one hand, the Court must exercise its authority, on the other hand, there are barriers that the judge of the Constitutional Court may not be a judge in his own case.

18 For example, there is an element of an article constructed differently from its original formulas without sufficient reason for the change of meaning. 19 For example, in contrast to the previous ruling of the court (which has been legally binding). 20 The non-completion is only one or two elements of the action, while the rest is declared no longer necessary to prove. 21 For example, decision states the lawsuit is unacceptable, but it still checks the subject matter. 22 Satjipto Rahardjo, Penegakan Hukum Progresif, (Jakarta: Kompas), 2011, p. 92. 23 Maruarar Siahaan, Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta: Konstitusi Press, 2005), p.68. 191 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

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In Decision No. 49/PUU-IX/2011 regarding the review of the Constitutional Court Law No. 8/2011, the Constitutional Court affirmed the building of the legal argument why the Constitutional Court has the authority to examine the laws governing its existence, as well as to eliminate any doubts about the objectivity, neutrality, and impartiality of judges of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court's argument, including:24 first, the existence of the Constitutional Court as a state institution which by the 1945 Constitution is authorized to examine the law against the 1945 Constitution; secondly, Constitutional Court as an institution that serves to guard the constitution or the Constitution (the final interpreter of the Constitution when a constitutional dispute occurs); thirdly, because the law petitioned for judicial review is concerned with the Constitutional Court, so it is related to the universal principle in the judicial world of nemo judex in causa, but in this context there are three reasons the Court must adjudicate the petition for judicial review of this law, namely: (i) no other forum could hear this petition; (ii) the Constitutional Court shall not refuse to hear the petition filed against it by reason of non-existence or unclear concerning its law; (iii) this case constitutes the constitutional interest of the nation and state, not merely the interests of the Constitutional Court institution itself or the individual interests of the constitutional judges in office. Fourth, one of the objectum litis of the judicial process in the Constitutional Court is a matter of the constitutionality of the law which concerns the public interest guaranteed by the constitution as the highest law. Therefore, the Constitutional Court emphasizes on its function and duty to guard and enforce the constitution while maintaining the principle of independence and impartiality in the whole judicial process.

Another distinct view is the Judicial Commission, in its written statement of Case No. 1/PUU- XII/2014 and No. 2/PUU-XII/2014 on the examination of Constitutional Court Law No. 4/2014 has the view that the Constitutional Court is not authorized to test the laws governing its existence with the arguments, including First, it is important for the Constitutional Court to look back on the legal principle in the procedural law, "one cannot be a judge for himself" (nemo judex idoneus in propria causa). Secondly, in modern law enforcement, control over the judiciary's organizing authority is not impossible, in order to maintain the impartiality of judges and public trust. Third, related to the petition for judicial review of Second Constitutional Court Law No. 4/2014, has

24 Tanto Lailam, “Pro-Kontra Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Menguji Undang-Undang yang Mengatur Eksistensinya”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Volume 12 Nomor 4, Desember 2015, p. 799. 192 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

ISSN 2455-4782 placed the Constitutional Court, as "judge for himself". Fourth, so far the Constitutional Court uses the argument in decision No. 005/PUU-IV/2006 that the litigation in the Constitutional Court is not the same as litigation in the ordinary courts so that the principle cannot be applied in the Court's court environment. This view is erroneous, unreasonable, and groundless and cannot be used as an argument to disregard the principle of nemo judex idoneus in propria causa. Fifth, the deviation of this principle is also contrary to the principle or principle of propriety and moral ethics. Sixth, the Constitutional Court judges in dealing with this issue should pay attention to the principle of justice and wisdom.25

However, there are cases and precedents as recusal example in Indonesian Constitutional Court.26 First, case number 5/PUU-XV/2017.27 Second, case number 88/PUU-XIV/2016.28

In Case Number 5/PUU-XV/2017, in which the right of repudiation is filed by Paustinus Siburian to the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, as an individual applicant, who submits a recusal of Constitutional Court Justice Wahiduddin Adams, which in his objection letter,29 the petition is doubtful of fairness from the Constitutional Court Justice Wahiduddin Adams. Moreover, the applicant also conveyed the related matters contained in his objection letters that the Constitutional Justice Wahiduddin Adams actually did not qualify to become a Constitutional Justice.

In Case of Number 88/PUU-XII/2016, unlike Case Number 5/PUU-XV/2017, where Constitutional Justice Saldi Isra was once the expert of the applicant who gave his statement at the

25 Tanto Lailam, Ibid., p. 780. 26 There may be more cases that occur as embryos of the right embodiment of judges as a constitutional right of the parties, due to subjective limitations of the researcher and the absence of valid data from the Constitutional Court regarding the appeal of the judges in panel. 27 Applicant Paustinus Siburian; Object Review of Law Number 33 Year 2014 regarding Halal Product Guarantee; and the legal issue is the limited Halal Product. 28 Applicant 1. Adwin Suryo Satrianto (Petitioner I) 2. Supriyanto (Petitioner II) 3. Anggiastri Hanantyasari Utami (Petitioner III) 4. Masruchah (Petitioner IV) 5. Saparinah Sadli (Petitioner V) 6. Sjamsiah Achmad (Petitioner VI) 7 Siti Nia Nurhasanah (Petitioner VII) 8. Ninuk Sumaryani Widiyantoro (Petitioner VIII); Object Testing of Law Number 13 Year 2012 on Special Feature of Special Region of ; and Legal Issues are Requirements of Candidate of Governor and Deputy Governor of Special Region of Yogyakarta. 29 Received from the Registry on Friday, February 3, 2017, at 13:44 pm. 193 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

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Constitutional Court hearing30 at the time has not been a constitutional justice.31 Then the Constitutional Justice Saldi Isra did not able to decide the case.32

In addition, in order to avoid any direct or indirect conflicts of interest, in examining, adjudicating, and deciding cases in the Central and Regional Electoral Results, the agreement of the Judge Meeting agrees that the panel of judges shall not as far as possible examine and adjudicate a case originating from the area of domicile of the constitutional justices, although due to the reason of the quorum, the judges of the constitution in question must continue to decide the cases, this becomes a kind of affirmation of the right of wrong to the existing judge in the Constitutional Court.

In view of some of the above cases, which can be embryo that the right of disagreement exists and occurs in the court environment of the Constitutional Court, therefore, it is necessary to prescribe definitively and explicitly in a regulation, in order to be a reference for justice seekers to be able to propose the right of disobedience against judges and can also be as a precedent in its implementation.

CONCLUSION In the realization of the right of recusal at Indonesian Constitutional Court, need rules for the use of the right of recusal and should be included in norms in Constitutional Court Law. Moreover, the specific format of recusal application also needed, where it should be made in a systematic appeal letter such as a petition filed with the Constitutional Court which contains at least the identity of the parties, the reasons for the objection and the desired matter. It is necessary that the "applicants" can be more focused on appeals for their inherent rights.

30 Minutes of the Case Session Number 88/PUU-XIV/2016, on Tuesday, November 29, 2016, at 11.08 to 13.10 WIB, on the agenda of Listening to the Statement of Parliament and Expert Petitioner in the fifth session. 31 This Constitutional Justice was inaugurated by President at the State Palace on Tuesday, April 11, 2017. 32 In Decision Case Number 88/PUU-XIV/2016 (who granted the petition for the whole case), Constitutional Justice Saldi Isra resigned in a Closed Meeting, on Tuesday, May 16, 2017, marked by not giving his opinion. The verdict was read on Wednesday, August 30, 2017, not attended by Constitutional Justice Saldi Isra. 194 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 4 ISSUE 7

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Then it is necessary to make separate "trials" to give a verdict in the form of a ruling of objection to the application of the right of recusal. In the hearing, it is also necessary to involve the Court's Ethics Board as an outsider to be more transparent and objectively assessing the filing of rights of recusal. Since it is a separate hearing, it is necessary to make every claim submission submitted by one of the justice seekers, also to be informed to the other party so that it can get feedback from other parties.

Given the clear arrangement of filed rights by a justice seeker against one or more constitutional judges and still considers the judge's quorum, one of the constitutional rights of the justice seekers to obtain justice is fulfilled, in which cases raised in court are examined, tried, and decided by a panel of judges with undoubted independence and impartiality. Where, one of the obligations of constitutional judges is the protection of rights and liberties, and the protection of the constitutional rights of justice seekers in obtaining justice.

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REFERENCES

Books  Jimly Asshiddiqie. (2008). Menuju Negara Hukum yang Demokratis, Cet. I., (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah Konstitusi).  Luthfi Widagdo Eddyono. (2013). Penyelesaian Sengketa Kewenangan Lembaga Negara oleh Mahkamah Konstitusi. (Yogyakarta: Insignia Strat).  Komisi Yudisial. (2014). Kualitas Hakim dalam Putusan Laporan Penelitian Putusan Hakim Tahun 2012, Cet. 1., (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia).  Mahkamah Agung RI. (2004). Buku Pedoman Pelaksaan Tugas dan Administrasi Pengadilan Buku II, Edisi Revisi, Cetakan ke-5, (Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung RI).  Maruarar Siahaan. (2005). Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta: Konstitusi Press).  Satjipto Rahardjo. (2011). Penegakan Hukum Progresif, (Jakarta: Kompas).  Susi Dwi Harijanti (Ed.). (2011). Negara Hukum yang Berkeadilan–Kumpulan Pemikiran dalam Rangka Purnabakti Prof. Dr. H. Bagir Manan, S.H., M.CL., Cet. 1., (Bandung: PSKN FH UNPAD).

Journals  Luthfi Widagdo Eddyono, “The First Ten Years Of The Constitutional Court Of Indonesia: The Establishment Of The Principle Of Equality And The Prohibition Of Discrimination”, Constitutional Review, Vol 1, No 2 (2015).  Tanto Lailam, “Pro-Kontra Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Menguji Undang- Undang yang Mengatur Eksistensinya”, Jurnal Konstitusi, Volume 12 Nomor 4, Desember 2015.

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Court Decisions  Indonesian Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006  Indonesian Court Decision Number 49/PUU-IX/2011.  Indonesian Court Decision Number 1/PUU-XII/2014.  Indonesian Court Decision Number 2/PUU-XII/2014.  Indonesian Court Decision Number 88/PUU-XIV/2016.  Indonesian Court Decision Number 5/PUU-XV/2017.

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