Taking Turns: a Theory and a Model of Government-Dissident Interactions Stephen Michael Shellman
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Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2003 Taking Turns: A Theory and A Model of Government-Dissident Interactions Stephen Michael Shellman Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES TAKING TURNS: A THEORY AND A MODEL OF GOVERNMENT-DISSIDENT INTERACTIONS By STEPHEN M. SHELLMAN A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2003 Copyright © 2003 Stephen M. Shellman All Rights Reserved The members of the Committee approve the Dissertation of Stephen M. Shellman defended on 10/10/2003. Will H. Moore Professor Directing Dissertation James Cobbe Outside Committee Member William D. Berry Committee Member Sara Mitchell Committee Member Damarys Canache Committee Member Approved: Dale L. Smith, Chair, Department of Political Science David W. Rasmussen, Dean, College of Social Sciences The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members. ii To My Family I dedicate my dissertation to my loving family. To my wife, Sherry, whose love, support, and confidence made finishing possible. Without you by my side, I could not have succeeded. To my parents, Chuck and Joanne, who always believed in me, supported my actions, and never gave up on me. To my sisters, Karen and Kim, who mentored me and showed me that greatness is achievable. To my brother-in-laws, Martin & David, who always supported my endeavors and to my mother- and brother-in-law, Mary and Russ, who supported me through thick and thin and facilitated my achievements. Thanks to all of you for all your emotional, psychological, and financial support over the years. You made all of this possible. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My dissertation would not be possible without the help of several individuals. To begin, I would like to thank Will Moore for believing in me, steering me in the right direction, and leading me through this long difficult process. I am forever indebted to him. Next, I would like to thank Sara Mitchell for also believing in me and encouraging me during difficult times. There were many days when I needed positive feedback and she was able to keep me going. Thanks to Bill Berry for assisting me with issues related to presentation, language, clarification, and methodology. He spent countless hours scrutinizing my dissertation and giving me useful feedback and comments that improved my work immensely. Damarys Canache provided relevant criticisms to address and always kept me thinking about the big picture. Jim Cobbe provided useful feedback on my theoretical foundations. Phil Schrodt helped me solve problems related to TABARI and my data collection. Kamal Muthuswamy helped write Perl script and C++ code for the automated coding. Jared Ullman helped develop actor and verb dictionaries for the data collection. In addition, I would like to thank Ashley Leeds, Andrew Long, Mike Allison, Kursad Turan, Dale Smith, Kelly Kadera, Pamela Paxton, anonymous reviewers from the National Science Foundation grant program, International Interactions, Journal of Peace Research, and Political Analysis, members of the FSU IR workshop and FSU Department of political Science colloquia, participants at the Event Data Seminar at Texas A&M University, participants at the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) II Institute, and participants of panels at the International Studies Association (2001) and Peace Science Society (2000 and 2001) for additional feedback and comments. Moreover, I would like to thank my wife, Sherry, for reading draft after draft and correcting my grammatical errors. In addition, there were several people and a specific activity that kept me sane during this process, my band – Jeff, Justin, Kris, and Tony. Thanks for all the memories, frustration-relieving jams, and the good times we shared on the road together! I’ll surely miss it all! Finally, I would like to thank God for giving me the strength needed to complete such an arduous task. This research was partially funded by the National Science Foundation. SES-0214287 ($7,976). Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: A Theory and A Model of State-Dissident Interactions. Co-Principle Investigators: Stephen M. Shellman and Will H. Moore. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables …………………………………………………………………...... vi List of Figures …………………………………………………………………...... vii Abstract …………………………………………………………………………... viii 1. INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………...... 1 2. GOVERNMENT-DISSIDENT INTERACTIONS: PIECING TOGETHER THE PUZZLE …………………………………………………………… 12 3. LEADERS, MOTIVATIONS, SEQUENCES, AND CONTEXTS: EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT AND DISSIDENT BEHAVIORAL CHANGE ……………………………………........................................... 24 4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS I: LEADERS’ CONTEXTS AND SEQUENTIAL CHANGE ………………….............. 42 5. HOW MUCH IS THAT COUP IN THE WINDOW? THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG COSTS AND VARIOUS CHOICES ………………………………………………………………. 72 6. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS II: ILLUSTRATING THE COOPERATION-HOSTILITY DYNAMICS IN CIVIL STRIFE ………... 85 7. CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………….. 103 APPENDIX A: DATA …………………………………………………………… 110 APPENDIX B: RESULTS ……………………………………………………….. 121 REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………... 127 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ……………………………………………………... 137 v LIST OF TABLES Table 1.1 Sequence of Government-Dissident Interactions in Chile, June 1983 …. 11 Table 4.1 Differences Across Cases of Inquiry 60 Table 4.2 General Event Data Scheme …………………………………………… 61 Table 4.3 Frequency (Percentage) of Contexts in Each Dataset …………………. 62 Table 4.4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Statistics and Significance Levels 63 Table 4.5 Multiple Equation OLS Time Series Estimates with Robust Standard Errors …………………………………………………………………… 64 Table 4.6 Multiple Equation ARIMA or OLS Time Series Estimates ……………. 66 Table 4.7 Summary of Supported Hypotheses By Country ………………………. 68 Table 5.1 Verbal Statement of Hypotheses ……………………………………….. 83 Table 6.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Statistics and Significance Levels 96 Table 6.2 Multiple Equation OLS and ARIMA Time Series Estimates ………….. 97 Table 7.1 Sequence of Government-Dissident Event Data in Chile, June 1983 ….. 109 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1 Government and Dissident Action Set …………………………………... 23 Figure 3.1 Six Decision-Making Contexts ………………………………………….. 40 Figure 3.2: Six Decision-Making Contexts and Hypothesized Change in Behavior 41 Figure 4.1 Sequential Processes ………………………………………………… 69 Figure 4.2 Average Government Change by Country and Context ………………. 70 Figure 4.3 Average Dissident Change by Country and Context ………………….. 71 Figure 5.1 Graphs of All Hypothesized Relationships ……………………………… 84 Figure 6.1 Relationships between Past and Present Government Behavior in Each 99 Decision-Making Context By Country…………………………………. Figure 6.2 Relationships between Past and Present Dissident Behavior in Each 100 Decision-Making Context By Country ………………………………... Figure 6.3 Relationships between Previous Dissident Behavior and Current 101 Government Behavior …………………………………………………. Figure 6.4 Relationships between Previous Government Behavior and Current 102 Dissident Behavior …………………………………………………….. vii ABSTRACT The project focuses on the interrelationship between both government and dissident leaders’ “micromotives” and the regime’s/group’s “macrobehavior” (Schelling 1978). That is, the author explains how dissident and government leaders’ individual motives transpire into events such as the clashes with riot police, cooperative agreements, and terrorist activities we observe in Chile, Venezuela, Afghanistan, and Israel. In contentious political struggles between the government and an opposition group, how does a state’s choice among tactics (e.g., violence versus negotiation) influence an opposition group’s choice among tactics? Conversely, how does an opposition group’s choice among tactics influence a state’s choice among tactics? This project proposes a theory to answer these questions and posits a research design to test the theory's implications. The theory restricts attention to a two actor world composed of a government and a dissident group, in which the government implements policies and defends those policies and dissidents challenge those policies and the government's authority to rule. Thus, the government and the dissidents are viewed as opponents of one another. The author further assumes that each entity is controlled by a rational leader and that each leader gets utility from maintaining their tenure. To protect their positions of authority, leaders direct actions towards one another. Each leader’s choice of action is influenced by three factors: internal threat, external threat, and resource pools. First, each leader faces threats from his or her coalition of supporters (internal threat). For leaders to remain in power, they must have a coalition of followers that support them. The likelihood of a leader maintaining power decreases, as his or her support erodes. In this simplified world, a leader’s coalition of supporters judges the leader’s performance in office based on the successes and failures he or she has in interactions with the opponent. Thus, one’s actions are a function of previous outcomes in interactions with the opponent. Second, leaders face threats from the opponent itself