Impartiality As a Lack of Interest: Israel, Brazil, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Question of Jerusalem

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322178978

Impartiality as a Lack of Interest: Israel, Brazil, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Question of Jerusalem

Article in Israel Studies · April 2018 DOI: 10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.08

CITATIONS READS 4 86

1 author:

Jonathan Grossman Hebrew University of Jerusalem

10 PUBLICATIONS 20 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Jonathan Grossman on 06 May 2020.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. Impartiality as a Lack of Interest: Israel, Brazil, the Jewish Diaspora, and the

Question of Jerusalem

Working Paper

Jonathan Grossman, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

[email protected]

The final version of this paper was published as:

Grossman, Jonathan. “Impartiality as a Lack of Interest: Israel, Brazil, the Jewish Diaspora, and the

Question of Jerusalem.” Israel Studies 23, no. 1 (2018): 152–76.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/israelstudies.23.1.08

Abstract: Persuading foreign countries to move their diplomatic missions from Tel Aviv to West

Jerusalem was a paramount diplomatic objective of Israel in the 1960s, as such an act implied recognition of the city as Israel’s legitimate capital. Based on diplomatic documents from Israeli and

Brazilian archives, this article portrays Israel’s attempts to convince Brazil, the world’s largest Latin

American and Catholic country, to consent to such a transfer, and analyzes the reasons for the failure of

Israel’s secret pressure campaign, which was known as the “Jerusalem Plan” and supported by prominent and influential Brazilian individuals of Jewish origin. In spite of obtaining the Brazilian president’s authorization of the transfer, the plan was eventually derailed by the Brazilian foreign ministry for standing in contrast to Brazil’s traditional position of equidistance toward the Israeli-Arab conflict while failing to serve in any substantial way the Brazilian national interest of social and economic development. Author’s note: I dedicate this article to the memory of my brother Uri. Research for this article was supported by the Liwerant Center for the Study of Latin America, Spain, Portugal and their Jewish

Communities; the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations; and the Cherrick Center for the Study of Zionism, the Yishuv and the State of Israel (with the Jewish National Fund). I would like to thank James

N. Green, Gadi Heimann, and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions.

On June 5, 1963, a brief telex message dispatched by a Brazilian journalist to the Israeli embassy declared that Brazil’s President João Goulart had “officially authorized the transfer of [Brazil’s] embassy" to Jerusalem.”1 This concise telegram was the zenith of an extensive, complicated, and clandestine diplomatic operation carried out by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Israeli embassy in Rio de Janeiro, and notable Brazilian individuals of Jewish origin. This operation, destined to persuade Brazil to move its embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem, Israel’s ever-disputed capital, was known in Israeli diplomatic circles as the "Jerusalem Plan."

This article explores the rise and fall of that ambitious plan in the wider context of relations between Israel, Brazil, and the Brazilian Jewish diaspora. The literature on Israeli-

Brazilian relations and Brazil’s attitude toward the Israeli-Arab conflict has been fairly limited up to date, in spite of the latter being the largest Latin American and Catholic country and home to one of the world’s largest Jewish diasporas. Most existing studies are written in Portuguese and based upon Brazilian primary sources, if at all. Some of them are very general, analyzing major trends and tendencies in Brazil’s relations with the Middle East or Israel’s relations with

Latin America over a long span of time at the expense of the intricacies of bilateral relations.2

Others emphasize the positions expressed by Brazil at the United Nations with regard to the

Israeli-Arab conflict,3 or focus on specific periods and events: the creation of the State of Israel and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries,4 the presidencies of Getúlio

Vargas and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,5 the pro-Arab shift in Brazil’s foreign policy in the mid-

1970s,6 and Brazil’s 1975 vote in favor of UN Resolution 3379 that equated Zionism with racism.7

Of all these works, only Santos mentions the Jerusalem Plan in brief and without reference to Jewish involvement in the negotiations.8 While some scholars refer to the Jewish diaspora of Brazil as an element that influenced Brazil’s attitudes to Israel, none of them surveys the active role that Jewish Brazilians played in the formation and conduct of Israeli-Brazilian relations. A recent article by Meir Chazan addresses this issue, but its emphasis is predominantly on Jewish Brazilians who immigrated to Israel.9 Research on Israel’s ties with the Jewish

Brazilians has been so scant that a volume on the Six-Day War’s impact on world Jewry dedicated two articles to Argentina and one to Mexico while ignoring Brazil altogether.10

The present article bridges some of this gap by addressing Israel's relations with Brazil in a period which up to date has been understudied in this context, namely the final phase of the

Brazilian democratic experiment in the early 1960s. It demonstrates the special role that members of the Jewish diaspora played in the execution of Israel’s foreign policy and their participation in Israeli informal and quiet diplomacy.11 In the Jerusalem Plan operation, notable

Brazilian Jews who exerted considerable influence over their government acted as “unofficial diplomats,” who could legitimately promote and negotiate Israeli interests to their government with the latter's consent.12 The extent of Jewish ability to assist Israel was limited, however, and it was the “technocratic” strata of Brazil’s foreign ministry (Itamaraty) that eventually derailed the Plan for not satisfying Brazil’s own interests. Israel’s recurring pressure on Brazil, which continued even as it became clear that the Plan had failed, reveals a lacking political understanding by the MFA.

Israeli-Brazilian Relations: Equidistance, Cordiality, and Technical Assistance

A sentimental connection existed between Israel and Brazil since before the establishment of the

State of Israel, owing to the myth surrounding Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations

Osvaldo Aranha, who presided over the 1947 General Assembly that voted in favor of the

Partition Plan. This plan divided the British mandate for Palestine into two independent states,

Israeli and Arab, thus allowing the establishment of Israel. As a result of Aranha’s efforts to pass the vote in the assembly he was glorified in the Israeli collective memory and celebrated by the two countries as a symbol of Israeli-Brazilian fraternity.13

In spite of its 1947 vote in favor of the Partition Plan, Brazil did not recognize Israel until

February 1949 and diplomatic relations between the countries were only established in 1951.14

This attitude can be explained by the pragmatic and legalistic nature of Brazil’s foreign policy.

Voting for the Partition Plan in 1947 was perceived by the Brazilians as an opportunity to stand by the United States, thus improving their relations with Washington. Recognizing Israel after

1948, however, was already a much more complex and controversial issue, involving the

Catholic world and the Brazilian Arab diaspora, which did not pressure Brazil so firmly in 1947 but vociferously resisted Israel’s measures thereafter. Brazil thus preferred to stall until Israel was widely recognized and only then joined the majority as a mere acknowledgement of a fait accompli.15

As Norma Breda dos Santos shows, from that moment until the early 1970s, the key concept of Brazil's attitude toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was eqüidistáncia

(equidistance), i.e., keeping equal distance from the demands of both parties and tackling regional problems impartially, with a compromising attitude. Impartiality seemed the best course of action as Brazil was geographically distant from the Middle East, did not have important trade

3 interests in the region, and contained substantial Arab and Jewish diasporas whom the government was reluctant to antagonize.16 During this period, Brazil remained loyal to the idea of equidistance in such issues as the status of Jerusalem, the refugee problem, and the border disputes between Israel and Egypt.17 In multilateral forums it adopted a consensual approach and either voted with the majority or abstained.18 Brazil’s participation in the United Nations

Emergency Force (UNEF) that was deployed along the Israeli-Egyptian border in the wake of the

1956 Suez Crisis was not a divergence from this equidistance but rather a reflection of its desire to become an important player in the multilateral scene.19

David Sheinin, in his critique of Argentina’s similar approach to the Israeli-Arab conflict, makes a very important observation. According to Sheinin, “equidistance was a diplomatic position not a policy,” whose ambiguous and noncommittal nature “offered the basics and nothing more – no policy depth or strategy.”20 As shown in this article, this seemed to be the case with Brazil, whose equidistant stance was often publicly claimed, but could be circumvented by policy-makers if a considerable potential gain was at stake.

In the mid-1950s, Israel began to give technical assistance to Third World countries, especially in Asia and Africa, as a means to garner their diplomatic support and improve economic, and sometimes strategic, relations with them. With Israel being a developing country itself, neither communist nor capitalist, and lacking imperialist pretensions, it was easy for those countries to accept and enjoy its technical and agricultural expertise.21 Even though Africa remained Israel’s top priority in the Third World, in the 1960s Jerusalem began to increase its technical cooperation with Latin American governments following Adolf Eichmann's kidnapping from Argentina and the ensuing blow to Israel’s image in the region.22 The revenues that Israel hoped to collect in exchange for its technical assistance were mainly diplomatic – recognition of

4 its sovereignty, establishment of diplomatic relations, and favorable votes in multilateral forums.

In this respect, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital was considered a most desired diplomatic achievement. In addition, the Israeli assistance served to fortify the status of Jewish communities within Latin American societies.23

In March 1962, Brazil signed a technical cooperation agreement with Israel and Israeli technical missions were sent to Rio de Janeiro and Recife. Cooperation with Brazil focused on agricultural development, and was often financed by third parties like the Organization of

American States or the Inter-American Development Bank.24 Israel’s modest contribution to the

Brazilian developmental project fortified its presence in Brazil, improved its image there, and was appreciated by the Brazilian authorities, as manifested in the 1962 official visit of Brazil’s foreign minister to Israel, which was not followed by an equivalent visit to neighboring Arab countries.25 Nonetheless, as the Jerusalem Plan case study reveals, the technical assistance was insufficient to cajole Brazil into changing its position on a sensitive political issue.

Jerusalem: Israel’s Capital or a Corpus Separatum?

The city of Jerusalem has long been the focal point of Jewish aspirations. As Michael Brecher wrote in the 1970s, Jerusalem, as an issue, “dominates the cultural-status area of Israel’s foreign policy.”26 The Partition Plan for Palestine, approved by the United Nations General Assembly in

1947, defined Jerusalem as an international territory (corpus separatum) under UN control. The

Zionist leadership despondently accepted this compromise as a necessary evil – a sine qua non for the establishment of a Jewish state. However, many Jews viewed it as a temporary concession and refused to renounce the historical and spiritual connections to the city, which had a Jewish majority since 1860.27

In the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jerusalem's western part was conquered by the Israelis while East Jerusalem came under Jordanian rule. Israel’s new government rapidly consolidated its control over the city, and in 1949 West Jerusalem was formally annexed and declared capital of Israel. Since then, Israel has withstood strong pressures by the international community to allow the establishment of a corpus separatum in the city according to the Partition Plan.28 In

1953, it took an additional measure to solidify Jerusalem’s status and installed the MFA’s headquarters there. As Gadi Heimann notes, transferring the MFA from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem

“was tantamount to snubbing the international community, which refused to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital or even Israeli juridical sovereignty over the city.” As the foreign embassies were located in Tel-Aviv, moving the ministry “would force foreign governments either to bow to Israel’s decision and relocate to the Holy City or stand on principle and remain in Tel-Aviv, even if that significantly hampered their work.”29 This act was followed by laborious diplomatic efforts to convince foreign governments to transfer their diplomatic missions to Jerusalem. While most legations remained in Tel-Aviv, some countries eventually succumbed to the pressure.30

However, Motti Golani remarks that although Israel celebrated these transfers as legitimization of West Jerusalem, in reality “the countries in question did not recognize Jerusalem's status de jure, but merely made what they considered a technical adjustment to the place where the Israeli government sat.”31 Be that as it may, such measures were unequivocally interpreted in the world as pro-Israeli acts.

The Catholic Church has been one of the major foci of resistance to Israel’s pretensions regarding Jerusalem. The Vatican repudiated the notion that the Holy Places in Palestine be controlled by non-Catholics and strongly supported the Corpus Separatum solution. An internationalized Jerusalem would guarantee the integrity and accessibility of the Holy Sites and

Catholic institutions. Moreover, it would allow the return of exiled Christian Arab refugees who fled during the war, and strengthen Rome's international position by creating a Catholic power center in the Middle East.32 The Holy See attempted to mobilize the Catholic world to support the internationalization plan and to exert pressure on Israel in this regard. In the multilateral sphere, Catholic opposition occasionally put Israel at odds with Catholic countries that were generally favorable to Israel.33 Having the world's largest Catholic population, Brazil was considered a strategic country in this respect.

The Vatican's success in co-opting Latin American support for internationalization was only partial. On the one hand, during the late 1940s and early 1950s most Latin American countries acceded to papal pressure and voted in favor of pro-internationalization UN resolutions.34 On the other hand, these countries maintained cordial relations with Israel, were not prone to Arab pressures, and wished to be viewed as acting independently of the pro- internationalization United States.35 During the 1960s, Israel managed to persuade most Latin

American countries to relocate, and ten of fourteen Latin American missions moved to Jerusalem or were originally established there – a majority among the diplomatic contingents in the capital.

However, the embassies of the Latin American “big three” – Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico – remained in Tel-Aviv.36

That Brazil, the largest Catholic country and a traditional ally of the United States, would adhere to Rome and Washington’s line was far from surprising. When Israel asked to be admitted into the United Nations in 1949, Brazil abstained, mainly as a result of Catholic pressure following Israel’s noncompliance with the internationalization of Jerusalem.37 In 1949, it supported a resolution that ratified the internationalization solution “because we must follow the instructions of the Vatican,” as its foreign minister explained to an Israeli diplomat.38 In

1953, Israel rejected a Brazilian proposal of temporary demilitarization of the city, assessing that it was actually Rome that stood behind it.39

Notwithstanding, in the early 1960s the MFA identified a potential breach in Brazil’s intransigence regarding Jerusalem. It tried to take advantage of the unstable political and financial situation that reigned in the country by launching an extensive and orchestrated pressure campaign and striking a swift and conclusive deal with the Brazilian government for the transference of its embassy. Despite the fact that its ultimate goal was not achieved, this campaign had a nominal and declaratory value for Israel, as it caused the Brazilian president and his foreign minister to authorize the relocation, albeit informally.

Launching and Funding the Jerusalem Plan

The Jerusalem Plan gained momentum in the chaotic latter half of 1963. For Brazil, the early

1960s were a period of political, social, and economic turmoil, as the country faced a major economic crisis inherited from previous administrations. In August 1961, President Jânio

Quadros unexpectedly resigned after merely seven months in office. According to the constitution, he was to be replaced by Vice President João Goulart, who was considered by conservative circles in the Brazilian military and business community to be close to and influenced by the radical Left and communist-infiltrated labor unions. When Quadros resigned, a segment of the military attempted to prevent the constitutional succession and Brazil was on the brink of a civil war. A conciliatory solution was finally achieved by Congress, according to which the government system was changed from presidential to parliamentary, thus reducing

Goulart's executive powers. Only in January 1963 was that system eliminated in a plebiscite, and

Goulart regained full presidential powers. Failing to stabilize the economy or to obtain

8 substantial emergency foreign loans, he veered toward the radical Left, further alienating the opposition.40

As Heimann describes, Israel’s method of persuading Latin American countries to move their missions to the capital was to “wait patiently until suitable political conditions in one of those countries ripened, then bring to bear pressure that achieved its goal.”41 With a worsening financial crisis, a dramatic polarization of the political arena, and a growing animosity of the

White House toward Brazil, it seemed that the perfect moment to act in that country had finally arrived. Israel hoped that Goulart’s fragile government, in its desperate quest for survival, would accept a controversial diplomatic move related to a remote area of the world and detached from

Brazilian domestic politics and Cold War tensions. Due to Brazil's regional importance, it hoped that an eventual consent would serve as a catalyst for other Latin American countries to relocate their missions.42

The main author of the Jerusalem Plan was Arieh Eshel, Israel's ambassador to Rio de

Janeiro. What set it in motion was the looming end of the terms of Brazil's two highest-ranking diplomats: Foreign Minister Hermes Lima and Itamaraty Secretary-General Carlos Alfredo

Bernardes were known to be sympathetic to Israel and maintained close relations with Eshel. A few months earlier it was Bernardes who had discreetly attempted to enlist Israel’s help in inducing a more favorable coverage of Brazil in the US media – a request stemming from the dual stereotype of US Jews controlling the public opinion in their country and Israel controlling the Jewish diaspora).43 Eshel agreed to help, and later tried (and failed) to convince his counterpart in Washington to cooperate.44 Now it was his turn to ask for a favor.

In March 1963, Eshel learned that the Brazilian ambassador to Tel-Aviv, Barreto Leite

Filho, who had already promised to support the transfer of the embassy, might be removed on

9 account of his not being a professional diplomat.45 When he learned that Lima and Bernardes were also about to leave their positions, a result of the never-ending rotation of government officials in Goulart’s dysfunctional government, he was resolved to squeeze from them one final diplomatic gesture and move the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem. He started to pressure them separately, and after two rounds of informal conversations, both conceded to the transfer. More importantly, Lima confirmed the existence of a memorandum signed by Bernardes that affirmed the Plan.46

A formal document written by Itamaraty's highest official and recommending the transfer was by itself an unprecedented Israeli achievement. This memorandum, enthusiastically favorable to the transfer, not only renders the UN internationalization resolution as dead letter and defines the current division of the city as irreversible, but also forecasts that “sooner or later, the tendency of all the countries that accepted the General Assembly resolution would be to search for an arrangement with Israel.” Dismissing the opposition of the Catholic Church as irrelevant in light of the benefits that Brazil could reap, it reveals a stereotypical perception of the Jews by stressing "the importance of the role that the Jewish community exercises in the great world financial centers, in the press and in the international news agencies, in the most advanced cultural and scientific means, all of which are forces that Brazil’s sympathy and good will would instantly capitalize on for the benefit of…national development."47

When Eshel first discussed the issue with Lima, the foreign minister opined that there was “no reasonable cause for the embassy not to be in the same city as the foreign ministry,” but insisted that Israel’s supplying a proper seat for the new embassy would be a prerequisite for the transfer.48 There was not the slightest doubt about who would bear the burden of such a costly operation. Israel has always depended heavily on financial aid from the Jewish diaspora.49 In

Brazil, as in other countries, Israel viewed the Jewish population as the most available solution for all sorts of financial necessities. The majority of Brazilian Jews belonged to the social, economic, and political elite of the country,50 and since the start of diplomatic relations with

Brazil, Israel often utilized their resources for diplomatic purposes. In fact, the Israeli embassy in

Rio was itself bought and furnished by Brazilian Jews in the early 1950s.51 The first Brazilian chancery in Tel-Aviv was similarly purchased by the Klabin family, a prosperous Jewish family of industrialists and businessmen that was prominent in domestic politics and Zionist activity.52

This arrangement was far from being a Brazilian peculiarity. Israel’s diplomatic mission in

Argentina was donated by the local Jewry,53 and in 1960 the efforts of Jewish Argentines to collect the money required to build an embassy for their country in Jerusalem were frustrated by their government.54

Eshel’s haste “to raise funds among the local Jews” was therefore understandable.55

Brazil's Ambassador Barreto Leite similarly argued that such a donation would be more effective in promoting the transfer than any diplomatic action in Brazil, and complained that "either you

[the Israeli government] do not know how to work, or the wealthy Jews of Brazil, like Israel

Klabin, who are accustomed to waste money on all sorts of things, are not aware of the things they need to do for you."56 The perceptions implied in this declaration should not be overlooked, given that the referred potential donors were Brazilian citizens who lived and worked in Brazil, contributed to the Brazilian economy and culture, and attained high positions in state and federal administrations. Virtually none of them had been born in Palestine, and their ties to Israel were mostly ethnic, religious, and spiritual. And yet, official representatives of their government were expecting them to raise money for a foreign country – to do “the things they need to do” for

Israel. Such declarations seem to assume, and even tolerate, a certain degree of loyalty to Israel on the part of Brazilian Jews.

Many Jewish Brazilians shared this perception. The organized Jewish communities in

Latin America maintained close connections with Israel, which was manifested in the Jewish educational system, fundraising for Zionist causes, encouragement and organization of emigration to Israel, and an impressive Zionist majority in representative Jewish institutions.57

However, according to Israeli Zionist envoys to Brazil, Jews in this country lacked a firm ideological base and tended to focus on financial donations to Israel as a substitution for more profound Zionist intellectual and communal activities.58 It is also imperative to remember that about one half of Latin America’s Jewish population was not affiliated with communal institutions at all,59 although, as will be seen below, non-affiliation should not be automatically taken as non-identification with Israel.60 That is not to say that the established Jewish community of Brazil was not significant to Israeli ventures in the country. In the 1960s, for instance, the

Jewish Confederation of Brazil (the umbrella organization of the various Brazilian Jewish state federations) entrusted Arabic-speaking Jews with the task of monitoring Arab publications and radio programs in the country and reporting to the Israeli embassy.61 The Confederation also published such pro-Israeli pamphlets as “The Jews of Nasser” and “Difficult Questions and

Answers about the Middle East," which were distributed in the late 1960s, and the Israeli ambassadors attended its executive meetings.62

In 1967, the Jewish Confederation declared that Jewish Brazilians could legitimately assist Israel as their Zionism and local patriotism “never cross each other, but complete each other.”63 This Jewish identification with Israel traversed intra-communal ideological disputes: in

1966, the editor of the popular Jewish weekly Aonde Vamos?, which was identified with

Revisionist Zionism and strongly opposed the local and international Zionist organizations, proclaimed that Israeli President Zalman Shazar’s visit to Brazil in that year was a “double privilege” for Jewish Brazilians, who were, at the same time, “integrated and unconditionally loyal” Brazilian citizens and Zionists loyal to Israel.64 This harmonic view was not always shared by the host society. Jewish identification with Israel often resulted in charges of dual loyalty, which became stronger in Latin America after Israel’s violation of Argentine sovereignty in the

Eichmann affair. Many Latin Americans failed to make the distinction between Israelite and

Israeli, and regarded Israel’s ambassador as the representative of the Jewish collectivity.65 It should be noted that this conflation was not necessarily detrimental to the Jews. For Jewish Latin

Americans, having an ancestral homeland of their own, like such ethnic communities as the

Spaniards, Italians, and Lebanese, was a way to overcome the stereotype of the Wandering Jew and become a "normal" diaspora.66 Israeli diplomats, on their part, had been instructed by

Jerusalem to act as both representatives to the governments to which they were accredited and envoys to the Jewish communities.67

An Israeli official affirmed in 1960 that “Latin American Jewry displayed the model attitude of Jews to Israel and to their country” by maintaining complete civil loyalty to their country of residence alongside a feeling of belonging to the whole Jewish nation as a cultural entity. Other diplomats agreed that “Latin American Governments accept this dual identification.”68 There is certain over-righteousness in the first assertion, as issues like the political status of Jerusalem, in which Latin American Jews were actively involved, far exceeded the ethno-cultural dimension. However, the fact that Brazil’s government accepted and encouraged the idea that Brazilian Jews finance the embassy building, and the nature of the negotiations which shall be discussed next, support the notion that Latin American governments

13 embraced, at least to a certain extent, Jewish identification with Israel. As Gabriel Sheffer postulates, split-loyalties are the norm rather than an exception among ethno-national diasporas anywhere, and do not pose major difficulties as long as relations between homelands and host countries are correct.69 This attitude was expressed by Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón, who once said that “an Argentine Jew who does not help Israel is not a good Argentine.”70

Negotiating an Impossible Deal: The Jewish Pressure Campaign

Even with the financial issue taken care of by the Jews, it was still mandatory to obtain the approval of the highest authority in Brazil, the president of the republic. Prima Facie, the praised technical cooperation gave Israel a certain leverage over Brazil as it addressed the foremost

Brazilian national interest of social and economic development. However, in a vast country like

Brazil, the importance of Israel’s relatively-modest assistance, appreciated as it was, should not be overemphasized. According to the 1963 annual report of Itamaraty's Middle East Division, while it was admittedly difficult to remain impartial in the Israeli-Arab conflict given Israel’s diplomatic efforts in Brazil, there was also no immediate reason to get involved in this dispute,

“not even the perspectives of Israeli technical assistance to Brazil, until now very limited.”71

Even though, in Brazil, as in other Latin American countries, Israel had another important asset that gave it a considerable advantage over much larger, stronger, and wealthier nations, and was nearly nonexistent in the Asian and African beneficiaries of its technical cooperation: the political influence of the local Jewish diaspora.

Using Jewish leaders as intermediaries in secret negotiation has been a constant feature of

Israeli backchannel diplomacy.72 Thanks to such individuals, Israel, a small country with little political and economic significance for countries like Brazil, was often granted privileged access

14 to the highest-ranking officials. All Israeli and Latin American diplomats interviewed by

Kaufman, Shapira, and Barromi

stressed the importance of personal relations in influencing policymaking, i.e., certain individuals, not in an official capacity, whom as a result of personal close relationships with the president or relevant minister, can successfully influence decisions in favor of either side in the existing [Israeli-Arab] conflict. In the case of the pro-

Israeli lobby, such strategically placed persons are often also members of the Jewish community – though not necessarily active within its framework – who may be close friends of the Israeli ambassador and prominent in national business or intellectual circles.73

Throughout the Jerusalem Plan campaign, Israel had made use of an entire arsenal of prominent Jews who enjoyed influence and connections at the highest echelons of Brazilian politics. First and foremost among them was press magnate Adolpho Bloch, the founder and owner of the popular media network Manchete and a close friend of former President Juscelino

Kubitschek, a leading candidate for the 1965 presidential elections.74 In the Israeli diplomatic documents Bloch is described as a generous donor, reliable source of information, and a well- connected mediator capable of influencing Brazilian elite views. Bloch might have married a

Catholic woman, disassociated himself from Jewish communal activities,75 and never traveled to

Israel in person, but when Eshel mobilized him for the operation he complied with pleasure and exerted all his influence to promote it. As Goulart’s government was in desperate need of positive press coverage, friendly relations with Bloch were of utmost importance to it.

Israel Klabin, who was portrayed by Ambassador Barreto Leite as the model Jewish donor for the transfer, was another invaluable asset. Due to his family's long tradition of Zionism and political activitym– his father’s cousin Horácio Lafer was Brazil’s foreign minister and finance minister in the 1950s and early 1960s – he maintained from a young age close and direct

15 connections with the highest political circles in Israel and Brazil.76 For Goulart, who was fiercely and ceaselessly attacked by Brazil’s business community, the support of an influential entrepreneur like Klabin could be extremely beneficial, particularly during a devastating financial crisis. A third collaborator in the Plan was the Jewish activist and federal senator Aarão

Steinbruch. The president was interested in drawing Steinbruch's political support, a fact that gave the senator some leverage over him.77 Another ally was Samuel Wainer, a leftist journalist and confidant of former President Getúlio Vargas. Wainer had worked very closely with the

Israeli embassy during Vargas’s term, and although his influence dwindled after his patron's suicide in 1954, he was still an important figure in the national media and an old friend of

President Goulart, himself a former protégé of Vargas.78 Other Jews, too many to mention, promoted the Plan among friends from the Brazilian decision-making elite.79 With Jewish financial backing and political support, Eshel was finally able to make concrete offers to the

Brazilian government.

With all the pieces in place, “Brazil was about to move its embassy to Jerusalem,” as a

Brazilian diplomat admitted two years later.80 The plan’s chances of success seemed greatest in

June 1963, when secret negotiations with Foreign Minister Lima took place in Brasília under the auspices of Adolpho Bloch. Bloch, who surrounded himself with Jewish employees, chose a

Catholic journalist named Murilo Mello Filho, Manchete’s correspondent in Brasília and a longtime friend of Goulart and Lima, to represent the Israelis. Looking back on that affair, Mello observes that “Adolpho thought that being non-Jewish, I would have more liberty to defend the transfer.”81

On 5 June 1963, it appeared that a deal had been struck and approved by the president.

Foreign Minister Lima’s only reservation was his request not to publicize the transfer prior to the

16 official announcement.82 Two days later, Lima insisted that the transfer had been authorized, “on condition that the Jewish community in Brazil help with the expenses as promised,” and once again asked to keep the matter secret until he personally signed the transfer decree in Rio de

Janeiro, adding that he wished to “crown” his soon to be ended term with what he saw as an “act of interest for the Jewish Brazilians.”83

Lima went to Rio, but the conclusion of the deal kept lingering. On August 10, Goulart reaffirmed to Murilo his authorization of the Plan, emphasizing the clause about the Jews financing the transfer, which was evidently important to him. Claiming ignorance as to why his orders were not followed by Itamaraty, Goulart preferred to wait until Lima returned to Brasília and explained the delay. Murilo urged the Israelis to contact Lima while he was still in Rio, as his following meeting with Goulart was to be his last as foreign minister.84

On the next day, a disillusioned Murilo disappointedly reported that Lima had decided to leave the ruling on the issue to his successor due to “certain internal administration sectors at

Itamaraty who manifested against the transfer.” Lima argued that he tried to tackle them but soon realized that “these obstacles were insurmountable.” After that conversation, Murilo became pessimistic about future chances of success and warned that the Plan’s adversaries at Itamaraty were powerful enough “to sabotage any measure,” including the transfer of their own ministry from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília, in disobedience to the president and foreign minister’s orders. 85

The firm opposition to the Plan by large segments within the Brazilian foreign service can be observed in the comments of Itamaraty’s Middle East Department on Bernardes’s advocacy of the Plan. Arguing that supporting a de facto situation like the Israeli dominion over

Jerusalem stood in contrast to Brazilian foreign policy, and that it would be difficult to justify the

Israeli occupation of the city in international forums and to Brazil’s Arab and Third World allies,

17 this memorandum claimed that Jerusalem’s importance for the Jews was merely religious “since

Zionism is hardly understandable out of the religious context [sic.],” and therefore contrasting

Brazil’s interest in the city as a Catholic nation. In such a setting, there was no reason for Brazil to favor “the Jewish interest over ours,” not even “the financial aura of the Jewish community.”

As a compromise, the memorandum suggests to approach the Holy See and inquire if there had been any changes in its attitude toward Jerusalem.86 Such an appeal was rapidly made, probably at Bernardes’s behest,87 but the Vatican’s replied that its support of internationalization remained intact.88

If the Jerusalem Plan had any chance of success in the first place, it was probably doomed to failure with the departure of Secretary-General Bernardes, its main proponent at

Itamaraty, who was appointed ambassador to the United Nations in mid-June.89 Without his support, Lima and Goulart were unable to counter the internal opposition at the ministry, or more likely, were unwilling to do so and risk confrontation over a decision that could not yield any immediate political benefit at a time of social and political unrest. Unfortunately for Israel, the incessant replacement of government personnel made renegotiation of the Plan practically impossible. By mid-July, for example, Bernardes’s successor, himself on his way out of

Itamaraty, told Eshel that the Plan, which he personally supported, was not feasible in the current political setting, but hinted that the incoming foreign minister (to replace Lima’s successor

Evandro Lins) might reconsider it.90 Relying on that feeble hope, Israel refused to give up on the

Plan. After all, several foreign ministers and Itamaraty secretaries general had verbally confirmed the transfer and Goulart, according to his press secretary, was still favorable to it and did not consider the matter closed.91 The problem seemed to be that none of the Plan’s supporters was willing to be held accountable for its outcomes: Lima left the final decision to Lins; Lins

18 handed it over to the president on the pretext that Itamaraty was “equally divided” on the issue; and Goulart, for his part, refused to counter the opinion of Itamaraty’s professional staff and risk another domestic clash.92

Trying to break this stalemate, Eshel decided to take full advantage of his Jewish allies’ connections and increase the pressure. In September, Samuel Wainer requested his old friend

Bernardes, by then Brazil’s ambassador to the United Nations, to convince the new Foreign

Minister João Augusto de Araújo Castro of the necessity of the transfer.93 Similarly, Israel

Klabin attempted to arrange an “informal unofficial personal meeting” between Aráujo Castro and Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir to discuss it.94 Even Juscelino Kubitschek, motivated by

Bloch, promised to pressure Goulart to rule in favor of the transfer.95 Such intensive lobbying, aimed at the highest Brazilian officials at a time when they had to deal with acute domestic problems, was not only futile but also counterproductive; in August 1963, Araújo Castro hinted that the embassy better decrease the pressure.96 Afterwards, only sporadic attempts were made and the issue was practically off the table.

A Clash of Interests: The Jerusalem Plan's Failure

Transferring the Brazilian embassy to Jerusalem was antithetical to the three major tendencies of

Brazilian diplomacy as portrayed by Amado Luiz Cervo: peaceful negotiation and resolution of conflicts, legalism and respect for international accords, and strong pragmatism and preference of material gains over political and ideological ones.97 Israel failed to understand that the

Brazilian government could hardly be persuaded to endorse a de facto political situation that was created by force rather than negotiated, was contrary to UN resolutions supported by Brazil, and did not offer Brazil any concrete and immediate benefit. Not only that authorizing the transfer would not serve Brazil’s national interest of development, it might also compromise its relations

19 with the Arab, Muslim, Catholic, and Third World countries and peoples.98 Pragmatically speaking, there was simply more loss than gain for Brazil in the Jerusalem Plan.

Another reason for the Plan’s failure was Goulart’s fear that it would raise further internal opposition to his unstable government. A Brazilian diplomat confidentially revealed to Eshel that the government, “suspect of exaggerated leftist tendencies, is interested in good relations with the Church in order to remove itself from the stain of leftism.”99 In a conversation with Murilo, the president defined the issue as a possible source of domestic ethno-political dispute and lamented the fact that there were “52 deputies of Syrian origin at the [federal] Chamber of

Deputies” who were likely to break with the government if the transfer happened, while

“unfortunately, there [were] less deputies of Jewish origin.” The president suggested a creative solution: “that in the next elections, the Jews try to elect more deputies than the Syrians.”100

This comment suggests that like Foreign Minister Lima – who had equally perceived the transfer as a predominantly Jewish Brazilian interest – Goulart might have accepted the transfer initially and offhandedly, as a personal favor to Adolpho Bloch and his friends and out of ignorance about Jewish, Arab, and Middle Eastern affairs. In late 1962, Goulart’s similar acceptance of the MFA’s invitation to officially visit Israel enraged Itamaraty officials, who feared that such a visit might incite a serious backlash in Brazil’s relations with Arab countries.101 According to Zevi Ghivelder, a senior journalist and editor in Manchete who was involved in the Jerusalem Plan negotiations as Bloch’s confidant, Goulart was “misinformed about the situation in the Middle East,” and therefore “willing to do it without knowing what he was actually doing,” but withdrew his support as soon as he was properly briefed by

Itamaraty.102 However, as soon as Goulart realized that the execution of the Plan might stir additional domestic turbulence, he was quick to discard it. That the organized Arab diaspora in

Brazil had any part in the failure of the Jerusalem Plan is yet to be proven. In the Israeli and

Brazilian diplomatic archives there is no mention of this kind of efforts, although a future research of Arab diplomatic archives and Brazilian Arab institutional archives might yield additional findings.103

Israel’s pressure campaign proved successful in drawing the support and consent of several prominent individuals within the Brazilian government, but none of them had sufficient personal power, was genuinely committed to the transfer, or retained his position long enough to actually promote it. A definite negative answer had never been given, as Brazilian officials, cautious not to antagonize Israel, kept stalling and making arguments against premature action.104 The Plan suffered its death blow on Christmas Day 1963, when its existence was exposed by the Arab-Brazilian journalist Ibrahim Sued.105 Curiously, Sued was a former employee of Adolpho Bloch, and a “great friend” of Samuel Wainer.106 The exposure itself was anything but surprising – Eshel actually expressed his bewilderment that such an operation could go on freely in Brazil for half a year without being leaked to the press.107 Curiously, the Plan was brought up again in March 1964, when Juscelino Kubitschek solemnly promised to Bloch that if he were elected president in 1965 he would transfer Brazil’s embassy to Jerusalem.108

Whether Kubitschek meant to keep his word or was just courting the Jewish electorate was never to be known. On 31 March 1964, the Brazilian armed forces finally staged their long- planned coup d'état, toppled Goulart’s government, and took over the country for more than two decades. Kubitschek and Goulart were exiled, and the influence of Israel’s “unofficial diplomats” over the new government was drastically reduced. Unlike Goulart's government, the new administration showed unrelenting intransigence as regards Jerusalem, and promptly rejected any initiative to revive the Plan. Such Israeli attempts were made occasionally and halfheartedly over

21 the next years, but Brazil’s answer was always decisively negative.109 In 1967, the Brazilian ambassador to Tel-Aviv commented that Israel had tried to persuade Brazilian officials to move the embassy to Jerusalem in “many opportunities,” including President Shazar’s 1966 visit to

Brazil.110 Some futile attempts were made even after the Six-Day War and Israel’s occupation of

East Jerusalem.111 As of 2017, the Brazilian embassy remains in Tel-Aviv.

Conclusion: Misunderstanding Brazilian Pragmatism

The efforts to persuade Brazil to move its embassy to Jerusalem illuminate Israel's unique condition in the early 1960s. As a young state whose own existence was yet to be guaranteed, it was struggling to win international acknowledgement in the face of Arab delegitimization attempts. Against this backdrop, Israel believed that the recognition of Jerusalem as its rightful capital by the largest Latin American and Catholic country might have significant international implications. During Goulart's administration, Israel spotted a unique historical moment in which, for the first (and probably last) time, such a transfer seemed feasible for the following reasons: the precarious political reality in Brazil made its chief decision-makers vulnerable to extra-governmental pressures. Brazilian Jewish “unofficial diplomats” were in a position that enabled them to influence the highest echelons of Brazilian politics. The Brazilian government was considerably tolerant to Jewish affiliation with Israel. Brazil’s president, ex-president, ambassador in Israel, and various foreign ministers and diplomats were favorable to the transfer.

Relations between the countries were characterized by remarkable cordiality and pioneering technical cooperation.

However, the very same circumstances that made the plan seem attainable also predetermined its failure. The tumultuous domestic situation in Brazil undermined decision- makers’ authority. The frequent rotation of government officials rendered their promises obsolete

22 before long, and the political purging of most of them following the 1964 coup cut short any chance to revive the Plan. Eshel’s enthusiasm caused him to overestimate its chances of success.

And most of all, friendly and cordial as relations with Israel were, Brazil had no indispensable political or commercial interest in the Middle East that could convince it to circumvent its declared equidistant position and relinquish its support of internationalization. Eshel himself was aware that apart from the Jewish Brazilians’ influence, Israel barely had any leverage over

Brazil, and communicated time and again to his Brazilian interlocutors that Israel would “most appreciate the transfer of their embassy, but if they do not see any possibility to carry it out, friendly relations between the two countries shall not be damaged.”112 Jewish Brazilian

“unofficial diplomats” were evidently allowed, and to a certain extent even encouraged by their government to promote Israeli interests, under the assumption that there was benefit for Brazil in it – financial contributions, favorable press, public relations in the United States, etc. However, as the Jerusalem Plan’s failure demonstrates, Jewish influence as a diplomatic instrument was not strong enough to affect Brazilian foreign policy.

Eshel’s analysis, according to which the main reason for the Plan’s failure was the

Catholic Church’s opposition,113 was inaccurate, inasmuch as the Vatican’s attitude was only a secondary factor in the set of political determinants and constraints that dictated Brazil’s position toward the Middle East. As the MFA, with its wider and global perspective, observed, the

Church did not interfere in similar attempts in other Latin American countries. Therefore, it accurately explained Itamaraty’s resistance by “political considerations grounded in the glorious neutrality, which is always contrary to our interest,” i.e. Brazil’s equidistant claims.114 What even the MFA failed to comprehend was that Israel’s interest played no part whatsoever. All along, it was about the Brazilian interest and nothing more.

1 Israel State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [henceforth MFA]/244/5: Melo Filho to Bloch, 5 June 1963. All translations from Hebrew and Portuguese are by the author. 2 Carlos Alberto Michaelsen Den Hartog, “O Brasil e o Oriente Médio,” in Sérgio França Danese (ed), Ensaios de história diplomática do Brasil: (1930-1986), (Brasília, 1989), 108-15 [Portuguese]; Edy Kaufman, Yoram Shapira, and Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American Relations (New Brunswick, NJ, 1979); Netanel Lorch, “Israeli-Ibero American Relations before 1972,” in Moshe Yegar, Yosef Govrin, and Arye Oded (eds), Ministry for Foreign Affairs: The First Fifty Years (Jerusalem, 2002), 723-53 [Hebrew]; Luciano Ozorio Rosa, “O Brasil e o Oriente Médio (1930-1990),” in . J. A. Guilhon Albuquerque (ed), Sessenta anos de política externa brasileira (1930-1990): o desafio geoestratégico (São Paulo, 1996), 431-54 [Portuguese]. 3 Guilherme Casarões and Tullo Vigevani, “O lugar de Israel e da Palestina na política externa brasileira: antissemitismo, voto majoritário ou promotor de paz?,” História, 33.2 (2014): 150-88 [Portuguese]; João Vicente Pimental, “O padrão de votação brasileiro na ONU e a questão do Oriente Médio,” in Gilberto Dupas and Tullo Vigevani (eds), Israel-Palestina: A Construção da Paz Vista de uma Perspectiva Global, ed. (São Paulo, 2001), 287-302 [Portuguese]; Norma Breda dos Santos, “O Brasil e a questão israelense nas Nações Unidas: da criação do Estado de Israel ao pós (?)-sionismo,” in Norma Breda dos Santos (ed), Brasil e Israel: Diplomacia e Sociedades (Brasília, 2000), 19-70 [Portuguese]; “As posições brasileiras nas Nações Unidas com relação ao Oriente Médio (1945-2002): Eqüidistância, pragmatismo e realismo,” Cena Internacional, 5.2 (2003): 5-22 [Portuguese]. 4 Tullo Vigevani and Alberto Kleinas, “Brasil-Israel: da partilha da Palestina ao reconhecimento diplomático (1947- 1949),” in Norma Breda dos Santos (ed), Brasil e Israel: Diplomacia e Sociedades (Brasília, 2000), 71-113 [Portuguese]. 5 Giselle Datz and Joel Peters, “Brazil and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the New Century: Between Ambition, Idealism, and Pragmatism,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 7.2 (2013): 43-57; Norma Breda dos Santos, “A política externa do governo Lula com relação ao conflito Israel-Palestina,” História, 33.2 (2014): 189-216 [Portuguese]; Leonardo Senkman, “O Brasil de Vargas e as relações diplomáticas com Israel: análise comparativa com a Argentina, 1949-1955,” in Norma Breda dos Santos (ed), Brasil e Israel: Diplomacia e Sociedades (Brasília, 2000), 115-47 [Portuguese]. 6 Antônio Carlos Lessa, “Israel e o mundo árabe no cruzamento das escolhas internacionais do Brasil,” in Norma Breda dos Santos (ed), Brasil e Israel: Diplomacia e Sociedades (Brasília, 2000): 149-86 [Portuguese]; Monique Sochaczewski, “Palestine-Israel Controversies in the 1970s and the Birth of Brazilian Transregionalism,” in Paul Amar (ed), The Middle East and Brazil: Perspectives on the New Global South, trans. Bianca Brigidi (Bloomington, IN, 2014), 75-91. 7 Jerry Dávila and Jeffrey Lesser, “Brasil, Israel y el voto «sionismo=racismo» en las Naciones Unidas (1975),” in Raanan Rein, María José Cano, and Beatriz Molina Rueda (eds), Más allá del Medio Oriente: las diásporas judía y árabe en América Latina (Granada, 2012), 227-41 [Spanish[ ; Norma Breda Dos Santos and Eduardo Uziel, “Forty Years of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX) on Zionism and Racism: The Brazilian Vote as an Instance of United States-Brazil Relations,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 58.2 (2015): 80-97. 8 Santos, “Brasil e a questão israelense,” 33; “As posições,” 10. 9 Meir Chazan, “The Creation of Relations between Israel and Brazil from a Pioneering Perspective: Between Diplomacy and the Kibbutz,” Cathedra 156 (2015): 129-66 [Hebrew]. 10 Eli Lederhendler (ed), The Six-Day War and World Jewry (Bethesda, MD, 2000). The aforementioned chapters are Haim Avni, “The Impact of the Six-Day War on a Zionist Community: The Case of Argentina,” 137-65; Leonardo Senkman, “Repercussions of the Six-Day War in the Leftist Jewish Argentine Camp: The Rise of Fraie Schtime, 1967-1969,” 167-86; Judit Bokser Liwerant, “The Impact of the Six-Day War on the Mexican Jewish Community,” 187-203. 11 On Israel’s practice of quiet diplomacy see Aaron S. Klieman, Statecraft in the Dark: Israel’s Practice of Quiet Diplomacy (Boulder, CO, 1988). 12 Unfortunately, issues related to the history, sociology, demography, and identity of the Jewish Brazilians, their integration into Brazilian general society, or the existence of anti-Semitism in Brazil or lack thereof are beyond the scope of this article. For a bibliographical and historiographical discussion of Latin American Jewry see Jeffrey Lesser and Raanan Rein, “New Approaches to Ethnicity and Diaspora in Twentieth-Century Latin America,” in Jeffrey Lesser and Raanan Rein (eds), Rethinking Jewish Latin Americans (Albuquerque, NM, 2008), 23-40. 13 Den Hartog, “Brasil e o Oriente Médio,” 109-10; Lorch, “Israeli-Ibero American Relations,” 723-7. On Aranha’s notorious refusal, as Vargas's foreign minister, to accept Jewish refugees from Europe during the Second World War see Jeffrey Lesser, Welcoming the Undesirables: Brazil and the Jewish Question (Berkeley, CA, 1995), 1-2, 120-42. 14 Senkman, “O Brasil de Vargas,” 126-7.

15 Vigevani and Kleinas, “Brasil-Israel,” 102-13. 16 Santos, “As posições,” 7-8. 17 Norma Breda dos Santos, “Brasil e a questão israelense,” 29-43; “Dez anos no deserto: a participação brasileira na primeira missão de paz das Nações Unidas,” in Gilberto Dupas and Tullo Vigevani (eds), Israel-Palestina: A Construção da Paz Vista de uma Perspectiva Global (São Paulo, 2001), 265-6 [Portuguese]; “As posições,” 5-11. 18 Casarões and Vigevani, “O lugar,” 181. 19 Santos, “Brasil e a questão israelense,” 35-43; Santos, “Dez Anos,” 270-85. For Brazil’s motives see Den Hartog, “Brasil e o Oriente Médio,” 110; Santos, “Dez Anos, 268.” 20 David M. K. Sheinin, “Reading Kissinger’s Avatars: Cold War Pragmatism in Argentina’s Middle East Policy,” in Adriana Brodsky and Raanan Rein (eds), The New Jewish Argentina: Facets of Jewish Experiences in the Southern Cone (Leiden/Boston, 2012), 266. Sheinin’s other arguments regarding the fallacies of Argentine equidistance are less applicable to Brazil for reasons related to political, cultural, and ethnic differences between the two countries which are beyond the scope of this work. It should be noted that Argentina’s equidistant approach was even more rigid than Brazil’s. Thus, for example, Argentina abstained in the 1947 voting on the Partition Plan. See Ignacio Klich, “Equidistance and Gradualism in Argentine Foreign Policy toward Israel and the Arab World, 1949- 1955,” in David Sheinin and Lois Baer Barr (eds), The Jewish Diaspora in Latin America: New Studies on History and Literature (New York/London, 1996), 219–37. 21 Shimeon Amir, Israel’s Development Cooperation with Africa, Asia and Latin America (New York, 1974), 1-4, 9- 11; Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, 91-4; Lorch, "Israeli-Ibero American Relations," 744-5. On Israel’s Cold War bilateral priorities see Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (London, 1972), 35-46. On Israel’s technical assistance to developing countries see Ralph Benyamin Neuberger, Israel’s Relations with the Third World (1948-2008) (Tel Aviv, 2009). 22 In May 1960 Israeli secret agents kidnapped the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann from a street in Buenos Aires. The Argentine government was neither informed nor involved in this operation, which provoked a wave of anti- Semitic and anti-Zionist protests in Latin America. On the effects of the Eichmann affair on Argentine Jews and Israel’s relations with Argentina see Raanan Rein, Argentina, Israel, and the Jews: Perón, the Eichmann Capture and after, trans. Martha Grenzeback (Bethesda, MD, 2003), 163-228. For the effects on Israel’s relations with Latin America in general see Lorch, "Israeli-Ibero American Relations," 735-45. 23 Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, 91-4, 125. 24 Amir, Israel’s Development Cooperation, 6, 19-21, 25-6; Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, 118- 120; Lorch, "Israeli-Ibero American Relations," 745-8. 25 Davar, 21 May 1962, 1 [Hebrew]. 26 Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy (London, 1974), 9. 27 Ibid., 10-21; Motti Golani, “Jerusalem’s Hope Lies Only in Partition: Israeli Policy on the Jerusalem Question, 1948-67,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 31.4 (1999): 577-80; Shlomo Slonim, “Israeli Policy on Jerusalem at the United Nations, 1948,” Middle Eastern Studies, 30.3 (1994): 579-81. 28 Brecher, Foreign Policy System, 9-32; Brecher, Decisions, 9-10; 21-31; Golani, “Jerusalem’s Hope,” 580-5; Peter L. Hahn, “Alignment by Coincidence: Israel, the United States, and the Partition of Jerusalem, 1949-1953,” The International History Review, 21.3 (1999): 667-9; Slonim, “Israeli Policy,” 581-93. 29 Gadi Heimann, “The Struggle Between the United States and Israel over Recognition for Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital, 1952–67,” The International History Review, 37.4 (2014): 4. 30 Hahn, “Alignment by Coincidence,” 675-8; Heimann, “The Struggle,” 10-12; Golani, “Jerusalem’s Hope,” 585-9. For a comprehensive list of diplomatic representations in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem until 1972 see Brecher, Decisions, Table 3 (following p.55). 31 Golani, “Jerusalem’s Hope,” 586. 32 Uri Bialer, Cross on the Star of David: The Christian World in Israel’s Foreign Policy, 1948-1967 (Bloomington, IN, 2005), 4-7, 15-18; Silvio Ferrari, “The Holy See and the Postwar Palestine Issue: The Internationalization of Jerusalem and the Protection of the Holy Places,” International Affairs, 60.2 (1984): 261-70; Richard Stevens, “The Vatican, the Catholic Church and Jerusalem,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 10.3 (1981): 102-7. The Holy See was also influenced by the position of France, which had its own interests in the region. See Ferrari, “The Holy See,” 269; Brecher, Foreign Policy System, 49-50. 33 Bialer, Cross on the Star of David, 18-23; Brecher, Decisions, 49-50. Ferrari, “The Holy See,” 283.

34 Brecher, Decisions, 25-6; Edward B. Glick, “The Vatican, Latin America, and Jerusalem,” International Organization, 11.2 (1957): 213-19; Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, 51-2, 218. Brazil and Peru were the only Latin American countries that voted against Israel in all six Resolutions. 35 Heimann, “The Struggle,” 10-11. See also Brecher, Decisions, 51. 36 Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, 6, 213-16. 37 Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty-Brasília [henceforth AHIB], Ofícios, Confidential: Brazilian Mission to the UN to Itamaraty, 23 June 1967, 1203. See also Ferrari, “The Holy See,” 273-4; Lorch, "Israeli-Ibero American Relations," 728-9. 38 Bialer, Cross, 24-5. 39 Ibid., 40-2. 40 On the Brazilian crisis of the early 1960s and the US intervention in Brazilian domestic affairs see Boris Fausto, A Concise History of Brazil, trans. Arthur Brakel (Cambridge, 1999), 260-79; Ruth Leacock, Requiem for Revolution: The United States and Brazil, 1961-1969 (Kent, OH, 1990), 1-220; Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930- 1964: An Experiment in Democracy (Oxford, 2007), 187-302. 41 Heimann, “The Struggle,” 10. 42 MFA/244/5: Doron to Eshel, 28 July 1963. 43 This stereotype was used by Yaacov Tsur, Israel’s ambassador in Buenos Aires, to promote Israeli-Argentine relations. Raanan Rein, Argentine Jews or Jewish Argentines?: Essays on Ethnicity, Identity, and Diaspora (Leiden/Boston, 2010), 118-19. In the 1960s, these perceptions were still very strong in Argentina. See Rein, Argentina, Israel, 189. 44 MFA/3394/21: Eshel to MFA, 13 February 1963; MFA/243/3: Eshel to Jerusalem, 14 February 1963; MFA/3394/21: Eshel to Harman (Washington), 4 April 1963 and other documents in these dossiers. 45 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Barromi, 28 March 1963. 46 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Meir, 16 September 1963, Top Secret. 47 AHIB, Memorandos, Confidential: Memorandum, 14 May 1963, SG/29. 48 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Barromi, 28 March 1963. 49 Brecher, Foreign Policy System, 105-6. 50 Judith Laikin Elkin, The Jews of Latin America: Revised Edition (New York/London, 1998), 263-6; Henrique Rattner, “Economic and Social Mobility of Jews in Brazil,” in Judith Laikin Elkin and Gilbert W. Merkx (eds), The Jewish Presence in Latin America (Boston, MA, 1987), 187-200. 51 MFA/3394/42: Eshel to Nitzan, 7 November 1962. 52 Interview with Israel Klabin, Rio de Janeiro, 5 August 2014. On the Klabin family see Elkin, The Jews of Latin America, 138-139; Senkman, “O Brasil de Vargas,” 145; Henrique Veltman, A história dos Judeus no Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro, 1998), 149 [Portuguese]. 53 Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 24 December 1949. 54 Edy Kaufman, “Israel’s Foreign Policy Implementation in Latin America,” in Michael Curtis and Susan Aurelia Gitelson (eds), Israel in the Third World (New Brunswick, NJ, 1976), 141. 55 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Barromi, 28 March 1963. 56 MFA/244/5: Dotan to Eshel, 12 May 1963. 57 Haim Avni, “Cuarenta años: el contexto histórico y desafíos a la investigación,” in Haim Avni et al. (eds), Pertenencia y alteridad: Judíos en/de América Latina: cuarenta años de cambios (Madrid, 2011), 102 [Spanish]; Elkin, The Jews of Latin America, 205-7; Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, 35-6. 58 Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem [henceforth CZA], S64/168: Feder and Tamari to Lurie, 29 November 1963. For a theoretical discussion of ideological and material manifestation of Zionism among Jewish diasporans see Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (New York, 2008), 106-12. 59 Lesser and Rein, “New Approaches,” 31-2. 60 For a general discussion of “core” and “peripheral” diaspora members see Yossi Shain and Aharon Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations Theory,” International Organization, 57.3 (2003): 452-3; Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad (New York, 2003), 100; Khachig Tölölyan, “Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 5.1 (1996): 18-19. 61 MFA/3525/7: Shoham to MFA, 13 April 1964, Secret; Shoham to MFA, 9 June 1964; CZA/C3/1068: Ibram Salama, “Report on Jewish-Arab Relations in Brazil.” 62 Arquivo Histórico Judaico Brasileiro, São Paulo[henceforth AHJB], FEDERAÇÃO-F.05, 13-3-CONIB, Relatos de Atividades 1968-70: Relatório de atividades, January 1968-April 1970.

63 AHJB, CONIB-CI0002, Dossiês Temáticos e , Convenção Nacional Ordinária (1967): Confederação Israelita do Brasil, 1 December 1967. For a discussion of the “triangular relationship” between homeland, host country and ethno-national diaspora see Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 192-9. 64 Aonde Vamos?, 21 July 1966, 3-5 [Portuguese]. 65 Brecher, Foreign Policy System, 241; Elkin, The Jews of Latin America, 208-9. Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, 38-9. 66 Avni, "Cuarenta Años," 100-1; Elkin, The Jews of Latin America, 206. On State-Linked versus Stateless diasporas see Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 148-79. 67 Moshe Yegar, “The Israeli Diplomat as a Jew,” in Moshe Yegar, Yosef Govrin, and Arye Oded (eds), Ministry for Foreign Affairs: The First Fifty Years (Jerusalem, 2002), 916-18 [Hebrew]. 68 Brecher, Foreign Policy System, 502. 69 Sheffer, Diaspora Politics, 219-38. 70 Rein, Argentina, Israel, 79. 71 AHIB, Memorandos, Confidential: Memorandum, 23 January 1964, DOP/10. Italics added. 72 Klieman, Statecraft in the Dark, 43-4. 73 Kaufman et al., Israel-Latin American Relations, 142. 74 Veltman, A história dos judeus, 105-8. For a more detailed account on Bloch’s history, personality, connections, and the rise and fall of Manchete see Arnaldo Bloch, Os irmãos Karamabloch: ascensão e queda de um império familiar (Rio de Janeiro, 2008) [Portuguese]; Arnaldo Niskier, Memórias de um sobrevivente: a verdadeira história da ascensão e queda da Manchete (Rio de Janeiro, 2012) [Portuguese]. 75 Bloch’s reapproximation to Judaism and Zionism began only after the Six-Day War of 1967. Interviews with Alberto Dines, São Paulo, 28 July 2014; Arnaldo Niskier, Rio de Janeiro, 6 August 2014; Osias Wurman, Rio de Janeiro, 6 August 2014. The three interviewees have worked under Bloch in Manchete and were personally close to him (Dines was married to Bloch’s niece and Wurman’s sister to his nephew). Bloch’s role in the Jerusalem Plan operation is a strong argument for the need to research unaffiliated Jewish Latin Americans and their diasporic identity. 76 Interviews with Israel Klabin, Rio de Janeiro, 5 August 2014; Celso Lafer, São Paulo, 19 May 2015. 77 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Jerusalem, 14 June 1963; Veltman, A história dos judeus, 118. 78 Senkman, “O Brasil de Vargas,” 129-30, 136-7; Samuel Wainer and Augusto Nunes, Minha razão de viver: memórias de um repórter (Rio de Janeiro, 1987), 233-6 [Portuguese]. 79 See, for example, MFA/244/5: Ofri to Barromi (manuscript), 20 May 1963; MFA/3394/21: Eshel to Jerusalem, 29 August 1963. 80 AHIB, Ofícios, Confidential: Bittencourt to Leitão da Cunha, 7 May 1965, 132. 81 Interview with Murillo Mello Filho, Rio de Janeiro, 2 June 2015. 82 MFA/244/5: Melo Filho to Bloch, 5 June 1963. 83 MFA/244/5: Melo Filho to Bloch, 7 June 1963. 84 MFA/244/5: Melo Filho to Bloch, 10 June 1963. 85 MFA/244/5: Melo Filho to Bloch, 11 June 1963. 86 AHIB, Memorandos, Confidential: Memorandum, 4 June 1963, DOP/24. 87 AHIB, CTs, Confidential: Itamaraty to the Vatican, 17 June 1963, 19. 88 AHIB, CTs, Confidential: Souza Gomes to Itamaraty, 11 July 1963, 62. 89 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Jerusalem, 14 June 1963. 90 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Levavi, 12 July 1963; Eshel to Sarlouis, 12 July 1963. 91 MFA/244/5: Mello Filho to Bloch, 22 August 1963 (at 12:25). 92 MFA/3394/21: Eshel to Jerusalem, Secret, 21 August 1963; MFA/244/5: Eshel to Meir, 16 September 1963, Top Secret. 93 MFA/244/5: Wainer to Bernardes, 15 September 1963. 94 MFA/244/5: Klabin to Meir, 2 September 1963. 95 MFA/3394/21: Eshel to Jerusalem, Secret, 21 August 1963. 96 MFA/3394/21: Eshel to Jerusalem, 29 August 1963. 97 Amado Luiz Cervo, ‘Relações internacionais do Brasil’, in Amado Luiz Cervo (ed), O Desafio internacional: a política exterior do Brasil de 1930 a nossos dias (Brasília, 1994), 25-8. 98 For Itamaraty’s accentuation of this point see AHIB, Memorandos, Confidential: Memorandum, 23 January 1964, DOP/10.

99 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Sarlouis, 12 July 1963. 100 MFA/244/5: Mello Filho to Bloch, 22 August 1963 (at 9:45). 101 MFA/3394/21: Eshel to MFA, 13 December 1962; AHIB, Memorandos, Confidential: Memorandum, 2 April 1963, DOP/16. 102 Interview with Zevi Ghivelder, Rio de Janeiro, 31 May 2015. 103 On Jewish-Arab relations in Latin America see various articles in Ignacio Klich and Jeffrey Lesser (eds), Arab and Jewish Immigrants in Latin America: Images and Realities (London/Portland, OR, 1998); Raanan Rein, ed., Árabes y judíos en Iberoamérica: similitudes, diferencias y tensiones (Sevilla, 2008) [Spanish]. 104 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Levavi (manuscript), 6 May 1963; MFA/3394/2: Eshel to Jerusalem, Secret, 14 August 1963; MFA/240/6: Eshel to Doron, 15 January 1964. 105 Diário de Notícias, 25 December 1963, 6; 31 December 1963, 6 [Portuguese]. The choice of those dates to run the article was likely no accident for those in the press who opposed the Plan. 106 Niskier, Memórias, 162-6; Wainer and Nunes, Minha razão, 275-6. 107 MFA/240/6: Eshel to Doron, 6 January 1964. 108 MFA/240/6: Shoham to Doron, Secret, 13 March 1964. 109 See, for example, MFA/3525/20: Nahmias to Jerusalem, 8 July 1965; MFA/244/4: Divon to Eshel (by then chief of the Latin American Division), 10 April 1967; Divon to Eshel, 12 May 1967; AHIB, Ofícios, Confidential: Bittencourt to Leitão da Cunha, 30 May 1965, 146. 110 AHIB, CTs, Secret: Bittencourt to Itamaraty, 30 April 1967, 87. 111 AHIB, Ofícios, Ostensive: Meira Penna to Itamaraty, 3 January 1969, 8. 112 MFA/244/5: Eshel to Meir, 16 September 1963, Top Secret. 113 MFA/240/6: Eshel to Doron, 15 January 1964. 114 MFA/240/6: Doron to Eshel, 21 January 1964.

View publication stats