Where and Why Public Ownership Has Failed
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WHERE AND WHY PUBLICOWNERSHIP HAS FAILED WHERE AND WHY PUBLIC OWNERSHIP HAS FAILED BY YVES GUYOT- TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY H. F. BAKER PREFACE The chief difficulty in preparing this book has been to make a coherent arrangement of the material, as the various sources from which it has been gathered are more or lessincomplete. Indeed the obstaclesin the way of presenting a true picture of industrial en- terprises, as operated by states and local governments, can scarcely be exaggerated. The partisans of government and municipal owner- ship of every species of public utility have assumed a distinctive title. They callthemselves representatives of the movement for direct operation (Reprksentonts de 2a Rkgk Directe). Their leader in France is Edgard Milhaud, occupying the chair of Political Economy at the University ofGeneva, where he makes a special point of emphasizing Socia1ism.l In a little periodical, entitled Annales de la Rkgie Direcfe, he presents the case for all government and municipal undertakings, although his enthusiasm frequently receives cruel set- backs, as in the suicide of the Mayor of Elbeuf. He has also published several articles for the purpose of demonstrating that accidents are muchless frequent upon government railways than upon the lines of pri- vate companies. We shall see later (Book 3, Chapter ‘See La D’hnocratir Socidiste Allmade, Paris, F. Afcpa V WHERE AND WHY PUBLIC OWNERSHIP HAS FAILED 2) the value of these attempts to justify his creed, and we may judge from them the importance that is to be attached to his other statements. For the academic year 1911-1912,L’lhle des Hautes Etudes Sociales organized a series of confer- ences on the subject of public operation under the direc- tion of M. Milhaud. It was considered advisable that at the closeof this seriesa dissenting voiceshould be heard-a rde ultimately assigned to me. In addi- tion to ten precedinglectures, wherein the whole theory and practice of Socialism had been set forth, M. Milhaudwas to speak forforty minutes, after which I was to be allotted forty in which to refute the points previouslydeveloped by him during 640 minutes. Then we were both to beallowed twenty minutes in order to sum up our arguments. I had at least the satisfaction of knowing that L‘Humanite‘ attached sufficient importance to this conference to an- nounce that for several days before itwas to take place entrance ticketswould be reserved for “comrades”; under which conditions it was not difficult to foresee that thehall would be converted into a public assembly room. His audience, thus prepared and won over, natur- ally gave M. Mifhaud an enthusiastic welcome. How- ever, despitesome murmurs,it proveditself not unwilling to allow me to oppose my facts to his state- ments. I borrowfrom the report of the discussion, as published in L’Humwzitk, November 14,rgr I, the fol- lowing r6sum6 of the argument of M. Milhaud: ’The organ of the Sscialist propaganda. vi PREFACE “Private monopoly,seeking nothingbut maximum profit, is far more costly than public monopoly, which is not boundby the sameconditions. Money costs public enterprises less, and, therefore, they can amortize their debtand thus reducegeneral expenses. On the other hand,heavier expenses for labor canbe supported by public undertakings. The management of a public enter- prise can even hope for profit, and all this can be accom- plished within less rigid limits than those which neces- sarily confine private monopoly. “Milhaud conciuded by outlining the tendency of pub- lic enterprises to become administrative autonomies. In order that they may escape pernicious bureaucratic influ- ences, they are being transformed into separate comer- cia1 entities.Through increased control by the con- sumer, on the one hand, and by labor on the other, they are being gradually but completely socialized. *‘Through reduction in prices, these enterprises create larger bodies of consumers, and theyalso bring abmt more flexible relations between employers and employed, The representatives of collectivism, individual consut&?fs and producers, may thusunite in behalf of &l progress.” When wecome to examine the assertions of the propagandists of public operation,we perceive that they are of no better quality than any other Socialist theories ; but the assuredmanner with which these statements are declared succeeds in disturbing and in- timidating many people. Yet, in the elections of 1910, Paul Forsans,President of La Sociktk des IntkrZts Ecorcomiques, was able to organize a vigorous cam- paign against an alcohol and insurance monopoly. French Socialists, unable to appeal to the experience vii WHERE AND WHY PUBLIC OWNERSHIPHAS FAILED of the Western (state) railroad, or the experience of the town of Elbeuf, say : “Very good, but in Prussia the state railways are altogether satisfactory, and, in all the important cities of Great Britain, Municipal So- cialism is enjoying a veritable triumph.” Such partisans quote the testimony of public depart- ments, never weary of boasting of their own success- ful administration, and ofmunicipalities which, in- spired bylocal pride, declare that theyhave accom- plished miracles. But how can we accept these preju- diced certificates of good conduct until we have been privileged to make a detailed inventory? There is a crying need at the present time for col- lections of precise facts, which shall show the vanity and “bluff’ of Socialist programs, and such facts must beplaced before the public.My sole object in writ- ing this book has been to present just such a compila- tion of rigidly investigated, authentic facts and figures regarding public ownership and operation. If I have not been able to affirm that government and municipal undertakings are efficient the fault is not mine. I have not found them so. A well-knownAmerican, Arthur Hadley, President ~ of Yale University, says, in his book entitled Eco- nomics: “Theadvantages of intervention on the part of a government are visible and tangible facts : The evil that results from such intervention is much more indirect and can only be appreciated after close and intensive study.” i I have vainly sought for the benefit arising from public operation by states and municipalities. On the viii PREFACE contrary an unbiased survey of the whole subject forces me to testify to the resulting harm. Y. G. November, 1912. For the American edition thefacts and figures herein set forth have been brought up to dateJune, 1913. b TRANSLATOR’S NOTE The translation hasbeen read and revised by the Author. Otherwise my hearty thanks for most valu- ableassistance given in translation aredue to Miss Elise Warren and Mr. William D. Kerr. , CONTENTS BOOK I PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TRADINGOPERATIONS PAQE I. Two Precepts., . , . , , . , . , . , , . , I 11. The Three Main-Springs of Human Action. 2 111. Determining Motives of Private as AgainstPublic Enterprises. 5 N. Government and Municipal Trading Operations. 16 BOOK I1 FINANCIALREXJLTS OF GOVERNMENTAND MUNICIPALOWNBRSEIP I. Bookkeeping in State and Municipal Trading Enter- prises........................................35 11. The Belgian State Railroads. 46 111. Prussian RaiIroads.. ' 55 IV. State Railways of Austria and Hungary. 72 V. Italian Railways. 77 VI. The Railways of the Swiss Meration.. .. 88 VII. Railways of New Zealand. .. 94 VIII. Government Railro&s in France. IX. Public vs. Privat,e,operaeion.. :2d X. The Holy Cities of Municipal Operation.. 125 XI. Operation of Gas and hlectricity in the United ging- dm. :. I . 127 XII. Tramways in Great Britain.. , . 136 XIII. Housiag of the Worldng Claw.s and Public ownership in Great Britain.. , . , . .. , . , . , . 151 XIV. Housing of the Working- Ctasses (Continued). .. , ,. r61 CONTENTS PACE xv . Government Controlof Food Supplies............. ' I75 XVI . Victims of Government Ownership................. 181v XVII . Charges. Debts and Credits ....................... 183 XVIII . Fictitious Profits ................................ 191 XIX . MonopoliesFiscal ............................... 194 1 xx . The Alcohol Monopoly in Switzerland and Russia... 205 XXI . Financial Disorder ............................... 216 XXII . The Purchase Price .............................. 241 XXIII . Delusions of Profit and the Life Insurance Monopoly inItaly ...................................... 243 1 XXIV . The Fiscal Mines of the Saar District .............. 253 xxv . Public vs. 'Private Enterprises..................... 256 BOOK I11 ADMINISTRATIVE RESULTS I. Administrative Results........................... 271 I1 . TheSafety of Travellersupon State andPrivate Railway Lines ................................ 272 I11 Disorders. Delays and Errors ..................... 280 . 1 IV. official Conservatism ............................ 292 V . Labor .......................................... 300 VI . The Consumer .................................. 348 VI1 . Programs of Organization and Regulation .......... 369 BOOK IV 1 POLITICALAND SOCIALCONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC OPERA~ON . I. Socialist Programsand the Facts .................. 381 I1. BlUtE ........................................... 394 111 . Results of Experience ............................ 398 1 IV . The State a Dishonest Man ....................... 400 V . Corruption ..................................... 423 VI . Nationalization of Public Utilities and the Foundation of Great Fortunes ............................. 47 VI1. Disintegrating Character of Public Operation ..... 429 WHERE AND WHY PUBLIC OWNERSHIP HAS FAILED Where and Why Public Owner- ship