127 _.-Part __._11 ----~--- .-- be for a six month period since this would make for “Noting that the report of the Secretary-General ‘better planning, management and economy in the dated 10 December 1965 (S/7001 ) states that the conduct of the operation”. Hc also observed that if United Nations Peace-keeping Force is needed in the mandate were extended it would be done in the CYPt-w light of “the expectation” of members that the parties “Noting that the Government of Cyprus has directly concerned would make an intensified effort agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem.2i” the island it is necessary to continue the Force lx- The representative of the Netherlands raised five yond 26 December 1965, points concerning the responsibility for progress to- “1. Reafirms its resolutions of 4 March (S/ ward a solution and the question of financing the 5575), 13 March (S/5603), 20 June (S/5778), 9 United Nations operation in Cyprus which his delega- August (S/5868), 25 September (S/5987), and tion would have wished to see reflected in a draft reso- 18 December 1964 (S/6121), the consensus ex- lution. Owing to the pressure of time and the fact pressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on that the matter was also being deliberated in the First 11 August 1964, and its resolutions 201 ( 1965 ) of Committee he did not press for a draft resolution 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June and 207 (1965) incorporating all the points he had raised.“74 of IO August 1965; At the same meeting after the rcprcsentatives of “2. Extends once again the stationing in Cyprus Cyprus, l 278 Turkey, l 278 and Greece, +:!77 had com- of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, estab- mented on the report of the Secretary-General and lished under the Security Council resolution of 4 offered explanations as to why the situation had not March 1964, for an additional period of three been more greatly improved or a solution found, the months, ending 26 March 1966.” representative of Malaysia introduced a draft rcsolu- tion 27n submitted jointly by the six non-permanent COMI’LAINT RY YEMEN members of the Council (Bolivia, Ivory Coast, Jor- INITIAL PROCEEDINGS dan, Malaysia, Netherlands and Uruguay). He noted By letter “*’ dated I April 1964, the deputy perma- that this draft resolution followed closely the language nent representative of Yemen requested the President of carlier resolutions, and that while it kept clear of of the Security Council to convene an urgent meeting unnecessary controversies, it faced up to the urgent and of the Council to consider “the deteriorated situation immediate task of having to extend the mnndatc of the resulting from the British continuous acts of aggrcs- United Nations Force in Cyprus. I&ailing that the sion against the peaceful Yemcni citizens”, the culmi- Secretary-General had recommended an extension of nation of which was the attack on 28 March, which the mandate for a period of six months rather than had caused the death of twenty-five Yemcni citizens a shorter period, he observed that after consultation it and several injuries besides material damage The re- was felt that “in the prevailing context of events in quest was made in accordance with Articles 35 ( 1) Cyprus as reflected in the Secretary-Gcncral’s report, and 34 of the United Nations Charter. It was further an even longer period would probably give rise to stated that the attack and the massing of British troops more complacency”. However, in order to emphasize and heavy equipment between Beihan Protectorate and a sense of urgency that the parties should get together Harib, together with the many frequent British raids and settle the problem with whatever means might be and attacks against Ycmeni villages and towns consti- available to them a period shorter than six months tutcd an act of war against the Yemen Arab Repub- was more desirable.“” lic, cndangcring the international peace and security The representative of Jordan suggested that in order and creating a situation the continuation of which to avoid any possible misinterpretation, operative para- would lead to unfavourablc consequences. So far, the graph 3 of the draft resolution referring to “a peaceful Yemen Arab Republic had adopted an attitude of settlement of the problem of Cyprus” be reformulated self-restraint and patience, but its Government wanted to read “a peaceful solution and an agreed scttlcmcnt” to make it well known that it would not hesitate to thereby following the language of the resolution ot 4 use all means and ways to ensure its self-dcfcnce and March 1964.‘“” territorial integrity and the protection of its people. After a brief suspension of the meeting, the reprc- The Ycmcn Arab Republic was placing “this very sentative of Malaysia stated that during consultation grave situation” before the Council in the hope that among the co-sponsors of the draft resolution it was an end would soon be reached. decided that operative paragraph 3 should bc dropped At the 1 106th meeting on 2 April 1964 the Coun- from the draft resolution.“‘* cil, after including L’“5 the item in its agenda, invited Z&11 The revised draft resolution was unanimouslv the representatives of Yemen, Iraq and the United . adoptcd.zHg It read as follows: ‘“i:’ Arab Republic to participate in the discussion. At ;1 “The Security Courrcil, later stage L’Ki the representative of Syria was also in- vited to participate, and the question was considcrcci LW 1270th meeting: paws. 3-4. For the statement of the at the I 106th to the I I I I th meetings held bctwecn 2 Secretary-General see chapter I, Case 30. z7.t 1270th meeting: paras. 9-33. and 9 April 1964. zT5 1270th meeting: pnras. 35-66. lkeiwion of 9 April 1964 ( 1 I 1 I th meeting) : 2~ 1270th meeting: paras. 68-77. 277 1270th mcetini: paras. 79-82. ( i ) Condemning: reprisds as incompulihle with 27* S/7024. the purpows cm1 principles of he United L’~‘b 1270th meeting: parn. _ X7. For decisions _ of the-. Council Nations; concermng prolongation ot the mandate of the Force. see chapter V, Case 1. L’*.I S/5635. O.R.. IYIII yr., Suppl. for April-lrrrw lY64. zxo 1270th meeting: para. 11.5. pp. l-2. 2s’ 1270th meeting: para. 154. w 1106th meeting: preceding para. I. IIs2 1270th meeting: para. 162. z~l 1106th meeting: paras. l-2. For discussion on participa- XI S/KES/2lY (1965). O.R., 20th yr., Resolutions md tion, see chapter Hi, &se 2. Decisions of the Swrtrify Coumil, 1965, pp. 5-6. 287 1107th meeting: para. 2. 128 Chapter VIII. Maintenance of international peace and security __-.__-- (ii) Deploring the British military action at Horib incidents started on 9 March 1964 had been described on 28 March 1964; in three letters N” addressed to the President of the Council on 20, 28 and 31 March 1964. Those inci- (iii) Deploring all attacks und incidents in rhe area; dents had convinced the Government of the South Arabian Federation and the Government of the United (iv) Calling upon the Yemen Arab Republic and Kingdom that a deliberate and increasing attack by the United Kingdom to exercise the maximum Yemen against the Federation was under way. The restraint in order to avoid further incidents Government of the United Kingdom was responsible and to restore peuce in the area; for the defence of the Federation and the protection (v) Requesting the Secretary-General to use his of its Territory, and it was in the fulfilment of that good ofices to rry to settle outstanding issues responsibility that the counter-attack of 28 March had in agreement with the two parties been launched. The attack was directed at Harib Fort, At the 1106th meeting, the representative of Ye- a military and isolated target about one mile outside men * stated that the unprovoked attack by eight Brit- Harib town itself. Moreover before the attack, leaflets ish military aircraft coming from the direction of in Arabic were dropped in the arca advising all per- Aden against the Yemcni town of Harib, which took sons to leave immediately. The only weapons used in place on 28 March 1964, was not only an act of ag- the attack were rockets and cannon fire, and none gression but was the beginning of a British plan, the went astray. All possible measures had therefore been aim of which was to open a “hot-war front” in the taken in order to minimize the loss of life and prop southern and south-eastern regions of the Yemen Arab erty. The Government of the United Kingdom wished Republic, and to plunge that whole region into a to reiterate its policy of non-involvement in the inter- fcrrncnt of restlessness, with the hope that such a state nal affairs of Yemen, and its beticf that the solution of affairs would Icad to the overthrow of the Govcrn- of the whole problem dcpcndcd on the adoption and ment of the Ycmcn Arab Republic and solve the Brit- enforcement by the Yemeni Government of a neigh- ish “colonial problem” in occupied southern Ycmcn. bourly and peaceful policy toward the South Arabian Furthermore, the attack had culminated in a whole Federation. As a step toward that solution, the <;ov- series of British acts of hostility against the Yemen ernment of the United Kingdom also wished to rc- Arab Republic, that included the forcible occupation iterate the proposal for the demilitarization of a zone of areas and villages in the region of Harib, as well in the Beihan area from which both sides would with- as continuous violations of the Ycmcni territory and draw their forces.