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Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown

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Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown Fatima el Issawi MEDIA@LSE POLIS Department of Media and Communications Journalism and Society POLIS—Media and Communications London School of Economics “Arab Revolutions: MediaRevolutions” Project Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown By Fatima el Issawi1 1. This report was produced with the contribution of our interns team: Terrine Friday, David Britain and Raneem Hannoush. About the Author FATIMA EL ISSAWI is a research fellow at POLIS, the journalism and society think tank in the Department of Media and Communications at the London School of Economics (LSE). She is leading the research project on “Arab Revolutions: Media Revolutions,” which looks at the transformations in the Arab media industry under the transitional political phases within the current uprisings. She has over fifteen years of experience in covering the Middle East for international media outlets. She also works as an independent journalist, analyst, and trainer in the Arab world. l 3 l Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown Table of Contents Introduction: The Historical Context .......................................... 7 Chapter 1 Mainstream Libya Media: From Gaddafi ’s Propaganda to the Reconstruction Process ................................................... 11 Historical Background ...................................................................... 11 State Media: TheVoice of Propaganda ............................................ 14 The Reconstruction Process: Heading to the Unknown ................. 22 Regulation and Journalists’ Unions .................................................. 27 Chapter Recommendations .............................................................. 29 Chapter 2 Newsroom Dynamics, Professionalism and Its Relation to New Political Power ................................................................... 31 Relationship to News Sources/Political Sphere ................................ 31 Skills and Professionalism ................................................................. 35 A Case Study: The National News Agency and the Challenge of Professionalism ............................................................................. 37 Media Institutions’ Dynamics ........................................................... 40 Flourishing Talk Shows: Debating Politics ....................................... 43 Training and Media Development Efforts ........................................ 45 Chapter Recommendations .............................................................. 46 l 5 l Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown Chapter 3 Working in a Transitional Environment ...................................... 48 Who Runs the Place?........................................................................ 48 Who Funds the New Libyan Media? ................................................ 52 Field Reporting in a Hostile Environment ....................................... 57 The Media Reconciliation ................................................................ 60 Chapter Recommendations .............................................................. 64 Conclusion ................................................................................ 65 Major Highlights ............................................................................... 71 l 6 l Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown Introduction: The Historical Context The Libyan revolution of 17 February 2011 resulted in a United Nations mandated NATO air campaign in March 2011, and the death of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi at the hands of rebel fighters 20 October 2011. Almost two years after the February 17 Revolution began, the transition to democracy remains a fragile process. The transitional process can only be understood in the context of the heavy legacy of Colonel Gaddafi’s dictatorial and totalitarian rule. For four decades Gaddafi’s regime maintained a monopoly on political and economic power in Libya. Civil and political rights and rights of association were highly restricted. In addition, media was under the control of the government.2 The result was chronic underdevelopment and mismanagement of the country’s institutions. In contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, the revolution in Libya took the form of a major internal conflict resulting in on-going consequences for Libyan security. The National Transitional Council (NTC)—formed on 5 March 2011 in the city of Benghazi3—failed to disarm rebel groups once fighting had ceased. The NTC handed power to the General National Congress in August 2012. 2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Libya. Retrieved online 03/12/12: http:// carnegieendowment.org/2010/12/17/libya/1shh accessed 03/12/12 3. The website of the transitional council http://www.ntclibya.org/english/ l 7 l Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown The first free elections in decades that took place in July 2012 saw liberal, secular and independent candidates outflank the Muslim-Brotherhood- aligned Justice and Construction Party. The liberal National Forces Alliance party won with 48% of the vote (39 seats), with the Islamist Justice and Construction party coming second with 10% (17 seats). Independent candidates won 120 seats, reflecting the importance of regional politics. Mr Ali Zidan was elected by the parliament as prime minister in October 2012. His predecessor, Mustafa Abu Shagur, had failed in two attempts to form a government acceptable to Congress. The interim government is formed of a mixture of liberal figures and Islamists and also aims to strike a balance between Libya’s various regions. It was officially inaugurated in November 2012. The government is facing a major change; that of asserting the new state’s authority in face of the growing hegemony of diverse armed factions in Libya’s post-Gaddafi. These decentralised armed groups are the greatest threat to Libya’s recovery. The killing of US ambassador Christopher Stevens in an attack against the American consulate in Benghazi by Islamist gunmen was a major setback for the transitional authorities and reveals its shortcoming in dealing with the security challenge.4 The result is widespread insecurity and stalled economic recovery. The Libyan government’s quest for justice has focussed on the cases of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (son of Colonel Gaddafi) and Abdullah Senussi, both of whom are facing arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity. The Libyan government is still refusing to hand over Gaddafi’s son arguing that he should be tried before the national legal system.5 While these are high profile and nationally significant cases, 4. See http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/12/uk-libya-usa-attack-idUKBRE88B0ED2012 0912 5. CNN, Libya challenges International Criminal Court’s order to hand over Saif Gaddafi, 09/10/12. Retrieved on 18/12/12. l 8 l Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown the government has not yet proposed a comprehensive transitional justice strategy for the country. The adoption of the so-called political isolation bill incited further internal divisions and occurred under the pressure of militias who mounted a siege of governmental buildings in Tripoli. The bill is meant to prevent officials who worked under the former Gaddafi-era government from participating in politics. There are worries that this bill will over-reach its mandate and will be used for account settlements.6 There are fears that this bill will also contribute to the exclusion of endemic lack of skills in the country. Moreover, the growing tribal tension is hindering the national reconciliation. In a country that lived for years without any political dynamics, tribes replaced the political arena manipulated by the regime. This situation confirms the primacy of a national reconciliation plan able to help Libyans close the chapter of the Gaddafi era and to successfully lead a peaceful state building process. Although national media is now free from the tight control of Gaddafi’s regime, Libyan media are still struggling to develop into a free and professional industry. Subject to the threat of armed groups, lack of professional structures, poor skills and the heavy legacy of the past, Libyan journalists have been reduced to the same self-censorship of the prior regime.7 6. BBC, Why Libya’s militias are up in arms, 01/05/2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- africa-22361101 7. This report was published in a smaller version by Carnegie International. See the report of Carnegie http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/14/transitional-libyan-media-free-at- last/g3dk# l 9 l Libya Media Transition: Heading to the Unknown CHAPTER 1 Mainstream Libyan Media: From Gaddafi ’s Propaganda to the Reconstruction Process Under Gaddafi, the media was used solely to secure his own power. Content was highly politicised in favour of the regime and any criticism of Gaddafi would result in imprisonment or worse. The revolution saw an explosion of new private media while the old state media apparatus is struggling to cope with the transitional phase. According to Legatum Institute’s Libya Media Wiki there are currently at least 200 registered newspapers, 20 TV channels and 200 radio stations,10 though the volatile transitional phase makes it impossible to assess with accuracy the number of new media outlets. The lack of any law or emerging policy to organise this field also means it is ripe for libel, slanderous statements and unfounded accusations. Historical Background For much of its history,
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