Impartiality As a Lack of Interest: Israel, Brazil, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Question of Jerusalem
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See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322178978 Impartiality as a Lack of Interest: Israel, Brazil, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Question of Jerusalem Article in Israel Studies · April 2018 DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.08 CITATIONS READS 4 86 1 author: Jonathan Grossman Hebrew University of Jerusalem 10 PUBLICATIONS 20 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Jonathan Grossman on 06 May 2020. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. Impartiality as a Lack of Interest: Israel, Brazil, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Question of Jerusalem Working Paper Jonathan Grossman, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem [email protected] The final version of this paper was published as: Grossman, Jonathan. “Impartiality as a Lack of Interest: Israel, Brazil, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Question of Jerusalem.” Israel Studies 23, no. 1 (2018): 152–76. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.08 Abstract: Persuading foreign countries to move their diplomatic missions from Tel Aviv to West Jerusalem was a paramount diplomatic objective of Israel in the 1960s, as such an act implied recognition of the city as Israel’s legitimate capital. Based on diplomatic documents from Israeli and Brazilian archives, this article portrays Israel’s attempts to convince Brazil, the world’s largest Latin American and Catholic country, to consent to such a transfer, and analyzes the reasons for the failure of Israel’s secret pressure campaign, which was known as the “Jerusalem Plan” and supported by prominent and influential Brazilian individuals of Jewish origin. In spite of obtaining the Brazilian president’s authorization of the transfer, the plan was eventually derailed by the Brazilian foreign ministry for standing in contrast to Brazil’s traditional position of equidistance toward the Israeli-Arab conflict while failing to serve in any substantial way the Brazilian national interest of social and economic development. Author’s note: I dedicate this article to the memory of my brother Uri. Research for this article was supported by the Liwerant Center for the Study of Latin America, Spain, Portugal and their Jewish Communities; the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations; and the Cherrick Center for the Study of Zionism, the Yishuv and the State of Israel (with the Jewish National Fund). I would like to thank James N. Green, Gadi Heimann, and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. On June 5, 1963, a brief telex message dispatched by a Brazilian journalist to the Israeli embassy declared that Brazil’s President João Goulart had “officially authorized the transfer of [Brazil’s] embassy" to Jerusalem.”1 This concise telegram was the zenith of an extensive, complicated, and clandestine diplomatic operation carried out by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Israeli embassy in Rio de Janeiro, and notable Brazilian individuals of Jewish origin. This operation, destined to persuade Brazil to move its embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, Israel’s ever-disputed capital, was known in Israeli diplomatic circles as the "Jerusalem Plan." This article explores the rise and fall of that ambitious plan in the wider context of relations between Israel, Brazil, and the Brazilian Jewish diaspora. The literature on Israeli- Brazilian relations and Brazil’s attitude toward the Israeli-Arab conflict has been fairly limited up to date, in spite of the latter being the largest Latin American and Catholic country and home to one of the world’s largest Jewish diasporas. Most existing studies are written in Portuguese and based upon Brazilian primary sources, if at all. Some of them are very general, analyzing major trends and tendencies in Brazil’s relations with the Middle East or Israel’s relations with Latin America over a long span of time at the expense of the intricacies of bilateral relations.2 Others emphasize the positions expressed by Brazil at the United Nations with regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict,3 or focus on specific periods and events: the creation of the State of Israel and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries,4 the presidencies of Getúlio 1 Vargas and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,5 the pro-Arab shift in Brazil’s foreign policy in the mid- 1970s,6 and Brazil’s 1975 vote in favor of UN Resolution 3379 that equated Zionism with racism.7 Of all these works, only Santos mentions the Jerusalem Plan in brief and without reference to Jewish involvement in the negotiations.8 While some scholars refer to the Jewish diaspora of Brazil as an element that influenced Brazil’s attitudes to Israel, none of them surveys the active role that Jewish Brazilians played in the formation and conduct of Israeli-Brazilian relations. A recent article by Meir Chazan addresses this issue, but its emphasis is predominantly on Jewish Brazilians who immigrated to Israel.9 Research on Israel’s ties with the Jewish Brazilians has been so scant that a volume on the Six-Day War’s impact on world Jewry dedicated two articles to Argentina and one to Mexico while ignoring Brazil altogether.10 The present article bridges some of this gap by addressing Israel's relations with Brazil in a period which up to date has been understudied in this context, namely the final phase of the Brazilian democratic experiment in the early 1960s. It demonstrates the special role that members of the Jewish diaspora played in the execution of Israel’s foreign policy and their participation in Israeli informal and quiet diplomacy.11 In the Jerusalem Plan operation, notable Brazilian Jews who exerted considerable influence over their government acted as “unofficial diplomats,” who could legitimately promote and negotiate Israeli interests to their government with the latter's consent.12 The extent of Jewish ability to assist Israel was limited, however, and it was the “technocratic” strata of Brazil’s foreign ministry (Itamaraty) that eventually derailed the Plan for not satisfying Brazil’s own interests. Israel’s recurring pressure on Brazil, which continued even as it became clear that the Plan had failed, reveals a lacking political understanding by the MFA. 2 Israeli-Brazilian Relations: Equidistance, Cordiality, and Technical Assistance A sentimental connection existed between Israel and Brazil since before the establishment of the State of Israel, owing to the myth surrounding Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations Osvaldo Aranha, who presided over the 1947 General Assembly that voted in favor of the Partition Plan. This plan divided the British mandate for Palestine into two independent states, Israeli and Arab, thus allowing the establishment of Israel. As a result of Aranha’s efforts to pass the vote in the assembly he was glorified in the Israeli collective memory and celebrated by the two countries as a symbol of Israeli-Brazilian fraternity.13 In spite of its 1947 vote in favor of the Partition Plan, Brazil did not recognize Israel until February 1949 and diplomatic relations between the countries were only established in 1951.14 This attitude can be explained by the pragmatic and legalistic nature of Brazil’s foreign policy. Voting for the Partition Plan in 1947 was perceived by the Brazilians as an opportunity to stand by the United States, thus improving their relations with Washington. Recognizing Israel after 1948, however, was already a much more complex and controversial issue, involving the Catholic world and the Brazilian Arab diaspora, which did not pressure Brazil so firmly in 1947 but vociferously resisted Israel’s measures thereafter. Brazil thus preferred to stall until Israel was widely recognized and only then joined the majority as a mere acknowledgement of a fait accompli.15 As Norma Breda dos Santos shows, from that moment until the early 1970s, the key concept of Brazil's attitude toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was eqüidistáncia (equidistance), i.e., keeping equal distance from the demands of both parties and tackling regional problems impartially, with a compromising attitude. Impartiality seemed the best course of action as Brazil was geographically distant from the Middle East, did not have important trade 3 interests in the region, and contained substantial Arab and Jewish diasporas whom the government was reluctant to antagonize.16 During this period, Brazil remained loyal to the idea of equidistance in such issues as the status of Jerusalem, the refugee problem, and the border disputes between Israel and Egypt.17 In multilateral forums it adopted a consensual approach and either voted with the majority or abstained.18 Brazil’s participation in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that was deployed along the Israeli-Egyptian border in the wake of the 1956 Suez Crisis was not a divergence from this equidistance but rather a reflection of its desire to become an important player in the multilateral scene.19 David Sheinin, in his critique of Argentina’s similar approach to the Israeli-Arab conflict, makes a very important observation. According to Sheinin, “equidistance was a diplomatic position not a policy,” whose ambiguous and noncommittal nature “offered the basics and nothing more – no policy depth or strategy.”20 As shown in this article, this seemed to be the case with Brazil, whose equidistant stance was often publicly claimed, but could be circumvented by policy-makers if a considerable potential gain was at stake. In the mid-1950s,