MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA
FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH STUDIÍ
Beyond the borders of the everyday: a sociological analysis of Lukashenka's authority
Diplomová práce
BC. DMITRII KOPYSOV
Vedoucí práce: doc. Mgr. Pavel Pospěch, Ph.D.
Katedra sociologie Program Sociologie
Brno 2021
MUNI FSS BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE EVERYDAY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LUKASHENKA'S AUTHORITY
Bibliografický záznam
Autor: BC. DMITRII KOPYSOV Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykova univerzita Katedra sociologie Název práce: Beyond the borders of the everyday: a sociological analysis of Lukashenka's authority Studijní program: Sociologie
Vedoucí práce: doc. Mgr. Pavel Pospěch, Ph.D.
Rok: 2021 Počet stran: 67
Klíčová slova: Legitimacy, power, authority, protests, Aleksandr Lukashenka, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Republic of Belarus, authoritarian regime, social institutions, post-soviet countries
2 BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE EVERYDAY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LUKASHENKA'S AUTHORITY
Bibliographic record
Author: BC. DMITRII KOPYSOV Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University Department of Sociology
Title of Thesis: Beyond the borders of the everyday: a sociological analysis of Lukashenka's authority Degree Programme: Sociology Supervisor: doc. Mgr. Pavel Pospěch, Ph.D. Year: 2021 Number of Pages: 67 Keywords: Legitimacy power, authority, protests, Aleksandr Lukashenka, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Republic of Belarus, authoritarian regime, social institutions, post-soviet countries
3 BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE EVERYDAY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LUKASHENKA'S AUTHORITY
Anotace
Diplomová práce je venovaná sociologické analýze autority Lukašenkova režimu. Výzkum se zaměřen na analýze konceptu autority které jsou po psané Maxem Webrem, Ivanem Szelenzim a Pertti Alasuutari. Výzkum je věnován specifickému příkladu Běloruské Republiky a analyzuje moc au toritářského režimu. Autor zkoumá základy autoritářské moci při po moci metody obsahové analýzy akademických textu a materiálů z masmédia. Klíčovou otázkou výzkumu je "Jak autoritářský režim určuje svou autoritu a jaké jsou podmínky jí legitimity?".
Počet znaků práce: 132 360
4 BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE EVERYDAY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LUKASHENKA'S AUTHORITY
Abstract
The master's thesis focuses on the sociological analysis of Lukashenka's authority. The thesis is dedicated to analyzing the concept of authority studied by Weber, Szelenyi, and Alasuutari. The work presents an analy• sis of the domination of the authoritarian power based on the specific case of Belarus. Through content analysis of the academic researches and mass media, the author observes the basis of the authoritarian power. The critical question of the research is "How the authoritarian regime es• tablishes the authority and proves its legitimacy?".
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BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE EVERYDAY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LUKASHENKA'S AUTHORITY
Declaration
Prohlašuji, že jsem práci na téma Beyond the borders of the everyday: a sociological analysis of Lukashenka's authority zpracoval sám. Veš keré prameny a zdroje informací, které jsem použil k sepsání této práce, byly citovány v textu a jsou uvedeny v seznamu použitých pramenů a li teratury.
Brno May 19, 2021 BC. DMITRII KOPYSOV
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BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THE EVERYDAY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF LUKASHENKA'S AUTHORITY
Acknowledgements
I want to thank my supervisor, doc. Mgr. Pavel Pospěch, Ph.D. who has been incredibly helpful. I am appreciated to doc. Mgr. Pospěch for his mentoring reading drafts, and all suggested recommendations, which he made during the work. I want to thank the Faculty of Social Studies, and especially the Depart ment of Sociology, for the opportunity to obtain a Master's degree and write this thesis.
Šablona DP 3.2.0-FSS-anglicky (2021-03-18) © 2014, 2016, 2018-2021 Masarykova univerzita 9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 13
2 Theoretical frameworks 15 2.1 From the concept of institutionalization to power 16 2.2 The concept of power and legitimacy 21 2.3 The alternative perspective of the theory of authority 25 2.4 Symbolic capital as evidence of the state power 28 2.5 The authority in post-communist countries 29
3 Belarusian protests as a representation of the extraordinary situation 32 3.1 The Lukashenka presidency: context and formation of legitimacy 32 3.2 The crisis of legitimacy and formation of the opposite institution 41 3.3 The presidential election 2020 and the Lukashenka presidency during the protests 47
4 Conclusion 53
Bibliography 60
Name Index 65
11
INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
The presidential elections in Belarus in 2020 established a field for researches of protests and authority. Massive demonstrations, which started on the 9th August 2020, created the basis for the political and social researches and interest for Western and Russian media. Analysts, experts, and scientists who analyzed the current situation in the Republic of Belarus and underlined that the last voting campaign varied from pre• vious election periods. The numbers willing to nominate challengers hailing outside the traditional opposition and polls suggested that the president commands very little public support. In addition, after the elec• tions became a period of protests which proceed for a much more ex• tended period than before (the paper is writing in May 2021, when pro• tests proceed for ten months) and occupied not only the capital city Minsk but also other regions of the republic (Challis, 2020). Many political types of research are dedicated to analyzing the Bel- arusian regime and events that follow its establishment. Political scien• tists like Hall, Marples, and Wilson presented an empirical analysis of Aleksandr Lukashenka's regime and highlighted in detail what mecha• nisms and events the current Belarusian president used for establishing and strengthening his authority. Belarusian authoritarian regime arouses the interest of various researchers, and specialist like Ivan Szelenyi underlines that Belarus is a unique case of a European post-so• viet country that did not move toward a democratic and liberal state; however, it established an autocratic type of power which is closer to Chinese or Vietnamese types (Szelenyi, 2016). The former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, describing the political and social situation in Belarus, listed the Republic of Belarus as an "outposts of tyranny" like Cuba, Iran, and North Korea. (Marples, 2009). Most empirical researches dedicated to the Belarusian regime describe the context of Lukashenka's presidency and how he accumulated the full range of state power in his hands as well as the support of the majority of the population. The following thesis presents the review of the theoretical princi• ples of the authority theories formulated by Weber, Szelenyi, Alasuutari, and other researchers. The thesis establishes the sociological analysis of the evolution of Lukashenka's authority and describes the specific char• acteristics of the authority in the authoritarian regime. The question of
13 INTRODUCTION the analysis is "How the authority develops in a post-soviet authoritarian country?". The theoretical chapters present the basis for the following empiri• cal analysis of the reasons for the current situation in Belarus. The sec• ond part of the work presents the analysis of the historical context of Lukashenka's presidency from 1994 until 2020. Lukashenka is an exam• ple of an authoritarian leader who adapts his policy according to the needs and requirements of society. He used public requirements to sup• port his authority and establishing an authoritarian regime. The second chapter of the thesis describes how Lukashenka created the political structure for retaining his own power as a president. Special attention will be given to the first presidential term, when Lukashenka won the election, earned the support of the majority, and created a basis for his power, on the other hand, to the presidential campaign in 2020 and the following massive protests, with the focus on consequences that it caused for Lukashenka's authority according to theories of authority by Weber and Alasuutari theories. The analysis describes the political and communication strategies of president Aleksandr Lukashenka and opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and connects it with socio• logical and political studies, which caused massive protests in Belarusian society and challenged the legitimacy of the Belarusian president Ale• ksandr Lukashenka.
14 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
2 Theoretical frameworks
The paper's primary purpose is to describe the mechanism of the legitimacy of uncommon situations of authoritarian power. Most studies focus on observations examples of the social fact of liberal power, while the authoritarian power is claimed as illegitimate. The thesis is dedicated to observing principles of authority in the authoritarian country and ana• lyzing its legitimacy. The term of social fact was determined by the French sociologist Emil Dürkheim, and according to his definition, the social facts are manners of acting thinking and feeling external to the individual, and which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over the individual (Dürkheim, 1982). The crucial feature of social fact is the social character. The basis for the social fact lies out individual phenomena; the individual is not a substratum for the social fact so that they can have none other than society as a substra• tum, either political society in its entirely or one of the partial groups that it includes - religious denominations, political and literary schools, occu• pational corporations, etc. (Dürkheim, 1982). Social facts are created out of individuals, and they cannot be reduced to the individual level. Based on this definition, as a social fact could be observed a broad scope of phe• nomena that occur within society. Social facts could be determined, for example, institutions, statuses, roles, laws, beliefs, population distri• bution, urbanization, etc. Social facts include social institutions, social activities, and the strata of society - for example, the class structure, sub• cultures, etc. The research will focus on the analysis of legitimization of the excepti• onal situation when the people legitimize the illegal social institutions oppo• site to the illegitimate legal institution. Their main method for the research will be qualitative content analysis using secondary sources and other sources from the media sphere, which allow understanding of the main characteristics of institutions and the historical context of their creation. A historical context is an essential part of the analysis of social institutions and the process of their legitimization. The paper includes theoretical observation of the concept of institutio• nalization and theories of authority and its legitimization inside society and includes analyzing the empirical case of the Republic of Belarus. Referencing the theory of legitimacy and institutionalization to the Belarusian case, the vital issue is to understand the historical context of the institutions' creation.
15 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Berger and Luckman mentioned that it is essential for understanding the so• cial institution to analyze the historical context of its creation. The theory of institutionalization will be observed later in this work.
2.1 From the concept of institutionalization to power
The concept of institutionalization was described in detail by Berger and Luckman in „The social construction of reality: A treatise in the soci• ology of knowledge", where sociologists described the origin of instituti• onalization and how it functions in the social world. Berger and Luckman started their observation from the description of human existence in the context of social and biological worlds. In comparison with animals, pe• ople affect their environment and create it through the common effort, including all socio-cultural and psychological features, which can not be observed as a result of the biological nature of the human. Institutionali• zation is a part of humans' social world. Institutionalization has a social character and forms common fra• mes for all members of society. Processes of habitualization, creating pat• terns of human behavior, precede any institutionalization. Institutions are the product of shared history, and the understanding of the instituti• ons is closely tied with his historical context. Furthermore, institutions deploy control under human behavior. "It is important to stress that this controlling character is inherent in institutionalization as such, prior to or apart from any mechanisms of sanctions specifically set up to support an institution. Institutions also, by the very fact of their existence, control hu• man conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would theore• tically be possible. It is important to stress that this controlling character is inherent in institutionalization as such, prior to or apart from any me• chanisms of sanctions specifically set up to support an institution." (Berger & Luckman, 1966). Two principles of institutions are historicity and control. Mutual ha- bitualizations of activities are creating during the general history. Insti• tutions always have history, and they are a product of it. It is impossible to understand the institutionalization and institutions as a product of it without understanding the historical process, which occurs during the creation of institutions. That statement is critical for the following re• search. Belarus in the early 1990s is a young country without a stable
16 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS and efficient political system. It was the first experience of the indepen• dent creating of political institutions. In this case, historical context pla• yed a crucial role. Belarus faced independence with a positive attitude to the Soviet past. Thus, the political system from the last years of Soviet history was chosen as an example for Belarusian institutions. Here is an example of mutual habitualization, when the institutions are creating un• der the influence of shared history. The institution of the president, which characteristics are close to the soviet president, is an example of mutual habitualization of behavior patterns and institutionalization in the case of Belarus. Furthermore, institutions control individual behavior, setting up predefined patterns, which attach one of many possible theoretical di• rections to behavior. The crucial point is controlling character inherent in institutionalization per se, independently regardless (and before) of creating any sanction mechanisms that support institutions. Those me• chanisms, which create social control system, exist in many institutions (Berger & Luckman, 1966). Creating human behavior institutions as habitualized patterns of it have close ties with humans as actors. Institutionalization occurs whene• ver takes place mutual classification of habitual activities by various actors. Following this statement, institutionalization always takes place, where is habitualization. Also, there is mutual institutional habituali• zation and typicality not only activities but also actors inside institutions. The habitualization of activities is understandable for members of a spe• cific group, and the institution habitualizes individual actors and concrete activities. The institution set the principle that X-type actions should be made by X-type actors (Berger & Luckman, 1966). The institutional world is perceived as an objective reality. It has its own history, and this history has objective character, same as a tradition of institutions' existence. Institutions as historical and objective facticity appear as undeniable facts. In this regard, the institutions appear as an external factor for individuals, saving their reality despite the relation of individuals to it. Institutions resist individuals' attempts to change it or manage without them. They have coercive power over him. It is essential to remember that the human creates the objectivity of the institutional world. Although the social world is marked by objectivity in human per• ception, thus it did not acquire ontological status, independent of human activity which creates it (Berger & Luckman, 1966).
17 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
At the same time, despite the fact that the institution defines and controls human behavior and is closely tied with the human as an actor, it is independent of individuals somehow. Institutions exist out of indivi• duals, and the institutional world is defined as objective reality, where the individual exists as a part of the objective history of society, and this history supports the objective character. Institutions have external power under the individuals and exist independently from them. They cannot be deleted because of the wish of one concrete individual. "They resist his attempts to change or evade them. They have coercive power over him, both in themselves, by the sheer force of their facticity, and through the control mechanisms that are usually attached to the most important of them." (Berger & Luckman, 1966). While the president Lukashenka performs the role under the con• trol of the institutional order, he has a wide range of responsibilities as a president. It was promoted by society through the acceptance of strong centralized institutions during mutual typing of general Soviet history. However, he was always evaluated and criticized for his actions which were out of bounds of institutional responsibilities. For example, after the referendum in 2004, when was declared the right to participate in elections without any terms restrictions. This example shows the ability of institutions to limit human behavior and presents the concept of role - president Lukashenka performs inside the limits and rules under the impersonal institutional order. The institution of the president has a con• trolling position, at the same time, citizens and other institutions also evaluate Lukashenka as an actor who represents the institution. Luka• shenka had the power to make changes in the constitution through a re• ferendum established by the president's wish (Sputnik, 2021). Luka- shenka's actions in 2004 caused the charges in violations of the instituti• onal frames. According to Michail Pastuchov, who is the former judge of the Constitutional Court, this referendum is not legal due to the Consti• tution. Moreover, he mentioned that article 112 of the Election Code does not allow considering issues related to election and dismissing the pre• sident through a referendum (Corsac, 2020). The term of the role is crucial for the description of institutionali• zation and its influence on human behavior. Lukashenka represents the institution of the president, and he acts according to frames established by the institution. In this case, his legitimacy is evaluating according to the compliance between the institution and its representative. Berger and Luckman used the „role" to describe the position of the individuals
18 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS and the directions of behavioral patterns in the frames of the institution. The construction of role typologies is necessary to correlate with insti• tutional behavior. Using the role concept, institutions are translated through individual experience, and there are standards of role-playing behavior pattern, which are available for all members of the society or at least for the actor, who will perform that role. Berger and Luckman describe the mechanism of roles' functionality through the example of the judge. And participating in deliberating the verdict means perfor• mance as the judge. The individual who deliberates the verdict only commits to the role of judge. The roles represent an institutional order at two levels. Firstly role performance represents itself. Second, the role is the institutional conditionality of behavior. The role of the judge is lin• ked to other roles, all of which constitute the institution of law. The judge acts as a representative of this institution. As a result, the role represents the institution, and they allow institutions to exist permanently and pre• sent individuals' experiences. The mechanism of applying the role con• cept could be described as „every actor, who performsXrole is responsible for following standards, which were created according to the context of in• stitutional traditions and which are used as evidence of the authority of all actors, also standards exist as controlling mechanisms" (Berger & Luc• kman, 1966). Lukashenka operates in compliance with institutional order. He es• tablishes his will based on opportunities collected from the institution, and all his actions are acceptable because of acceptance of the institutio• nal order by society. However, all issues related to charges in his illegiti• macy are dedicated to violations of representative borders settled by the institution. Some decrees, referendums, and repressions are out of bounds according to the presidential institution representative's respon• sibilities, and those charges refer to Berger and Luckman's concept of role. Roles, same as institutions, are the product of habitualization and objectification. Every institution can not exist without roles as represen• tatives of institutional behavior. Roles have controlling nature. When actors were typed as performers of roles, their behavior was being sub• jected to coercion. Inside the perspective of institutional order, roles ap• pear as institutional representatives and links mediating institutionally objective systems of knowledge. Each role has a part of socially defined knowledge. Addressing the role issue, on the one hand, the institutional order is real because it is realized in the executed roles, on the other
19 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS hand, roles represent institutional order, which defines their character and gives them objective meaning (Berger & Luckman, 1966). The insti• tutional order is real because actors perform their roles and realize the institution through it. At the same time, the role represents institutional order, which defines their character and gives them objective meaning. As a controlling mechanism created by social reality, the institutions have a mechanism of its creation and the legitimacy of its power gained from society. Legitimacy creates not only reasons for doing the action but also meaning. The knowledge precedes the values of institutions' legiti• macy. As a product of society, institutions receive their power from soci• ety, "despite the objectivity that marks the social world in human experi• ence, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the hu• man activity that produced it. At the moment, it is important to emphasize that the relationship between man, the producer, and the social world, his product, is and remains a dialectical one. That is, man (not of course, in isolation but in his collectivities) and his social world interact with each other. The product acts back upon the producer." (Berger & Luckman, 1966). Regarding power as thematized in The Social Construction of Rea• lity, the idea is decisive that objective reality is always connected to sub• jective reality, that subjective meaning is transferred into objective social facts that in turn determine the constitution of subjective reality. This systematic interconnection is described as a ..dialectical relationship between objective and subjective reality" (Dreher, 2016). The connection between a human as a creator and the social world as a product is dialectic and will stay the same. The social world and hu• mans interact with each other. The product has the reverse effect on the creator. Externalization and objectification are two features of the conti• nuous dialectic process. The third feature is internalization, which trans• forms the objective social world into consciousness raised during socia• lization. There is a fundamental connection between three dialectic fea• tures of the social reality, and they correspond to crucial characteristics of the social world. Society is the human product, the society is the ob• jective reality, and the human is the social product. The analysis of the social world will be incomplete and distorted without an understanding of those moments. At the same time, the institutional world needs legiti• macy as a method of explanation and justification. The extending insti• tutional order creates legitimacy. This legitimacy learns by the following generations through the same process that socializes them in the
20 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS institutional order. Institutions must deploy their power under the indi• vidual independently of subjective meanings, which institutions can give to each specific situation (Berger & Luckman, 1966). Berger and Luckman's theory of institutionalization will be used to observe the historical context when the social institution was created. Berger and Luckman mentioned that it is crucial for institutional analysis to understand the historical context, and the first task of the work will be dedicated to that issue. Then this theory will be used for the description of actors' roles. People represent the social institution and perform ac• cording to rules and setups formed as roles.
2.2 The concept of power and legitimacy
As was mentioned before, the institution as a product of the social world needs the legitimacy and power to control human behavior. That power is under individuals, and the sources of its legitimacy lie inside society. Necessary to describe the mechanism of power and the way of legitimacy creation. This phenomenon is well described in Weber's work "Politics as a Vocation". Weber defined power as "the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even aga• inst the resistance of others". One of the fields where power appears is the "legal order". The observation of power in this field relates to the po• litical sphere, which will be observed during this paper. Another impor• tant term for Weber's theory is legitimacy. The legitimacy is used to ap• prove authorities' actions and allow them to rightfully exercise domina• tion over other members of society. Legitimate domination is possessing the ability to "rightfully" exercise domination over others. Through these proves, authorities legitimate their actions and actions of individuals who follow their commands (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021). Weber described three types of ideal types of legitimate domina• tion/authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal/rational. The pure type of authority does not exist, and there is always the combination of types, but for understanding the essence of the domination phenomena and for the following empirical analysis is crucial to describe pure types of authorities. The first type is traditional authority. The legitimacy of its power is based on an "established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditi• ons". This type of authority is typical in societies where the king rules or
21 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS a tribal structure of society. Individuals obey neither rules nor laws but to the concrete person, whose power transfers because of inheritance and based on upper human or sacred order (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021). As mentioned above, the pure type of authority does not exist, and the traditional authority is related to Belarusian. The common soviet order was habitual for the Belarusian society. Hence, it affected not only the process of institutionalization but also the traditional ground for Luka- shenka's presidential authority. Individuals obey the concrete leader, who took up his position ac• cording to tradition by inheritance or was chosen according to the tra• dition by the concrete master. Appelrouth and Edles note that the commands of such a leader whose authority is traditional are legitimized in one of two ways: - ..partly in terms of traditions which themselves directly determine the content of the command and are believed to be valid within certain li• mits that cannot be overstepped without endangering the master's traditi• onal status" (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021); - ..partly in terms of the master's discretion in that sphere which tra• dition leaves open to him; this traditional prerogative rests primarily on the fact that the obligations of personal obedience tend to be essentially unlimited" (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021). In this situation, the traditional authority is not about the heredity and natural character of Lukashenka's authority. Traditional authority defined the character of power and gave almost unlimited acceptance to the leader's centralized power, which was consistent with soviet autho• rity. The second type is based on the charisma of the concrete leader. The leader gains specific characteristics created during the historical event when the leader demonstrated extraordinary performance, and society interprets it as a miracle of a hero. The extraordinary perfor• mance allows talking about the specific charisma of the leader and gives him the superhuman position in the minds of the society, which em• powers the leader with extraordinary qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a "leader." This type of authority is close to the first type by the loyalty dedicated to the concrete person. In contrast with traditional authority, charisma is not related to his• tory and tradition. The leader gains specific characteristics created
22 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS during the historical event when the leader demonstrated extraordinary performance, and society interprets it as a miracle of a hero. This type represents the power of the concrete individual, and "there are no exter• nal or preexisting limits to a charismatic leader's commandments and demand for obedience" (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021). On the other hand, the charismatic type of authority has specific fe• atures. It is unstable and highly depends on the personality of the leader and his charisma. The charisma of a leader is connected with his extraor• dinary performance and supports his legitimacy, only if he continues to demonstrate this "miracle" and provide benefits to his followers. If the leader's prophecies are proved wrong if enemies are not defeated, if miraculous deeds begin to "dry up," then his legitimacy will experience the lack of support. In an authoritarian regime, an image of a leader is essential. In the Belarusian case, when society experiences a lack of stability and leade• rship, a strong leader who can find a solution for those issues accumulate the support of his authority. Lukashenka became the leader who faced those issues and represented public will in the 90s. He established cha• rismatic authority and constantly adapted his communicational strategy to strengthening it. Szelenyi describes the importance of charisma for au• thoritarian regimes and later will be further presented how Lukashenka created his charismatic authority at the beginning of rule and support it during all presidential terms, especially during the protests in 2020. The third type of authority described by Weber is based on the rule of rules and laws. The rational-legal authority deploys the domination based on obedience to impersonal legal order. "Obedience is owed not to the person who exercises authority but to the office or position in which authority is vested". Applerouth and Edles describing Weber's theory declared that governments are organized on rational-legal authority in modern states. In this situation, the power is dedicated to the position or the institution, not to the person (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021). In contrast, the third type dedicates the legitimate domination to rational laws and the office, which are represented by the concrete leader of the institution. This type of authority creates the strictest external frames for the leader, which performs the role of institution representative and should follow the rules applied by the institution. The pure type of legal authority is based on mutual activities. Legal norms are the product of the social world and gain their power from so• ciety and have a form of rational rules that obey all society members. The
23 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS legal authority extends to all individuals, including members of the im• personal institute. Thus, the leader whose domination is supported by the rational-legal authority also must act according to frames created by the institution. Society obeys the leader, but at the same time, this obedi• ence is dedicated not to the concrete leader but the impersonal order. And authoritarian leaders always refer to the legal side of their power. Lukashenka receives his power through regular elections, his responsi• bilities are described by the Constitution and other laws, and when he makes a change, he operates through referendums and decrees that give legal power to his actions. The two first types of authority are closely tied with the leader's identity and are primarily based on his person or his sacred position in• side society. Opposite to them, the third type is less connected with the personality of the leader. The crucial position is occurred by the rational rules, which dedicate the power and right to exercise domination over other members of society. However, in describing societies, the law de• dicates power to the concrete person. It means that the typical person in authority is subject to an impersonal order by orienting his actions to it in his dispositions and commands. It is relevant not only for simple "offi• cial" but, for instance, for the elected president of a state. The president of the state occupies his position of dominance by virtue of election (Ap- pelrouth & Edles, 2021). Max Weber died in 1920, and his description of types of authority represents the situation at that time. Because of this fact, there are theo• rists that supplement Weber's theory, one of them is Ivan Szelenyi, who referenced Weber's theory and added the fourth type of authority, which is relevant to the modern situation. Observing Weber's theory about power and authority, Szelenyi emphasized that the current system is le• gitimate only until those who follow the order of authority accept this order, and the society does not have an opportunity for a better alterna• tive. His work „Weber's theory of domination and post-communist capi• talisms" has focused on reviewing types of authorities and their applica• tion on empirical cases. He observed three types of authorities, which were described above. He mentioned that only legal-rational authority is relevant for modern and capitalist society. The crucial point of Szelenyi's paper that he also describes the fourth type of authority, when the legitimacy comes from the „will" of people. People are subjected to domination, and the fourth type still pro• duces the system of domination „rather than the realm of freedom." As
24 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Szelenyi mentioned, this is an „ironic definition of democratic legitimacy" (after all, this is the will of those ..subjected to authority, not the will of "free citizens" (Szelenyi, 2016).
2.3 The alternative perspective of the theory of authority
Pertti Alasuutari presents his own point of view of the theory of au• thority. His theory is quite similar to Weber's classical treatment. He also defined different types of authority. This concept of authority describes how actors could establish domination and affect others' behavior that creates the condition to achieve their own goals. Alasuutari highlights that this kind of strategy could be described from a societal perspective as a scope of various techniques and specific types of knowledge that control people's behavior through their aspirations, interests, and be• liefs. Described work could be characterized as epistemic. It focuses on three aspects of the social world that are essential for describing specific forms of authority: people's understanding of the environment's ontol• ogy, their identifications, and their conceptions of what is suitable or de• sirable. The crucial feature of authority is a relational character: there is always an individual or a thing recognized by other members of society. In this case, society treats that authoritative subject in a specific way; moreover, they correct their behavior according to the authoritative or• der (Alasuutari, 2017). Despite the fact that Alasuutari describes the phenomenon of au• thority in quite a similar way as it was observed in Weber's works, the difference between the two theories is significant. According to Weber's theory, authority or legitimate domination is defined as possessing the ability to "rightfully" exercise domination over others. Power is the abil• ity of someone or something to establish order and affect others' will even there is resistance. Authority is described as the rightful ability of the individual to subordinate others to his will. Legitimate domination and violence are opposite terms (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021). Alasuutari describes power and authority as close concepts. They refer to the ability of the individual to rule people and control their behavior. The individual refers to different factors which strengthen his power, and he expects that other people will respect or fear the grounds of authority. Thus, au• thority means a broad scope of techniques that actors use to realize their own will in society even with fear. Such relations between the actor and
25 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS those who obey him show that they recognize his power and take it into account. Authority is not only about persuasion; violence and coercion can be used as methods of control (Alasuutari, 2018). Observing the concept of authority, he declared that authority is closely connected with violence, and his theory is related to Weber's theory, which declared that the state employs its domination through the using of force, it has a unique position inside society by having a mono• poly on legitimate coercion (Alasuutari, 2018). At the same time, Ala• suutari describes authority in different ways than Weber. In his paper "Authority as epistemic capital" were described capacity-based, moral, ontological, and charismatic types of authorities. The following part of the paper will be dedicated to observing those types of authorities. The first type of authority refers to the opportunity of the potential event. The capacity-based authority demonstrates when common wills, perceptions, and ideas create conditions for the event, affecting the actor and stimulating them to act in concrete frames designed by capa• city. Avant et al. use this term to reference authority that derives from and is justified by the task the authority is supposed to perform for a community (Avant, Finnemore, Sell, 2010). For a demonstration of that authority, Alasuutari used the case of political protest. A disagreement of a single individual or small group of individuals will not lead to a reaction from the government. The situation will change dramatically when the masses will support this individual. The governments will react to this disagreement to save their positions. Also, they will evaluate the capacity of the future consequences which could follow after their response (Ala• suutari, 2018). Alasuutari has also defined a specific type of capacity-based autho• rity as the result of the use or threat of violence. This point of view is different from others theories because specialists claim that violence de• stroys the legitimacy of power. On the other hand, Alasuutari says that threats and acts of violence also product the authority: they contribute to making an actor worth taking account of when others are considering their moves. In this case, capacity is the ability to use violence and force. The authority of dictators could be described through these factors, and it is based on the power of fear and make people take the source of vi• olence into account. The force influences the population and shows what type of behavior is expecting by the authority. At the same time, Ala• suutari makes an essential remark that this type of capacity-based aut• hority is risky and could be used as a last resort because it should lead to
26 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS a lack of loyalty, legitimacy and create resistance from the population (Alasuutari, 2018). Ontological authority demonstrates the power of the fact. "Appea• ling to reality and to what is possible and feasible in the current state of affairs is influential because it appears to depoliticize decision-making by making it science-based "(Alasuutari, 2018). Using incontrovertible data gives the individual or the phenomena a dominant position under others. Those facts and domination can have no connection with the opinion of the producer of facts. For example, neutral scientific research could support the dominant position of some individuals through using that research for reinforcement of their point of view. This situation could be used to involve neutral persons in political processes. The next type of authority described by Alasuutari is also based on knowledge. The moral authority serves for employing the type of power based on common rules and principles. "The law, judges and legal insti• tutions are an obvious example; religious rules, priests and the church are a parallel case." Alasuutari mentioned that not only common principles make sense for moral authority, but it also is relevant to speak about norms or standards regarding acceptable or desired conduct (Alasuutari, 2018). The last type of authority is the charismatic authority which description is close to Weber's definition. At the same time, Alasuutari made an emphasis on the fact that charisma is a phenomenon, which could be produced not only by the individuals. No doubt, individuals could gain power through their charisma, produced by the extraordinary performance. At the same time, individuals could get charisma from the institution. After being chosen for the representation of the institution, the individual adopts specific features of it. Those forms of authority are closely tied with each other and could exist as a mixture during the concrete event. "Forms of authority are also accumulated into generalized epistemic capital attached to actors, texts, and principles. They constitute the self-evidence of the social world that actors' attempts to advance their goals call into question knowingly or in• tuitively" (Alasuutari, 2018). Alasuutari's concept not only develops Weber's theory but presents a basis for the description of authoritarian power. Observing the theory of authority, Alasuutari makes a critical remark about the possibility of authority based on violence and fear. However, Alassutari is quite careful in his definitions by calling some types of authority questionable
27 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
(illegitimate). Authoritarian cases use capacity-based authority, and Ala- suutari mentions that their legitimacy could be questionable. This sta• tement is crucial for the following description of the grounds of Luka- shenka's authority and analysis of his legitimacy.
2.4 Symbolic capital as evidence of the state power
As mentioned above, the described theory is used to describe the case of the Belarusian political situation. The theory of institutionali• zation describes the context of creating the Belarusian institution and the environments in which they exist. At the same time, it is crucial to ana• lyze the Belarusian case by using the concept of role, which was formu• lated in Berger's and Luckman's theory institutionalization, because those institutions are represented by concrete persons who got the aut• hority and power to control people, but act in frames limited by the in• stitution. The Belarusian case was based on a struggle between the current president Lukashenka and opposite leaders caused by the presi• dent's lack of support by citizens due to falsifications during voting and following forcibly dispersed protests. For the description of grounds of the authority of the current president and opposition leaders are used theories by Weber and other authors who studied this phenomenon. Those theories allow explaining why people support leaders and why their authority is legitimate. Furthermore, the authority and basis of the leaders' power are described by Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital. It shows how an official like the president receives their power by collecting the symbolic power of common interests and the state representative. It also describes the legitimacy of officials' actions, how it is created through shared interests and recognition, and how officials can use this power of symbolic capital by controlling citizens. The institution is a part of the social world created by the people, and people give grounds for its legitimacy. And the theory of authority describes in detail how individuals condition their power. People support the legitimacy of the concrete institution because of charisma, legality, common opinion, etc. And by giving the force to control the state and its citizens, people condition legitimacy of the certain patterns of conduct and social order by representing that they share a common set of beliefs. That means they give value to them and actions, also recognize
28 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS it. In other words, they assign symbolic power and give a symbolic capi• tal. As Bourdieu mentioned: "The state, which possesses the means of im• position and inculcation of the durable principles of vision and division that conform to its own structure, is the site par excellence of the concentration and exercise of symbolic power" (Bourdieu & Farage, 1994). One of the parts of symbolic capital is juridical capital, according to which the king or the president represents common interests and owes everybody security and justice. It serves to concentrate the symbolic ca• pital and accumulate political power in the leader's hands in the form of laws. By signing an official document like a decree of nomination, the pre• sident of the Republic mobilizes his symbolic capital accumulated in the network of relations and recognition, which create the bureaucracy. The nomination belongs to the category of official acts. They receive symbolic power because they are accomplished by authorized characters marked by the state as holders of a function or position. The state, acting in the manner of a bank of symbolic capital, guarantees all acts of authority. And the person who becomes the president receives the official title and is recognized by citizens as a holder of this title because of the state's power (Bourdieu & Farage, 1994).
2.5 The authority in post-communist countries
Ivan Szelenyi described the type of authority in communist and post-communist countries and what type of legitimation is relevant. First of all, it is important to describe the basis of communist legitimation. Sze• lenyi also emphasizes a crucial feature of the legitimate order, which is especially relevant for authoritarian post-communist countries. The le• gitimate power always assumes some degree (even if a weak one) of belief and voluntariness. People obey orders from an illegitimate authority merely if they are afraid of what will happen to them if they do not comply; they are concerned about their life and livelihood (Szelenyi, 2016). A group of communist regimes was established using systematic coercion and can not be described as free. Those regimes were despotic and ille• gitimate. However, other regimes have another ground for their domina• tion, and they rule because of the leader's charisma. For example, Lenin and Stalin's types of domination could be described in this way.
29 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
"Arguably, some communist orders had a strong charismatic appeal. The propaganda machine, the "personality cult" obviously was impor• tant in manufacturing such charisma, in generating enthusiasm and de• dication to the leaders who promised to deliver "miracles" through "re• volutionary change." (Szelenyi, 2016). So, as mentioned in the paper, communist domination has features of all types of authority, but Szelenyi is sure that the ground of communist rule is opposite to legal-rational. This statement is based on the history of communist regimes, which are formulary were organized on rational, legal, and democratic orders, at the same time there was designed the fake type of democracy. Post-communist countries' domination is connected with commu• nist history. There are different types of domination forms. After the collapse of the communist bloc, countries like China are still socialist and can not be described through legal-rational legitimation. Other countries move in the direction of democratic transformations, even some of those transformations were made with bias. Post-soviet countries established multi-partial elections, but at the same time, the former elite of commu• nist regimes was highly involved in the process of private properly dis• tribution. That caused the deviation from the ideal legal-rational type of domination because those processes were not inherent to democracy. The following analysis is relevant to observe the case of Russian transformation after the collapse of the USSR. The power will be concen• trated in the hands of the leader, this regime is not completely democra• tic, but the established structure has legal-rational features. Further• more, Russia continues to transform from a liberal country to an autocra• tic one. As Szelenyi mentioned, post-communist countries emerging "a novel combination of legal-rational authority operating with a rather or even excessively managed democratic framework combined with some aspects of patrimonialism, when the administrative staff appropriates particular powers, and, more recently, prebendalism, when the members of administrative staff are purely personal instruments of the master." (Szelenyi, 2016). As a result, the described domination has traits of all types of authority. Prebendalism is the type of traditional authority when the leader has charisma, does not matter its nature, and there are featu• res of legal-rational authority. The theory of authority and power formulated by Weber, and theo• ries of authority by Szelenyi and Alasuutari, which reference Weber's ideas, are crucial for that paper and analysis of the extraordinary situ• ation. The theory of authority will be used for the description of grounds
30 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS of observing institutions' power. The topic of authority basis is important because it shows the reasons for institution legitimization. The theory of authority describes which institution is considered legitimate and what conditions caused that legitimization. Using these definitions will be analyzed the case of the current Be- larusian political situation, which began on 10th August, when were an• nounced the official election results, and Lukashenka was declared as a winner and the next president of the Belarusian republic. This event star• ted large-scale protests of people who do not recognize results, support an opposite leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and demand new and free presidential elections. Those protests were actively held over several months. During the political crisis and the confrontation between the current president and the opposition, was created a social institution as the Coordination Council. This institution remarked as representative protest masses and the will of the Belarusian nation in opposition to the institution of the president. The president as the representative of the people was rejected, and society and the global community recognized the Coordination Council as a representation of the people demanding democratic change in Belarus. This case will be used for analyzing the executive and two social in• stitutions like the president of the republic and an opposition leader de• signed for playing a role of representation of it. Theories formulated by Weber, Szelenyi, Alasuutari, and others demonstrate the justification of the authority based on different reasons, it will be applied on case of Be• larus and actors who act in these environments, for definition the basis of their authority, reasons for its decrease and transfer of symbolic capi• tal. The institutionalization theory presents the definition of the histori• cal context of the institutions' creation, roles, and frames of its represen• tation. The next chapter of the paper will be dedicated to observing the historical context of Lukashenka's Presidency and the definition of his authority.
31 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
3 Belarusian protests as a representation of the extraordinary situation
This paper includes an analysis of the current situation in the Re• public of Belarus, where the current president Aleksandr Lukashenka ex• periences the lack of legitimacy of his authority after the announcement of election results. Lukashenka became the president of the republic af• ter the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and still holds office. The following chapters will be observed the historical context of the Luka• shenka Presidency, which allows us to show the formation of his legiti• macy, what reasons lead to the political crisis, and the crisis of legitimacy of the current legal president. This description of the historical context will describe the current regime and compare traditional and extraor• dinary institutions. The comparison will show the difference of authori• ty's grounds and demonstrate the process of its transfer from one insti• tution to another. The research will focus on the analysis of legiti• mization of the exceptional situation when the people legitimize the ille• gal social institutions opposite to the illegitimate legal institution.
3.1 The Lukashenka presidency: context and formation of legitimacy
As was mentioned above, the first task is to describe the historical context of the Lukashenka presidency from the USSR collapse until the presidential election in 2020. It is important to observe and understand how Aleksandr Lukashenka created his authority what pillars support it. His strategy did not experience dramatic changes during all presidential terms; it only adapts to some relevant issues. The Belarusian republic is a unique case between former socialist countries in East Europe and the Post-soviet area. As Szelenyi described in his work related to post- communist countries' authority, Belarus's case is different. While Euro• pean post-communist countries made their effort to liberal direction, Be• larus is described as an authoritarian country without any democratic reform, which makes it closer to post-communist or communist coun• tries from Asia than to European neighbors (Szelenyi, 2016). Aleksandr
32 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
Lukashenka is described as' the last dictator' of Europe (Frear, 2018), but his regime is authoritarian, not totalitarian. There are many definitions of the Belarusian political system, which support the meaning above or reject some points of it. For example, some studies describe Belarus as autocratic with democratic characteristics, a hybrid of democracy and dictatorship, or an autocratic regime with de• mocratic characteristics. For supporting this statement, they use the Be• larusian Constitution and elections as signs of democracy (Terzyan, 2019). Nevertheless, studies agree that Lukashenka's regime is authorita• rian, and as von Soest underlined in his work, the primary purpose of the authoritarian governments' policies is to support its power. Due to that fact, authoritarian leaders constantly analyze and search for a way to stay in power, and they adapt to all issues and changes which are taking place in their society (von Soest, 2015). As was mentioned by Szelenyi, the Lukashenka regime is unique compared to other European post-so• viet countries, and it deserves an analysis of the grounds of Lukashenka's authority. Lukashenka used lessons of the soviet and imperial past and the experience of the previous authoritarian and totalitarian leaders to support its power and successfully analyzed and satisfied requests of the Belarusian society. For a description of his policy is rightly to use the term of learning or policy transfer. They are using to describe the process when state governments actively seek out policy options from other sta• tes (Hall & Ambrosio, 2017). This term shows how authoritarian leaders like Lukashenka adapt policies from the past to support their legitimacy and power. He often used references to the USSR, especially to the Se• cond World War, to collect people's positive attitude and support. Aleksandr Lukashenka successfully analyzed what issues are essential for Belarusians to capture the power and collected citizens' support, symbolic capital, to sustain his legitimacy. At that period, critical charac• teristics of Belarus were an economic crisis, relationships with ne• ighbors, a political crisis with the corruption scandal, nostalgia after the collapse of the USSR because of poverty, and relationships with former Soviet republics. All those traits of the Belarusian society Lukashenka used and still using for enabling his legitimacy and supporting it, and how each of those aspects influences Lukashenka's legitimacy as a presi• dent and how they are related to described theory will be unwrapped in the following paragraphs.
33 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
The first task is to show how Lukashenka acted between 1991-1994 before the presidency. Aleksandr Lukashenka became the president of Belarus in 1994. Before that date, the country was ruled by the Parlia• ment and experienced an economic decrease and political infighting. Af• ter the Soviet Union's collapse, Belarus experienced an economic crisis with growing poverty and a political crisis with corruption and leade• rship. Belarus experienced a transformation of the political and social system after the USSR collapse. That process was accompanied by nos• talgia for the Soviet era, which influenced institutionalization in Belarus society. Institutions are the product of history, and while the Belarusian society experienced the lack of leadership and nostalgia of the USSR, it pushed Belarus to the soviet scenario. The habitual order of the soviet society and political structure was suggested as a solution. Belarus de• cided to create the institution of the president, which close to the soviet presidency. While the soviet political structure was totalitarian after the collapse, post-soviet countries, including Belarus, moved to the liberal direction that established a specific type of presidency. During that period, Aleksandr Lukashenka was the chair of a parlia• mentary commission to investigate corruption that had also targeted and brought about the removal of current leaders (Marples, 2009). Luka• shenka often refers to the instability of the 1990s, equating it with corruption and violence. Hall mentioned that: "Lukashenka drew lessons from the failure of Prime Minister Vyacheslau Kebich to win the 1994 pre• sidential election." Later Lukashenka will address to the parliament and refer to the Kebich period parliamentary rule as a "nightmare" (Hall, 2020). To create an effective economy of independent Belarus, Lukashenka adapted and updated the Soviet economy. Habitual patterns of the beha• vior had their influence in different spheres. Mutual habitualization took place not only during the construction of political institutions but also in other spheres. Formed institutions function for the president's authority and established control under society. The Belarusian government took lessons from the Soviet past and tried to change the Soviet concept of economy. Hall observed the process of policymaking in the first years of the presidency: "Allegedly upon coming to power in 1994, Lukashenka asked his advisors if anyone knew how to build a capitalist system, and when no one answered in the affirmative he asked if they knew about the Soviet economy. This question was answered positively by his advisors and
34 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
Lukashenka allegedly said "okay we shall go with what we know then." Lu- kashenka evaluated the Soviet collapse as a mistake that also described soviet characteristics of the Belarusian economy and state control (Hall, 2020). The government changed the factories' administration that all• owed creating greater control over the economy, created new workpla• ces for solving the problem of unemployment. In addition, the regime sets control over the rise of independent oligarchs who support the pre• sident's power (Frear, 2018). The second issue which served as a ground of his authority lies in relationships with neighbors. Furthermore, Lukashenka's opinion about the Soviet collapse was affected his promises and actions in foreign po• licy. The chapter of the electoral program related to foreign policy under• lined the opinion that "Belarusian statehood is not a bargaining chip and not an ikon." He told about the importance of Belarus's global prestige and reputation as a reliable and favorable partner, moreover as an essential task of his policy was the recovery of connection with former Soviet re• publics, especially with Ukraine and Russia (Sraiban, 2014). The Repub• lic of Belarus, especially Lukashenka's authority, is closely connected with external influence by Russia and NATO. Lukashenka always uses these relationships to support his authority as a president. Furthermore, an important role was played by the nostalgia about the USSR. The poli• tical and economic crises are intrinsic to Belarusian society, and Aleksandr Lukashenka successfully played with those opinions and emo• tions and regrets about the demise of the USSR and would remain faithful to its memory and achievements (Marples, 2009). Aleksandr Lukashenka felt social opinions for building his regime and strengthening his authority as the legitimate president. Marples's work supports this statement, he mentioned that in reality, Lukashenka was concentrating on creating his independent local power, which is not addicted to decisions of Western or Eastern countries. As the president, his tactics were considerably subtle as he gradually focused on the power base, using his personal standing with the electorate to enhance his legi• timacy (Marples, 2009). Observing the history of the Lukashenka presi• dency can be followed trends to support his authority as a representative of the Belarusian nation and an independent leader. Later, Lukashenka made the relations with the Russian Federation cooler and rejected the Union state with Russia when he defined that he would not become the Union State chairman. At the same time, he still retained close economic
35 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION cooperation with Russia. That is why Marples describes Lukashenka's policies seem somewhat contradictory and inconsistent. Based on a large amount of media sources: speeches, reports, television appearances, and the like made by the president, it is possible to evaluate his speeches both as pro-Western and as pro-Russian. Also, official policies have been and remain both pro- and anti-Belarusian (Marples, 2009). Corruption was an important and relevant issue for the Republic of Belarus, and Lukashenka collected credits for the future presidency when he was the chair of a parliamentary commission to investigate corruption. This topic was popular in Belarusian society. Investigations were used during pre-election, and Lukashenka appeared as an honest "hero" who unmasked corrupted politicians. In his opinion, the main re• ason for the rise of corruption is the transfer to the market economy that also supported his actions to update the Soviet economy and to change factories' administration. His actions made him popular in Belarusian so• ciety and famous for his brave and uncompromising fighter against corruption (Karbalevicz, 1998). On the other hand, loyally is a crucial reason why the Belarusian re• gime functions. Lukashenka is less concerned with personal friendships. If someone disappoints him, they are removed. The Belarusian authori• ties only plan to stay in power, adapting according to issues as they ap• pear (Silitski, 2005). Corruption does not lead to authoritarian learning but it keeps the regime in power and is vital for explaining the regime's survival. Lukashenka learned lessons from Kebich's case well. As the chair of the commission, which investigated the corruption in govern• ment. Analyzing the Kebich period, Aleksandr Lukashenka understood that corruption should be hidden. "Highlighting learning, Lukashenka has stated consistently that elites should not take too much, but the system has constructed hidden corrupt activities." (Hall, 2020). In addition, hidden corruption and loyalty are parts of another ground of capacity-based authority. Alasuutari mentioned that force could be used for legitimate domination. The force, especially in the form of security services, is crucial for the power of Lukashenka's regime. Those state agencies are known as "Siloviki," and they are an inseparable part of Lukashenka's authority, especially during the period of disappe• arances and protests after elections. Hall underlines in his study that the Ministry of Interior and other security agencies support the Lukashenka authority on different levels. They were essential for establishing
36 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION ontological authority through controlling political institutions, including the Constitutional court. Moreover, siloviki establish a capacity-based authority of the majority through the fight with opposition to ensure the support of the majority of the population and capacity-based authority of force (Hall, 2020). He used all described expectations and directions of policies to es• tablish his charismatic authority. He created a „miracle" by solving a po• litical crisis with corruption in government before the presidential electi• ons and an economic crisis in the first year of Belarusian independence. He was running as a populist against nomenklatura privilege and corrup• tion but also had business supporters who stayed in the shadows (Wilson, 2011). The economical situation was an important factor in the process of the creation of Lukashenka's authority. The nostalgic mood in Belarusian society and presidential speeches about the collapse of the USSR allowed him to strengthen his receive an honor / symbolic capital and became a charismatic leader for the Belarusian society. By creating independent local policy, supporting the people's expectations, and sol• ving economic problems, Lukashenka made the first part of his authority. As well as charisma, another crucial part of Lukashenka's authority is the rational-legal basis. As was described above, some studies described Lukashenka's regime as democratic. He won the first presiden• tial election in 1994 with huge public support. That allows him to add a legal characteristic to his charismatic identity. Furthermore, he conti• nues to strengthen his legal authority after the official inauguration. A huge role in these processes plays the Belarus Constitution by sustaining Lukashenka's regime's legal and democratic side (Rovdo, 2009). The Constitution enlarged presidential power and established a rational-le• gal side of his authority. Based on the description of Weber's theory and the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, the state is ruled by rational- legal authority and legitimacy based on the legal ground, when obedi• ence is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it by virtue of the for• mal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office. The president of the republic is the elected position, which acts under the body of law. According to the law, the authority to rule is strictly limited by rules, and those rules are the primary source of the president's power and other national institutions' power (Appelrouth &
37 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
Edles, 2021). The law and the Constitution as the main law democratize the country by establishing the rule of law as in democratic countries. On the other hand, the Constitution developed a crucial characteris• tic of Lukashenka's power, which he often uses for supporting legitimacy. As William Partlett mentioned, the Belarus Constitution, which was cre• ated in 1994, consolidates and sustains the centralized, authoritarian rule of the president. In particular, these changes have provided the Office of the President with formal constitutional power to dominate the legislature, local government, the courts, prosecutors, and fourth-branch regulatory or integrity institutions. This constitutional authority has the• refore subordinated most Belarusian institutions to presidential power (Partlett, 2020). Below will be described fundamental changes esta• blished in the political structure of Belarus by the Constitution. The first three chapters describe Belarus as a ..unitary, democratic, and social state based on the rule of law", contain the list of human rights, etc., and establish democratic characteristics. Nevertheless, for Luka• shenka's authority, the following chapters had a crucial impact. The fourth section identified the presidential form of rule in the republic and set the list of responsibilities for the president. The president is still elec• ted by citizens, however, he consolidated control over all ministries, government alongside a unicameral legislature. The president and the legislature shared appointment power over the courts, prosecutors, and other fourth-branch institutions (Partlett, 2020). By the Constitution, Lu- kashenka started the formation of authoritarian power within the state. The chapter of the Constitution related to the president's characte• ristics describes the range of presidential power. According to article 84, the president is both the Head of State and the head of the executive branch. He also appoints six from ten judges to posts in the Constitutio• nal Court and affects the appointment of the Chairperson of the Constituti• onal Court. The president can dissolve both chambers of the Parliament. This decision could be initiated based on the Constitutional Court order in the event of a systematic or gross violation of the Constitution by the chambers of Parliament (article 94). Describing Lukashenka's legitima• tion is vital to mention an artistic identity based on his charisma. Fabian Burkhardt underlines that Lukashenka adapted his political rhetoric and activity according to public opinion and national identity. That contri• buted to ..authoritarian learning" and ..adaptive authoritarianism" (Egge- ling. 2017).
38 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
On the other hand, in the first years of the Lukashenka Presidency, he was focused on creating the legal ground for his power and setting the authoritarian regime. The same as using the Constitution, he used two referendums, which took place in 1995 and 1996, Lukashenka consoli• dated legal power. Silitski mentioned that/n 1995, he won a popular man• date to dissolve parliament if required (Silitski, 2003). By this referendum cynically but skilfully linked all his priorities together. The first question was supported by almost the whole population and boosted other issues and Lukashenka. According to this question, the status of the Russian lan• guage as equal to Belarusian was established. The second question con• cerned using modified versions of the Soviet Belarusian flag and national emblem instead of the red-and-white flag and Pahonia of the Grand Du• chy. It was affected by the nostalgia for collecting public support. On the other hand, the affair was about politics and his support: it was not about heraldry. In combination with the fourth question, it was designed to undermine the credibility of parliament. Lukashenka told about relations with former Societ republics and dedicated the third que• stion to the issue of reintegration with Russia that would save the Bela• rusian economy, with the following deal with Russia and various trade scams gave him sufficient funds to begin building a „social contract" after 1995, allowing him to link the use of neo-Soviet symbols with the restora• tion of a neo-Soviet welfare state. (Wilson, 2011). The 1996 referendum gave him extensive new powers, including: the right to appoint judges to the Constitutional Court; assign the head of the Central Electoral Commission; pick half of the new parliamentary upper house; and extend his term in office (Silitski, 2003). By referendum in 1995 neutralized the only opponent of the presi• dent institution for the state power, while from 1996 Lukashenka exten• ded the authority and accumulated the full range of formal and informal power in his hands by law and charismatic grounds. As Weber described, the leader can gain specific characteristics during the historical event. During the election campaign, Aleksandr Lukashenka presented himself as a person who supported public opinion, ready to speak honestly about problems, fights against corruption, etc. He positioned himself as a can• didate close to the nation (a man from their environment), which played its role. Society interpreted it as a "miracle" of a hero, gave votes during the elections, and supported him as a leader. This type represents the power of the concrete individual. In that situation and according to his
39 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION promises and actions, people supported charismatic authority, at the same time, massive support at election (80.1% of votes) allows to speak not only about rational-legal and charismatic authority but also the capa• city-based authority described by Alasuutari (lreg.by, 2020). The capa• city-based authority demonstrates the legitimacy of the common wills, perceptions, and ideas. Another ground supports public support and cha• risma. Lukashenka formulated the third ground, which dedicates the le• gitimate domination to rational laws and the office, which are represen• ted by the concrete leader of the institution. There is important to make a reference to Szelenyi's theory and un• derline the characteristics of the autocratic regime in the Lukashenka presidency. Szelenyi mentioned that Belarus did not make an effort to democracy and stayed autocratic. Furthermore, at the beginning of the Lukashenka rule, the Belarusian republic made this effort to a democra• tic and liberal state for a short period. Like Russia in Szelenyi's study, Belarus had characteristics of a liberal country and transformed into an autocracy. It is relevant to speak about the lack of liberal changes in Be• larus because of quicker transfer to autocracy. The Belarusian regime has the characteristic of authority described by Szelenyi: the power is concentrated in the hands of the leader, which is supported by „the new grand bourgeoisie", this regime is not entirely democratic, but the esta• blished structure has legal-rational features. Lukashenka emerged power which legitimacy has legal-rational features with a rather or even excessively managed democratic framework. Those democratic features function in combination with patrimonialism and prebendalism. Despite collecting symbolic capital and supportingthe legitimacy of his authority, Lukashenka designed a structure for supporting the stability of his power. As was described above, Lukashenka learned lessons from the previous government, and parallelly with the anti-corruption policy, he understood that corruption should be hidden. He collected public support and support from elites, which concentrated all sorts of power in his hands and established the stability of his rule. Observing the first Lukashenka's presidency could be underlined the following ground of his legitimate domination according to the theo• ries of Weber, Szelenyi, and Alasuutari. Lukashenka uses the rational-le• gal authority of law and bureaucracy as a power of impersonal order. He is a leader who was chosen by the citizens during the voting. He always mentions that he is legal president. In this case, Weber's rational-legal
40 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION authority cooperates with the ontological authority described by the Ala- suutari. Alasuutari referenced Weber's theory and continued to develop it. The referendums and elections established the fact and irrefutable evi• dence of his power, especially in conditions when the state controls al• most all media. Another essential ground is charismatic authority. Luka- shenka is perceived as a guarantor of the stability and defender of Bela• rusian independence. He solved the economic problems of the 90s. He became a strong leader who can lead the nation during times of crisis. While the working people and civil servants are the major part of the electorate, he provided a miracle. Lukashenka is a working man who told the truth about corruption and other problems inside the governance, solved economic problems, and support workers during the whole term of his presidency. All described actions allowed him to form a capacity- based authority through the support from the majority (workers and ci• vil servants) and the capacity-based authority of the force through the support from the security services and the army.
3.2 The crisis of legitimacy and formation of the opposite institution
The referendum in 1996 had a crucial point for the Lukashenka pre• sidency. The critical statement of the Constitution is described in article 144 describes that the term of presidential powers is calculated from the date of entry into force of this Constitution. What prolonged the first Lu• kashenka presidency until 2001. This version of the Constitution was contested by the Supreme Council, which asked to evaluate its legality. Lukashenka had control under the Constitutional Court that allowed him to put the new version of the Constitution into effect. He also enacted the first decree about the elections to the National Assembly's Council of the Republic. After he dissolved the Supreme Council by the votes of 103 de• puties, Lukashenka appointed the new parliament. The government began under the rule of the president and was personally accountable to him. The high courts (the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, the High Economic Court) and the lower courts were utterly subordinate to the president. The status of the Constitutional Court has changed. The president received the right to appoint and dismiss the chairman of the Central Election Commission, the chairman of the board of the National
41 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
Bank, the Prosecutor General, as well as other officials included in the personnel register of the head of state (Pastuchov, 2020). Those actions enabled total presidential control under government branches and were reasoned through the new constitution. Furthermore, Lukashenka had the power to make changes in the constitution through a referendum es• tablished by the president's wish. Later, Aleksandr Lukashenka deleted by the referendum in 2004 the statement which allowed one person to be the president only twice (Sputnik, 2021). On the other hand, those events caused the first prosecution of Luka• shenka. According to Michail Pastuchov, the former judge of the Consti• tutional Court, this referendum is not legal; due to the Constitution, glo• bal practices in limitation of terms in high-ranking government positi• ons. Moreover, he mentioned that article 112 of the Election Code does not consider issues related to election and dismissing the president through a referendum. Those decisions were approved by using admi• nistrative sources and state media and also supported by citizens (Corsac, 2020). Based on the first version of the main law, the next presidential election planned to be in 1999 (5 years after the first elections), in fact, it was in 2001 (5 years after the second referendum about the Consti• tution). Lukashenka did not eliminate the whole opposition out of the system. It mobilized in 1999 for the shadow elections organized by the former head of the Central Election Commission Viktar Hanchar. He plan• ned to mobilize opposition leaders for the elections according to the Con• stitution from the year 1994, did not find enough support. A plan B for Hanchar was to make an "apparat revolution" and to declare the end of the legal term of Lukashenka's presidency through the parliament (Wilson, 2011). This plan was not realized because of Hanchar's disap• pearance in 1999. The next presidential elections were organized in 2001, as was declared in the last versions of the Constitution. The 1999 election ..campaign" was finished by Hanchar's failure. On the other hand, it seems to have seriously spooked Lukashenka, as it que• stioned his legitimacy and prestige and revealed threatening splits within the elite. This campaign mobilized Lukashenka's action to protect his power and authority (Wilson, 2011). The first term of Lukashenka's presidency ended in controversy. There were critical points in 1999 when it should have been the first re• election, and in 2001, when it happened. To confront opposition
42 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION movements, Lukashenka strengthened the force control, which started the disappearances and changed his policy related to elites. The disappe• arances of 1999-2000 meant that many Lukashenka's potentially most dangerous opponents were no longer around. This way of clash allowed him to win the first reelections without looking total autocratic. Balazs Jarabik wrote, "The Lukashenka regime has always had an ability to adapt to the most important local, regional and international shifts" (Jarabik, 2009). In the same way, Lukashenka continued to interact with opposi• tion to use administrative resources and relations with neighbors to support his capacity-based and charismatic authorities. The following period of the presidency was used for strengthening the regime. In 2001 the effort of Belarus's democratic opposition was not effective because it was divided by a leadership crisis. The opposition has failed to raise political reform and freedoms as an attainable agenda in Belarus or win trust in its management capabilities. Many Belarusians might legitimately prefer Lukashenka to the current opposition (Jarabik, 2009). Furthermore, the regime used political technologies to prove the victory during the elections. The Belarusian authorities learned lessons of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution and used it for their purpose better than opposition movements. In 2006 the regime organized a campaign for depicting the opposition candidate as a foreign stooge bent on social chaos. Another technology is an exit poll. Lukashenka established control under sociology by deleting independent institution IISEPS and other or• ganizations that researched during previous votings and organizing state organization: „EcooM" and the Belarusian Committee of Youth Organi• sations. Their polls were close to the official results. Those researches formed another ground of Lukashenka's authority - ontological authority as the power of a fact from an expert. A stable socio-economic situation and effective measures from the current president allowed him to win the third election. His victory was inevitable. However, Milinkevich and Kazulin managed to organize two mass protests against the official re• sults and Lukashenka (TUT.by, 2009). Despite protests, which combined with about 30 000 people, they had a minority of votes and could not accumulate enough support for further protests. In 2008 the Belarusian foreign policy experienced a giant swing. Du• ring the whole term of the presidency, Lukashenka switched between pro-Western and pro-Russian policy. His foreign policy was unstable. Despite the statement about good relations with former Soviet republics,
43 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION especially with Russia in 1994, he followed his independent duration. The focus in rhetoric moved from relations with neighbors to the secu• rity of the Belarusian independence, which also includes protecting Lu- kashenka's authority. He argued with the Russian government in issues related to the economic sphere and gas prices, and in 2008 he made a step from Russia to more open relations with the West. He made this effort to the western duration to maintain the authoritarian system and keep Russia paying for his social model, which also helps him keep the majority of Belarusian society (Wilson, 2011). The big shock for his authority was in 2010 when his swing in fore• ign policy failed, and Belarus was on the edge of an economic crisis. Lu- kashenka stands against Russia in political issues via refusing to reco• gnize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, maneuvers to the West, and broken promises of inside privatizations for Russian capital. As was mentioned above, economic stability and charisma as the defender of the state, hid• den corruption, and autocratic techniques support his legitimacy. In 2010 Lukashenka had been struck by Russia to some grounds of his legi• timacy. Russia did not want to subsidize Lukashenka's traditional round of pre-election social spending that affected the economic situation in the republic. They also attacked his image by broadcasting the documentary about Lukashenka, which presented him as a dictator and unwrapped the kidnappings and elimination of opponents organized by Lukashenka. These movements undermined the foundations of Lukashenka as the de• fender of independence, struck economic pre-election plans, and also could have been used as a basis for democratic post-election protests (Wilson, 2011). Lukashenka moved the election to March 2011 and solved some is• sues with Russia and Europe, which allowed him to organize elections before the economic crisis and after a new gas contract with Russia. Con• frontation with Russia ended with the new gas contract, but Lukashenka lost total support from Moscow (Padhol & Marples, 2011). Nevertheless, those events in combination influence the post-election situation. The current president won with a huge margin, and official exit polls almost perfectly proved that victory. However, researches made by the IISEPS, which moved to Vilnius, and the Ukrainian group SOCIUM showed less gap between candidates and the existence of the falsification. Those evi• dence of falsification provoked a protest organized by opposition leaders and cracked down by OMON (Wilson, 2011).
44 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
Lukashenka still had colossal support from mean citizens and saved all grounds of his authority. On the other hand, Belarus faced economic and political problems which decreased the stability of the regime. The force ending of the protest strengthened the position of security agencies and finally established the autocratic Lukashenka regime. Lukashenka's adaptive authoritarianism is focused on the stability of his regime, followed by changes of policy based on related issues in Belarusian soci• ety. This structure is created to rule a politically passive population such as Belarusian society. He developed the rhetoric of the first presidency according to the needs of his regime and Belarus. Legal-rational autho• rity was based on changes in the Constitution and the enlarged power of the president. In combination with results of official polls and effective use of apparat resources like security agencies, media, and state instituti• ons, which were entirely controlled by the president, it provided the basis for legality and legitimacy of the regime. The empowerment of the presidency and repressions of political opponents gave him capacity- based authority, which played an even more significant role than ratio• nal-legal in forming Lukashenka's legitimacy. The absence of the united opposition with the strong leader allowed him to win elections. All unpo• pular ideas and decisions that could confront the law, like changes of the Constitution and the election order, were made through capacity-based mechanisms like referendums. It also was supported by stability in the economy and prestige of the defender of independence. During the 2011 election, Belarus did not face an economic crisis, and it fulfilled the pro• mises of stability, which were crucial for Lukashenka since his first term. A positive result of economic policy is represented by the Gini index, which shows the distribution of income inequality and lowering in 21 century, and now it is lower than in western countries like the USA, Sweden, etc. (The World Bank, 2020). As Buzgalin and Kolganov menti• oned that the distribution of people with income less than 5,50 dollars is decreasing until 2014 by 34 percent from 2003. Financial support for workers in the state sector as well as sponsorship of social services as healthcare and education. Together, these achievements won Luka• shenka a substantial level of trust from the population (Buzgalin & Kol• ganov, 2020). On the other hand, as was mentioned above, Belarus faced an eco• nomic crisis after the elections in 2011. Despite the positive dynamic of the Gini ratio, Belarus experienced a decline in the socio-economic
45 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION sphere. The global economic crisis and situation after the elections in 2011 are also represented through polls made by IISEPS. According to their research, Lukashenka's rating decreased from 53% in December 2010 to 25% in December 2011. As Sergey Nikoluk mentioned, it is the first time when Lukashenka lost the support of the majority (Nikoluk, 2011). There is an important remark that research is provided by an unofficial in Belarus institution. It represents the effect of the economic crisis and also could be indirectly used as evidence of the decrease of be• liefs in Lukashenka as a charismatic leader. However, he still had the cha• risma of defender of national ideas and capacity-based authority. The le• ading electoral group for Lukashenka is working people, and the following period affected them. After increased salaries, especially du• ring election campaigns, it became a time of increasing pension age and new labor laws. Lukashenka created the system of contract that esta• blished the order when workers became more dependent on employers in all sectors of the economy. Wages and social welfare provisions had stopped growing (Buzgalin & Kolganov, 2020). Three grounds transformed to "state authoritarianism" without strong oppositions and with support from security agencies and the unpopularity of the perspectives of the political opposition; continuing economic stability with the job and pension security; and new national ideas which recognize the attainments of the Soviet past, but also of spe• cifically Belarusian goals. The authoritarian regime was created in the form that controls all government power in the hands of the president and regulates formal multi-party structure, leading mass media and communication technologies, including internet and mobile connection. Furthermore, the opposition did not accumulate mass support (Buzgalin & Kolganov, 2020). The opposition's problem was the lack of unity and the absence of a leader who would accumulate the support of the majo• rity. Lukashenka made relevant changes in his rhetoric and domestic po• licy that allowed him to save the legitimacy and stability of the regime. Domestic policy and capacity-based authority are critical for his legiti• macy, even though it is highly dependent on foreign policy and relations with partners. Permanent swings between West and East, gas wars, and political struggles with Russia had a significant impact on the situation inside Belarus. In contrast, Europe acted in the same way as usual by not recogni• zing elections and sanctions against Lukashenka and Belarusian
46 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION deputies, worsening relations with the Russian government, and the following response from the affected Lukashenka's legitimacy. Russian actions did not destroy the stability of the Belarusian president. He still felt certainly in his position, and all grounds work for legitimacy, re• duction of Russian support, and consequences of their actions created the basis for the future protests, strengthening the opposition and crisis of legitimacy.
3.3 The presidential election 2020 and the Lukashenka presidency during the protests
The most challenging period for the Lukashenka presidency started in 2020. Racz mentioned that typically passive Belarusian society be• came mobilized. The electorate started to demand more representation and became more politically active. Those trends created new conditions for the election campaign of the current president (Racz, 2020). Luka• shenka organized his campaign focusing on two topics: achievements of the current president and how the president overcame the problems and crisis of the 1990s; the second idea was dedicated to the statement that only Lukashenka and current governance can guarantee Belarus inde• pendence and sovereignly (Burov, 2020). Experts described the started campaign as unusual because of high activity from opposition candidates. Furthermore, it was the first time when Lukashenka experienced a low approval rating before elections. At the beginning of a campaign, it was hard to judge because governments control official sociological institutions, and official political ratings were never published. However, Gennadiy Korshunov, the director of the In• stitute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, which organizes political research in the Republic of Belarus and makes accre• ditation of institutions that are allowed to conduct political researches in Belarus, published approval ratings in July 2020, and according to that research, 24% of citizens support the current president in April 2020 (TUT.by, 2020). Announced approval ratings formulated by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus have ontolo- gical authority and challenged Lukashenka's power and also support Tsi- khanouskaya's candidature. It was the first time when Lukashenka expe• rienced low ratings in combination with recession and politically
47 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION mobilized society before the elections. Repression and disappearances of candidates started before the elections, not after as it was before. Econo• mic problems, political instability, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which also damaged his image as a defender of the Belarusian nation, affected his position and power stability (Podrugina & Bocharova, 2020). Since the first presidential term, the workers and civil servants were the main target group and had been relatively well-protected in econo• mic and social ways. At the same time, they were subordinate and politi• cally passive. Economic problems and pandemic changed their position, and as Buzgalin and Kolganov mentioned that by 2020 their conditions had become intolerable, and when the attacks on their social and econo• mic rights were added in, the situation grew potentially explosive. It woke ..ordinary" citizens up and mobilized their political activity. They also underlined that current policy implies not just stability but also stag• nation. A crucial difference with other election campaigns is the growing distribution of other social and class forces in Belarusian society. The de• velopment of information technologies and the fundamentally capitalist nature of Belarusian society fosters an orientation in the big part of the population, especially the youth, towards the liberal-consumerist system of values that dominates the world in the 21st century. Those groups are the primary electorate of opposition movements (Buzgalin & Kolganov, 2020). In 2020 traditional media, which is under the control of govern• ments and the current president, became less effective. In contrast, plat• forms like telegram and the Internet play a crucial role in political acti• vity. Telegram cannot be controlled or blocked, and such channels like Nexta, which is followed by about 2 million people, provide alternative sources of information and later will support protest activity and the mo• vement against Lukashenka's power. The basis of the protests of 2020 is the objective rejection of the existing Belarusian economic and political system by the majority of the so-called ..middle class"; with organizational and information support not only from the opposition but also from media, which play an impor• tant role in currents conditions, this rejection of Lukashenka's regime has gradually ripened into protest. Buzgalin and Kolganov underline and support mentioned arguments that the root of the problems faced by Be• larus in 2020 lies in economic stagnation, social inequality, and the bu• reaucratic-capitalist subjugation of working people. They also describe that the current situation is caused not simply by the absence of
48 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION fundamental political rights and the lack of freedom of speech (Buzgalin, A. V., & Kolganov, 2020). Here is essential to remark on political events influenced on conditi• ons during the election campaign. Three leading opposition candidates (Sergei Tsikhanousky, Viktor Babariko, and Valery Tsepkalo) were elimi• nated before the elections. As a result, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was re• gistered as a candidate and became the first united opposition leader, who united teams and supporters of all three eliminated candidates. Lu- kashenka uses the same rhetoric strategy as he had during the first election campaign. He speaks directly and honestly. It was influential du• ring the first time it had an opposite effect in the current situation. He used offensive remarks toward his female rivals and called Tsikha• nouskaya like a housewife (Regnum.ru, 2020), poor girl (Rosbalt.ru, 2020), goof girl (Surikova, 2020), etc. He shows that his opponent does not understand what she is doing and can not be a president. However, in 2020 it has the opposite effect and was evaluated as disrespectful and offensive. He and state media also call supporters and protestants a "herd of sheep", provocateurs, criminals, and other harmful and offensive la• bels (Chupryna, 2020). Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya formulated her program around the idea to organize legal and free elections, where any candidate who was ne• utralized by governments can participate (Tsikhanouskaya, 2020). On the other hand, her promises are similar to Lukashenka's rhetoric before the first presidential elections. As a reaction to economic problems, be• cause of addiction from Russian credits and recession as well as social and economic problems because of COVID-19, she promised to create a market economy as an opposite to Lukashenka's social state economy which allows developing small and medium-sized businesses. Her fore• ign policy promises are also situated to defend the Belarusian indepen• dence and good relations with neighbors. These ideas are similar to Lu• kashenka's but they are focused not only on the former Soviet republic but also on swing foreign policy when Belarus was a victim of the perso• nal ambitions of the president. During these elections, Lukashenka used various characteristics to Tsikhanouskaya: during elections the Kremlin sponsored her and also there were mercenaries, economists, and politi• cal operatives from Russia who supported her (TUT.by, 2020a); after the protests, the European Union and the USA became the main opponents for Belarus, and according to Lukashenka's statements they control
49 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
Tsichanovskaya. The main argument of Tsikhanouskaya's program was focused on changes in political structure and fight against the authorita• rian regime, and as the first stage is free elections as a response to repre• ssions and falsifications relevant to Belarus. Early voting started on 4th August, an official voting day was on 9th August. The only source of results were exit polls which projected the re• election of the current president. The Central Election Commission on 14th August announced official results and Aleksandr Lukashenka's victory with 80.1% of votes, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya had 10.12%. Ove• rall turnout in the election 84.28% (BelTA.by, 2020b). Sviatlana Tsikha• nouskaya, as well as other candidates, rejected the results and convicted falsifications. These complaints were supported by photos and sta• tements by members of local election commissions which declared Tsi• khanouskaya's victory (TUT.by, 2020b). Another source that proved fal• sifications is the platform "Golos" (The Voice) (Golos, 2020), where peo• ple marked their voice for candidates. Also, this platform collected pho• tos and information from protocols. Those facts undermined the credibi• lity of Lukashenka's rational-legal and ontological authority because it declared falsifications of results and made his presidency illegal. In ad• dition, specialists confirmed that the widespread accusations that the au• thorities had committed electoral fraud could not be silenced. Chupryna researched the causes of Belarusian protest and interviewed Belarusi- ans, and a common response was that citizens may have accepted the re• sults if Tsikhanouskaya had been awarded a more reasonable share of the vote. However, the margin was giant and varied from previously announ• ced ratings. It encouraged a huge number of citizens to walk out on the streets, but also in regions. Thousands of protestants demanded a re• count and the removal of Lukashenka from office (Chupryna, 2020). Af• ter official announcements, supporters of Tsikhanouskaya organized protests, which faced violent crackdown on demonstrations from police and special forces. The regime has responded to the protests in a heavy- handed manner. Special police forces, fully equipped in antiriot gear, have been viewed dispersing peaceful protesters in a manner unprece• dented even for Belarus. During the first night of protests, about 6000 protestants were arrested (TASS.ru, 2020b). It also confronts Luka• shenka's capacity-based authority. This government tactic had an oppo• site effect, and despite it worked in 2006 and 2010, police acted more brutally this time. Later it motivated about 250 000 citizens to
50 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION participate in the following demonstrations in Minsk and about half a million across Belarus. This time protests were supported by medics who did not receive enough help from the government during the pandemic and workers who organized strikes in large enterprises, including state factories (Chupryna, 2020). As Szelenyi mentioned in his research of post-communist countries, there is some degree of voluntary in states with legitimate governments. And when the regime is illegitimate the only reason to obey is afraid of what will happen if people will not follow the order (Szelenyi, 2016). In a situation, when a mass of people protests against current governance, it is possible to speak about illegitimacy of this order. Based on statements from Alasuutari's paper, demonstrations and protests signal to authorities that many people disagree with their policy, and at the same time, support the opposition movement. Alasuutari men• tioned that such demonstrations supported by the large crowd are taken seriously even by autocratic regimes. This statement is supported by the fact that Lukashenka firstly started his repression policy before the election day, and protests, which took place after the announcement of results, face brutal resistance from security forces. This fact provides capacity-based legitimacy to protests and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as a leader and the president of the Republic of Belarus (Alasuutari, 2018). Furthermore, demonstrations and capacity-based authority are accom• panied by international attention and condemnation, which marked by the rejection of results from OSCE and demand to organize a new election (TASS.ru, 2020a) and by the recognition of the Coordination Council, which Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya created for transfer of power, as an "in• terim representation of the people demanding democratic change" by the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2020). Lukashenka proves his authority by charisma - a defender who pro• tects the stability and independence of Belarus. In his speeches, he often underlines that only his efforts keep stability and peace in the republic. In addition, he proves his position as a defender of independence by the arguments that protests and opposition are sponsored and controlled from abroad. In interviews were mentioned that European countries like the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Poland coordinate protest mo• vements and opposition leaders to destabilize the situation in Belarus (Belteleradiocompany, 2020a). By criticizing the opposition symbol (white-red-white flag) and connecting this flag with fascist symbols, he
51 BELARUSIAN PROTESTS AS A REPRESENTATION OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION references history and memory about the Second World War, which plays an important role in the values system of Belarusian citizens. He still accumulates capacity-based authority by referencing official election results and support of 80% of citizens and legal power as the constitutional president. After the start of opposition protests, demon• strations were also organized to support Lukashenka (BelTA.by, 2020a). The Constitution supports Capacity-based as well as ontological and ra• tional-legal authority, official results from the Central Election Commis• sion, which proved Lukashenka's victory and acceptance of results and legitimacy of the president by Russia (Belteleradiocompany, 2020), China, Armenia, Turkey, etc. (Belteleradiocompany, 2020b). Experts evaluate and reflect on the situation in August 2020, menti• oned that Lukashenka labeling all protestants as „rebels" and used only brutal force as a response to protest activity lost the majority's support and destroyed trust in state institutions (TUT.by, 2021). Observing events that are happening after the elections in 2020, Lukashenka is still supporting other types of authority like charismatic, rational-legal, and capacity-based with the support of the majority of the population. At the same time, capacity-based authority based on violence became more and more important in Lukashenka's strategy. Repressions, administrative resources, power based on force, and fear support the authority of the current president and allow him to control state power. It corresponds with Alasuutari's theory and describes how Lukashenka controls state power. Same as Alasuutari described, the violence caused the resistance, and the most significant protests started after brutal force response from governments. However, there is no force resistance from the population, and Lukashenka controls the government and accumulates capacity- based authority of violence and fear.
52 CONCLUSION
4 Conclusion
The thesis presented the observation of theories dedicated to describing authority and how it recognizes in society. Those theoretical principles were applied to the empirical case of the Belarusian president of Aleksandr Lukashenka and connected with the social theory. He orga• nized a political system that serves to accumulate all power in the hands of the president. The political and communicative strategy was focus on creating legitimate dominance of Lukashenka. His legitimate domination is based on different grounds like charisma stability defender; legal-rati• onal through the status of the president of the republic; ontological, which is created by the decrees, elections results, and the constitution; and the last ground of his power is a capacity-based authority which describing through the support of the majority of the population. Lukashenka's authority experienced changes during all 27 years of his rule. Starting as a populist president, who guaranteed stable develo• pment of the state, confront the national government after the collapse of the USSR, and answered public requirements. By winning the first elections, Lukashenka used the same strategy during all terms of the pre• sidency by fulfilling the requirements and believes of the Belarusian so• ciety and strengthening his power and installing the authoritarian re• gime. Von Soest well describes his policy as an authoritarian strategy, when the leader constantly analyzes and searches for a way to stay in power. As an authoritarian leader, Lukashenka always adapts to all is• sues and changes that are taking place in their society (von Soest, 2015). Lukashenka's regime has a crucial characteristic that, as an authoritarian leader, he also accumulated capacity-based authority based on force. Du• ring the whole presidency arose the opposition movement as a response to Lukashenka's policy. The opposition confronts Lukashenka until 2020, when the confrontation reached the extremum. In 2020 the sixth presidential campaign started. The following events could describe key characteristics of the socio-economic conditi• ons: repressions, media confrontation between the state government and the opposition, united opposition movements around Sviatlana Tsi- khanouskaya, economic and social crisis because of the COVID-19 pan• demic, and highly politically mobilized society before the elections. The official announcement of the presidential voting results provoked inten• sive protests as a response to falsification and Lukashenka's victory with
53 CONCLUSION a huge margin. According to social meaning and international laws, the official results were rejected. While the falsified elections caused the first demonstrations, the following more massive protests were triggered by the brutal crackdown of protests and brutal force from the state govern• ments, violation of human rights, what does not comply with the laws. Based on Weber's and Szelenyi's theories, the legitimate authority needs a voluntary belief in some way, which is not in accord with force and vi• olence. When a state leader uses fear and violence to defend his power, he becomes illegitimate. This statement and the opinion of experts and politicians prove that Lukashenka became illegitimate and lost his legiti• macy as a political leader. This situation demonstrates the crisis of the authority of the national institution and the rise of authority of the oppo• sition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya cre• ated her authority during the election campaign and protests. As an opposition candidate, she referenced social and economic cri• sis because of the pandemic to challenge Lukashenka's authority. Also, she created her charismatic authority as an opposition leader and deci• ded to confront the authoritarian regime even after the disappearances of other opponents. Her central thesis was to guarantee amnesty for po• litical prisoners and new presidential elections with all candidates. The crucial point is that Belarusian society and the global community reject the voting results and do not recognize Aleksandr Lukashenka as the country's president. In this situation, the named president violated the law, internationally recognized standards that do not correspond to the ground of legitimacy based on Weber's rational-legal authority. After the elections, there were proves of the falsifications, and Tsikhanouskaya was recognized as the president by a part of the Belarusian citizens and international organizations like OSCE, European Parliament, UN, etc. As a legitimate leader, she created the Coordination Council as the opposite institution to the current state institution to coordinate resistance to the authoritarian regime and as the primary purpose to coordinate the transfer of the state power. The reason to talk about lack of legitimacy could be supported by the analysis of Weber's theory by Ivan Szelenyi. He observed the theory of legitimacy and declared that "Systems are legitimate if those subordi• nated to authority accept their subordination since they cannot define a better alternative and the staff of the person who issues commands has a firm belief that the master's claims (myths for his superiority) are valid. Those systems are illegitimate that have to coerce the ones subjected to
54 CONCLUSION authority to obey orders; hence they have to jail, kill, and torture masses of people in a rather unpredictable way to obtain obedience" (Szelenyi, 2016). This statement supports the mentioned lack of legitimacy related to the president of the Republic of Belarus. As was mentioned before, one of the reasons for massive social protest is the forced response to the re• jection of election results. The current president cannot support his legi• timate domination through voluntary and uses force for it. Szelenyi un• derlined that in authoritarian regimes, those who exercise political aut• hority may have majoritarian approval but may violate the principles of the rule of law. The type of authority in the Belarusian republic is a kind of legal-rational authority with features of charismatic authority. The le• ader has a "genuine charisma" or "fake charisma", which produces legiti• macy for the authority. Based on this description, this type of legitimacy is based on legal ground and charisma (Szelenyi, 2016). During the 2020 presidential campaign and protests, Lukashenka lost the authority resting on devotion to a person's heroism or exemplary character. The end of the legitimacy appeared as soon as the leaders stop delivering "miracles". The masses will believe that the domination impo• sed on them is justified since they cannot find a realistic alternative at this point. If they begin to consider a possible alternative ruler/master the system is facing a "legitimation problem." This event happened in the Belarusian case right after the announcement of results, when president Lukashenka lost the support of his exceptionality, and also the masses found an alternative as opposite leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. The fact that the power is dedicated to the position/order, not to the person, creates the lack of authority due to the violation of legal norms established by social agreement allow to analysis the situation when so• ciety does not recognize the power of the president and creates the social institution as an opposite to tradition. There is Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as a leader and representative of the Belarusian nation and the Coordi• nation Council. Lukashenka as a person who acts according to the role of the president was rejected, and a massive part of the Belarusian society and the global community recognized Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and the Coordination Council as an "interim representation of the people deman• ding democratic change" in Belarus that is open to all political and social stakeholders (European Parliament, 2020). This statement produces the basis for future discussion. Based on Weber's and Szelenyi's ideas, Lukashenka became illegitimate in the mo• ment of using force. Weber wrote that legitimate domination demands
55 CONCLUSION an in some extent, voluntary compliance from the obeyed (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021). When the government starts repressions, jail, kill and tor• ture people to reach compliance, it becomes illegitimate, which is rele• vant to the Belarusian case. Szelenyi underlines that „People obey orders from an illegitimate authority merely if they are afraid of what will happen to them if they do not comply; they are concerned about their life and live• lihood"'(Szelenyi, 2016). The fact that the most massive protests started after violence from police and OMON proves it and shows the collapse of capacity-based authority from people's support. It is relevant to refer to Alasuutari's theory about the capacity-based authority of fear which al• lows speaking about the legitimacy of Lukashenka. On the other hand, Aleksandr Lukashenka controls the state govern• ment, and in 2021 protest lost the massive character. There is a political crisis in Belarus, but it is essential to mention that despite the described reasons for Lukashenka's illegitimacy, he still holds the state power and has grounds for authority. Theories formulated by Weber, Szelenyi, and others point out that political leader loses legitimacy when using force to retain power. It is happening because legitimacy implies at least a small part of the voluntary and belief. According to that point of view, Luka• shenka lost the legitimacy, and he is staying illegitimate because he lost the support of the majority, which is proved by political scientists (TUT.by, 2021) main reason why he controls national power and insti• tutions is violence and force. At the same, Alasuutari observes the theory of authority differently. In his opinion, there could be applied capacity- based authority that is relevant not only in case of demonstrations and support of the majority but also to dictators and other authorities that hold power through fear and violence. This variant of capacity-based au• thority works when people take the leader and his action seriously and correct the behavior according to his will. This way of domination is con• sidering legitimate. Besides, this type of authority is the last variant to hold power, and it also could lead to mobilization of the resistance. There is no brutal resistance from the protest movement, and it saves Luka• shenka's capacity-based authority. The legitimate domination by fear and violence the power is keeping until the leader can accumulate re• sources to produce brutal force and fear. The opposition with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya did not achieve political control inside the state, and they did not defeat Lukashenka's support from siloviki. Lukashenka is still the president of the Republic of Belarus, and in the territory of the state, he has state power. Despite the opinion of
56 CONCLUSION experts and massive support for Tsikhanouskaya inside and outside the country, Lukashenka establishes control under the behavior of society, and his power seems legitimate. The crucial role is dedicated to mass me• dia that work for claiming opposition leaders as terrorists and protesters as criminals and establishing Lukashenka's image of the only one who can guarantee the country's stability. The media supports Lukashenka's charisma, and the fact that he controls the state power allows speaking that Lukashenka has a dose of charisma. It is vital that workers are not included in protests massively what also shows that Lukashenka has a loyal following. However, the central role is dedicated to the security ser• vices that support the president's authority via violence and fear. The analyzed case allows speaking about a new type of legitimate domination which differs from described concepts and takes place in au• thoritarian countries. The authoritarian power could be legitimate through establishing power that is based on force and charisma. In cur• rent conditions, mass media play an important role in supporting charis• matic authority and establishing the leader's legitimacy. Charisma also creates the loyalty of security agencies, which are the main source of force. The force is not the reason for claiming the leader as illegitimate, as was described by Alasuutari mafia bosses and dictators could achieve the belief in their authority via force and fear. The authoritarian author• ity is relevant while the leader could establish the loyalty of the security services and produce the control under the society. The force produces the control, regarding the authoritarian case, it could be the main reason for control under behavior and realization of the leader's will. However, Alasuutari underlines that such type of power could be questionable and illegitimate. On the other hand, capacity-based authority makes people recog• nize a leader's power and take it into account. It means that they do it because they believe in the leader's authority and their own will that proves Weber's statement that legitimate domination demands a bit of voluntary compliance. In this situation, it is also relevant to refer to Szelenyi's research. He mentioned that some authoritarian leaders have charisma or at least fake charisma which creates support and produces loyalty. Force and administrative resources established control under mass media, which supplied ideological support of leader and produced charisma of the leader and loyalty and voluntarily obey. While the brutal power can be defined as questionable, charisma gives irrefutable evi• dence of loyalty and voluntary. This type of authority is identified as an
57 CONCLUSION independent type because it is situated between charismatic authority and specific capacity-based authority of force. It will be stable while those grounds are functioning. Previously, studies were focused on liberal authorities and mainly claimed authoritarian power as illegitimate. The main issue regarding authoritarian regimes is the difference between power as the ability to command despite the resistance and domination as the probability that a command will be obeyed (Appelrouth & Edles, 2021). Szelenyi updated Weber's theory and made it actual for the current situation. He identified illegitimate; it means that system should use massive coercion to achieve obedience. In opposite, legitimate systems always have some sort of vol• untary. People and the staff believe in a leader's superiority even it is fake (Szelenyi, 2017). It means that legitimacy forms from the inner motives of people and their voluntary beliefs in master's superiority. From that point of view, the leader is illegitimate if he uses massive coercion and violence to achieve obedience. Alasuutari used a cautious definition of authority and authoritarian power. In his work, authority seems like a method to achieve obedience. He used the term authority to define sys• tems that use violence and coercion, and the legitimacy of an authoritar• ian regime seems questionable. At the same time, he described this the• ory differently than Weber and identified capacity-based authority (Alasuutari, 2018). This type of authority uses an opportunity to do something to achieve beliefs in someone's superiority. This thesis has presented a new type of authority and shown that authoritarian regimes could be evaluated as legitimate, as we can ob• serve in Belarus. It develops theories by Max Weber and Pertti Alasuutari and defines the type of legitimate domination for the authoritarian re• gime. Observing the Belarusian case, we can find different grounds for the legitimate dominations what confirms Weber's statement that there is no pure type of authority. Lukashenka uses legal-rational authority through elections, Constitution, and other sources, which support his right to rule by the law. At the same time, he also has charisma as a leader who solved crises at the beginning of Belarusian independence and achieved stability inside the country. Furthermore, there is a propaganda machine that supports Lukashenka's charismatic image. It generates enthusiasm and following, claims general belief that he is the only one who maintains stability and defends the state from a crisis. Moreover, Lukashenka accumulated loy• alty and beliefs in his superiority from the staff and security services.
58 CONCLUSION
Here is a point which confronts with Weber's theory and question Lukashenka's legitimacy. Throughout the presidency, Lukashenka uses massive coercion and forces that confront Weber and Szelenyi's defini• tion of legitimate domination. Massive repression, crackdowns and ar• rests, even they are described by the law, make the power illegitimate because of lack of voluntary. The thesis has shown that when the leader uses massive coercion, he can produce legitimate domination. Belarusian case demonstrates the authority of force (capacity-based), which produces beliefs in master's superiority. When Lukashenka achieves subordination by using brutal force and a dose of charisma, the current situation in Belarus demon• strates a voluntary acceptance of his power from those who subordi• nated. This type of authority references the leader's opportunity to con• trol society through force and fear. Lukashenka has loyally from security services that allows him to achieve a belief in superiority. This type of authority cooperates with others; the number of followers and the loy• alty of staff and security services demonstrates that there is still cha• risma. According to official election results and the constitution, he is a president. At the same, Lukashenka actively operates by force to achieve his superiority. The fact that his rule does not face an active and brutal resistance allows talking about the legitimacy of such domination. The definition of the legitimate system also proves it. Belarusian society ac• cepts their subordination and takes Lukashenka's actions into account. They cannot define a better alternative, there are no massive protests and demonstrations, and opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya cannot resist and be seen as an alternative, and there are people who be• lieve in his superiority.
59 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Yale University Press. 64 NAME INDEX Name Index A K Alasuutari, 15,16, 26, 31, 51, 52, 56, 57 Karbalevicz, 37 Ambrosio, 34 Kazulin, 43 Appelrouth, 23, 24, 38 Kebich, 35, 37 Avant, 2 6 Kolganov, 45, 46, 48 Korshunov, 47 B L Babariko, 49 Berger, 18, 28 Luckman, 18, 28 Bourdieu, 28, 29 Lukashenka, 15, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, Burov, 47 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, Buzgalin, 45, 46, 48 51,52,53,54, 56 c M Corsac, 42 Marples, 15, 35, 44 Marples's, 36 D Milinkevich, 43 Dreher, 21 N Dürkheim, 17 Nikoluk, 46 E P Edles, 23,24,38 Eggeling, 39 Padhol, 44 Partlett, 38, 39 Pastuchov, 42 F Farage, 29 R Finnemore, 26 Frear, 34, 35 Räcz, 47 Rice, 15 Rovdo, 38 H Hall, 15, 34, 35, 37 s Hanchar, 42 Hanchar', 42 Seil, 26 Silitski, 37, 39,40 Ch Sraiban, 36 Surikova, 49 Chupryna, 49, 50 Szelenyi, 15, 25, 29, 30, 31, 34, 40, 51, 54, 56 I Jarabik, 43 65 NAME INDEX T V Terzyan, 34 von Soest, 34, 53 Tsepkalo, 49 Tsikhanouskaya, 16, 31, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, w 54,55,56 Tsikhanousky, 49 Weber, 15,16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 31, 40, 54, 56 Wilson, 15, 37, 40, 42,44 66