Harold Winton on the Fall of the Philippines: the Desperate

Donald J. Young. The Fall of the Philippines: The Desperate Struggle against the Japanese Invasion, 1941/1942. Jefferson: McFarland, 2015. 220 pp. $39.95, paper, ISBN 978-0-7864-9820-8. Reviewed by Harold Winton Published on H-War (January, 2016) Commissioned by Margaret Sankey (Air University) This book’s title suggests that it is about how herence to the book not evident in its formal and why the Philippine Islands fell to the forces of structure. Among others, such themes include Imperial Japan in the months following Pearl Har‐ friction in war, courage in the face of virtually bor. It is actually a collection of seventeen stories certain defeat, and the moral dilemmas of surren‐ drawn from that experience. The stories range der. from the frst Japanese air attacks of December 8, From almost the very frst moment, the de‐ 1941, to the surrender of the American/Filipino fense of the Philippines was plagued by friction-- garrison on the island of Negros on June 3, 1942. the term Clausewitz uses to embrace accident, im‐ Ten deal with ground action, fve with air action, perfection, and the unexpected in war. The Amer‐ and two with naval action. Young has written pre‐ ican air forces in the Philippines were clearly ex‐ viously on the pre-Midway period of World War II pecting an attack. This expectation was height‐ in the Pacific, having penned works on the sur‐ ened when news was received at 4:30 a.m., De‐ renders of Wake Island, Bataan, Corregidor, Hong cember 8, 1941, Manila time, that Pearl Harbor Kong, and Singapore, as well as a comprehensive was being attacked. The 20th Pursuit Squadron history of the battle of Bataan. The present work was on alert at Clark Field when radar detected a is apparently drawn from research conducted for flight of incoming aircraft just over a hundred the earlier studies. miles from Luzon. Reading the approach vector, The author intended the various vignettes to the interceptor command aircraft-warning officer stand alone, and they do. Each is an interesting judged the target to be Manila, some ffty miles story of the fall of the Philippines, told in the spir‐ southeast of Clark. Several unsuccessful attempts it of “tales around the campfire,” long on descrip‐ were made to intercept this fight. As the Japanese tion and short on analysis. The reader, however, aircraft came closer, the warning officer deduced can tease out themes that provide unity and co‐ that both Manila and Clark Field would be at‐ H-Net Reviews tacked and sent a warning message to the 24th decision to meet the Japanese on the beaches, Operations Group at Clark. But the group com‐ rather than moving immediately to the Bataan mander, having previously ordered his squadrons Peninsula as called for in previous war plans. This to scramble to no avail, hesitated to order them meant that the supplies that had been so assidu‐ into the air again. Thus, when ffty-three Japanese ously stockpiled on Bataan for a long siege had bombers arrived over the feld a few minutes lat‐ been moved north to support a forward defense. er, the planes on the ground were literally sitting Only a small fraction made it back to the peninsu‐ ducks. The bombers destroyed twenty-three of the la. Thus, early January 1942 found the defenders 20th Pursuit Squadron’s twenty-six planes and of Bataan facing what they knew would be in‐ killed four pilots. And unlike Pearl Harbor, the in‐ evitable defeat. But they fought back in the face of frastructure at Clark Field was ravaged. terrible odds, perhaps out of the discipline that But there was also great courage in the air made them soldiers, perhaps for the honor of fight. Six days after the devastating attack on their arms, and perhaps because they had little Clark, several B-17s from the southern island of choice. One singular exemplar of this fery spirit Mindanao attacked a Japanese invading force at was Lieutenant Arthur Wermuth. Wermuth led a the south end of Luzon. One, piloted by Captain patrol into enemy territory to burn a village the Hewitt Wheless, developed engine trouble and Japanese sought to use as a staging area, led a showed up late to the fght. When he arrived the similar effort to torch a cane feld that provided Japanese defensive air cover was fully alert. De‐ concealment for an expected assault, and orga‐ spite this signal disadvantage, Wheless entered nized a Philippine Scout force to do the dangerous the fray and was almost immediately attacked by work of hunting down and killing scores of a large number of Zeros, estimated variously from snipers who stayed behind American lines after fifteen to eighteen. A harrowing engagement en‐ Japanese attacks had been repulsed. sued. One crew member was decapitated by ene‐ The most poignant theme of the work is the my fre, another had a leg shredded from knee to hard moral choices commanders must make thigh, a third found his right hand dangling loose‐ when facing the decision to surrender. After the ly from his arm, and a fourth manned two guns Korean War, the US Army developed a code of though also wounded. Despite these casualties, conduct, one article of which read in part, “I shall the crew kept fghting, bringing down seven of never surrender my men while they still have the their assailants. means to resist.” This was the uncodified but op‐ Valor abounded on the ground as well. After erative philosophy of American commanders in the Japanese assault at Lingayen Gulf on Decem‐ World War II. It sounds straightforward--you fght ber 22, the American/Filipino forces were inex‐ until you can no longer do so, but then you may orably forced back to the Bataan Peninsula. The honorably surrender. One problem is determin‐ question of Philippine defense in the 1920s and ing what constitutes being no longer able to resist, 30s had presented a virtually impossible conun‐ and it is a complex question demanding very fne drum. American policy required that the islands judgments. But another important consideration be held, but the country’s military resources were also intrudes in the question: “Who, exactly, are inadequate for the task. Thus, the perennial hope my men?” On April 8, 1942, after three months of that the Army would be able to hold out until the remorseless Japanese pressure, it became clear to Navy arrived was just that--a hope, and a forlorn Major General Edward P. King, the local American one at that. The odds of success were significantly commander on Bataan, that his starving, emaciat‐ diminished by Douglas MacArthur’s calamitous ed men had lost all sense of tactical cohesion and were beyond the limits of human endurance. But 2 H-Net Reviews the authority to surrender was vested in Lieu‐ tenant General Jonathan Wainwright, who had succeeded MacArthur as commander of American forces in the Philippines. Thus, the soldiers on Bataan were not King’s to surrender. But in an act of tremendous moral courage, King made them so. Acting on his own initiative and without in‐ forming Wainwright, he dispatched two staff offi‐ cers under white fag to make contact with the Ja‐ panese. This led to the forces on Bataan capitulat‐ ing the next day. After the fall of Corregidor on May 7, Wainwright tried valiantly to limit the scope of his surrender by declaring that the Amer‐ ican/Filipino forces on the islands to the south were under local command, not his. The Japanese would have none of this attempted evasion. Over the next month, they effectively used the soldiers and nurses captured on Bataan and Corregidor as hostages to compel the surrender of the remain‐ ing American/Filipino forces in the archipelago. During this period of intense drama and tension, each of Wainwright’s subordinate commanders faced real crises of conscience in determining the right thing to do. Perhaps nothing in war tests a commander as much as facing the decision to sur‐ render. In summarizing the book, one could perhaps look on it derisively as a collection of scraps left over from previous research. But as every good cook knows, a little imagination can transform scraps into a delightful meal. And so it is here--the reader has to supply much of the imagination, but the ingredients for a good read are at hand. If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-war Citation: Harold Winton. Review of Young, Donald J. The Fall of the Philippines: The Desperate Struggle against the Japanese Invasion, 1941/1942. H-War, H-Net Reviews. January, 2016. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=45305 3 H-Net Reviews This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. 4.

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