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Beyond brinkmanship: the implication of South China sea conflicts on China's in Southeast Asia Nandyatama, Randy W.

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Nandyatama, R. W. (2019). Beyond brinkmanship: the implication of South China sea conflicts on China's soft power in Southeast Asia. Journal of ASEAN Studies, 7(1), 18-39. https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5684

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Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-64000-4 Beyond Brinkmanship: The Implication of South China Sea Conflicts on China’s Soft Power in Southeast Asia

Randy W. Nandyatama Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

Abstract

While contemporary scholarly literatures on South China Sea conflicts have been dominated by hard power calculations, some other aspects remain under-researched. Rather underplayed in the existing literature is the question on the political implication of the conflicts on China’s soft power in the region. In responding to this issue, this article tries to carefully investigate the nature of the China’s soft power and the linkage between the increasing Chinese assertive measures in the South China Sea and the foundation of China’s soft power in the region. Through some cases of China’s skirmishes with Southeast Asian countries on the South China Sea between 2009 and 2012, this article argues that Beijing’s increasing hard power measures have induced growing threat perceptions in the region. This very context not only signals a distinct dissonance of Beijing’s image in Southeast Asia but also creates surging discontents and rejections to China’s role and political position in the region. Ultimately, China’s perceived inappropriate hard power measures affect its soft power, particularly in eroding the reputation of being a benign political entity as its source of soft power in Southeast Asia.

Key words: China-Southeast Asia, soft power, threat perception

Introduction started to build friendly interactions with the rising China, including Southeast The twenty first century has Asian countries. Nevertheless, generally deemed to be an important era concomitant with its growing for China. Along with its remarkable international profile, Beijing also started to transformation and modernization since have strong measures, 1978, China’s political power in the particularly in the South China Sea international arena began to expand (Wong, 2010; Thayer, 2010, pp. 2-6; rapidly. The poor and weak China has Jayakumar, 2011). Along with existing become a center of attention in global conflicts over territorial claims between (Brahm, 2001; Senkar, 2004). The China and some Southeast Asian modernization of its military posture and countries, the growing China’s assertive the fast growing of its economy have measures eventually created a greater changed how other countries engage with political concern in the region. Beijing. Its neighboring countries have Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2019), pp. 18-39 DOI: https://doi.org/10.21512/jas.v7i1.5684 ©2019 by CBDS Bina Nusantara University and Indonesian Association for ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic Journal of ASEAN Studies 19

Indeed, there is a general tendency reference for political interactions in the in privileging the preponderance of hard international arena. Within this context, power calculations in the International the capability to project and sustain Relations literatures (Baldwin, 1999, pp. particular reputations ‘provide states with 173-183). This specifically exists in the issue-specific forms of influence’ (Hall, scholarly literature on South China Sea 2010, pp. 209). This logic is well apparent conflicts (Green & Daniel, 2011; Karim & in China’s foreign policy, especially as a Tangguh, 2016) However, as the rise of logical pathway for Beijing’s soft power in China increasingly influences Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, since this contemporary global politics, it becomes article emphasizes good reputation as the important to not only investigate China’s source of soft power, its existence and actual capability in terms of its traditional foundation can be easily weakened by ‘hard’ power in influencing Southeast negative perceptions, such as excessive or Asia, but also assess its soft power and the inappropriate use of hard power. Hence, implication of its ‘hard power’ measures we can see that Beijing’s growing on its soft power in the region. This is not assertiveness, particularly the utilization without a clear logic. In an event which of hard power measures in managing the involves hard power measures, for South China Sea conflicts, has induced the instance, it is easy to prioritize hard burgeoning of ‘threat perceptions’ among power’s examination and overlook its soft Southeast Asian countries and eroded power aspect, such as how the United China’s reputation as its source of soft States (US) calculate its hard power power. capability in ‘securing’ Iraq and Specifically, in investigating the Afghanistan. However, it is important to dynamic quality of Beijing’s soft power in note that US hard power measures as part Southeast Asia and the linkage between of global ‘ on terror’ campaign, in fact, the growing ‘threat perception’ from weaken its ‘soft power’ in the Middle East China’s hard power measures and its soft (Nye, 2004, pp. 42-44). Reminiscing this power in in Southeast Asia, this article context, a similar concern for China may gathers qualitative data from the series of arise, especially in light of the rising surveys on China’s popularity as well as tension in the South China Sea conflicts. elites’ opinions and statements on China As such, it is important inquire what is the (including Beijing’s increasing hard power nature of China’s soft power in Southeast measures in South China Sea). Indeed, Asia? And how South China Sea conflicts given the complex relationship between affect its soft power in the region? China and Southeast Asia, including the Echoing Todd Hall’s (2010) effort different characteristics of mainland in investigating soft power as a category Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast of analysis, this article underlines the logic Asia in dealing with China, it is of how soft power, especially in the form impossible to claim that there is a solid of reputation, serves as an important and definitive Southeast Asian perception 20 Beyond Brinkmanship

of China (Percival, 2007; Storey, 2013). responses. In the end, it will discuss the However, this does not mean that we linkages of the South China Sea conflicts cannot see a growing trend of how some to the contemporary China’s soft power. Southeast Asian countries respond to Conceptualizing Soft Power Beijing’s growing assertive measures in the South China Sea. As a result, this The term ‘soft power’ is a unique article reviews the existence and quality of notion. It becomes a distinct phrase as it China’s soft power in two countries that refers to a large spectrum of non-military represent different geo-political groupings hard power in the international arena. It is in Southeast Asia, namely Vietnam and also generally adopted in implying the the Philippines. Despite this decision may various non-tangible modalities which also have a certain bias, this decision is support a particular state to persuade or based on the data availability. Existing influence the preferences of other states data on popularity of China in (Hall, 2010, pp. 190). This concept is Southeast Asia only covers particular rooted from E. H. Carr’s (1949) notion of countries like Vietnam and The ‘power over opinion’ which acknowledges Philippines. The gathered data also only that public and elite opinion is one of the covers the time span of 2000 to 2012. This essential elements in the international is aimed to provide a better analysis on arena and it forms a distinct political force the impact of South China Sea conflict on from military or . Steven China’s soft power. In 2013, Beijing Lukes (2005, pp. 25-29) advances further formulated a new policy—i.e. One Belt this idea into the so-called ‘the third and Road—which alters the political map dimension of power’—i.e. the ability to of China-Southeast Asia relations. affect and shape the formation of perceptions and preferences in ensuring Ultimately, this article evaluates the acceptance of a particular role in the China’s approach in exercising its soft existing order, and vice versa. in Southeast Asia and underlines how inappropriate hard power However, only after Joseph Nye measures eventually entangle with soft writes about ‘power’ along with the power. Specifically, article is structured growing interdependent and transnational into four main parts in which each issues and actors in international politics, element is taken into account. Following ‘soft power’ becomes a well-known this introduction, the next part covers on concept in IR literatures. Nye (2005, p. x) the conceptualization of soft power as the specifically defines soft power as ‘a foundation of this research. The second country’s ability to get what it wants through part will focus the nature of China’s soft appeal and attraction.’ This concept power in the Southeast Asia. The third underlines the logic of how various viable part of this article broadly elaborate the resources can be applied to make other case of the South China Sea conflicts, countries acquire more positive beliefs especially in assessing Southeast Asian and perceptions which eventually resulted Journal of ASEAN Studies 21

in the targeted states’ greater tendency to to how does it actually operate. In this respect and give amicable response. Thus, regard, looking at Hall’s (2010) logic of the Nye’s exposition of soft power becomes a various sources of soft power may offer an ground-breaking analytical tool, especially important analytical tool. For him, a set of for identification of the new trend in issue-specific reputations will support a and positive image projection particular country on the respective issue, from a rising state in the world, such as signifying the so-called ‘reputational power’ China. (Hall, 2010, pp. 209). Along with the conditions which are predominated by the At this juncture, it is important to inadequacy of Beijing’s contemporary note that Nye offers a relational approach leadership in the global arena and the as a new model in making sense the characteristics of suspicion and mistrust existence of soft power in international between countries in Asia, the primary politics. Nye notes that soft power is not source of China’s soft power basically lies always fungible. In other words, the on its reputation. In the manner where effectiveness of soft power depends on every actor interprets each other, the how each country utilizes its ‘ability to image (mianzi) of Beijing reputation in the influence other’s behavior’. As such, a international arena is important for the particular country does not have an decision-making process of other actors inherent soft power; yet, it has to be (Hall, 2010, pp. 207-211). generated from the process of attribution among the international actors. Any Certainly, the examination of soft country will get the result it prefers power needs to also acknowledge the because the other states realize the intertwining mechanism between soft legitimacy of the respective state and power and hard power. As Nye (2004, pp. follow its narrative (Huang & Sheng, 2006, 25-30; Li, 2009, pp. 4-5) notes before, soft pp. 23-34). Therefore, the study of soft power needs to be welded in a tactical power in this article is not focused on the manner in the realm of intersubjectivity quantity of soft power, but in the context among international actors. As such, the of how the source of soft power turns into research on soft power demands a further an active element in shaping other exposition in its structure of action and countries’ behavior. the surrounding influencing factors, including whether hard power measures Nevertheless, sinologists have exist. At this point, one cannot simplify realized some difficulties in assessing the structure of hard power as the China’s soft power (Yan, 2006, pp. 6). utilization of military force in destroying Despite major works on China’s soft and paralyzing the enemy, but on a much power, such as Kurlantzick (2007) and broader aspect, especially in terms of its Lampton (2008), researches often focus on ability in imposing clear directive through identifying and predicting the impact of its consequences for other countries and Beijing’s soft power and pay less attention 22 Beyond Brinkmanship

generating a distinct perception among forming the so-called ‘China threat’ theory other entities. (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 396-402; Krauthammer, 1995, pp. 72; Roy, 1996, pp. In the case of the complex relations 758-771). By mid 1990s, this narrative between China and Southeast Asia, the started to influence some major powers’ analysis of soft power, thus, relies on political behaviors against China. As a other countries’ perception of Chinese result, a growing ‘containment’ policy reputation. It implies that hard power towards Beijing seemingly manifested in measures and the basis of soft power are the international arena, such as the US- interlinked, as both powers may share the Japan alliance in 1996 as a gesture in same juncture, namely ‘threat perception’. restraining Chinese ambitions (Nye, 2002, By adopting the notion of threat pp. 22), and US effort in persuading the perception, this research tries to elucidate to retain its arms- the crucial conceptual bridge in embargo on China (Archick, Grimmett, & understanding how China’s hard power Kan, 2005). measure affects its soft power and political images, particularly along with the Against the abovementioned repercussion of actual misconduct or ‘be backdrop, Beijing became fully aware that perceived as misconduct’ measures (Li, the growing anxiety over ‘China threat’ 2009, pp. 5). Moreover, it also indicates the theory could negatively impact its subjective nature of international actors, prospect for development. Besides that, especially the elite, as they perceive the considering that the modern China was growing external hard power measures initially emerged as mere one of (Tilman, 1984, pp. 2-3; Novotny, 2010, pp. developing countries in the world, Beijing 67-68). had a limited claim and legitimacy, especially in terms of its source of soft The Nature of China’s Soft Power in power (Wang, 2011, pp. 37-53). In this Southeast Asia regard, China realized the need for Along with the onset of the post- overcoming the suspicion and mistrust Cold War era, Beijing’s foreign policy was from its regional environment and gradually transformed with renewed encountering the growing China threat vigor. There was a strong willingness to theory with a careful projection of its soft sustain its rapid economic development power via promoting a better ‘reputation’ through being an active actor in the in the international arena (Deng, 2006, pp. international arena. However, at the same 186-206). In seemingly echoing Hall’s time, China’s meteoric economic rise categorization of reputational power, started becoming a global spotlight. Often Beijing underlines how building a certain being compared with and likened to the new image and reputation as a ‘benign’ rise of Germany and Japan during the pre- rising country will help inducing other World War II, Western scholars regarded states to respect and support China’s the rise of China as a new global concern, Journal of ASEAN Studies 23

agenda and position at the international ‘’ (Guo & Jean-Marc, arena. 2008). In all, there is a strong element of the efforts in building ‘benign’ reputation As a response, Chinese and transforming other countries’ government and scholars have rapidly perception to benefit China’s interests as began to endorse a new consideration in its core policy framework. This is also improving national image, especially reaffirmed by Hu Jintao’s (2007) statement through the domestic debate on how which emphasizes the necessity to China should encounter ‘China threat’ develop Chinese cultural soft power in theory and pursue its national goal. Zheng dealing with domestic needs and the Bijiang, for instance, notably points out increasing global challenges. the conception of ‘the development path of China's peaceful rise’ (zhongguo de In the context of China-Southeast heping jueqi fazhan daolu). Zheng (2005, pp. Asia relations, Beijing’s commitment for 18) stresses that China requires tactical building its soft power in the region is measures to sustain a peaceful essential. Many countries in the region, international environment, including the particularly maritime Southeast Asian cultural support for the country and countries, have often been having a coordination of interests in its various suspicion against China and maintaining sectors to create a better ‘climate’ for its close relations with the US and its allies development. Beijing soon adopted this (Cho and Park 2013; Kristof, 1998). concept through Prime Minister Wen Therefore, Southeast Asian reaction to Jiabao’s speech during a visit to the US in China can be deemed to be as a litmus test 2003, where for the first time China for its soft power projection (Rozman, officially stated the determination of its 2010, pp. 201). Within this context, Beijing rising power as a ‘peaceful’ country. finally developed a set of slogans, such as Subsequently, after some minor alteration, ‘friendly and good-neighbourly’ (mu lin Beijing finally used the term of ‘peaceful you hao) and ‘benevolence towards and development’ as its official policy (The State partnerships with neighbors’ (yi lin wei Council Information Office, 2006). shan, yu lin wei ban), in elucidating China’s new approach to the region (Tang, Indeed, in supporting the Mingjiang, & Acharya, 2009, pp. 17). In sustainability of its rapid growth, tapping responding to Asian Financial Crisis, for into soft power has become one of China’s instance, Beijing took the risk not to foreign policy agenda. The concern in devalue its reminbi and agreed to give creating a better international additional financial support for some environment for China eventually countries in Southeast Asia (Jones & manifested through the projection of soft Michael, 2007, pp. 169-172). In contrast to power, especially in the form of the US which supported the IMF’s campaigning China’s commitment for unpopular austerity packages, Beijing’s creating ‘peaceful development’ and foreign policy signaled a real 24 Beyond Brinkmanship

transformation in its engagement with power in Southeast Asia. Denoting with Southeast Asia (Percival, 2007, pp. 8). the Nye’s conceptualization of soft power Moreover, Beijing also manifested its soft which emphasizes the ability to influence power campaign with being the first non- other countries’ perception and behavior, member of the Association of Southeast this condition affirmed the existence of Asian Nations (ASEAN) to sign the Treaty China’s source of soft power in shaping of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with Southeast Asia’s preference in accordance ASEAN in 2003 and the support for the with its intention. Nevertheless, Beijing’s East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005 (Pan, soft power projection in this region is not 2008, pp. 39-62; Storey, 2011a, pp. 64-87). progressing on a linear pattern. In fact, This signals the logic of China’s soft China’s soft power is, somehow, complex power projection—i.e. its determination in and non-static, especially after the promoting a ‘benign’ image and assuring growing tension in the South China Sea the neighboring countries with amicable conflicts since 2009. foreign policy implementation. Beijing’s Increasing Hard Power Reacting to China’s soft power Measures in the South China Sea projection, Southeast Asia demonstrated a Although there was an positive gesture towards China. Beijing’s improvement in Southeast Asian’s soft power projection have proven perceptions and attitudes towards China significantly in boosting Southeast Asia’s after the end of Cold War era, some good perception of China. The initial East existing problems in China-Southeast Asia Asia Summit (EAS) formation, for relations still exist. There are at least two instance, is aligned with Beijing’s important issues in here. First, looking preference to limit regionalism in East back to the long political Asia (Nanto, 2008; Sutter, 2008, pp. 261- interactions in the region, including the 282). In fact, this condition is also verified memory of China’s over its by how Southeast Asian eyes view China periphery, there is a widely shared has transformed from ‘the state most often attitude among elites which stresses the feared into, for most but not all, a notion of sovereignty and perceived partner’ (Percival, 2007, pp. 3). to as the means to survive (Kang, 2003; Besides that, a public opinion survey in six Katzenstein & Rudra, 2004). Second, there Southeast Asian countries by the Japanese are some uncertainties about the rise of Foreign Ministry has indicated the rapid China, especially the enigmatic decision- increase of China’s influence in the region, making process in Beijing and the even compared to that of Japan (Er, question of what role China will want to Narayanan, & Colin, 2010, pp. 44-66). play in the international arena. Both of At this juncture, China has these issues eventually lead to the demonstrated its ability to put project a formation of the general pattern of many distinct reputation as a benign rising Southeast Asia countries’ suspicion Journal of ASEAN Studies 25

towards China rise (Kristof, 1998, pp. 37- to the other claimants which have a closer 49; Cho & Park, 2013). distance to the disputed area. Beijing has only started its active claim along its Being perceived as both growing military power, such as the 1974 opportunity and latent threat, many China-Vietnam battle of the Paracel countries in Southeast Asia generally Islands and 1988 China-Vietnam skirmish pursue a tactical approach in gradually over Spartly Islands (Shirk, 2007, pp. 114). engaging with China and maintaining the China believes that the other claimants balancing options in case of engagement have been taking advantage for a long measure fails (Acharya, 2003a, pp. 2). This time, especially in exerting its claim over generates the variety of each state’ and extracting resources from the South reactions towards China, ranging from the China Sea. This logic pushes Beijing to bandwagoning trend to the inclination of pursue a more active measures (Li, 2008). acting to balance against China (Kang, 2003, pp. 58; Acharya, 2003b, pp. 150-153). Despite some efforts in managing Accordingly, the issues of power politics, the conflicts, such as the agreement of the , the economic gap and Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in dependence as well as the potential of the the South China Sea (DoC) in 2002, there apparent territorial conflicts in the South have been growing hard power measures China Sea added up to the strategic on the South China Sea (Banlaoi, 2010). calculations of each country. Thailand, for Indeed, since 1999 China had been instance, seem to have a better perception annually declared unilateral fishing ban in of China than Vietnam or the Philippines, the South China Sea from June to July. which perceive themselves as the However, since 2009, Beijing extended the ‘frontline’ of China’s possible aggression. fishing ban from May to August (Macikenaite, 2014). Moreover, in reacting The conflict is rooted in the to Malaysia-Vietnam joint submission of multiple overlapping territorial claims. the clarification of their claim on the Southeast Asian countries such as ‘southern part of the South China Sea’ to Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, the Commission on the Limits of the Brunei, had laid official claim to several Continental Shelf (CLCS) under the territorial features in the South China Sea Convention on the Law of in the mid-1960s and 1970s (Emmers, the Sea (UNCLOS) on May 2009, China 2010, pp. 66-77; Ott, 2011, pp. 1). However, declared its rebuttal to the claim many of these claims overlapped with (Rajagobal, 2016). Subsequently, Beijing China’s claim, which declared the area made unprecedented move in enforcing limited by nine dashed lines covering the its jurisdictional claims in the South China South China Sea as its territory in 1947. Sea, especially by actively dispatching its Indeed, it is important to note that China patrol vessels to the South China Sea to has been only demonstrated a limited protect Chinese fishing vessels outside the physical claim in the initial era, comparing period of its unilateral fishing ban (Thuy, 26 Beyond Brinkmanship

2011). This certainly marked a significant China Sea conflicts. change in Beijing’s approach to the South

Map 1. Conflicting claims over South China Sea

Source: U.S. Department of Defense’s Annual Report on China to Congress (2012)

During 2011, there were, at least, deliberately used the vessel of the three events which illustrate the growing paramilitary maritime law enforcement use of China’s hard power measures in the agency, namely China Marine South China Sea conflicts. First, China Surveillance (CMS), to actively block often unilaterally patrol the South China foreign vessels from conducting research Sea and expel other countries’ traditional and exploration in the disputed area fishing boats. In fact, Chinese People regardless their Executive Economic Zone Liberation Army-Navy is reported firing (EEZ) claim. Two CMS vessels dispelled some warning shots at the Filipino trawler Filipino-owned vessel MV Veritas near the Jackson atoll on 25 February 2011 Voyager near Reed Bank on 3 March 2011. and Vietnamese fishing boats on 1 June On 26 May 26 2011, CMS vessels 2011 (Jamandre, 2011). Second, China has intentionally cut the seismic survey cables Journal of ASEAN Studies 27

of Petro Vietnam vessel Binh Minh 02 authorized the law enforcer to board and within the area of Vietnam’s EEZ (Storey, seize control of foreign ships which enter 2011b, pp. 2-3). Likewise, when Hanoi the Chinese-claimed waters and order complained about China’s actions in them to change course or stop sailing flaring tensions in Vietnamese waters, the (Banchard & Mogato, 2012). Chinese response was an explicit warning The abovementioned Beijing’s for Vietnam to stop any activities ‘where measures in the South China Sea have China has its claims’ (Gomez, 2011). Third, eventually triggered negative reprisals in despite the visit of Chinese Defense the region, especially with how some Minister, General Liang, to Manila and the Southeast Asian countries rapidly joint agreement between China and The upgraded their naval capability. These Philippines to refrain any unilateral action actions are basically a harbinger of on 23 May 2011, Beijing allegedly kept regional instability, and more importantly, installing markers at Reed Bank, Amy to the degree of Southeast Asian Douglas Reef, and Boxall Reef which are confidence of China’s menacing intention well within the Philippines’ EEZ (Mogato, (Banlaoi, 2010). Likewise, Beijing’s 2011; Pazzibugan, 2011). in Southeast Asia has suffered Beijing’s growing hard power a series of setbacks since 2009. While the measures also occurred in 2012. The issue of China’s aggressiveness was Philippine navy sent its warship to the hardly securitized in the previous forum area of Scarborough Shoal, 220 kilometers of ASEAN dialogue, the ASEAN Regional west of Zambales and also within the Forum (ARF) in 2010 finally raised the Philippine’s EEZ, after spotted eight issue in regional public debate. In fact, Chinese fishing boats anchored inside the some Southeast Asian countries, lagoon. Soon after that ‘two Chinese especially Vietnam and the Philippines, surveillance ships arrived and taken up a pushed for the involvement of other great position at the mouth of the lagoon’, power, particularly the US, in the debate creating standoff and preventing the (ASEAN, 2010). arrest of the Chinese fishermen’ (CNN, Indeed, although the growing 2012; Dupont & Baker, 2014). Moreover, Southeast Asian concern over China’s China also began enforcing the fishing hard power measures in the South China band in larger area of South China Sea in Sea is apparent, it does not mean that all May 2012, including the disputed countries in the region have the exact Scarborough Shoal (The Jakarta Post, same degree of grievance. There are still 2012). By July 2012, Beijing dispatched its diverse forms of reactions from Southeast fisheries law enforcement command on Asian countries, especially with regards to and erected a barrier to the entrance of the each country’s economic dependency and disputed shoal (Pazzibugan, 2011). The security concern towards China (Khong, Chinese government even promulgated 2004, pp. 192-197). While some Southeast local law in December 2012 which 28 Beyond Brinkmanship

Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Laos Revisiting China’s Soft Power and Myanmar, generally have a closer The development of Beijing’s hard relations and cooperation with China, power measures in the South China Sea other countries, such as Singapore, has eventually incited the growing ‘threat Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, tend to perceptions’ in the region. But how it show a more cautious and circumspect actually affects China’s soft power? manner, largely due to the concern in Acknowledging reputation can turn into maintaining regional stability. However, an essential source for inducing other the Philippines and Vietnam have become states to respect and follow a particular more assertive in resisting China's state’s articulation, certain aspects that domination in the region. As such, both affects a particular country’s reputation countries have been supporting for the can also acts as an important reference for internationalization of South China Sea other states in acting and responding to its issues beyond China-ASEAN framework, environment (Hall, 2010, pp. 207-211). In including advocating for US’s the case of China-Southeast Asia relations, involvement as a counter balance the growing ‘threat perceptions’ that measures (Chongkittavorn, 2011). Southeast Asian countries have against Nevertheless, one shall clearly see China are deemed as the crucial element the emerge of a new distinct pattern in the in eroding a state’s reputation as the Southeast Asian reactions towards China’s source of its soft power. growing hard power measures in the There are two sources for South China Sea conflicts. The identifying the weakening of its soft disconnected message between Beijing’s power. Firstly, one can see the effects of good image projection and its actual China’ measures in South China Sea on its actions in the South China Sea conflicts soft power via investigating the Southeast inevitably generated grievances, induced Asian elites’ perception. As Southeast counter-measures, and ultimately, Asian elites maintain a strong role in exacerbated China’s soft power. With the foreign policy’s decision-making and fact that the characteristics of suspicious policy implementation process (Tilman, and mistrust still prevail in the region, 1984, pp. 2-3), their perspectives reflect the Southeast Asian countries have the attitude toward other states and the opportunity to internalize the concern efficacy of their respective soft power over Beijing’s hard power measures in the performance. Secondly, the identification South China Sea among its regional. As a of how China’s soft power is affected by result, there is now a growing trend in its growing assertive measures in the openly discussing the South China Sea South China Sea can also be identified by issues in the ASEAN-related forums, such the second source, namely the degree of as the ARF’s joint statement in 2010 and favorability in public opinion. As the EAS’s joint statement in 2011. government is expected to respond to its Journal of ASEAN Studies 29

people’s aspirations, the public mood may Moreover, Southeast Asian act as an essential stimulant for the state’ countries have also eventually signaled a attitude and action towards other states; reaction to Beijing’s hard power measures and in the same time, display the result of in the South China Sea, indicating a other states’ soft power projection. growing shared perception of China in the region. While prior to 2010 ASEAN Indeed, it is difficult to claim that generally demonstrated its affinity to there is a coherent and persistent China, some Southeast Asian countries perception of China among Southeast signaled a new political message within Asian elites. However, political elites in ASEAN-led regional mechanisms. All both Vietnam and the Philippines started countries represented at the EAS in 2011, demonstrating a striking perception of for instance, agreed to discuss the regional China, especially in their public concern over the South China Sea conflicts statements. In his response statement to and embrace the US as a new member of the Beijing’s action in the Binh Minh EAS. Given the symbolic gesture, namely incident in May 2011, PM Nguyen the involvement of other publicly noted that ‘we continue to affirm outside China in the region and the strongly and to manifest the strongest suggestion that the current tension should determination of all the [Vietnam’s be carefully managed on the basis of Communist] Party, of all the people and of ‘multilateral resolution of the conflicting all the army in protecting Vietnamese territorial claims’ (Calmes, 2011), the EAS sovereignty in maritime zones and islands statement signaled how most ASEAN of the country’, signaling a deep distrust countries accepted the growing Beijing’s of China (Agence France-Presse, 2012). activities in the region as a real concern. Moreover, in the Shangri-La Dialogue Besides EAS, this particular concern was Forum in 2011, Vietnamese General also affected ASEAN internal Phung Quang Thanh specifically cited that mechanisms. Despite not reaching a ‘China has violated the DoC, raising consensus, ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ concern in Vietnam and in the rest of the Meeting in 2012 discussed the Philippines region’ (IISS, 2011). Likewise, Filipino and Vietnam’s concern about how Beijing Secretary of Defense Voltaire Gazmin also was imposing ‘its claim over the entire expressed his concern about Beijing’s South China Sea and raising the risk of a growing threat in his reference to another conflict’ (Thul & Grudgings, 2012). This incident in May 2011 involving China in meeting created a new precedent where the Filipino-claimed area. Gazmin ‘ASEAN way of consensus failed’ and specifically underlined the importance of some countries held a strong and extreme the Philippines’ ‘robust alliance with the perception of China (Emmerson, 2012). US’ for tackling the growing China’s threat in the South China Sea and The above responses, indeed, ensuring the freedom of navigation in the signify the problem of Beijing’s soft power region (IISS, 2011). projection. Denoting the Nye’s primary 30 Beyond Brinkmanship

definition of soft power as the ability of a one can see that while showing a good state’s allure in shaping the behavior of respond to China in 2002, Vietnam and other countries, the shifting of ASEAN’s the Philippines signaled a dramatic perspective and attitude to the opposite of change in the growing of unfavorable China’s strategic interests, have shown a perception of China. Both countries major change in the strength of Beijing’s showed a relative higher number of soft power in Southeast Asia. Some unfavorable views of China in 2014, Southeast Asian countries’ elite especially with 78 percent of the surveyed perceptions, especially from Vietnam and people in the Philippines and 58 percent the Philippines, have indicated that of the surveyed people in the Philippines Beijing’s aggressive measures in the South regarding China negatively. China Sea were perceived as excessive or Table 1. Percentage of Southeast Asian inappropriate actions. Aligning with Li countries’ unfavorable responds to China (2009) argumentation, the inappropriate utilization of hard power, which is formed Country 2002 2013 2014 2015 the ‘threat perception’, can result in the Vietnam 18 - 78 74 demise of its soft power. Instead of The 30 48 58 43 Beijing’s good image and reputation Philippines projections that primarily affect Southeast Asian countries’ policy, the other forms of Source: adapted from Database Pew action—i.e. its growing hard power Global Attitudes Project - Pew Research measures in the South China Sea, —has Centre 2017 increasingly led elites in other countries to doubt Beijing’s reputation and act in Likewise, the BBC World Service contrary to the interests of China itself. Poll (2011) provides a similar data on the rising doubt over China’s amicable Beyond the Southeast Asian elites’ intention in the region. The BBC World statements, one can also indicate the Service Poll data reveals that some weakening of Beijing’s soft power through countries in Southeast Asia, especially the the declining popular favorability towards Philippines, have shown a gradual China, especially after the growing of its declining positive perception towards hard power measures in the South China China. Whereas 54 percent of the Sea. This condition is reflected in the surveyed people in the Philippines public opinion in showing how China is showing positive view in 2006, the perceived. Pew Research Database (2017), favorability towards China dropped for example, reveals a distinct trend of rapidly in 2009, resulting in only 39 China’s favorability. Although the percent of the surveyed people research data base is limited to some maintaining such positive view. This is countries in Southeast Asia, this data certainly not a standalone phenomenon. shows the dynamics of Southeast Asian Linking this trend with the record of how response towards China. From Table 1, Beijing builds its soft power, we can see Journal of ASEAN Studies 31

this trend as the weakening of China’s was not perceived as a genuine capability in projecting benign image in characterization of its ‘peaceful’ rise Southeast Asia since its heyday in the first campaign. In Southeast Asia, this half of 2000s. Despite it had been actively condition was well apparent with a wielding soft power projection as a growing external context outside Beijing’s ‘peaceful’ country since its official active in efforts building its soft power. campaign in 2003, Beijing’s foreign policy

Table 2. Change in the views on China’s influence in Southeast Asian countries

2006 2009 mainly mainly mainly mainly positive negative positive negative The 54 30 39 52 Philippines

Source: adapted from BBC World Service Poll 2011

During the latter half of 2000s, China’s military capability in 2005, the there is a growing discrepancy between number of negative perceptions rose China’s perceived intention and capability rapidly to 63 percent of the surveyed in terms of its economic and military, people in the Philippines in 2011 especially in the form of bigger anxiety (GlobeScan, 2011). over China’s military threat compare to This dissonance between the the confidence of China’s economic perception on Beijing’s economic and collaboration tendency (BBC World military rise eventually affected China’s Service Poll, 2011). Table 3, for instance, reputational power as the source of its soft indicates the dissonance of Beijing’s image power. With the growing discrepancy in Southeast Asia and, therefore, the between its good reputation projection paradox of its soft power strategy in the and actual action in the South China Sea, region. While China’s soft power the ability of China’s soft power in projection was in line with the influencing other countries was development of the positive belief on its weakened. Table 2 and Table 3 economic rise, the increasing Beijing’s demonstrate the decline of China’s assertive measures in the South China Sea positive image in the Philippines’ public also added to a growing perception that opinion and the link to Beijing’s growing China is a threat to regional security. BBC hard power measures in the region. This World Service Poll (2011) even shows that becomes even clearer if we link the there is a sharp contrast in the Philippine’s decreasing public favorability of China public view on China’s military capability. and the increasingly tougher Southeast Whereas 46 percent of the surveyed Asian elites’ statements on Beijing’s policy people showing unfavorable view of 32 Beyond Brinkmanship

in the region. The existence of Beijing’s hard power measures in the

Table 3. The discrepancy in the opinion on China’s economic and military concern in 2011

China Becoming More China Becoming More

Powerful Economically Powerful Militarily

Positive Negative Positive Negative

The 61 32 29 63 Philippines

Source: adapted from BBC World Service Poll 2011

South China Sea has influenced the hard power measures in the South China narrative of China’s reputation and its soft Sea and developing the use of military power in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the approach for the soft power purpose. overall data presented cannot be deemed Hence, with a better coordinated strategy, to rule out that there are diverse Southeast China can project a clear message in Asian countries’ reactions and perceptions easing the threat perception in Southeast towards China (Goh, 2007, pp. 823-824). Asia and building a more coherent However, at the same time, one shall also reputation as a benign country in the note that the shifting of Southeast Asian world. elites and public opinions towards China Conclusion reflects an essential and unprecedented gesture in the China-Southeast Asia Realizing the complex relationship relations. between its image projection and actual actions in Southeast Asia, China’s Ultimately, the findings in this case experience has marked an important vividly exemplify the importance of illustration of the logic and nature of soft perception of China’s behavior. As one of power. China has made a significant the most influential major countries in transformation to wield its soft power in Asia, China still has real impediments in an appealing way. More importantly, wining ‘hearts and minds’ of its China has demonstrated its ability in neighboring region. Notwithstanding its reducing suspicion and building a benign complexity, this also underlines the ‘responsible global stakeholder’ image in importance of reconsidering the notion of the post-Cold War era. However, along ‘soft power’ and how it cannot be with Beijing’s increasingly active hard separated from other aspects in the power measures in the South China Sea international arena. Learning from the since 2009, there has been a growing context of Southeast Asia, it is important concern over China’s intention in the for China to consider a nimbler approach region. This uniquely added a new in Southeast Asia, such as reconsider its Journal of ASEAN Studies 33

complexity in how Southeast Asian China Sea and the ability to project its countries perceive and react to China. reputational power through a better understanding of Southeast Asian The existence of many, albeit not regional contexts. all, Southeast Asian countries’ actions against China, especially in ASEAN- About the Author related forums and its bilateral relations, The author is a lecturer at the have become a major turning point in Department of International Relations, China-Southeast Asia relations. At this Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, juncture, one can see the growing threat Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. His perception from the increasingly Beijing’s research interests span Chinese foreign hard power measures in the South China policy, the politics of international Sea affect its soft power, particularly in the regimes, and ASEAN studies. This article form of inciting ‘threat perceptions’ is adapted from the author’s master among Southeast Asian elites and public dissertation at the S. Rajaratnam School of opinions. This, in turn, casted doubt on International Studies, Nanyang Beijing’s virtue and real intention in the Technological University, Singapore. The region, eroding China’s ‘reputational author would like to express his gratitude power’ as the source of its soft power. The to Ms. Ambar Widiastuti, Ms. Ezka South China Sea conflicts, in fact, have Amalia, and Mr. Jonathan Rayon for their vividly demonstrated the fragility of help during the research and the writing China’s soft power in the region. processes. In summary, beyond the focus on References the possibility for open conflict in the South China Sea, it is important to see Acharya, A. (2003a). Seeking Security in other political implications in the region, the Dragon’s Shadow: China and especially on Beijing’s soft power efforts Southeast Asia in the Emerging in Southeast Asia. As China’s soft power it Asian Order. Institute of Defence and is still muddling through the current Strategic Studies Singapore’s Working problem of the South China Sea conflicts, Paper, 44, 1-27. the only certain thing is that the remaining threat perception from the repercussion of Acharya, A. (2003b). Will Asia’s Past be Its its hard power measures will affect Future? International Security, 28(3), further the source of its soft power. The 149-164. prospect of China’s soft power in Agence France-Presse. (2011, June 9). Southeast Asia will rely on how Beijing Vietnam PM says sea sovereignty can ponder the broader aspects of ‘incontestable’. Straits Times wielding its soft power effectively, such as [online]. Retrieved January 19, the consideration of minimalizing the 2012, from perceived-excessive measures in South http://www.straitstimes.com/Break 34 Beyond Brinkmanship

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