ARRC, a User's Guide to SOFR: the Alternative Reference Rate
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LIBOR Transition Faqs ‘Big Bang’ CCP Switch Over
RED = Final File Size/Bleed Line BLACK = Page Size/Trim Line MAGENTA = Margin/Safe Art Boundary NOT A PRODUCT OF BARCLAYS RESEARCH LIBOR Transition FAQs ‘Big bang’ CCP switch over 1. When will CCPs switch their rates for discounting 2. €STR Switch Over to new risk-free rates (RFRs)? What is the ‘big bang’ 2a. What are the mechanics for the cash adjustment switch over? exchange? Why is this necessary? As part of global industry efforts around benchmark reform, Each CCP will perform a valuation using EONIA and then run most systemic Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs) are the same valuation by switching to €STR. The switch to €STR expected to switch Price Aligned Interest (PAI) and discounting discounting will lead to a change in the net present value of EUR on all cleared EUR-denominated products to €STR in July 2020, denominated trades across all CCPs. As a result, a mandatory and for USD-denominated derivatives to SOFR in October 2020. cash compensation mechanism will be used by the CCPs to 1a. €STR switch over: weekend of 25/26 July 2020 counter this change in value so that individual participants will experience almost no ‘net’ changes, implemented through a one As the momentum of benchmark interest rate reform continues off payment. This requirement is due to the fact portfolios are in Europe, while EURIBOR has no clear end date, the publishing switching from EONIA to €STR flat (no spread), however there of EONIA will be discontinued from 3 January 2022. Its is a fixed spread between EONIA and €STR (i.e. -
Bond Arithmetic
Debt Instruments Set 2 Backus/Octob er 29, 1998 Bond Arithmetic 0. Overview Zeros and coup on b onds Sp ot rates and yields Day count conventions Replication and arbitrage Forward rates Yields and returns Debt Instruments 2-2 1. Why Are We Doing This? Explain nitty-gritty of b ond price/yield calculations Remark: \The devil is in the details" Intro duce principles of replication and arbitrage Debt Instruments 2-3 2. Zeros or STRIPS A zero is a claim to $100 in n p erio ds price = p n t + n t j j Pay p Get $100 n A spot rate is a yield on a zero: 100 p = n n 1 + y =2 n US treasury conventions: { price quoted for principal of 100 { time measured in half-years { semi-annual comp ounding Debt Instruments 2-4 2. Zeros continued A discount factor is a price of a claim to one dollar: p 1 n d = = n n 100 1 + y =2 n Examples US treasury STRIPS, May 1995 MaturityYrs Price $ DiscountFactor Sp ot Rate 0.5 97.09 0.9709 5.99 1.0 94.22 0.9422 6.05 1.5 91.39 0.9139 2.0 88.60 0.8860 6.15 Debt Instruments 2-5 3. Comp ounding Conventions A yield convention is an arbitrary set of rules for computing yields like sp ot rates from discount factors US Treasuries use semiannual comp ounding: 1 d = n n 1 + y =2 n with n measured in half-years Other conventions with n measured in years: 8 n > > 1 + y annual comp ounding > n > > > > > kn > > 1 + y =k \k" comp ounding n > > < ny n e continuous comp ounding k !1 d = n > > > > 1 > > 1 + ny \simple interest" > n > > > > > : 1 ny \discount basis" n All of these formulas de ne rules for computing the yield y from the discount factor d , but of course they're all n n di erent and the choice among them is arbitrary. -
Federal Home Loan Banks Consolidated Bonds and Consolidated Discount Notes (With Maturities of One Day Or Longer)
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM Federal Home Loan Banks Consolidated Bonds and Consolidated Discount Notes (with maturities of one day or longer) The terms “we,” “us” and “our” as used throughout this Information Memorandum mean the Federal Home Loan Banks (the “FHLBanks”), acting by and through the Office of Finance, a joint office of the FHLBanks (together with its successors and assigns, the “Office of Finance”). We may offer consolidated bonds (the “Bonds”) and consolidated discount notes (the “Discount Notes” and, together with the Bonds, the “Securities”) pursuant to this Information Memorandum (as defined herein) and, in the case of the Bonds, a Pricing Supplement or an Offering Notice (each, a “Supplement”) that will contain the specific terms of, and pricing details for, each particular issue (sometimes referred to as “series”) of Bonds. The Securities will constitute joint and several unsecured general obligations of the FHLBanks. No person other than the FHLBanks will have any obligations or liability with respect to the Securities. The Securities will be denominated in U.S. dollars or as may otherwise be specified by us at the time of issue in the applicable Supplement (the “Specified Currencies”). There is no specific limit on the aggregate principal amount of Securities that we may issue. The Securities will have maturities of one day or longer from the date of their original issuance. The Bonds will bear interest as set forth in the applicable Supplement. Principal payments on the Bonds may be made periodically or only at maturity. Any index or formula used to determine the principal or interest payable on the Bonds will be set forth in the applicable Supplement. -
LIBOR Transition: SOFR, So Good Implications of a New Reference Rate for Your Business • 2021
LIBOR transition: SOFR, so good Implications of a new reference rate for your business • 2021 Contents What is LIBOR? 2 What fallback language is currently in place? 16 Why does LIBOR have to go? 4 How will derivative contracts be impacted? 17 Who is driving the process? 5 How will loans and bonds be impacted? 19 How can LIBOR be replaced? 7 How is Wells Fargo contributing? 21 What should I know about SOFR? 9 Where can I get further information? 22 Why are repo transactions so important? 10 Contacts 22 How can SOFR fill LIBOR’s big shoes? 11 What is LIBOR? A brief history of the London Interbank Offered Rate The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) emerged in How is LIBOR set? the 1980s as the fast-growing and increasingly international financial markets demanded aconsistent rate to serve as • 11 – 16 contributor banks submit rates based on a common reference rate for financial contracts. A Greek theoretical borrowing costs banker is credited with arranging the first transaction to • The top 25% and bottom 25% of submissions are be based on the borrowing rates derived from a “set of thrown out reference banks” in 1969.¹ • Remaining rates are averaged together The adoption of LIBOR spread quickly as many market participants saw the value in a common base rate that could underpin and standardize private transactions. At first, the rate was self-regulated, but in 1986, the British 35 LIBOR rates published at 11:00 a.m. London Time Bankers’ Association (BBA), a trade group representing 5 currencies (USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, CHF) with the London banks, stepped in to provide some oversight. -
Csl/19-28/Download
CFTC Letter No. 19-28 No-Action December 17, 2019 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION Three Lafayette Centre 1155 21st Street, NW, Washington, DC 20581 Telephone: (202) 418-5000 Division of Clearing and Risk M. Clark Hutchison III Director Re: Staff No-Action Relief from the Swap Clearing Requirement for Amendments to Legacy Uncleared Swaps to Facilitate Orderly Transition from Inter-Bank Offered Rates to Alternative Risk-Free Rates Ladies and Gentlemen: This letter from the Division of Clearing and Risk (DCR) responds to a November 5, 2019 letter from the Alternative Reference Rates Committee (ARRC)1 on behalf of its members that are subject to certain Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) regulations.2 Among other things, ARRC requested no-action relief for failure to comply with certain provisions of the swap clearing requirement promulgated pursuant to section 2(h)(1)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and codified in part 50 of Commission regulations when swap counterparties amend certain uncleared swaps as part of an industry-wide initiative to amend swaps that reference certain London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rates and other interbank offered rates (collectively with LIBOR, the IBORs)3 to reference specified risk-free rates (RFRs). ARRC’s request to DCR focuses on swaps that were executed prior to the compliance date on which swap counterparties were required to begin centrally clearing interest rate swaps (IRS) pursuant to the CFTC’s swap clearing requirement and thus were not required to be 1 Authorities representing U.S. banking regulators and other financial sector members, including the Commission, serve as non-voting ex officio members of the ARRC. -
FEDERAL FUNDS Marvin Goodfriend and William Whelpley
Page 7 The information in this chapter was last updated in 1993. Since the money market evolves very rapidly, recent developments may have superseded some of the content of this chapter. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Richmond, Virginia 1998 Chapter 2 FEDERAL FUNDS Marvin Goodfriend and William Whelpley Federal funds are the heart of the money market in the sense that they are the core of the overnight market for credit in the United States. Moreover, current and expected interest rates on federal funds are the basic rates to which all other money market rates are anchored. Understanding the federal funds market requires, above all, recognizing that its general character has been shaped by Federal Reserve policy. From the beginning, Federal Reserve regulatory rulings have encouraged the market's growth. Equally important, the federal funds rate has been a key monetary policy instrument. This chapter explains federal funds as a credit instrument, the funds rate as an instrument of monetary policy, and the funds market itself as an instrument of regulatory policy. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL FUNDS Three features taken together distinguish federal funds from other money market instruments. First, they are short-term borrowings of immediately available money—funds which can be transferred between depository institutions within a single business day. In 1991, nearly three-quarters of federal funds were overnight borrowings. The remainder were longer maturity borrowings known as term federal funds. Second, federal funds can be borrowed by only those depository institutions that are required by the Monetary Control Act of 1980 to hold reserves with Federal Reserve Banks. -
Emu and Market Conventions: Recent Developments
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. EMU AND MARKET CONVENTIONS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1. Introduction On 16th July, 1997, ISDA, along with a number of other trade associations, Cedel and Euroclear, published a joint statement on market conventions for the euro. That joint statement was subsequently supported by both the European Commission and the European Monetary Institute (now the European Central Bank). The joint statement was intended to focus attention on the need to establish a set of market conventions for the euro. Conventions of the type dealt with in the joint statement tend to differ between currencies, largely for historical rather than valid market reasons. It was inconceivable that the new single currency should itself suffer from the mixture of market conventions which apply to the various national currencies that it is due to replace. At the time of publication, the joint statement reflected a broad market consensus view on what standard market practice should be for new euro-denominated transactions entered into after 1st January, 1999. It also advocated that for "legacy" instruments or transactions (those entered into before 1999 in national currency units or the ECU, but maturing after 1st January, 1999) which incorporated the old national currency conventions, no change should be made to update the conventions. The purpose of this memorandum is to bring the issue of harmonised market conventions for the euro up to date in light of developments that have taken place since the publication of the joint statement over a year ago. A summary of the proposed market conventions for the euro financial markets is attached as Exhibit 1. -
2021: a Defining Moment for the Interest Rates Reform City Week 2020 – London
21 September 2020 ESMA80-187-627 2021: A Defining Moment for The Interest Rates Reform City Week 2020 – London Steven Maijoor Chair European Securities and Markets Authority Introduction Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great pleasure to participate today in the City Week 2020 forum. The interest rates reform is one of the key challenges that the global financial system is currently facing. Therefore, I would like to thank City & Financial Global and the other institutions involved in the organisation of this forum for inviting me and for including in the agenda a panel discussion on this very important matter. Today, before participating in the panel discussion, I would like to speak about recent and expected developments of the global interest rates reform and the crucial role that the cooperation between public authorities and the financial industry is playing in this process. €STR: the new risk-free rate for the euro area As Chair of a European Authority, please allow me to start with an overview of interest rates transition in the euro area and the challenges that lie ahead of us. ESMA • 201-203 rue de Bercy • CS 80910 • 75589 Paris Cedex 12 • France • Tel. +33 (0) 1 58 36 43 21 • www.esma.europa.eu We are soon approaching the first-year anniversary of the Euro Short-Term Rate, or €STR1, which has been published by the ECB since 2nd October 2019. This rate is arguably the core element of the interest rate reform in the euro area, and I will try to explain why this is the case. -
Mark Carney: the Evolution of the International Monetary System
Mark Carney: The evolution of the international monetary system Remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada, to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 19 November 2009. * * * In response to the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, policy-makers around the globe are providing unprecedented stimulus to support economic recovery and are pursuing a radical set of reforms to build a more resilient financial system. However, even this heavy agenda may not ensure strong, sustainable, and balanced growth over the medium term. We must also consider whether to reform the basic framework that underpins global commerce: the international monetary system. My purpose this evening is to help focus the current debate. While there were many causes of the crisis, its intensity and scope reflected unprecedented disequilibria. Large and unsustainable current account imbalances across major economic areas were integral to the buildup of vulnerabilities in many asset markets. In recent years, the international monetary system failed to promote timely and orderly economic adjustment. This failure has ample precedents. Over the past century, different international monetary regimes have struggled to adjust to structural changes, including the integration of emerging economies into the global economy. In all cases, systemic countries failed to adapt domestic policies in a manner consistent with the monetary system of the day. As a result, adjustment was delayed, vulnerabilities grew, and the reckoning, when it came, was disruptive for all. Policy-makers must learn these lessons from history. The G-20 commitment to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced growth in global demand – launched two weeks ago in St. -
No Arbitrage Pricing and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
No Arbitrage Pricing and the Term Structure of Interest Rates by Thomas Gustavsson Economic Studies 1992:2 Department of Economics Uppsala University Originally published as ISBN 91-87268-11-6 and ISSN 0283-7668 Acknowledgement I would like to thank my thesis advisor professor Peter Englund for helping me to complete this project. I could not have done it without the expert advice of Ingemar Kaj from the Department of Mathematics at Uppsala University. I am also grateful to David Heath of Cornell University for reading and discussing an early version of this manuscript. Repeated conversations with Martin Kulldorff and Hans Dill´en,both Uppsala University, and Rainer Sch¨obel, T¨ubingen,have also been most helpful. The usual disclaimer applies. Financial support for this project was received from Bo Jonas Sj¨onanders Minnesfond and Bankforskningsinstitutet. Special thanks to professors Sven- Erik Johansson, Nils Hakansson, Claes-Henric Siven and Erik Dahm´enfor their support. Uppsala May 1992 Abstract This dissertation provides an introduction to the concept of no arbitrage pricing and probability measures. In complete markets prices are arbitrage-free if and only if there exists an equivalent probability measure under which all asset prices are martingales. This is only a slight generalization of the classical fair game hypothesis. The most important limitation of this approach is the requirement of free and public information. Also in order to apply the martingale repre- sentation theorem we have to limit our attention to stochastic processes that are generated by Wiener or Poisson processes. While this excludes branching it does include diffusion processes with stochastic variances. -
SIFMA Insights: SOFR Primer
Executive Summary SIFMA Insights: Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) Primer The transition away from LIBOR July 2019 SIFMA Insights Page | 1 Executive Summary Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 The Transition Away from LIBOR ............................................................................................................................................................... 6 What is LIBOR? .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Why Is LIBOR Important?........................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Why Transition to New Reference Rates, Away from LIBOR? ................................................................................................................... 9 Who Is Impacted by the Transition? ........................................................................................................................................................... 9 US Transition Plan ................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Establishing the ARRC ............................................................................................................................................................................ -
Liquidity, Information, and the Overnight Rate
WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 378 / JULY 2004 LIQUIDITY, INFORMATION, AND THE OVERNIGHT RATE by Christian Ewerhart, Nuno Cassola, Steen Ejerskov and Natacha Valla WORKING PAPER SERIES NO. 378 / JULY 2004 LIQUIDITY, INFORMATION, AND THE OVERNIGHT RATE 1 by Christian Ewerhart 2, Nuno Cassola 3, Steen Ejerskov 3 and Natacha Valla 3 In 2004 all publications will carry This paper can be downloaded without charge from a motif taken http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network from the €100 banknote. electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=564623. 1 The authors would like to thank Joseph Stiglitz for encouragement and for a helpful discussion on the topic of the paper. The paper also benefitted from comments made by attendents to the Lecture Series on Monetary Policy Implementation, Operations and Money Markets at the ECB in January 2004 and by participants of the joint ETH/University of Zurich quantitative methods workshop in April 2004. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank. 2 Postal address for correspondence: Institute for Empirical Research in Economics,Winterthurerstrasse 30, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland. E-mail: [email protected]. 3 European Central Bank, D Monetary Policy, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, e-mail: [email protected] © European Central Bank, 2004 Address Kaiserstrasse 29 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Postal address Postfach 16 03 19 60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Telephone +49 69 1344 0 Internet http://www.ecb.int Fax +49 69 1344 6000 Telex 411 144 ecb d All rights reserved.