INDIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES: NEW FRONTIERS

“Arrows may not kill a soldier but skillful intrigue can kill even those in the womb.” Kautilya in Arthshastra

The whole of South Asia- India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Pakistan- is going through internal unrest and upheavals due to insurgency movements, ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalism. Such unrests have a history of crossing national boundaries and leading to inter-state tensions. With regard to India, the unrest is brewing in Indo Nepal border and Indo Bangladesh border. The situation has become grave owing to the development in the chicken neck area i.e the area in and around Siliguri (West Bengal), Assam and the border areas of Jharkhand ,Chhattisgarh ,Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal.

Geo-politically, India has become a cauldron of merging insurgent movements which has developed internal networks which can create horrendous logistical repercussions .On the other hand, India has special ties with each of her neighbours–of ethnicity, language, culture, common historical experience, or of shared access to and dependence upon vital natural resources – of a character and to a degree of intensity that is not shared by any two others. Although India does not have serious territorial security problem with neighbours other than Pakistan, there are issues like the Indian secessionist groups using their territory as sanctuaries, trans-border immigration, gunrunning and narcotics, which affect the country’s security. The neighborly unrests, therefore, have special significance and implications for India.

Attributes of Internal Security ΠSecure territory ΠPrevalence of peace and order ΠFreedom for people ΠRule of law Рlaw must protect everyone irrespective of status and equality ΠGrowth through equity - -egalitarian growth - prosperity for all ΠVisible egalitarianism ΠUnity in plurality

1 Internal Security Challenges ΠTerrorism / Militancy ΠLeft wing extremism ΠCommunal divide Рit can divide us and even lead to fragmentations of nation ΠCaste and ethnic tensions ΠOrganised crimes ΠForged Indian currency notes ΠCoastal security ΠCyber crime ΠMushroom growth of Madrasas and religious fundamentalism [growth of deobandis / Qaumi Madrasas along Indo-Bangladesh border] they are not recognised by government. ΠIllegal immigration, 12.5 lakh Bangladeshis have not gone back,entered India and staying illegally. Reduction in illegal migration, though it is going on through West Bengal. ΠNarcotics trade Рsmuggling and trafficking Рunproductive lifestyle of people. ΠHawala transfers(illegal money transfers)

Reasons for Internal Security Problems ΠUnfriendly neighbour ΠWeak state structure Рpoor governance ΠAbject poverty in large numbers Рbecause of deforestation, sustenance has decreased ΠPolitical insecurity Рsecessionism, revolutionary movements ΠPolarisation of society ΠHardening class barriers Рhaves and have nots ΠDrug trafficking and arms smuggling ΠRise in intolerance and fundamentalism [despite rise of literacy, intolerance is increasing]

Tentacles of Terrorism (External Influences) Œ Al Qaeda Œ Jamat-e-Islami, Ahle Hadith, Jamal-Ul –Ulema-Islami etc. Œ Hijbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohamad, Al Badar., Al-Umar, all groups (1200 approx).

2 ΠUnited liberation Front of Asom(ULFA) and terrorist networks in Bangladesh

Some specific issues that are faced in the country are:

ΠProblems of national assimilation and integration particularly of Border States in the North East. ΠPorous borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka which enable illegal trans-border movements and smuggling of weapons and drugs. These days AK rifles, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, land mines, RDX, even shoulder fired surface to air missiles are easily available in our neighborhood. ΠWeak governance including law and order machinery and large-scale corruption. Nexus between crime, insurgency and politics.

The internal security has become a cause for serious concern for those in the national security apparatus. The Indian map below shows the extent and spread of terrorist and leftist insurgents.

Source :South Asia Terrorism Portal,New Delhi

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India - Insurgent and Extremist Groups In India few of the extremist groups including that of the naxalites/Maoists have slowly started to assert themselves in threatening the internal security apparatus of India which are given in the map above and the details are as follows:

Assam Œ United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) Œ National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) Œ United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) Œ Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) Œ Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) Œ Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) Œ Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) Œ Rabha National Security Force (RNSF) Œ Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO) Œ Hmar People’s Convention – Democracy (HPCD)

Manipur Œ United National Liberation Front (UNLF) Œ People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Œ People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) Œ National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) Œ Hmar People’s Convention- Democracy (HPCD)

Meghalaya Œ Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) Œ Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) Œ People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLFM)

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Nagaland ΠNational Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isaac Muivah)(NSCN-IM) ΠNational Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)(NSCN-K)

Tripura ΠNational Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) ΠAll Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) ΠTripura Liberation Organisation Front (TLOF) ΠUnited Bengali liberation Front (UBLF)

Mizoram Œ Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) Œ Hmar People’s Convention –Democracy (HPC-D)

Arunanchal Pradesh ΠArunanchal Dragon Force (ADF)

Left Wing Extremist Groups Œ People’s Guerrilla Army Œ People’s War Group(PWG) Œ Maoist Communist Centre(merged with PWG to form CPI-Maoist) Œ Communist Party of India -Maoist (CPI-Maoist) Œ Communist Party of India (Marxist –Leninist) Janshakti

Other Extremist Groups ΠAkhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES) ΠStudents Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) ΠKamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) ΠRanvir Sena

5 The major threat to India's internal security apart from terrorism is from Naxalism.The movement which started from Naxalbari in 1967 has assumed very sinister proportions. One hundred fifty nine districts spread in 13 States are under the evil influence of this violent creed. Forty, big and small groups, including the two major ones--People's War Group and Maoist Communist Centre,(which have merged together in 2004 to form Communist Party of India –Maoist) are active in the different parts of the country. In fact the danger to the internal security of the country has grown manifold in view of the fact that Maoist groups active in Nepal and Bangladesh are working in tandem with other Maoist formulation and global groups such of LiberationTigers of Tamil Ealam(LTTE) and Lashkar-e-Toiba(terrorist group operating in Kashmir ). During the last one year, these Naxalites have gone out of control and berserk. During the last one month 24 security men have lost their lives in different states of India . It only underlines the ugly reality that the menace of Naxalites is increasingly assuming dangerous proposition. In a way if one analyses the spread of extreme leftist forces then there are startling facts about the area of spread and the immense logistical support that the extremists have developed .In this case a selective state wise analysis would be stressing on the new emerging areas.

Orissa On May 27, 2005 the Maoists in Orissa went on rampage and killed three villagers and injured several others in the Burda village under Jujumura police station. Prior to this the Maoist activities were only confined to abductions followed by ransom. The incident came as a shock as the Maoists generally target the police, forest officials, contractors and other businessmen.

This incident has been considered important with regard to the course of Naxal growth in the underdeveloped and tribal dominated Western Orissa. The timing of the incident speaks in volumes about the greater aims and ambitions of Naxals in the region. The incident came barely after nine hours of an important meeting of high-level police officers held at Sambalpur district headquarter to discuss problems related to the Left wing extremism in the area. It clearly signals the Naxal game plan of defying the Government and creating an environment of terror and suspicion. For long Naxal activities in Western Orissa was considered as a spill-over from Jharkhand. However, things have changed for worse and now the Maoists have created a red corridor from the Sarnda forest of

6 Jharkhand to Rairakhol forest in Orissa. Earlier it was confined to some parts of Sundargarh, Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj but now the Maoists have managed to put their foot in different parts of Sambalpur, Jharsuguda, Deogarh and Anugul. The successes of all counter measures in these areas need a proper coordination among the officials of Orissa and Jharkhand. They must devise a sort of joint strategy to fight the Maoist threat, but this is what seems to be lacking. So far it has been alleged several times that in the name of anti-Naxal operations, the Jharkhand police harassed the residents of bordering villages of Orissa. This has been a constant cause of worry for the local populace, which is being successfully exploited by the Naxals in their favour.

Over last three years the Naxals have strengthened their position in the tribal districts of Orissa. With their activities the Naxals have managed to spread the message of terror among the innocent villagers of the area. In this situation it is the foremost duty of the police and administration to restore the confidence among the local people. And for this the police have to act real fast and definitely tough. It is very much necessary to strengthen intelligence gathering system of police and equally important is also the modernization of the police force. So far the Maoists are banking on the support of the local tribal and poor rural people.

Punjab The bomb blasts in Delhi last year at two cinema halls on May 22 show a trend of desperation within the residual Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) elements who either are attempting to come over ground or to flee the country. Arguably, it is due to constant international pressure on Pakistan and its intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), border fencing, deployment of Special Forces in Indo-Pak borders particularly in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Punjab, strict vigil at Indo-Nepal check posts, and choking of arms and drug routes, has forced the left out Punjab militants to reconsider their decision to execute ISI instructions.

In the last seven months a total of 35 alleged BKI members have been arrested, including four women cadres. The three BKI militants Jagtar Singh Hawara, Jagtar Singh Tara and Paramjit Singh Beora, who were facing trial for killing the former Chief Minister of Punjab, Beant Singh, had escaped from the high security Burail jail on January 25, 2005 and reportedly fled to Pakistan. Reports too indicated that 13 of the 18 ‘wanted’

7 Punjab militants, who had escaped in separate incidents, have crossed the border to find refuge in other countries, including Pakistan. Moreover, a Punjab police report said the crime rate had come down by 11 percent with 25,626 cases being registered under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) in 2004 compared to 28,756 cases in 2003. The report also said no remnants of Sikh terrorism were there in Punjab. Even support to the separate Sikh state of Khalistan has waned from abroad as people found it was aimless.

The BKI, which traces its origin to the Babbar Akali Movement of 1920, was believed to have assumed its present form after the Baisakhi 1978-clashes between the Akhand Kirtani Jatha and Nirankaris. Subsequently the BKI started targeting sympathisers of the Nirankaris during 1980s. With the objective of establishing a sovereign Khalistan state in the present Punjab province in India, the first unit of the BKI was founded in Canada in 1981 under the leadership of Talwinder Singh Parmar and Sukhdev Singh Babbar. However, Talwinder Parmar formed the Babbar Khalsa (Parmar) faction in 1992, after splitting from the BKI.

After the terrorist-secessionist movement for Khalistan was comprehensively defeated in 1993, terrorist outfits of various shades used very low intensity firearms because of limited resources and firepower. Although the radical Sikh leaders announced that they would endeavour to achieve separate Sikh nation through democratic and peaceful means, available information suggests many left out elements were engaged in criminal activities like, kidnapping, contract killings and drug peddling. There has been also a qualitative shift in the strategy of Punjab militants in view of their shrinking base and very limited resources. The killings of two Punjab militants-turned-criminals, Jagtar Singh Jagga and Parminder Singh Ranga of Punjab and Rajasthan respectively, in north Delhi in late April 2004 have solved many cases of extortion in Delhi and Haryana. This was not an isolated case where the dreaded Militants have turned to petty crimes to survive and sustain the so-called movement. Even the leaders of the Khalistan Liberation Front (KLF) and the BKI had tied up with Uttar Pradesh-based mafia dons to carry out kidnappings in order to raise funds for Khalistan Movement. The present leader Jagtar Singh Hawara after escaping from the Burail jail was busy in human trafficking and other petty criminal activities. For about 18 months, Hawara kept on organising militant activities in north India. He was also involved in the May 22 twin bomb blasts in cinema halls in Delhi. Hawara was arrested on June 8 in the capital while collecting money from

8 a Hawala operator on his way to Nepal. He had also maintained contact with members of the organisation in Germany.

Interrogation reports of the arrested cadres indicate that Punjab militants are under constant pressure from the ISI to produce results and revive terrorism in the State. Despite lack of public support to militancy, periodic efforts are made by terrorist coordinators within the country and abroad to rope in their old associates and those released from jails and family members of slain militants. Apart from BKI, other Khalistan militant outfits like ISYF-Rode with Kama Ghata Maru Dal of Harmit Bhakna, a Germany based terrorist outfit, Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), headed by Ranjit Singh Neeta, Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) - Panjar, Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) and Dal Khalsa International (DKI), have been making effort to revive militancy in the State. Further, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) has been making efforts during the last couple of years to create bases in Ludhiana, Jalandhar, and Pathaankot and Udhampur areas in Jammu and Kashmir. There are reports that the Punjab militants have so far maintained close association with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Al Burq and Jammu Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF).

Presently, the BKI is more or less active in the USA, Canada and the UK along with other European countries like Germany, France, Belgium, Norway, Switzerland and neighboring Pakistan.

Andhra Pradesh After the breakdown of peace talks in January 17, 2005, the state has been reeling under the heat of Naxal violence. Since January last year, there are approximately 254 deaths, including 108 Naxalites, 16 policemen and 130 civilians and political activists. The YSR Rajsekhar Reddy government in Andhra Pradesh re-imposed the ban on the Communist Party of India (Maoist) along with its seven frontal organisations on August 17,2005. The other banned organisations: the CPI (Maoist), the Radical Youth League, the Rythu Coolie Sangham, the Radical Student’s Union, the Singareni Karmika Samakhya, the Viplava Karmika Samakhya, the All India Revolutionary Student’s Federation and the Revolutionary Writers Association. The ban came as an immediate fall out of the outrageous killing of Congress legislator Chittem Narsi Reddy and eight

9 others by an action team of Naxals at Narayanpet in Mahbubnagar district on Independence Day last year.

The YSR government could not escape the blame game for recent spurt of violence in the state because it allegedly took the help of the Naxalites to come to power. Even in July 2004, the YSR government had extended an invitation to the Naxals to come to the negotiating table ignoring the ground situation. It rolled back anti-Naxal operations and lifted the ban over them to open talks, unfortunately without much preparation. The government made the biggest blunder for it gave primary importance to electoral issues over the national security issues. However, it was more of a fairytale, away from the reality as both the sides were not at all sincere when they came to the negotiating table. As there was no agenda, the talks went nowhere. In fact during the peace talks the Naxals got the much-sought publicity at government’s cost by organising rallies and village meetings.

Ironically, this was the third time that the ban has been imposed on Naxals. On May 21, 1992, for the first time, the then Congress government had outlawed the erstwhile People's War Group and its frontal organisations. This followed the killing of a former minister T Hayagreeva Chary, who was a close aide of former Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao. However, during 1995, the then Telugu Desam government led by N T Rama Rao had relaxed the ban on the People's War and its frontal outfits. The ban was re-imposed by the Chandrababu Naidu government in July 1996, subsequently; the TDP government renewed the ban every year.

The ban on the CPI (Maoist) and its frontal organisations is bound to have serious implications. More than 1700 villages in North Telangana have been classified as Naxal- affected. The state must prepare itself to witness desperate Naxal attacks in the days to come, particularly in the districts of Adilabad, Nizamabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Mahbubnagar and Khammam, which have now become guerilla zones.

Immediately after the re-imposition of ban, the Naxal spokesperson Janardan sounded the Naxal game plan. “There will be no peace zone in the state. We will attack wherever and whoever possible.” As expected the Naxal groups have started coming together in responding to the ban immediately. The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)

10 Janashakti (Ramachandran faction) and CPI-ML Pratighatana have merged to form the new organization -- CPI (ML) that has been headed by K Ramachandran.

Chhattisgarh Since January 2004, the Naxalites have triggered more than 220 landmine blasts and as many as 104 landmines were recovered and defused. The non-tarred roads of the state are another handicap coming in the way of police, making them more vulnerable to landmine and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. Arguably, the Naxal violence has sharply increased in the state of Chhattisgarh after the formation of Communist Party of India (Maoist). The violence has been characterised by Jan Adalats, targeted attacks on police, police informers, ruling political class and tribal who are engaged in anti Naxalite movement in Bastar region particularly in Salva Zudoom (Peace initiative). The Naxals are known to be active in 9 districts out of 16 districts in Chhattishgarh and Bastar region––comprising Dantewada, Kanker and Bastar and the adjoining Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra. In fact, the Naxals have named the area as ’Abuz Marh’ (the unknown hill’), made Bastar their home and are controlling their activities from their base in the nearly impregnable Dandakaranya forest. The Naxal leadership claims that the entire Bastar region is a ‘liberated zone’, where the rebels are in a dominant position.

The so-called movement by the Naxals in the state has become a serious problem with regard to the development of the state. As the Naxals have established their control over the areas, which are rich in mines and minerals, development works have become standstill in Dantewada, Kanker, Bastar, Kawardha, Balrampur, Sarguja and other Naxal-infested districts of the state. The problem is not only affecting economic activities in the state but also forcing it to adopt an imbalanced model of growth because of the presence of Naxalites in a majority of the mineral-rich pockets of Chhattisgarh.

Tackling the rising Naxal violence has become a formidable challenge for the state administration in all Naxal-affected districts. As of now they have equipped themselves with sophisticated Kalashnikov rifles, wireless sets and remote control devices. In the face of eternally ill equipped state security force, the Naxals have established people's governance and virtually have their own administration in areas which they call 'liberated

11 zone'. They issue vehicle passes and charge taxes from people for using the roads or staying or doing businesses.

In view of the excessive Naxal violence the government really needs to rethink its strategy over the whole issue. The Singh government has so far formed 139 village defense committees, to take along the people of the state in dealing with Naxals. The state government has also launched a counter revolutionary movement in the name of Jan Jagran Abhiyan to spread awareness among people about the ill effects of Naxal Movement in the state. The unprecedented tribal support for Salva Zudoom, has really put the extremists on the back foot. On the other hand, the state sponsored Jan Jagran Abhiyan is being regarded as instrumental for restoring the confidence among people. The government must not allow these developments to go in vain rather it should use them to push forward the agenda of bringing an end to decade old left-wing extremism.

The recent Padeda incident(in which about six poliemen were killed in landmine blast) even shook the Union Home Ministry, only to carry a comprehensive review of the situations in Chhattisgarh. The state cabinet already recommended for a ban on Naxal activities in the state, trying to bring an ordinance to curb any organisation or group of individuals involved in illegal activities or terrorist activities in the state.

Jharkhand In the case of Jharkhand ,the areas of operations for naxalism ahs been majorly in the singhbhum ,Hazaribagh,Gaya ,Dhanbad and the coal belt .The acts of Naxalites /Maoists in the area has been aimed primarily to counter the upper caste Ranvir Sena and to extend their area of influence.The extension of their zone extended upto north of Bihar namely districts of Araria,Jogbani and few pockets close to the Nepal border.This increase in operational area has given a continuity as well as link to the Nepal Maoists which is discussed in the subsequent section.

Assam There are frantic calls to the people of Assam to throw out illegal Bangladeshis from the state. The result, thousands of illegal Bangladeshi migrants have left Dibrugarh, Jorhat, Golaghat and a few other areas in Upper Assam during the last year. What triggered this

12 exodus was the deadline imposed by an obscure student body, the Chiring Chapori Yuva Morcha (CCYM), formed on April 12 last year.

This student group had asked Dibrugarh denizens not to provide the Bangladeshis with jobs, food and shelter. It had set a deadline of May 7 for the Bangladeshis to leave. According to the Morcha members, they had to take recourse to drastic measures as they were fed up of the dilly-dally tactics of the government. With the passing of the deadline, hundreds of these illegal migrants trooped out of Dibrugarh. The Dibrugrah example was also enacted in few other towns of Assam. The police also could not take any action against the members of this outfit as there was no complaint about physical force being used against anyone. It used the Internet and innocuous mobile messaging to good effect passing the note around. It remains to be seen if this sort of phenomena spreads to other areas of Assam and if possible, neighboring States. A similar kind of situation was witnessed recently in coastal Orissa, for the record.

Assam for long has been facing the problem of illegal migration from Bangladesh due to its physical proximity. India has fenced parts of the 4,000-km (2,500-mile) border with Bangladesh, but officials say this has done little to deter migrants bent on leaving one of the world's poorest countries. Assam shares a 272 km (169 mile) porous border with Bangladesh, a vast stretch of which is unfenced. Assam’s border with Bangladesh is largely porous and even in the fenced areas it is alleged that the BSF personnel on duty allow the illegal migrants to enter Assam in lieu of money. The tragedy of Assam is that the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act, IMDT is prevalent whereas in all other parts of the country the Foreigners Act is applicable to deal with these illegal migrants. Over two years ago, the government estimated there could be up to 20 million illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in India, and labeled some of them a security risk.

One of the ludicrous provisions of the IMDT Act is that the onus of proving that a suspect is an illegal migrant lies on the complainant. Little wonder that there has been very little detection under this Act. It was the illegal migrant issue that led to the Assam Agitation in which hundreds of Assamese were martyred. The agitation ended with the signing of the Assam Accord on 15th August 1985 between the AASU (All Assam Students’ Union), the AAGSP (All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad) and the then Prime Minister Rajiv

13 Gandhi. The vote bank politics have ensured that the Bangladeshis have a free run in Assam.

The exodus of Bangladeshis from Assam had already taken near international dimension with Bangladesh threatening to seek United Nations Human Commission for Refugee’s (UNHCR) intervention. Always in a denial, Indian Agencies refuted claims of mass exodus and observers suspected that this development could be exploited by Bangladesh to neutralize the adverse fallout of the border skirmishes. The State government has deputed some ministers to assess the situation and has asked the Home Department to prepare a report. The Government has decided not to take any action against the persons involved in the anti-Bangladeshi campaign.

Undoubtedly, Assam is sitting on a powder-keg waiting to explode anytime. Whether this "save the nation, save identity” cry help the already fragile Assam or not, the issue has become a political hot-potato nobody wants to touch. The various parties are skirting the issue so as not to be seen taking sides. Something has to done to address the issue of illegal migrants in Assam which is all set to alter the demography of Assam. In November 2003, it was between students of Bihar and Assamese and now, the grudge against Bangladeshis. . Uttar Pradesh The growing influence of the newly formed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), the Naxal outfit, along the Uttar Pradesh's (UP) eastern borders and the rapidity with which they are expanding their organisation in the State is undoubtedly alarming. Naxals are looking to the State for fresh bases where they can build a formidable organisation. The inaccessible hilly terrain and dense forests of the state provide perfect cover for the Naxalites, who use their own maps to move around. On November 20, 2004 the Naxalite had ambushed a police party and shot dead at least twenty policemen near a culvert in Chandauli district of UP. The incident happened when Policemen and Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) personnel were proceeding on a combing duty in Naugarh police station area.This was the assertion of their presence in the state after a long time.

14 The Naxalites are active in the eastern part of the state since 1969. The then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh C B Gupta accepting their presence in different parts of the state, attributed their activities to the irregularities and injustices committed by some village headmen in the distribution of land. Although the government realised it as a socio-economic problem, it treated the issue as a law and order problem by deploying Pradesh Armed Constabulary (PAC) squad in Laxmipur district to curb the activities of Naxals. However, his successors neglected the Naxalite issue and followed a policy of non-interference.

The incident of November 20 was first major attack on security forces in India after the merger of two dreaded left wing extremist outfits, the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) and the People’s War Group (PWG). In Uttar Pradesh the Naxalites have influence over Mirzapur, Chandauli and Sonebhadra districts while Gorakhpur, Ghazipur and Ballia are targeted as potential districts to be brought under its influence. At least seven districts of the state are connected to Maoist affected regions of Nepal and another seven with Bihar. In addition, border districts of UP are also emerging as safe haven for Maoists from Nepal. The increasing pressure form the Nepalese army has forced the Nepalese Maoists to sneak into UP, Uttaranchal, West Bengal and Bihar for respite. On October 3,2005 the Special Task Force of the Bihar police had busted a crucial erstwhile MCC link with the arrest of nine suspected extremists during three raids. At least two of the rebels were from adjoining districts of UP. In August this year too the Uttaranchal police had arrested five suspected Nepalese Maoist sympathizers in Saufutia forests of Udham Singh Nagar district.

Recent intelligence sources indicated a strong Nepalese Maoist-Naxalite nexus that has emerged in the region as a serious threat to the internal security of India as a whole and in particular to five states— UP, Bihar, Uttaranchal, West Bengal and Sikkim. These states are connected to the Himalayan kingdom along the 1751 km border. It is observed that there has been regular exchange of men and material between the Maoists in Nepal and Naxalite outfits in India.

Nepal-India Border According to available information, the Maoists of Nepal have well-established linkages with India’s left-wing extremist organizations, primarily with the People’s War group

15 (PWG) and Maoist Communist Center (MCC). The first signs of contacts were reportedly registered during 1989-1990 when the two groups started collaborating in order to expand their influence. Towards this end, began the process of laying a corridor, which is now widely referred to as the Revolutionary Corridor (RC) extending from Nepal to across six Indian states, including Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. The Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) was organized by Nepal and Indian members of Naxalite (the popular term for left-wing extremism in India – the movement originated in Naxalbari ([hence the term Naxal] in the State of West Bengal in the late 1960s) , meeting at Siliguri in the Indian State of West Bengal during August 2001. The interaction between Maoist insurgents and the PWG increased with the sharing knowledge about guerilla warfare, bomb manufacturing techniques and arms training. Nepal Maoists had sent their delegates to the March 2001 Congress of PWG held at Abuz Marh in Bastar region of Chhattisgarh. The establishment of CRZ gave a wider space and platform for all proscribed Nepal and Indian left-wing extremist organization to strengthen their bases in both countries. Maoists and the PWG have also formed the India –Nepal Border Region Committee to coordinate their activities in North Bihar and along the India – Nepal border. A careful examination of expansion of Naxalite activity in Bihar in the last two years would reveal that growing linkages between the MCC and the Nepal Maoists are part of their larger strategy to create ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ stretching across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Bihar to Nepal. The porous Bihar- Nepal border, the general breakdown of rule of law, poor governance incapacity of the police force provides a context for these left extremist groups with ease. Reports of April 2000 indicate that the MCC and Maoists were holding joint training camps in Hazaribagh and Aurangabad. The porous Bihar – Nepal border is easily permeable. Bihar has eight districts and 54 police stations situated on the border. In the recent past, the Bihar police have arrested a number of Nepalese Maoists in the border districts of West and East Champaran, Sitamarhi, Sheohar and Madhubani. Taking advantage of a general breakdown of law and order, the Nepalese Maoists have reportedly up bases at several places along the border. Reports indicate the existence of training camps in the forests of Bagha in the West Champaran district, which has immersed as a safe haven for the Nepalese insurgents. The Bihar police also suspect that some top leaders of the Nepalese Maoists including Baburam Bhattarai, were /are hiding in Bihar. Maoists, with the help of Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), have been attempting to establish links with Naxalite groups such as the PWG and the MCC

16 by using the Siliguri corridor in West Bengal. Darjeeling and Siliguri are the important transit routes. They are in a process consolidating their presence in West Midnapore district, Bankura and Purulia especially in North Bengal with the help of Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO). There is also some reportage about the Nepalese Maoists’ links with insurgent groups active in India North- east like United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), Gurkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) and Gurkha Liberation Organisation (GLO).

While Nepal is rapidly moving towards another bloodier phase of internecine war, neighboring countries – China in the north, India in the south and Pakistan fishing from its own troubled water are beginning to take an interest. Apart from that Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan also help foreign Islamic militants to cross over to India through the porous Indo-Nepal borders. Reports indicated that the ISI is also supplying arms to Maoists through militant outfits operating in the northeast region of India. The relationship further deteriorated when New Delhi halted arms supplies to Nepal and has subsequently hosted the meetings between Maoists and seven political parties in November 2005. Nepal’s anger at India’s hosting of the meeting between Maoists and several political parties was clearly visible. While the king is not satisfied with India’s support of political parties and Maoists, certain cross-border connection of the Maoists had posed an even greater threat to India. In a joint statement on September 1, 2004, senior leaders of the CPN-Maoists of Nepal and CPI-Maoist of India declared that “… Maoist parties solemnly appeal to the entire oppressed masses, the world over, and Nepal and India in particular, to raise their voices against every evil design of imperialism and expansionism to repress the revolutionary cause of the oppressed people in Nepal & India… we pledge to fight united till all conspiracies hatched by the imperialists and reactionaries are crushed and the people’s cause of Socialism and Communism are established in Nepal, India and all over the world”. There is a strong link between the Indian and Nepalese Maoists. The Nepalese Maoists are mostly trained and educated in India. Intelligence sources indicated that the erstwhile Maoist Communist Center (MCC) of India cadres at the Jhumra hills and Saranda forests of Jharkhand are training the Nepalese Maoists. The CPN- Maoist has long maintained that unless the Maoists of the South Asia region work together to counter India’s ‘pernicious role’, ‘final victory’ would elude them. The 1,751-kilometre Indo-Nepal border is porous

17 and the problem of monitoring has become grave with the rise of left extremist in those areas.

Indo –Bangladesh Border Geography is certainly part of the problem, and the countries share a 4,095 kilometre border, with some pockets remaining un-demarcated, though agreements for the resolution of all issues on the border have long been in existence on paper. Tripura - the Indian State where the Akhaura incident occurred (one Paramilitary officer was abducted and killed by Bangladesh security personnel) - for instance, has a 856 kilometre long border with Bangladesh, of which just 200 kilometres has been fenced. However, barring 6.5 kilometres, the rest of the border is well demarcated. However, fencing has progressed slowly, despite a long-standing Indian mandate to fence off the whole area, and this is at least in part because of the Bangladesh Rangers (BDRS) repeated obstruction of fencing work. BDR men regularly fire at the men engaged in the border fencing work, and a BSF official disclosed that there had been at least five incidents of such "unwarranted firing" by BDR troopers on civilians and security personnel along the border with Tripura between March 1, 2005 and April 21, 2005. On April 20, the Tripura Director General of Police, G.M. Srivastava stated, "I am not saying that the Government of Bangladesh is involved in such acts, but there are reasons to believe that some BDR men, at the local level, are working to delay the construction of the fencing." There are also a number of small pockets under 'adverse possession' as well as some 'enclaves' of Indian and Bangladeshi populations in the other country. While agreements on these have long been in existence, their implementation remains in abeyance because of tensions along the border, as well as Bangladesh's evident strategic and tactical interests in obstructing an Indian fence that would put an end to the movement of terrorist and criminal groups, as well as the large volume of illegal migration that Dhaka implicitly supports. In some cases, topography also creates problems. The Belonia sub-division in South Tripura, for instance, has been a repeated flash-point, because the Muhuri river keeps changing its course, creating vast islands, which both the countries claim leading to border skirmishes.

Under the circumstances, occasional clashes along the border are not unexpected. However, the torture and cold blooded murder of soldiers is impossible to justify or

18 countenance. India, unfortunately, appears to lack the political will to impose minimal norms of civilized conduct in interactions with any of its recalcitrant neighbours.

The transient tensions overlie the deep and abiding mistrust and hostility that have become integral to relations between the two countries. Bangladesh has often accused India of 'hegemonistic designs'. India, on the other hand, has a long and growing list of specific complaints, including the presence of terrorist camps, safe havens and leadership headquarters on Bangladesh soil. While Bangladesh has dealt with these allegations through a strategy of blank denial in the face of mounting evidence - much of it available in Bangladeshi open sources - this pattern of 'minimal credible deniability' often comes under specific strains. Thus, Delhi's note verbale for the extradition of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 'general secretary', Anup Chetia alias Golap Baruah, charged with a number of crimes, including murder, in Assam, has been repeatedly rejected by the Bangladesh authorities - though his presence in that country is fully documented, since Chetia has been in a Bangladesh jail at Kashimmpur since 1997 on charges of possessing foreign currencies, a satellite phone and several passports. His prison term ended on February 25 last year, but Bangladesh has refused to extradite him to India, instead sending its own list of criminals who it claims are 'sheltering' in India. Over the years, there have been repeated incidents of violence, many of them in Dhaka, involving internecine clashes between various Northeast Indian terrorist groups housed there, including the top leadership of some of these, and these have been widely reported in the Bangladesh media. But Bangladesh persists with the fiction that 'there are no terrorists on Bangladesh soil.'

Delhi has also been concerned with the increasing activities of Islamist extremists and terrorists on and from Bangladeshi soil as well as the enormous quantum of small arms and explosives that are moving across into India - most dramatically exemplified by the massive seizure at Karnaphuli on the Chittagong coast on April 2, 2004, the result of poor coordination between different Bangladeshi enforcement agencies, some of which failed to 'cooperate' with the officials who were overseeing the transaction, of a consignment of small arms sufficient, as one commentator noted, "to arm a brigade".

Bangladeshi belligerence has also found repeated political expression. In September

19 2004, in an attack described by one Bangladeshi editorial as an "amateurish outburst",which shows the partisan approach of the media.

Fundamentalist activism in Bangladesh received a major boost in 2001 when militant Islam stormed its way to the heart of the current regime as Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JEI) and Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), became influential partners of the government led by Begum Khaleda Zia. Over three hundred terrorist camps, including militant outfits of Northeast India, are fully active in various parts of Bangladesh. Major Islamic networks presently operating in the country are JEI, Harkat-ul-Jihan-al-Islami-Bangladesh (HUJAI- BD), Jamiat-ul-Mujaihdeen-Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrato Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shahadat-e-al-Hikma, Al-Harakat-ul-Islamia, Harkat-ul-Jehad Islami and Al- Khidmat. Mushrooming Islamic seminaries in Bangladesh have been providing necessary fuel for the so-called Islamic Jihad and Pakistan’s proxy war against India. There are about 9,000 government-registered madrasas and another 15,000 Qawmi madrasas under the Bangladesh Qawmi Madrasa Education Bord, which are totally out of government control and have their own curriculum. JEI, the fountainhead of Islamic fundamentalism in Bangladesh has its bank named the Bangladesh Islamic Bank and it is all set to open the branches Al Falah Islamic Bank, IslamiTafaqul Sanchayee Bima, and Jamati Jiban Bima Corporation. NGO’s like Ibnesina, KZZ Trust, Ashiab, Muslim Aid and Bangladesh Masjid Mission, under the direct supervision of JEI are exploring ways to make JEI the single largest party in Bangladesh’s political map by 2011. Pakistan’s intelligence agency and Bangladesh’s Director General Field Intelligence (DGFI) have formed a deadly alliance against India.

Indian concerns of the existence of terrorist camps in Hobiganj, Maulvi Bazaar, Chittagong and Satcherri districts of Bangladesh, among others along the Indian border, have intensified following such reports. India has pointed out the existence of 100 to 150 such camps to Bangladesh, pinpointing their location. The Camps are allegedly run by terrorist groups active in Northeast India including the ULFA and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), active in Assam, and the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) that are active in Tripura. Besides getting shelter and using the Northeastern border as transit route for illicit arms and drugs trade, these groups are also said to be cooperating closely with the Directorate General of Foreign Intelligence (DGFI), the military intelligence agency of Bangladesh, and the Inter

20 Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. Following the Royal Bhutan Army's operations against ULFA (operation All Clear) and other such groups having camps on its soil, Bangladesh as the hub of anti-India terrorist groups is likely to grow.

Besides, there are also speculations of use of Northeastern Indian territory by Islamist groups as a transit to infiltrate into J&K. ULFA is also said to be a constituent of the Bangladesh Islamic Manch, a united council under HUJI's leadership. Inter-regional linkages of these groups further worsen the internal security situation in India. For instance, beyond its intra-regional linkages, ULFA is also reported to maintain connection with Nepalese Maoists and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The latter have links with various Naxalite groups alleged to be working towards a compact revolutionary zone from the forest tracts of Adilabad district in Andhra Pradesh to Nepal, traversing the forest areas of Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar. Under these circumstances where the Government is busy calming J&K, Bangladesh could be an important front to ensure greater stability.

Northeast Region

The statement of the Union Minister for Development of the North East Region (DONER), PR Kyndiah on January 21,2006 that the North-East Region is no more “sensitive” but “strategic” to not only the entire country but also the neighboring countries---like China, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar---has a historic sense.

The people of the Northeast region are mostly mongoloid races like that of China, Bhutan, and Myanmar and inhabited in the frontline areas bordering China, Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Many similarities are there between the people of the Northeast India and the Southeast Asian countries. According to history, most of the northeastern people originated from the central Asia as well.

Therefore it will not be very difficult for the Governments of Myanmar, China, and Bhutan to play politics with India through northeast militants. When the Bangladesh became soft to northeastern militants, where was the question that these Mongoloid governments in neighboring countries would not go soft to them.

21 Many Naga villages are there in Northwest of Myanmar, so also Maiteis in Myanmar’s Mandalay and Rangoon. The Kukis spread throughout the northeast region as much as Myanmar side. Even numbers of Maitei villages are there in Bangladesh’s Sylhet and Dhaka areas. Because of these existing historical bonds between the people of the northeastern region with the neighboring countries, things have become more complex for New Delhi to tackle the militancy problems of the region.

That is why what the DONER Minister’s describing the region as “strategic” to not only the entire country but also the neighboring countries has undercurrent meanings.

At the same time, India has its security problems with China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Unfortunately this largest democratic country in the world is surrounded by monarchical, military and despotic regimes and the current Royal coup in Nepal is more compounded to diplomatic juggernaut of India.

These countries surround the northeastern region leaving the chicken neck area in Siliguri like a spinal cord to the rest of the country. There are maximum advantages for the northeast militants in their struggle for sovereignty due to these unfriendly environments prevailing in the neighboring countries.

New Delhi has been worrying for quite some time, as most of the northeast insurgent organizations have been operating from inside the territories of Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh. There have been talks with Yangon, Dhaka and Thimphu not to allow northeast militants using their soil to launch anti-India campaign. The insurgency problems of the region can’t be effectively tackled without the cooperation and support of Myanmar. Yangon has been engaged cracking down northeast militants holed up in their territory. Dhaka is yet to respond to New Delhi’s demand.

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Analyzing the pattern of violence in India with regard to insurgents violence which excludes deaths in Kashmir is as follows :

1994-2005

Year Civilians Security Force Terrorists Total Personnel

1994 1696 417 1919 4032

1995 1779 493 1603 3875

1996 2084 615 1482 4181

1997 1740 641 1734 4115

1998 1819 526 1419 3764

1999 1377 763 1614 3754

2000 1803 788 2384 4975

2001 1693 721 3425 5839

2002 1174 623 2176 3973

2003 1187 420 2095 3702

2004 886 434 1322 2642

2005 913 287 1319 2519

Total 18151 6728 22492 47371

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Fatalities in Left-wing Extremism

2006 States Civilian SF Naxal Total

Andhra Pradesh 2 0 0 2

Bihar 1 0 0 1

Jharkhand 3 4 2 9

Chhattisgarh 12 0 3 15

Maharashtra 1 0 7 8

Total* 19 4 12 35

* Data till January 31, 2006 (Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional)

2005 States Civilian SF Naxal Total

Andhra Pradesh 132 21 167 320

Bihar 25 29 52 106

Jharkhand 49 27 20 96

Chhattisgarh 52 48 26 126

Orissa 13 1 3 17

Maharashtra 2 17 8 27

Karnataka 2 6 4 12

Uttar Pradesh 1 0 6 7

West Bengal 5 1 0 6

Total* 281 150 286 717

* Compiled from news reports and are provisional

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2004

States Deaths

Andhra Pradesh 74

Bihar 171

Chhattisgarh 83

Jharkhand 169

Madhya Pradesh 4

Maharashtra 15

Orissa 8

Uttar Pradesh 26

West Bengal 15

Other States 1

Total 566

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India data

2003

States Deaths

Andhra Pradesh 140

Bihar 128

Chhattisgarh 74

Jharkhand 117

Madhya Pradesh 1

Maharashtra 31

Orissa 15

Uttar Pradesh 8

25 West Bengal 1

Other States -

Total 515

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India data

The increasing level of deaths has in a way forced government to take both harsh as well as constructive efforts in this regard.

Steps Taken by Government As the extremists work to consolidate and expand their power, repeatedly declaring their commitment to 'armed struggle' and rejection of India's 'bourgeois democracy', regrettably, no such unified effort is in evidence from affected states. Rather the Centre, with the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, is encouraging other Naxalite-affected States to follow the Andhra Pradesh example. Seeing developments in Andhra Pradesh, most of the affected states showed interests either to initiate dialoge or ceasefire. But the ceasefire in neighboring Andhra Pradesh did not influence much to Orissa government on its stand on these outfits. Keeping the option of dialogue open with the Naxalite, if only they come to the negotiating table without preconditions, the Orissa Government plans to launch a developmental offensive against the ultras. While the Chhattisgarh government has decided to bring out a surrender policy for the Naxals, the previous Karnataka Chief Minister, N. Dharam Singh has ruled out a cease-fire or cessation of police operations against the Naxalites. The West Bengal government is confused to with whom to initiate peace talks, while Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttaranchal and Uttar Pradesh governments are remaining mute on the matter.

The irony is that the state response to Naxalism remains incoherent and directionless. The Central Coordination Committee (CCC) of Naxalite affected States headed by the Union Home Ministry has met at least fifteen times since its inception to discuss the problem, but has not been able to evolve any comprehensive strategy to tackle the threat. Although the Union Government has recently presented a proposal for a Unified Command, on the lines of Kashmir and the northeast, some states are of the view that the formation of the Command would lead to interference in the law and order. Now that the CPI-Maoist has indicated its inclination to negotiations with other state governments,

26 provided they give up their repressive measures; it is to be seen what steps these affected state governments will take. The Ministry of Home Affairs in India is in a Catch-22 situation. In the last six months, at least seven Naxalite-affected states have written to it making an unusual demand: amend the Forest Conservation Act (FCA), 1980 to curb the spread of Naxalites. But the union home ministry personnel are helpless: the Ministry of Environment and Forests, the nodal authority for the FCA, has refused to entertain any such demands. Outside the negotiation hall of the Andhra Pradesh (AP)-Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI- Maoist)peace dialogue held on on October 15,2004 in Hyderabad, the naxal representative asserted that the Forest Conservation Act has very high potential to derail any peace talks .

During this author’s interactions with several AP state government officials present in the dialogue, it emerged very prominently that the most important demand of the Maoist, land reform, was impossible to attend to without amendments to the FCA. It may seem to many very unrelated an issue to be talked about in the context of the peace dialogue but both the Union and state governments have off late realised the fact that Naxalites could only spread due to very restrictive and conservation-oriented forest laws. Forest laws like the FCA have made forests soulless islands thus alienating tribal people from the government. Naxalites groups have exploited this cleavage between government and people to spread in about 125 districts in 12 states. “Settlement of rights inside forest and access to forest produce are two central issues for us. The negotiation has to start and revolve around it,” said Ramakrishna, the charismatic state secretary of CPI (Maoist) who has come over ground after two decades, to this author during a media briefing in the second week of October.

Orissa, already in the process of initiating direct dialogue with the Maoist, is desperately trying to put in place a land reform policy before the dialogue starts. However, as its emissary told recently, it is much easier to amend central laws like POTA or TADA than to initiate change in forest laws. The forest bureaucracy is just inaccessible and has a very arrogant protection-mentality. According to him, “Before coming face to face with the Naxalites we need to do our home works on what we can do and what we can’t. It is clear that land settlement is proving to be very difficult. That is the reason why we need to involve the Union government very actively in the process.” As Orissa’s 50 percent of

27 forests is disputed and claimed by both forest and revenue departments, the state can’t even think of settlement of land rights without amendments to the FCA which has been applied to all forest areas.

Problems in Administrative Network The problems at the root level is manifold and the core in competency to counter it are numerous: Π25percent of the Police Stations and 50 percent of the Police outposts do not have regular buildings. ΠOver 37 percent Police Districts work from makeshift Police lines. ΠOver 70 percent Police Districts do not have a proper control room. ΠSuperintendents of Police in over 34 percent Police Districts are not provided residential accommodation. Π70 percent of the constabulary is without residential accommodation. ΠThe mobility deficiency is approximately 43 percent. ΠThe weaponry available with the Police is insufficient and obsolete. ΠThe communication systems are inadequate, out dated and non-functional in most cases. ΠThe National Police Commission (NPC) had assessed, over 20 years ago, that the Constables were required to work an average of 13 hours a day. Presently, they perform daily duties for even longer hours. ΠWhile required to undergo training every five years, Police personnel are provided training opportunities only once in every 20 years. ΠThe curricula for the training of Policemen, which requires continuing orientation to modern policing practices with special reference to the emerging crime patterns, has not been regularly reviewed and changed.

The experience of dealing with the period of serious disorder in Punjab, the insurgencies in the North East region, the continuing proxy war in J&K and significant disturbances elsewhere in the country has demonstrated that some of these disturbances may not have escalated into grave internal security problems, if they had been promptly and effectively dealt with, at the incipient stages. In this context it may be noted that while prolonged neglect has led to the presently obtaining inadequacies of the State Police organisations, a factor, which has seriously impaired their performance, arises from the

28 persistent interference in their functioning by political and extra-Constitutional elements. As the Police are among the most visible instruments of the national administrative apparatus its failure to enforce the law effectively has led not only to seriously eroding the image of governance but also creating a most regrettable impression that lawless elements can indulge in criminality with impunity.

The 43rd Report to the concerned Parliamentary Standing Committee, the Ministry of Home Affairs has brought out that 210 of the 535 districts in the country are affected by grave problems of public disorder such as insurgency, militancy and ethnic strife. In other words, about 40 percent of the country is facing serious disorders of one or the other kind. The probable solutions that can be explored are: Œ Problems can be redefined as border state problems and core state problems, which can be sorted among the center and state governments Œ Greater Structural Adjustments Œ Improved Weaponry Œ Anti –corruption efforts Œ Intense dialogue, so as to arrive at conclusions Œ Improved Infrastructure Œ Protecting Tribal Rights Œ Employment opportunities through tax holidays to Investments in those areas Œ Village Defense Committees Œ Food security and education Œ Land reforms and equitable distribution of infrastructure projects Œ Border state problem can be solved through Stopping Infiltration Œ Constructive dialogue with neighbors Œ Strong military might Œ Large investment in infrastructure

The need of the hour is to break the link that is emerging between various groups and also at the same time initiating dialogue in the process to iron out the differences in perception. As it is the need of the citizens also to contribute to the peace process because “who dies if India lives and who lives if India dies.

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