Rockets and People: Vol. 3, Hot Days of the Cold War Boris Chertok
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Naval War College Review Volume 70 Article 11 Number 2 Spring 2017 Rockets and People: Vol. 3, Hot Days of the Cold War Boris Chertok Andrew Erickson Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Chertok, Boris and Erickson, Andrew (2017) "Rockets and People: Vol. 3, Hot Days of the Cold War," Naval War College Review: Vol. 70 : No. 2 , Article 11. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/11 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Chertok and Erickson: Rockets and People: Vol. 3, Hot Days of the Cold War BOOK REVIEWS 151 open to abuse to be a defective theory; if where he lacks information, makes for anything, because of that potential it is an accessible, historically useful account� a realistic one� I highly recommend this From his perch in the Soviet missile work as a useful resource for practical bureaucracy, Chertok observed the Cold moral formation in just war theory� War as a scientific-technological- ALI GHAFFARI military competition� Manned space- flight was regarded as an indicator of national prestige—and socialist superiority: “There was an ongoing battle at the front line of the Cold War’s Rockets and People, by Boris Chertok, ed� Asif scientific-technical front� Rather than Siddiqi� Vol� 3, Hot Days of the Cold War. Wash- soldiers, it was scientists, engineers, the ington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space ‘generals’ of industry, and workers who Administration, History Office, 2010� 796 pages� determined the battle’s outcome� And $65� warriors of another sort came on the In this third volume of his memoirs, ably scene—cosmonauts” (p� 61)� Each side edited by acclaimed space historian Asif fed off the other in constant one- Siddiqi, Boris Yevseyevich Chertok, who upmanship, Chertok stresses: “American was the most senior surviving Soviet operations had a very strong effect on space engineer until his death at age our plans� American historians of aero- ninety-nine in 2011, offers a unique, nautics assert that our successes were the firsthand window into Cold War history primary reason why the United States as he lived it over his six-decade career� converted its space programs into a top- He spent most of it at the uppermost priority, nationwide challenge” (p� 246)� level of the OKB-1 design bureau (now Central to this competition, for some S� P� Korolev Rocket and Space Corpora- time, was a race to land a man on the tion Energia), where he participated moon� On August 3, 1964, Central in every major project though 1991� Committee and USSR Council of In this series, volume 1 details Chertok’s Ministers Resolution 655-268, “On rise from aviation factory electrician Work for Lunar and Space Research,” to official in charge of extracting recommitted Moscow to “land a man Nazi rocket expertise, volume 2 the on the moon and return him to Earth post-1946 emergence of the Soviet by 1967–68” (p� 397)� This goal was missile program� In volume 3, Chertok restated in a similar decree of October recounts and reflects on the golden 25, 1965 (p� 568)� This competition was age of Soviet cosmonautics, from Yury very real, and there was no substitute: Gagarin’s historic orbital flight in 1961 “[N]o matter how successful [other] to the death of key figures in the Soviet programs might be, they could not space program in and around 1967� compensate for our loss of superiority Volume 4, released in early 2012, covers if the Americans were to become the the U�S�-Soviet moon race� Chertok’s first to fly around the moon” (p� 523)� personable, technically informed, Then, despite suffering a major setback and somewhat politically detached in the Apollo 1 fire of 1967, the United perspective, as well as his frankness States started pulling ahead� The Soviet regarding credibility of sources and Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017 1 NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 151 2/22/17 9:32 AM 152 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval REVIEW War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 2, Art. 11 program was held back by a year of reduce the gap� Spaceflights served time-consuming yet inadequate ground propaganda purposes, in part to testing and the tragic death of Vladimir cover up missile limitations� Risky space Komarov when Soyuz 1 crashed in 1967� spectaculars were attempted, including In retrospect, there were larger reasons —on Khrushchev’s personal orders via for these results� The Soviet defense telephone to Korolyov—the 1964 cram- industry that Chertok depicts suffered ming of three cosmonauts without space from both direct involvement by party suits and with only limited life support organizations throughout the produc- into a Voskhod capsule whose “new tion process and limited government landing system had only been tested capacity, ruinous bureaucratic and once” (p� 237)� Soviet mission-control interpersonal struggles and finger- facilities were less advanced: “[T]he pointing, overly ambitious deadlines, mission control centers at Cape Canav- lack of systematic review of decisions, eral and Houston seemed like a fantasy and lack of politicians who understood to us” (p� 599)� The USSR fell behind the benefits of a comprehensive military- in integrated circuits, microchips, and civilian approach� So much depended computers, in part because of a lack of on a single individual� Chief Designer civilian applications� Quantity reflected Sergey Korolyov was a microcosm of lack of technological integration: Soviet society, having both suffered “[T]he first Soyuzes had so much varied significant repression and marshaled radio technology on board that they significant technical resources� His required twenty antennas” (p� 580)� untimely death in 1966, itself partly a Looking to the present and beyond, result of medical malpractice, devastated Chertok condemns the present Russian the Soviet space program� Korolyov’s government’s “crime” of dismantling successor Vasily Mishin would prove the nation’s great technological far less effective at cultivating the infrastructure (p� 331)� He makes Kremlin bureaucracy� Obsessive fascinating future projections: by 2015, secrecy reigned� The Central Committee “China (and perhaps India) will become maintained a categorical prohibition superpowers, surpassing Russia in terms on acknowledging space failures, even of military-strategic might�” Future when detected by foreigners� Inefficient conflict may center on resource access; use of limited resources imposed the United States, Europe, and China additional burdens: “For a long time may covet Russia’s unparalleled reserves during the post-Khrushchev period, of oil and gas, China its fresh water and we continued to develop and produce eastern territory as well� “Under those several parallel lines of strategic missiles, conditions, it appears that the strategic allowing unjustified redundancy” (p� significance of high-precision, nonnu- 155), their overproduction camouflaged clear weaponry together with intermedi- by creative budgeting (p� 146)� ate and even short-range tactical nuclear The United States led significantly in weapons might become a factor in missile numbers, accuracy, and nuclear deterring a large war just as ICBMs were weapons—a tremendous disparity dur- in the 20th century” (pp� 156–57)� Cher- ing the Cuban missile crisis, although tok judges further that “Chinese rocket subsequently the Soviets worked to and space technology will overtake the https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/11 2 NWC_Spring2017Review.indb 152 2/22/17 9:32 AM Chertok and Erickson: Rockets and People: Vol. 3, Hot Days of the Cold War BOOK REVIEWS 153 Russian space program in ten to twelve oil and the fact that most of the world’s years; and perhaps it will overtake the oil at the time came from this area, led American program as well” (p� 585)� then-president Jimmy Carter to declare As in previous volumes in the series, the security and stability of this region Chertok documents the toils of Soviet to be a vital national interest� Bacevich designers, who were remunerated believes the doctrine created a broad, poorly, subjected to difficult working open-ended commitment that expanded conditions, and hidden from foreign with time� Early in the book he describes sight and contact� Chertok learned of his the decision making, strategy and nation’s deployment of missiles to Cuba, policy development, and organizational for instance, from Kennedy’s speech (p� changes that positioned the United 95)! Driven in part by heartfelt ideals States as the guarantor of regional tempered by knowledge of the horrors of security� This was the context for the the Stalin era, these designers achieved formation of U�S� Central Command, so much, so quickly, under such which included in its geographic area of formidable constraints—truly amazing responsibility not only the Persian Gulf accomplishments� Theirs is not only a states but a total of nineteen countries, Soviet legacy, rooted now in a bygone including Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, era, but a part of a larger human legacy Kenya, and Pakistan� Bacevich argues that will inspire further exploration as that this new combatant command mankind moves farther into space� created both an expectation of and the pretext for future military intervention ANDREW S� ERICKSON in the