Political Freedom in the Developing and Developed World: What Difference Do Courts Make? Robert M. Howard Assistant Professor 404-651-3187
[email protected] Henry F. Carey Assistant Professor 404-651-4845
[email protected] Department of Political Science Georgia State University University Plaza Atlanta, GA 30303-3083 Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held August 28 – September 1, 2002 in Boston, MA. We thank Georgia State University (Grant # 00-012) for financial support. Abstract In this paper we examine the critical issue of judicial independence and political and civil rights. Though often taken as axiomatic, there is surprisingly little systematic analysis of the hypothesis that an independent judiciary is a necessary condition for political freedom. Our paper attempts to separate the effect of judicial independence from other sources of democratic freedom and liberty. Using a systematic analysis of time series cross sectional data, and a qualitative analysis of judicial independence and the concept of due process, we find that while there is some effect from judicial independence, at least when judicial independence interacts with social development, this influence is less than many theorists have proposed or speculated. Our results show that judicial independence without more is not enough to lead to greater political rights or even an increase in civil liberties. It is only with greater social development that judicial independence becomes a factor. 1 Political Freedom in the Developing and Developed World: What Difference Do Courts Make? 1. Introduction Though often taken as axiomatic, surprisingly little systematic analysis of the hypothesis that an independent judiciary is a necessary condition for political freedom has occurred.