8239/02 DCL 1 Mm DGF 2C Delegations Will Find
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Council of the European Union Brussels, 25 May 2018 (OR. fr, en) 8239/02 DCL 1 SCH-EVAL 11 COMIX 281 DECLASSIFICATION of document: ST 8239/02 RESTREINT UE dated: 7 May 2002 new status: Public Subject: Report on the Schengen evaluation of France Delegations will find attached the declassified version of the above document. The text of this document is identical to the previous version. 8239/02 DCL 1 mm DGF 2C EN RESTREINT UE COUNCIL OF Brussels, 7 May 2002 (28.06) THE EUROPEAN UNION (OR. en/fr) 8239/02 RESTREINT UE SCH-EVAL 11 COMIX 281 NOTE from : the Presidency to : the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation No. prev. doc. : 11617/3/01 SCH-EVAL 30 COMIX 624 + ADD 1 No. Cion prop. : 8095/02 SCH-EVAL 10 COMIX 277 + ADD 1 Subject : Report on the Schengen evaluation of France TABLE OF CONTENTS I. BORDERS ............................................................................................................................................................... 3 A. LAND BORDERS ................................................................................................................................................ 3 B. AIR BORDERS .................................................................................................................................................. 32 C. SEA BORDERS ................................................................................................................................................. 66 II. VISAS ..................................................................................................................................................................... 88 A. CASABLANCA ................................................................................................................................................. 90 B. GENEVA ......................................................................................................................................................... 101 III. SIS ......................................................................................................................................................................... 111 IV. DATA PROTECTION ........................................................................................................................................ 137 * * * 8239/02 urq/MCK/lpd 1 DG H RESTREINT UE EN RESTREINT UE PRELIMINARY REMARKS This report was drawn up on the basis of contributions by experts. The committee of experts received France's written opinions and attempted to reconcile the two documents as far as possible by correcting or adding paragraphs in the light of relevant comments. Contributions by France that supplement the information provided by the committee of experts are preceded by the sign "(F)" and shown in italics. Where differences of view remain, the experts' report has been expanded to present the French position as a footnote referring to the text concerned. 8239/02 urq/MCK/lpd 2 DG H RESTREINT UE EN RESTREINT UE I. BORDERS A. LAND BORDERS 1. Introduction Based on the mandate of the Schengen Evaluation Group (SCH/Com-ex (98) 26 Def) and the programme of evaluation adopted by the Council (8881/01 SCH-EVAL 17 COMIX 371), expert teams were sent to France. From 20 to 26 January, experts from the EU Member States, Norway, the Commission and the Council Secretariat reviewed external border controls and police cooperation. The following sites were visited: – Paris-Gare du Nord: exit controls towards the UK – London-Waterloo station: entry controls towards the Schengen area – Menton-Ventimillia: police cooperation with Italy – Thonex-Vallard: entry controls towards the Schengen area – Genève-Cornavin railway station: entry controls towards the Schengen area – Hendaye-Biriatou: police cooperation with Spain – Paris-SCCOPOL: information sharing and distribution and central level. The experts are grateful to the French authorities for having enabled them to gain a full insight into the strengths and weaknesses of France's operative set of measures. 8239/02 urq/MCK/lpd 3 DG H RESTREINT UE EN RESTREINT UE Participants E Presidency Antonio Pablo Gómez Vázquez Antonio Díaz Ramos José Luis María de Frutos (police cooperation) B Walther Rombaut D Jost Buch Bodo Kaping I Enrico Aragona NL E.H.M.L. Neerrijnen (land borders) R. Helsdingen (police cooperation) NO Svein Urdal A Günter Schnittler P Carlos Moreira FIN Olli Kolstela Kimmo Elomaa S Tommy Lomborn GSC Wouter van de Rijt COM Rudolf Roy Jacques Verraes 8239/02 urq/MCK/lpd 4 DG H RESTREINT UE EN RESTREINT UE 2. Executive summary The experts left France with mixed feelings: while police cooperation with neighbouring countries seemed very satisfactory, it appeared on the contrary that border controls with non-Schengen States (UK, Switzerland) received insufficient attention in terms of risk analysis, staff and equipment and therefore did not meet the Schengen standards. (F) In risk analysis terms, France believes that the migratory risk posed by its neighbouring non-Schengen countries (United Kingdom and Switzerland) is limited, particularly compared with the risks at other external Schengen borders. Technical means and human resources were considered insufficient both at border crossing points (BCPs) held by the Police aux Frontières and those held by customs. The experts' findings in this respect are confirmed both by the figures showing the distribution of staff allocated to border controls with police and with customs and by information provided to the experts by local staff. The border surveillance between the BCPs as well as surveillance on BCPs outside opening hours and on other roads crossing the external border cannot be considered effective. Since surveillance is carried out in a very random way, the authorities cannot have a comprehensive knowledge about the illegal immigration or smuggling situation on the so called green border. Furthermore, experts found that access to SIS was often unsatisfactory, in terms of equipment, communication and training. The experts were of the opinion that the policy decision taken in November 1995 at central level to transfer responsibility for the vast majority of BCPs to customs was based on financial considerations, with insufficient accompanying measures to ensure a secure situation under the new arrangements. In particular, it appears that customs do not have the same legal power to perform checks as the police had before such powers were transferred. 8239/02 urq/MCK/lpd 5 DG H RESTREINT UE EN RESTREINT UE (F) The decision to transfer responsibility was taken in the context of the complementary relationship between the police and customs forces sharing a common mission. As far as border control is concerned, the customs authorities have the same legal powers to refuse entry as the border police (PAF). France should therefore consider reinforcing the technical and human resources available to police and customs and/or building genuine multi-agency teams (police, Gendarmerie, customs) in order to exploit synergies. The need for synergies exists at all levels, and, to exploit synergies to the full, it is advisable to develop an effective, cooperative way of thinking and acting throughout the whole field of border security and police cooperation. These findings are considered worrying for the internal security of France and its Schengen Partners as well as for the candidate countries. 3. Background External borders It is important to recall that the French authorities had already decided in 1995 to divide the responsibility for border controls between customs, in charge nowadays of 184 authorised border crossing points (BCPs) and the police, which operates 41 BCPs. However, the powers of the two law enforcement agencies in fighting illegal immigration are not the same. They do not fall under the same Ministry. Complementarity of services would therefore be necessary. Police cooperation France is making use of two instruments to encourage police cooperation, namely Articles 39 et seq of the Schengen Convention on the one hand, and bilateral agreements between contracting Parties with a common border (under Article 39(5) of the Schengen Convention) on the other hand. – Direct exchanges of information – Creation of police and customs cooperation centres (PCCCs). PCCCs are in place or will be in place in the near future with Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg. There will also be a PCCC with Switzerland. 8239/02 urq/MCK/lpd 6 DG H RESTREINT UE EN RESTREINT UE Schengen exit controls at Gare du Nord to the UK 1 Within the premises giving access to the Eurostar from Paris to London at the Gare du Nord, there are two control booths available for exit controls. This exit control is performed by the Brigade des Chemins de Fer. Immediately behind the French Schengen-exit controls, the UKIS. (United Kingdom Immigration Service) performs a systematic UK entry control, which is separate from any Schengen procedure and not the purpose of this report. Furthermore, there is a so-called second line facility of the French police downstairs. The task of performing exit-controls is compulsory under Schengen rules. There is also pressure on France to perform 100% exit controls, owing to the attraction of the UK to immigrants. SIS verifications require a telephone call to be made to the second line, where one PC is available. An average of 10 verifications a day was mentioned. There are approximately 8 000 to 10 000 passengers a day travelling to London, of which some 25% are non-EU/EEA* citizens. The experts