Common Defense Quarterly Policy | Programs | Technology | Perspectives a Comdef Publication Summer 2011 U.S.$10.00

Common Defense Quarterly Policy | Programs | Technology | Perspectives A ComDef Publication Summer 2011 U.S.$10.00

Defense Trade Data: Why The Numbers Never Add Up

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Table of Contents Editorial Advisory Board Defense Trade Data: Why The Numbers Never Add Up 2 ▪ GEN. Robert Magnus, USMC (Ret.), Chairman By Joel Johnson ▪ Gertie Arts, the Netherlands International Cooperation: a tool for building the future. 6 By Colonel Idriz Haxhiaj ▪ Bruce Bade Increased Cyber Security Threat Represents Opportunity ▪ VADM Brent M. Bennitt, USN (Ret.), for International Defense Cooperation 10 Executive VP, Wyle Laboratories By Van D. Hipp, Jr. ▪ Dr. Stephen Bryen, President, SDB Partners International Collaboration to Secure the Worlds Oceans 12 By Dr. George GUY Thomas ▪ Aaron B. Fuller III, President, Enforcement, Security & Intelligence Group, North Science and Technology Intensive Small Countries: American Public Sector, CSC Big Contributions to Global Security and Stability - ▪ RADM Raydon Gates, RAN (Ret). The Case of Switzerland 14 By Dr. Christoph Ebell • Ronald E. Genemans, Chairman, Defense MoU Attaché Group (DMAG), & Defense Inadequate Consideration and Unintended Consequences 16 By Dr. Stanley Orman & MGEN. Eugene Fox, USA (Ret.) Cooperation Attache, Embassy of the Netherlands The Attack on the Reaper 18 ▪ Dr. Uwe Koch, Federal Office of Defense By Dr. Stephen D. Bryen Tech and Procurement (BWB) Koblenz, NATO Phased Ballistic Missile Defense: Germany Protecting the Euro-Atlantic Region 20 ▪ Gibson G. LeBoeuf, VP, Washington By John F. Morton, CAPT George V. Galdorisi, USN (Ret) & Scott C. Truver, PhD Relations, Raytheon Company DoD Leads Industry in Augmented Reality 23 ▪ Zorica Maric-Djordjevic, Defense Counselor, By Tom Zysk Embassy of Montenegro MIDS Across Borders and Around the World 24 ▪ Rich Millies, VP, International Strategy & By Michael Posner and Kathryn Peterson Business Development, BAE Systems Embracing Technological and Strategic Convergence ▪ Remy Nathan, Assistant VP, International to Increase Capability and Reduce Cost 26 Affairs, Aerospace Industries Association By Jesse Bonfeld ▪ Martin Neill, Counsellor Defence Acquisition Pre-Positioned Expeditionary Assistance Kit (PEAK) and Technology, British Embassy Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 28 By Dr. Russell Horn ▪ George Nicholson III

Interview with Dr. Michael B. Oren, ▪ Dr. Chris Pell Ambassador of Israel to the United States 34 ▪ George Perlman

Interview with Dr. Jennifer E. Stewart 37 ▪ Andrew Radcliffe, Vice President, Business Development, U.S./U.K. Relations, BAE Key Washington, DC Embassy Groups Systems, UK engaged in International Defense Cooperative Activity 39 ▪ Col Vance Renfroe, USAF (Ret.) Washington DC Embassy Defense Attachés 40 ▪ Dr. Jennifer Stewart, Chairman, Foreign Procurement Group; and Director General, Foreign Government Buyers in DC of Defense Procurement, Embassy of Canada, U.S. Defense and Aerospace Equipment 42 Washington, DC. OUSD (AT&L) International Cooperation 44 ▪ Patrick D. Sullivan, The Boeing Company

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By Joel Johnson

“U.S. Accounts for 50% of world’s defense exports.” It is not that U.S. government agencies do not produce reports “Two-way street impassable: defense trade related to defense trade. They do. The Defense Department, the State Department, the Congressional Research Service, and imbalance between Europe and U.S. unacceptable.” the Commerce Department all have repositories of data and issue “U.S. defense industrial base undercut by offsets.” reports on that data. The problem is that they accumulate such “Exports key to maintaining defense industrial base information for their own specific purpose and categorize defense during budget downsizing.” “Imports of high tech articles and services using different systems. No agency takes a components for use by defense industry endanger holistic approach to trade in defense products. U.S. security.” So Who has the Data?

Here’s a quick summary of who does what: Trade involving military hardware and technology engenders claims and counter-claims, endless studies, op-ed pieces, and • U.S. Census Bureau: The government’s primary data base legislation. Such trade can discourage or encourage domestic and on all exports and imports is maintained and controlled international conflict, can support or undercut national defense by the Census Bureau in the Department of Commerce. industrial bases, and can be an economic boon or economic Its data in turn comes primarily from U.S. Customs and liability. The trade is highly regulated by most countries that Border Protection, which is part of the Department of produce and/or import the products. Certainly that is true of the Homeland Security. Anything exported or imported through U.S. government. Given the level of interest in defense trade, U.S. ports of entry and departure are counted, valued, one might assume that there would be highly reliable data on and categorized by Customs. Imports are categorized U.S. exports and imports of defense products and underlying according to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United technology to resolve such issues. Alas, one would be wrong. States (HTS), which is in turn based on a combination of

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the six digit internationally agreed Harmonized Commodity • Congressional Research Service: Since 1982 the CRS has Description and Coding System (HS) and an additional four published a series on Conventional Arms Transfers to digits used by the U.S. for tariff and statistical purposes. Developing Nations, the most recent dated September 10, On the export side a similar total ten digit Schedule 2010 and covering calendar years 2002-2009. The report is B is used to classify exports. These categories, and of particular interest as it includes data on shipments from accompanying documentation, allow Customs to enforce all the major arms exporters. While it focuses on shipments U.S. laws governing exports and imports, which of course is to developing countries, it also contains data on shipments particularly relevant to defense trade. Customs is moving to industrial countries as well. towards an all electronic reporting system for both exports and imports, which should allow highly detailed information on defense trade. • Government Accountability Office: While the GAO does not deal in defense trade data as a normal activity, it recently took a hard look at data on the export of defense articles • Defense Security Cooperation Agency: The DSCA resides in and services (GAO-10-952: Defense Exports – Reporting on the Department of Defense (DoD), and maintains data on all Exported Articles and Services Needs to Be Improved). In Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements and deliveries. As particular, it found that DDTC’s reporting on licenses issued most readers know, U.S. defense sales can be made in one of and on actual exports against those licenses left a lot to be two ways. A foreign government can contract with the DoD desired. or one of the military services for a specific defense product or service, and acting as the foreign country’s agent, the government in turn contracts with a U.S. defense company for the product or service. This is known as the FMS OK, So What do the Numbers Look Like? system, and DSCA publishes an Annual Facts Book containing information on both new FMS agreements reached in the The agencies enumerated above produce lots of numbers; the fiscal year, as well as on actual deliveries of goods and basic problem is they don’t seem to match up very well. The two services against those and earlier contracts during the fiscal tables below show what each of those agencies offer in the way year. of data on exports and imports. The challenge for an analyst is to determine what the strengths and limitations are for each series.

• Directorate of Defense Trade Controls: The DDTC, housed in the Department of State, is instrumental in controlling the U.S. DEFENSE EXPORTS second means by which a foreign country can obtain U.S. ($ Millions) defense products and technology, namely direct commercial sales (DCS). For a U.S. company to sell a defense good, Year Census DSCA State GAO CRS service, or technology to a foreign purchaser, whether a CY FY CY CY CY government entity or private enterprise, it must obtain an export license from DDTC. Each year the State Department 2005 12,175 11,153 30,145 18,770 11,778 reports to the Congress on licenses it has issued during the 2006 15,815 11,549 31,605 20,140 12,350 year, broken down by country and category of weapon. This 2007 16,215 12,529 8,874 15,400 12,328 so-called 655 Report is available on the internet. Using 2008 15,948 11,828 33,509 19,430 11,956 data electronically furnished to it by Census (based on data 2009 14,149 12,522 5,220 22,150 14,383 from Customs), State has begun to include some information in the 655 Report on actual exports, but that published Notes: Census data is based on ten digit Schedule B codes that information is limited and highly questionable. are clearly defense items; DSCA and State data are from DSCA’s Historical Facts Book as of Sept. 30, 2009; GAO data is from its Report 10-952 on Defense Exports, and CRS data, which is in • Office of Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy: DPAP, also constant 2009 dollars, is taken from report R41403: Conventional part of DoD, provides procurement data to elements of DoD, Arms Transfers to Developing Countries 2002-2009. the Congress, the GAO, and the public. In particular, with respect to defense trade, it obtains data on prime contracts reported in the Federal Procurement Data System- Next Generation (FPDS-NG) on all goods and services purchased by DoD and the Services from foreign entities. Data on such US DEFENSE IMPORTS contracts is coded so as to differentiate between inherently ($ Millions) military products and services, as opposed to purchases of staples such as petroleum, construction, power and Year Census DPAP subsistence. DPAP also obtains information from all prime CY FY contractors on any subcontracts they have for purchases 2005 2,494 9,988 of goods and services from abroad valued at more than 2006 2,882 11,215 $550,000. The addition of these two data streams provides 2007 3,878 19,155 considerable information on total DoD purchases, directly 2008 4,325 17,677 and indirectly, of military goods and services from overseas. 2009 4,966 7,000

Common Defense Quarterly 4 Policy

Notes: Census data based on ten digit Harmonized Commodity FMS sales plus a few programs such as the Military Assistance Description and Coding System (HS) codes that are clearly defense Programs (MAP) and International Military Education and Training items; DPAP data is from DoD contracting agencies for goods and (IMET). This unfortunately means that the CRS report to Congress services purchased from foreign entities (excluding petroleum, underestimates U.S. defense sales by as much as half. Finally, the construction, power and subsistence) and from reports of overseas DPAP data reminds one that DoD and U.S. defense contractors pay for subcontracts by prime contractors under DFARS 252.225-7005. a variety of military related goods and services overseas that do not Holy Moly, Why Don’t Any of the Numbers Match? enter the country as defense articles that are counted by Customs.

The advantage of the Census-derived data is that the same Are There Some Simple Fixes? - Yes There Are! agency is counting everything – both exports and imports. There are several limitations, however, which result in Census numbers • First and foremost State should use the electronic data being lower than those of other agencies. First and foremost, available to it from Customs/Census to publish data in its Census data is based on the value of specific articles that are 655 Report that lists actual exports to foreign governments crossing the border. Hence defense services are not included. and firms, exclusive of equipment returned after repairs or Second, exported items are counted as defense articles only if shipments to US government agencies, and should break they require a license and as imported defense articles only if down such data by country and category. they fall into a clear military nomenclature. This is a particular problem on the import side, as defense articles manufactured in the US increasingly incorporate foreign components and • The government might add statistical categories to its technology that are essentially commercial in nature, ranging HTS and Schedule B coding systems that would indicate from electronic chips to marine and helicopter engines. Finally, commercial goods intended for incorporation into military while the law requires DoD to inform customs of FMS shipments, products. This would be particularly helpful if the current this does not always happen when goods are sent on military U.S. export control reform exercise eliminates many parts transport or aircraft are ferried directly from a production facility and components from the Munitions List. to the foreign customer. Bottom line, Census undercounts the real value of defense exports and imports. • DPAP might further refine the coding of overseas purchases to further distinguish between acquisition of defense- DSCA data tends to be quite solid, as it is directly related to related goods and services and those that involve essentially payments by the foreign customer. It does include services civilian products and support services. (e.g. training), plus government charges for administering FMS contracts, and even in some cases projects involving construction and non-military supplies. State export data, is, as the GAO study • DoD might review the process by which the services and pointed out, lousy. State’s primary interest is in issuing licenses, DSCA report to Customs on the transfer of FMS goods to not whether they are ever exercised. It is more interested in foreign customers. catching individuals who try to export military goods and services without a license, than counting legal exports. Furthermore, it’s licensing and shipment data include exports by US contractors • As part of the export control reform, agencies might to US military users overseas as well as equipment returned to construct an electronic “Rosetta Stone” that would allow original owners after repair. The GAO estimates that roughly 60% conversion from one electronic coding system to another, of the value of State licenses are for such transactions (Customs including the U.S. Munitions List, Wassenaar Munitions List, excludes such items in its defense export data). Alas, State’s HTS, Schedule B, Federal Supply Codes, etc. response to GAO’s recommendation that it should break out such transactions and improve its use of the data it receives from Better data won’t necessarily resolve arguments amongst policy Customs is that Congress hasn’t asked it to. This would imply that makers, pundits, and academics over issues involving defense neither Congressional staff nor their bosses on the Hill pay much trade and cooperation, but at least it will make those arguments attention to the content of the 655 Report, as long as they get it. better informed. To paraphrase the late Senator Moynihan, people are entitled to their own opinions, but not their own facts. The GAO audited State data in making its report. It used Customs With relatively modest fixes in the government’s collection and data available to State to estimate actual exports of goods and presentation of defense trade data, the facts available to all can related services to foreign customers, added to DSCA’s data on be greatly enhanced. FMS sales, and came up with the conclusion that US exports of defense goods and services has been running at about $20 billion a year. The CRS report essentially has always ignored State data Joel Johnson is Executive Director - International, the Teal as being hopelessly unreliable, and simply takes DSCA data on Group Corporation, and Executive Associate of U.S.-Crest.

5 Common Defense Quarterly Policy International Cooperation: a tool for building the future. By Colonel Idriz Haxhiaj

Many questions are raised by these issues, including what are the objectives of this process, how well are they determined by Albania, and have they changed over time? What are the main components of the process and how has Albania taken advantage of it?

Following the regime change in the early 1990s, the United States and other Western states showed high levels of interest in promoting defense and military relationships with Albania and with assisting in the transformation of these sectors. The Albanian political and military leadership was the first post-communist state to seek military bilateral relationships and to start cooperation with NATO. In 1992, Albania submitted a request to join the Partnership Program with NATO and in 1994 de facto started this program. Albania was eager and very willing to transform its military from its existing Soviet-style form to a Western model and to join the NATO alliance. Despite the political will and trust from both sides, it was clear that the transformation process would be a long and difficult one. Now, after almost two decades, Albania realizes that it would have been impossible to be where it is now without the assistance of our allies and partners. Used by permission of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin. at Texas The University of Libraries, Texas Used by permission of the University The objectives of Albania were clear: to transform military forces and the defense sector through restructuring, adapting, and making it compatible with the Western system. The Albanian national and defense policy was based on the concept of rapid integration of the country to the Euro-Atlantic security structure. The question was how to do it in the best and in the fastest way. Coming from an isolated era of the Cold War, with limited financial resources and a lack of adequate expertise to meet these goals, Albania decided to open its door to the partners who offered their assistance and contribution. Relying on their expertise was one of the ways to help and to support the process. The issue here was how to best organize, channel and de-conflict the efforts coming In today’s world, it would be difficult to find a country which from a considerable number of foreign countries. can work alone to accomplish objectives of national interest: especially those related to defense and security. Everyday, states The international cooperation that Albania established and are putting more and more effort into international cooperation. developed in the defense and military areas, has supported the At the strategic level, states are developing strategies, writing objectives of transformation and restructuring efforts in this doctrines and policies in order to ease this process and make area. The process was considered part of the overall national it more useful for everyone involved. At the operational level, effort to transform the defense sector and build military capacity. they are unifying training and operating procedures, establishing This cooperation sometimes played a leading role in bringing and effective and competent structures, and procuring compatible implementing new concepts, initiating new processes and starting and interoperable technology to run and support the operations reforms for organization, technology and human aspects of the on the ground. For every country, international cooperation defense sector. constitutes one of the important resources to help accomplish certain goals, to face different threats, and ultimately to win the The cooperation itself showed that this is a multifaceted process, war. always changing and adapting. During the first period of the transition, the objectives were to keep the armed forces up and In this article, I will try to give some aspects of international running, support and assist daily activity and its basic needs. Later cooperation that Albania has exercised in defense and military on, these objectives were replaced with more sophisticated and sector in order to join the Euro-Atlantic structure and to meet demanding ones. The current cooperation is focused on building the NATO standards for full integration of its military structures as capacity, unifying systems and doctrines,and contributing to the part of its national integration process. Of course, this is a broad collective efforts of the international community. As the process and wide topic, but I will examine this topic from the perspective of cooperation evolved, Albania continuously changed its position: of a small country and discuss the lessons learned from the from a receiving nation to a more giving one, and taking ownership Albanian experience of international cooperation. over the process. It is widely accepted that Albania quickly Common Defense Quarterly 6 Policy

transformed from a consumer of international security to a country Since joining NATO in March 2009, the goal of Albanian cooperation which contributes to this security. International cooperation and was to fully integrate its national structures into the NATO its contributions are largely to thank for this progress organization. The leading role for coordinating support for the Albanian Armed Forces from NATO entities was taken by Allied International cooperation as a learning process. Command for Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia. The integration phase helped to identify the essential areas where support Albania was able to benefit the most from bilateral cooperation. to achieve full integration was needed. This phase has been It carefully managed the assistance coming from individual characterized by detailed program and intense activities which countries, NATO and other regional organizations. Looking back, are identified and discussed during the Integration Conferences. one can see how Albania worked on an individual basis with each The main areas where Albanian and NATO experts are jointly country to improve and consolidate certain areas, to reorganize working to meet the objectives of the integration phase and to and transform specific units in order to meet the objectives assure full adaptability and interoperability with NATO are: of the transformation process. The investments contributed bilaterally by Albania and its allies have had big and valuable • Force Goals returns. Albania successfully built a new national defense system, • Doctrines and standardization consolidated civilian control over the armed forces, reorganized and significantly reduced the size of military, transformed its • Training and education military and education system and developed new military • Human Resources Management leadership capable of reform to be part of the Euro-Atlantic • Logistics and acquisition systems. There have been a considerable number of bilateral projects where a specific ally supported a certain military unit These areas of cooperation intend to review and rewrite strategic or service until a certain level of consolidation and operational documents and to develop doctrines and standards in new capability was achieved. The Albanian military appreciates these conditions for Albania as a member of NATO and other collective efforts and it is indebted to those countries who contributed to security structures. In addition, they seek to consolidate the such projects. system of defense resources management and logistic support to military operations; to build an effective, efficient and affordable On the other side, cooperation with NATO was supported by training system, and to develop capacities and capabilities in the accomplishment of defense reforms in a broader sense and military domains (air, land, and maritime) and in the non-military through a very comprehensive process; it helped Albania write domain, interoperable in a NATO operational environment. visionary strategic concepts and national documents in order to lead future reforms and to formulate a new defense policy and Regional cooperation is another priority that Albania has considered planning process. One positive aspect of the cooperation with as a tool to promote security, build mutual trust, and improve the NATO was that the foundation of this process was built on full trust climate of understanding through defense and military relations. and confidence, the will to work and to make decisions together. These regional activities established trust and confidence among The NATO consultation process became necessary to guarantee our states to strengthen and to deepen individual national reforms, the continuation of deep reforms, downsizing the size of military served as a mechanism to exchange ideas and experiences with and the demilitarization process. each other, put forth joint efforts toward the integration process, and finally built regional capacities as a main and final goalof The prospect of membership in NATO was one of the highest the cooperation. The Southeastern Europe Defense Ministerial incentives for reforms: it aroused wide support across the (SEDM) initiative presents an important example of integration whole spectrum of society and military experts, serving as and cooperation at the regional level. Established in 1996, it encouragement for the deepest reforms in Albania’s history. In proved that Balkan countries understood that in order to be transforming and reorganizing the armed forces, the cooperation integrated in Euro-Atlantic structures, they have to be integrated with NATO was a success story. NATO cooperation as a tool that among themselves first. One example of the concrete success of helped this process to be seen as part of a broader program; it this process was the deployment of the SEEBRIG HQ and staff served as a kind of “pressure” to deepen these reforms and to set support elements to the ISAF operation in 2006. The Adriatic more demanding deadlines. Charter, of which Albania, Croatia and Macedonia were the initial signatory countries in 2003, is another initiative formed for The cooperation with NATO during the pre-membership phase the purpose of coordinating their efforts to join NATO. Through went through fulfilling the requirements laid out in the Planning regional cooperation processes it became clear that these states and Review Process (PARP) and Membership Action Plan (MAP) in can work together and build valuable capacities to contribute to the framework of the Individual Partnership Program. Through international and global security. a series of consultations with NATO representatives, staff and expert talks and other forms of dialogue between NATO International cooperation as a contribution to global and and Albania for many years, clear milestones necessary for regional security. transformation were clarified. The cooperation process between Albania and NATO boosted the participation of Albanian military Albania has a long history of contribution to international units and individuals in international and bilateral activities, peacekeeping and stability operations led by NATO and/or which helped to familiarize them with the NATO system. This international coalitions. Participation in these operations is not process succeeded in improving interoperability, increasing the only considered a responsibility and an obligation to contribute operational capabilities of the Albanian military, and in preparing as a member of collective structures. Albania has used it as an and training units as a part of the NATO pool of forces to be used opportunity for its military to learn, train and fight together with in NATO-led operations. allies. This was considered one way to build military capacities 7 Common Defense Quarterly Policy

and their operational skills. Albanian military units benefitted conducting efficient reforms in defense and military arenas; from ally nations cooperating with them in real conditions of contributing to global and regional security issues; building the war. Serving alongside with American, German, Italian, Turkish confidence and mutual trust with allies and partner countries. and French troops, they gained necessary experience needed to Recent national documents, that institutionalize the cooperation operate in an international environment. Operational cooperation process, identify that Albania plans to export expertise and to served as a unique experience to improve interoperability with contribute in assisting other regional countries to build their allies, to standardize doctrines and procedures, to provide defence and military capabilities. compatible logistic and technical support for our units and to unify training systems. For the first time, Albania participated in Albania is now willing and capable to build an international a NATO-led IFOR/SFOR mission in 1996 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. partnership based on a “cost-sharing” principle. In order to take It continues to participate today in the EU-led ALTHEA operation full ownership of the process and to be more responsive, this in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the EOD team. Albania is engaged cooperation is run by organizing the “Integrated Staff–Talks” with in a NATO-led operation, ISAF, since 2002. Its participation in other allies where the Albanian decision makers and/or experts ISAF has continuously increased and expanded not just in size decide on issues of mutual interest. Moreover, the process itself and in number of personnel but also in quality. As part of this is more demanding. There is a big difference between then and operation, Albania has a considerable number of the military units now, working to meet the Force Goals accepted by Albania as and personnel in different areas in Afghanistan, including Herat, NATO member and the earlier process of meeting the Partnership Kabul, RC North, and Kandahar. Last year, the Albanian Special Goals taken as a partner country during the pre-membership Operation Forces joined US military forces in a combat mission time. The actual aspects of the cooperation are an example of in Kandahar. Albania previously contributed to the international the evolution of the cooperation process and the progress made stabilization force in Iraq prior to its mandate expiring in in Albania’s path toward integration. The scope of this process December 2008. Similar contributions were made to the EU-led is more focused on modernization, technology and on unifying operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Chad. Albania took advantage of processes and procedures with the alliance. these situations to contribute to the NATO alliance and at the same time to learn from these contributions. Albanian military At the regional level, they are a serious attempt to project and structures and services supported the NATO-led operation KFOR build regional capacities to respond to different situations, such in Kosovo in different ways. Also, Albania is engaged in NATO’s as disaster relief and civil emergencies, to better control borders operation, Active Endeavor, with liaison officers and information and fight terrorism, to monitor sea and air space. All of these exchange. projects will result in economizing resources and increasing the efficiency of responses. Increased contributions to peace and stability operations show that Albania has created considerable military capacities, gained Our common future as part of the international system, the the necessary experience showing its ability to be a respected common threats we face today, and the unpredictable environment member of the alliance. The US Secretary of State, Hillary impart to us the importance of strengthening international Clinton, marking the 20th Anniversary of the reestablishment of cooperation. The global impact of today’s developments and relations between the United States and Albania, stated that, increased interconnection between different parts of the world “Now a NATO member, Albania is showing a deep commitment to bring a need for closer technological cooperation. It is possible to the Alliance, with one of the highest per capita contributions to defeat our adversaries if we know how to work together, which the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan”. means adopting the same processes, strategies, doctrines and technology in our common education and training models. This is After becoming a NATO member, Albania repositioned itself and how we can build our future. enriched its profile as an international partner. Albania is using all means to leverage this process and to make it useful in order to support its national objectives and to contribute more in the international arena. The ultimate goal is to be fully integrated in NATO political and military structures. The new process of Colonel Idriz HAXHIAJ is the Defense Attache of Albania in revising strategic documents and of establishing new priorities the United States. He holds a Doctorate in a Military Science to build defense and military capabilities is taking place. This is from the Albanian Defence Academy and Masters Degree in aimed to provide an appropriate, collectively-oriented, legal and Public Administration from University of Tirana and Nebraska conceptual basis for Albanian defense and military apparatus and University as a joint venture. He has a Bachelors Law Degree to replace the previous model which was nationally-oriented. from Shkodra University and also a Bachelors Degree from the The objectives and dynamics of the post-NATO membership Military Academy. He continues to teach at the NATO School period are two-fold. First, the main efforts are focused to meet and has been a participant and speaker in several national the Force Goals accepted by Albania: to build capacities and be and international conferences. He is a career military officer able to participate in a NATO-led operation. Second, Albania is serving in different positions. Before being assigned to this seeking to strengthen cooperation with allies on issues of mutual job he served as Commander of the Military University of the interest; coordinating the formation of policies and strategies; Albanian Armed Forces.

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GRIP-084_Ad_CDQ.indd 1 09-11-10 11.08.43 Policy Increased Cyber Security Threat Represents Opportunity for International Defense Cooperation By Van D. Hipp, Jr.

The increased threat from cyberspace, as well as the possibility Hacking for intelligence-gathering purposes has been done often of a biological attack, consistently rank as the top two Homeland by Chinese sources, as well as by operatives of other governments. Security threats facing the United States today. Depending on The U.S. Government works steadily to thwart these activities. who you talk to and the current threat assessment, these two go The greater threat is that a hostile breach of our cyber defenses back and forth as the number one threat facing the country. could, in the future, lead to disruption of our electrical grid and computerized financial system, not to mention wreak havoc with Fortunately, several nations friendly to the United States have our military efforts. had a great deal of experience in combating the cyber threat long before it became a major threat here at home. Recent After a Chinese cyber attack in Summer 2007, then-President Bush indications are that both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization signed an Executive Order establishing the Comprehensive National (NATO), as well as certain parts of the U.S. Government, have Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). This put the Department of Homeland gotten the message and are working more closely with allies, Security in charge of better protecting our network systems from and implementing new and promising cyber security technologies cyber attack. It established an around-the-clock watch-and-warning from friendly countries in order to combat the ever-growing cyber center for the Federal Government’s Internet infrastructure. threat. This is welcomed news and should, hopefully, pave the way for increased international defense cooperation among the It also established the EINSTEIN program to identify unusual United States and our allies. network traffic patterns and trends which signal unauthorized traffic so that security personnel may quickly identify and respond Since 9-11, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) has been one of to potential threats. the United States’ most effective tools in combating terrorism. Unfortunately, the threat from cyberspace has found its way into These programs are strong steps in the right direction; however, it the UAV realm and has posed major challenges. Specifically, is essential to our global security that we continue to strengthen the revelation that al Qaeda hackers have been able to “see” our cyber defense perimeter. Along these lines, it is vital that what our drone aircraft were viewing while over Afghanistan the U.S. Government reach out to our allies and friends across and Pakistan underscored the need to urgently strengthen our the Atlantic who have great expertise and many more years of cyberspace defenses. experience in dealing with very real cyber security threats. Common Defense Quarterly 10 Policy

Cyber attacks have had serious consequences in recent years. Currently, the greatest software security challenge is the In Spring 2007, such an attack on Estonia blocked websites and discovery and remediation of unknown vulnerabilities before they paralyzed the small country’s entire Internet infrastructure. can potentially impact operations. In an era of state-supported Bank cards and mobile phone networks were out temporarily. cyber warfare, growing shares of vulnerabilities are never The attack came at a time when the Estonian Government was disclosed publicly. Instead, they are sold and/or distributed in a dispute with Russia over the removal of a Soviet-era war within underground hacker communities to further the supporting memorial in Estonia’s capital, Tallinn. The Estonian Ministry of state’s agenda. Defense was convinced the cyber attack was the work of agents of the Russian Government because it was too well coordinated to The United States and its allies can no longer afford to wait be the work of a lone hacker. for patch releases from vendors, nor can they rely on user communities to find and report these bugs. America and its allies, through international defense cooperation, need to find new In August 2007, shortly before Russian army forces entered the and proactive ways to protect their critical infrastructures and Republic of Georgia, the latter’s entire government computer military and non-military assets. NATO, with its CCDCOE, has put system was inexplicably shut down. As a result, in May 2008, NATO that into practice by implementing the “Defensics” technology. established the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) in order to expand its cyber defense capability. Based Indications are that certain elements of the U.S. Government in Tallinn, the CCDCOE acts as coordinator of cyber defense are now following suit. This is welcome news and an example initiatives and advances between NATO members and partners. of the type of international defense cooperation that we must Consequently, some of the best IT (information technology) and pursue along with our allies in order to combat major defense and cyber technology, including counter measures, emanates from the Homeland Security threats. Baltic region. In conclusion, it is imperative in an era of limited resources and The establishment of the CCDCOE presents our nation with an budget constraints that the United States engage its international opportunity to benefit from the work being done there. The U.S. partners who have far greater experience and expertise with niche should play a more significant role than it has with the CCDCOE technologies in specific cyber threat areas. Taking that course in order to take advantage of “lessons learned” and of new cyber will help ensure the safety here at home and abroad through the security technology and developments. most cost effective means.

Van D. Hipp Jr. is Chairman of American Defense Internation- Recently, the NATO’s CCDCOE has begun using a proactive Finnish al, Inc., a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm specializing cyber security tool known as “Defensics” from the company in government affairs, business development and public rela- Codenomicon, in order to combat the ever-increasing cyber threat. The Codenomicon “Defensics” technology is sort of like a tions. He is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. “hacker on steroids” and is able to proactively discover unknown Army. Since the September 11th attacks on the United States, vulnerabilities before they can potentially impact a critical Mr. Hipp has appeared on the Fox News Channel well over military mission. 400 times as an expert commentator on the War on Terror.

CCD COE is located in Tallinn, Estonia, on the premises of the Estonian Signals Battalion. The building itself was built by the Tsarist military in 1905 as a barracks, but it has now been completely renovated, and blends cutting-edge technological solutions within its beautiful, historic walls. CCD COE now hosts one of the most advanced cyber defence research centres in the world.

11 Common Defense Quarterly Technologies International Collaboration to Secure the Worlds Oceans

By Dr. George GUY Thomas

If oil is the world’s lifeblood, then oceanic commerce is its back- tems operate in five basic modes and, at low resolution, have bone. Since the 9/11 attack on the United States, many national wide sensor swaths. Most, if not all, of the coming SARsats will be and international organizations have addressed how to protect equipped with AIS receivers. their maritime assets individually and collectively. Recent events, such as the sea-borne attack on Mumbai, and the growing realiza- Germany, Italy, Japan and Israel also have launched radar satel- tion that piracy plagues several areas of the world have reiter- lites, and several other countries are moving that way. On June 21, ated the need for heightened maritime vigilance and awareness. 2010, the Germans launched TanDEM-X, a second radar vehicle to There’s also a growing realization that misuse of the oceans can fly in formation with the first TerraSAR-X launched in June 2007. It- lead to significant environmental damage and loss of natural re- aly’s COSMO-SkyMed system has four operating satellites, launched sources and the revenue they produce. between June 2007 and November 2010. TecSAR, the first Israeli satellite to feature SAR technology, was launched Jan. 21, 2008. The potential contributions of space-based Earth observation systems to global maritime awareness are of growing interest to the Each of these satellites carries a SAR sensor that can see through world’s naval and law enforcement forces. It’s widely recognized cloud cover and detect vessels and their wakes day or night. These that no one country or even an existing coalition of countries has commercial radar satellites represent a significant improvement the stature, breadth and depth to protect oceanic commerce and over previous commercial radar systems, including images with the maritime environment. It will take international collabora- resolutions as good as 1 meter and special collection methods tion and cooperation on an unparalleled scale to assure the safe, that can vary the polarization of the energy their sensors transmit secure use of the world’s oceans. Indeed, this effort may need to the ground. This permits image collection in different polar- to be managed by an agency of the United Nations. The great- izations simultaneously, which can characterize Earth’s surface est need, as well as the greatest opportunities for international structure in interesting new ways. collaboration, is to focus on the technology required to detect, EO/IR Imaging Satellites identify and track vessels well offshore. Many countries and companies operate EO/IR satellites. Their ca- Collection Systems pabilities have expanded to the point where even a layman can, The types of sensors currently within ports and in coastal areas, in many instances, look at one of their images and immediately such as radars, various types of cameras and self-reporting sys- recognize a specific building and which types of cars—trucks, tems, are well known. Acoustic sensors and other nontraditional sedans, convertibles, etc.—are parked in its lots. DigitalGlobe sensors, such as the passive coherent location sensor, which ex- (www.digitalglobe.com) and GeoEye (www.geoeye.com), the ma- ploits the reflections of the emissions of non-radar transmitters jor U.S.-based commercial satellite providers that pioneered this to determine an object’s location, also have roles. However, the significantly improved capability, receive a bulk of their operating need to detect, identify and track vessels well offshore can best budgets from U.S. military customers. Both companies have built be accomplished by space-based Earth observation systems, many sophisticated constellations of high-resolution (1 meter or bet- of which already exist in the commercial and civil world. ter) Earth imaging satellites, providing intraday revisit around the globe. Israel’s ImageSat International (www.imagesatintl.com) of- There are at least four basic types of space-based systems—six fers similar capabilities. if you include weather and navigation spacecraft—that must be integrated for effective results. Two of the four employ imaging Recently, Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (www.sstl.co.uk) sensors: announced plans to build and launch three Earth observation spacecraft by 2013 and to set up as a commercial Earth observa- 1. Synthetic aperture radar satellites (SARsats) tion company. The imaging capabilities of the satellite constel- 2. Electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) imaging satellites lation will be 1-meter panchromatic and 4-meter multispectral. RapidEye (www.rapideye.de) offers a similar small satellite con- The other two are based on communications systems: stellation that was largely built by Surrey, but it receives the benefit of a public-private partnership with the German Aerospace 3. Individual transponders, capable of sending formatted Center. In addition, the Spot Image (www.spotimage.com) Pleia- short messages, linked to a communications satellite des-1 and Pleiades-2 satellites, scheduled to launch at the end of 4. Automatic Identification System (AIS), which was designed 2011 and mid-2012, respectively, will provide sub-meter imagery. for collision avoidance but is now often also used as a primary ship identification and tracking system Transponders SARsats Owners of fishing vessels and other mobile platforms actively track their assets with transponder which can link to communication sat- The Canadian government currently operates two SARsats in a ellite systems. Their most common use is to report their position. public-private partnership with McDonald, Dettwiler & Associ- For example, fishing vessels must be able to prove they didn’t go ates (http://gs.mdacorporation.com). It launched the first one, into restricted waters. Tugboat and heavy equipment companies RADARSAT, in 1996. A more capable system, RADARSAT 2, was need to be able to track their assets on a near-hourly basis for launched in late 2007. Canada is expected to launch an additional business purposes. Many other companies also employ these self-re- three to six radar satellites within the next decade. These sys- porting systems for valid business, security and/or safety reasons.

Common Defense Quarterly 12 Technologies

Space-based AIS No one system can do it all, but a judicious mix of the aforemen- tioned systems and others should allow partner nations to detect, The International Maritime Organization and the International As- identify, track and interdict nearly all vessels that approach its sociation of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities coasts. Indeed, there’s no silver bullet, but international collabora- designed AIS to identify and locate vessels by electronically ex- tion among countries with space-based systems is the key to success. changing data with other nearby ships and vessel traffic service stations. On April 28, 2008, Canadian company COM DEV Inter- Collaboration Will Enable Global Maritime Awareness national (www.comdev.ca) launched a space-based AIS nanosat- The world’s maritime nations, working together, can make the ellite designed to detect AIS signals from space. The detected seas safer and more secure from wrongdoers, be they smugglers, signals were recorded and then relayed back to the ground. Prior polluters or pirates. A primary step would be to create a global to that, the U.S. Coast Guard funded the development of a ca- space partnership initially focused on the maritime domain, a pable AIS collector onboard an ORBCOMM (www.orbcomm.com) concept referred to as a Collaboration in Space for International communications satellite, which launched in June 2008, after Global Maritime Awareness (C-SIGMA). Such a concept has been several false starts, SpaceQuest (www.spacequest.com) also has discussed informally for years by experts who recognize the criti- launched space-based AIS collectors. Several other companies cal vulnerabilities of our maritime assets and the potential eco- and organizations have now launched AIS receivers into space, nomic impacts from their loss. and more are planned. The initial results of these efforts are promising, and all three of the original companies are planning Effective maritime domain awareness would encompass coastal additional capabilities. The number of AIS-equipped commercial and harbor surveillance and warning to persistent and pervasive and civil satellites on orbit is sure to grow. surveillance of the broad ocean area. To achieve maritime domain Ground Segments awareness goals, satellites could be used to openly survey the world’s oceans to establish normal patterns of behavior for ship- What to do with all of these data? Canada has developed its own ping and boating worldwide. ship-detection software called “Ocean Suite,” and various satellite processors have been designed to complement each other to For example, the operational cycle of the system might begin optimize ship-detection performance. The European community is with the tasking of one of a constellation of synthetic aperture working to leverage its resources. The two latest COSMO-SkyMed radar (SAR) satellites to collect data from wide-area search mode SAR satellites are to be part of the future Multinational Space-based and then switch to a spotlight mode to refine the attributes of Imaging System, which will combine the resources and space assets any targets. A second SAR satellite may be tasked on the fly to of Italy, Belgium, Greece, Germany, France and Spain, and other conduct more fine-grain surveillance before a third or fourth sat- European countries may join. The rest of the space-faring world ellite, equipped with optical sensors operating in the visible or in- has taken note, and discussions are under way in several locales. frared or hyperspectral bands, conducts a fourth, fifth or greater collect on the same target. Information from an automatic iden- A large player in maritime awareness for U.S. civilian space is tification system (AIS) collected via satellite also could be filtered the Center for Southeastern Tropical Advanced Remote Sensing into the analysis to identify the vessel and other nearby vessels. (CSTARS) at the University of Miami. In cooperation with Vexcel (www.vexcel.com), CSTARS developed OceanView, a software In addition, ship information compiled from unclassified sources program that rapidly analyzes any commercial imaging system to and pertinent to the area under observation could be scoured determine if there were vessels imaged. The software can gener- for supporting information, such as long-range identification and ally tell the size, type, course and speed of any vessel imaged tracking and terrestrial AIS reporting systems and/or other cor- from civilian spaceborne satellite systems. roborating information gathered from terrestrial unclassified sources. If deemed appropriate, and weather permitting, a high- CSTARS and other organizations are taking steps to improve image resolution imaging satellite could be tasked to image the correct processing, both in regards to better definition as well as timeli- spot in the ocean. The image could be processed to further deter- ness. CSTARS also hopes to gain additional access points by estab- mine a ship’s location, course, speed, and status. lishing mobile downlink sites in places such as the Azores and the western United States. This is important, because the timeliness The C-SIGMA stumbling blocks relate more to policy rather than of the reporting is dictated by the time between data collection technology challenges, but there’s definitely a need for better and its downlink to an Earth station for processing and reporting. surveillance systems and more of them. There’s also a need to process, fuse, analyze, display and disseminate all available data; Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) are another part of the mix. Many make accurate decisions; and interdict any suspicious vessel be- countries operate MPAs, and some countries have more than one fore it enters port or approaches anything of value. C-SIGMA is a organization operating them. For example, in the United States, paradigm shift, as, until very recently, few nations have consid- the Navy and Coast Guard have MPAs, and the Department of ered space systems within this framework. Steps in this direction Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) com- are underway. A sub-committee of the European Parliament met ponent operates a fleet of highly modified P-3 fixed-wing aircraft to discuss C-SIGMA in November 2010 and the European Space with superb ocean-surveillance capabilities. All three organiza- Agency will host the first global meeting to discuss a way ahead tions are in the process of installing AIS-collection capability into for the basic concept in June 21-23, 2011 at its research facility these aircraft. This could provide a paradigm shift in the way in Frascati, Italy. For more details and to register to attend see: other U.S. aircraft are outfitted for maritime surveillance. Many http://www.congrex.nl/11C17 other technologies also are being considered, from medium- and high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles, such as Predator B/Mari- George GUY Thomas is the science and technology advisor, ner and Global Hawk, to manned and unmanned airships. U.S. Coast Guard (www.uscg.mil), Washington, D.C.

13 Common Defense Quarterly Technologies Science and Technology Intensive Small Countries: Big Contributions to Global Security and Stability - The Case of Switzerland

By Dr. Christoph Ebell

time) forced a restructuring of the sector. Today this process is credited with pushing an entire industry of high-precision manufacturing and micro-technology into existence. A prime example is the Swiss medical technology industry. According

YOSHIKO KUSANO to some research, 80 to 90% of the Swiss medical technology industry’s output is for export, and the growing sector employs more than 20,000 people in a country of just over 7 million.

(http://medical-technologyblog.com/switzerland-play-major- role-in-medical-technology-industry)

The watch sector itself has since recovered and focuses on the luxury watch market, with Asian growth markets a major target – exports of luxury watches to Greater China are well north of 3 billion USD per year. This concentration on high value added products both depends and valorizes another asset of an advanced United Nations in Geneva innovation economy, the training and retention of a highly skilled What is the role of stable, advanced, science and technology workforce. intensive countries in the quest for global security and stability? Swiss universities, lead by the two Federal Institutes of Technology Small countries may have few natural resources, as is the case (the ETH in Zurich and the EPFL in Lausanne) have become in Switzerland, thus innovation power becomes an essential magnets for global talent and are actively pursuing globalization driving force for economic growth, wealth creation, maintenance strategies to attract the world’s best and brightest researchers. and improvement of living standards, and ultimately, political stability. Yet, this is just part of the recipe. Every year, almost 70% of Swiss Youth are embarking on a skills-based training, the so-called An export-oriented economy, in turn, demands high innovation vocational education and training path. Compared to many other intensity, as products have to compete in a global market place. countries, this education track, which is complementary to the In the case of Switzerland, the general absence of large-scale, academic trajectory, is valued and respected in Swiss society. It is low-cost production capacity further drives innovation pressure based on the centuries old tradition of the apprenticeship. In one as firms must compete on quality and need to invest heavily in high-precision manufacturing firm in the canton of Jura, a worker productivity, such as the use of ICT. who had manned a precision lathe for almost 40 years had trained his successor for a full eight years before he retired. The CEO of For example, the demise of the watch industry in the 1980s as a said firm claims that the precision of the complex parts produced result of the advent of comparatively cheap yet precise quartz still cannot be achieved by computer aided manufacturing controlled wristwatches from the Far East (mainly Japan at the techniques. The full integration of the vocational training with the academic education trajectories, are augmented by the fact that skilled workers can still embark on academic careers at a later point. A dual track system which combines a paid apprenticeship with a work contract and trade schools produces realistically skilled human resources in a market-oriented way.

© FDFA, Presence Switzerland Presence © FDFA, Thus, the education and research system contributes not only to knowledge production but ensures that innovation and manufacturing are tightly integrated and as such cross-pollinate, and enable a tighter innovation system with higher productivity and innovation efficiency – measured by the amount of innovation per capital invested.

Public innovation policy in Switzerland focuses on the optimization of framework conditions for innovation to occur. This includes a Apprentice working on a watch movement. world-class infrastructure, well funded research institutions, a

Common Defense Quarterly 14 Technologies

high quality of life, security, and a focus on support mechanisms for basic research. Legal security and predictability as well as strong IP protections and the availability of capital form an indispensable part of an innovation ecosystem.

The Swiss innovation support agency, CTI, focuses its activities on the interface between academia and industry, with the addition of facilitating startup formation and access to venture capital. Yet, Copyright: www.minergie.ch the overall contribution of the government to the country’s 2.9% of GDP gross expenditure for R&D remains at around 30%. The rest is private investment, much of it from Swiss multinational entities, such as Novartis (Pharmaceuticals) and Nestle (Nutrition). These firms also drive the globalization of Swiss R&D expenditure, which comes to over 100% of the domestic investment, allowing for a highly efficient allocation of resources.

The creation of global knowledge networks can be seen as an active outflow of a small R&D intensive economy.

The nature of innovation in the age of globalization has changed fundamentally: has become post-territorial. While multinational companies are leading the way, but increasingly, small and medium enterprises and universities, both public and private, operate within global knowledge and value chains. Only stable, highly credible and sound knowledge economies are capable of Highly energy efficient MINERGIE residential home in Zimmerwald, deploying and sustaining such networks. Switzerland.

This reality is mirrored and facilitated by an increasingly effective research and best practice networks – ETH Zurich’s partnership Swiss science diplomacy. Apart from science diplomats stationed with NUS and Nanyang Universities in Singapore creating a test in embassies around the world, Switzerland runs a network of lab for cities of the future is just one such instance (http://www. so-called Swissnexes. These are essentially consulates specialized futurecities.ethz.ch/). in all aspects of public science diplomacy. The first swissnex was established ten years ago in Cambridge, Massachusetts, followed Through hosting knowledge network nodes, Switzerland facilitates by one in San Francisco. Today, swissnexes exist in Singapore, the global exchange of information and intense transnational Shanghai, and Bangalore, with more planned in other locations cooperation. Institutions such as CERN in Geneva are joined by around the globe. Transcending knowledge creation alone, they newer initiatives such as the Brain-Mind Institute at EPFL and help facilitate the exchange of people, ideas and serve as policy the Swiss Systems X initiative in systems biology (http://www. learning centers in their host networks. systemsx.ch/) . National research focus initiatives such as Bern University’s North-South research node add to this tapestry Global dissemination of science-based policy approaches in areas with a decidedly international reach: over 400 researchers in such as health care, drug policy, environmental standards, and 40 countries are part of this network (http://www.north-south. social policies tend to travel more easily through established unibe.ch/content.php/page/id/265) . knowledge networks. Often, such policies can be more easily implemented, monitored, and measured against objectives With the realization that Switzerland can pull more than its own in small countries. Smaller countries can also provide test weight in a global innovation system focused on solving the 21st beds for the societal uptake of policies and practices that are century’s grand challenges comes a responsibility to share its extraordinarily difficult to implement in large countries. experience, knowledge, and intellectual resources. Much of that happens through informal networks – communities of practice and A case in point is Switzerland’s de facto green building standard, interest. On the level of government, the knowledge transfer and Minergie. What started as a voluntary standard has now become a mutual learning is advanced through active roles in international national movement finding its way into legislation on municipal, organizations, development policy and aid, as well as science state, and federal levels. A performance based standard, Minergie diplomacy. helps conserve resources by cutting energy use in the built environment by up to 85%. Considering that buildings typically account for around 40% of energy use in advanced economies, Christoph Ebell serves as the science and technology counselor such practices can contribute significantly to energy security and at the Swiss Embassy in Washington, D.C. He connects the reduction of carbon emissions – a long-term stability factor. Switzerland and the United States in the fields of science, technology, innovation, higher education, and professional A very concrete example of sharing Swiss expertise in sustainable education. Before his posting to the United States, Ebell worked building and urban planning is the Swiss Village in the world’s first at the Department of Economic Affairs in Bern, Switzerland, net zero city in Abu Dhabi, Masdar City. Partnering with other where he headed the international cooperation section for small knowledge economies can amplify and strengthen global innovation, education and international organizations.

15 Common Defense Quarterly Policy Inadequate Consideration and Unintended Consequences By Dr. Stanley Orman & MGEN. Eugene Fox, USA (Ret.)

This article notes that so many national and international avoided tackling the real problem of too easy access to America policies these days seem to have been given insufficient thought on the Northern and Southern borders. As a result the smuggling of before being introduced and therefore result in unintended contraband has increased significantly, the potential for terrorists consequences. The reasons for this discrepancy are explored and to infiltrate has been largely ignored and the risk of Mexican drug some steps to rectify the situation are suggested. As a starting wars extending into the United States is now becoming a reality. point we are convinced that whenever changes are made in None of these extensions of a porous border could be termed policies, in procedures or in the design of products, consequential unforeseeable, but they have all been quietly brushed aside while changes inevitably result. Some of these consequences should be other politically expedient policies have been pursued. foreseen, some might even have been designed to result from the initial change, others however may not have been predicted, and There is no shortage of other examples such as the decision in the worst cases may not even have been predictable. to invade Iraq without first identifying an exit strategy. The attempt to introduce democracy into Afghanistan, a nation in Every scientist and engineer engaged in the development of which the majority of the population still have little or no idea products understands these relations because all the components why Americans are currently fighting in their country. Attempts of a product have to work together effectively to produce a to reduce unemployment by awarding finance to shovel-ready satisfactory design. This applies to items ranging from simple activities without acknowledging that it usually takes Federal, household products, through cars to aircraft carriers. State and local governments several months to spend any money that is allocated without having first devoted that time Before any of these products can enter service they have to to prior planning and budgetary considerations. The proposal to go through an exhaustive development program to finalize the reduce annual defense expenditure by $100M may be a sensible design, and then be subjected to further testing to ensure they and achievable objective. Stating this objective without first are fit for purpose. This well established procedure is followed identifying the tasks to be undertaken by the armed forces in because a system engineer is trained to examine the possible the foreseeable future, is illogical. Such a step taken in defense effects of a change of one or more components of a developing of the nation, the principal area of government responsibility, is product to ascertain how they might affect overall performance. more than illogical it is irresponsible. The same procedure has to be followed when an existing product is “improved” by later modifications. Designers know that any Similarly the recent announcement that no offshore drilling will change in one area will inevitably produce changes somewhere be permitted in certain locations in the Gulf of Mexico for at least else, and it is only by simulating these changes that it can be seven years will have a dramatic effect on potential employment, confirmed that the product will really be improved. The effect on loss of new revenue and will lead to an increase in the balance can be likened to the ripples spreading on a pond from a single of payments as more oil will have to be imported. It is hardly stone thrown into the water. surprising that since the cessation of drilling for oil in the Gulf, the price of imported oil has risen steadily. It appears that little It seems that this systematic approach to change that is universally thought was given to these and other less obvious factors before utilized in engineering is not given the same level of consideration the decision was taken to ban drilling. A very recent example are in the non-technical areas of government and administration. the changes being made to NASA, an agency that is being retained These unintended consequences that result can range from but being given an incoherent program that leads nowhere. distortions in the market place by the introduction of grants or tariffs through to major effects nationally and internationally There appear to be two principal reasons for the problems because of changes to security and other policies. outlined above. Our education system no longer encourages freedom of thought and that coupled with the multiple pressures In times of crisis it is not unusual for governments to take rapid, on legislators leads to the lack of detailed review that seems to be less well considered actions to cope with particular problems. missing in so many decisions. A recent study by Richard Arum and Under these conditions departments of defense have been Josipa Roksa (Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College known to bypass well-established procedures in order to rush Campuses) reports that 45% of students show no significant capabilities to the troops during hostilities. But inevitably they improvement in the key measures of critical thinking, complex have had to review and modify such products later. There seems reasoning and writing by the end of their sophomore years. Half to be less compelling reasons for other government departments did not take a single course requiring twenty pages of writing, taking decisions so rapidly in the normal course of business, and one-third did not take a single course requiring even 40 pages but nonetheless experience indicates that many legislative acts of reading a week. We are not producing the next generation of appear to have been inadequately considered before decisions critical thinkers. are finalized. It is no secret that there are multiple pressures on legislators The still porous American borders provide an example of to take action and provide quick fixes, often in cases where no inadequately considered policies. Successive administrations have easy solutions are possible. For far too long our legislators, under

Common Defense Quarterly 16 Policy

these pressures have failed to pay sufficient personal attention to It is clear that the reported problems in the education system will the detail of bills before voting on them. Reliance on the advice take considerable time to rectify, even assuming that Universities of staffers, many of whom are young, keen and inexperienced, take the criticism seriously. In the meantime the deficiencies cannot replace the judgment of the elected officials themselves in the legislative process should be recognized and corrected. who have a duty to consider carefully the effects of new legislation None of the criticisms have been made in a party political sense; before voting on it. Present procedures have been demonstrated they apply equally to successive administrations of both colors to be inadequate to meet the expectations of an electorate that and illustrate a deeper malaise. Changes have to be made in the should demand higher standards from elected representatives. way bills are introduced and the time allowed for their proper consideration before being brought to a vote. No reputable official should agree to vote on bills that are produced mere hours before the vote is taken. Furthermore the Rather than attempt to specify such changes here, we are raising bills themselves should be simplified so that they occupy tens the issues for discussion in the expectation that a problem that has rather than thousands of pages. The way business is currently been ignored for too long will receive the recognition it deserves. conducted it is not surprising that reviews of any recent decisions reveal many unintended consequences that should have been taken into account before passage of the legislation.

Some may fear that allowing full consideration of issues prior to making a decision will lead to prolonged delays, or interminable Dr. Stanley Orman is the former Deputy Director of UK Atomic debates, but time constraints can be imposed that meet the Weapons Research Establishment and Director General of UK criterion of adequate consideration without leading to infinite SDI Participation Organization. delay. Some loss of time would be significantly preferable to the present position whereby the deficiencies in legislation are only MGEN. Eugene Fox, USA (Ret.) is the former Deputy Director recognized too late to avoid the problems discussed above. of SDIO and Army Program Manager of Missile Defense.

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17 Common Defense Quarterly Policy The Attack on the Reaper

By Dr. Stephen D. Bryen

Two years ago, in a Pew poll, more than 64 percent of Pakistanis considered the United States its enemy. The biggest political development in Pakistan recently has been the alignment of a number of Islamic political organizations, especially in the northern part of the country, threatening the ruling government. Reuters reports that “Groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the pro- U.S. Air Force photo U.S. Taliban Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) are forming a new coalition of about 18 parties and groups that are anticipating early elections against the governing Pakistan People’s Party (PPP).” If the coalition holds up, the ruling government will have to make concessions to stay in power.

Third, American operations inside Pakistan. There are a number of sensitive programs underway, mostly focused on trying to hit al-Qaeda and the Taliban. These programs involve the U.S. military, special operations organizations, and -of course- the CIA. MQ-9 Reaper Supporting them are numerous American and foreign contractors, most of whom are former military and intelligence experts. Criti- cal to these operations are the two bases from which the United Authors Note: This article discusses the potential danger to our States carries out Predator and Reaper drone operations. One defense infrastructure to terrorist attack using chem-bio weap- base is at Shamsi, in Pakistan’s part of Baluchistan, the arid re- ons. The author believes the convergence of events in Pakistan, gion that includes part of southeastern Iran, western Pakistan and Afghanistan and other conflict areas, the growing pressure on southwestern Afghanistan. The Shamsi Air Base is largely a classi- al-Qaeda, and the effectiveness of weapons such as Predator and fied operation but quite a bit of information has leaked out to the Reaper, could mean that al-Qaeda’s only way out is to carry out press, some as a result of statements by Senator Diane Feinstein, another spectacular attack on the U.S. Because their immediate and other information from enterprising journalists. The London enemy is Predator and Reaper, it would not surprise me at all the Times even printed photos taken of the base which they found factories that make them could be at the top of their attack list. on Google Earth, showing Predator drones parked at the airfield. Dealing with this kind of threat is not easy or simple, but we can- According to reports, the base has been used, at various times, not just stand by and let it happen. by U.S. Special Forces, by the CIA and by contractors including ------Blackwater (now called Xi) supporting both the CIA and U.S. mili- Where it started exactly is not clear, but the pieces of the puzzle tary organizations. have started to come together and in hindsight it is easier to see the inevitability of it. Here are some grainy snapshots of the de- The other base is at Jalalabad, in Afghanistan. Last November, velopment of the plot. Taliban forces wearing Afghan uniforms carried out a suicide attack against this base. This was neither the first, nor the last and First al-Qaeda. Because of the direct threat it poses to US inter- along with it are other Taliban attacks on U.S. bases in Afghani- ests and to targets in the United States, al-Qaeda is the number stan. So far these attacks have not disrupted base operations. one target of the United States. The group has had some spectacular successes, 9-11 being the biggest ever. And al-Qaeda has Launching a Predator or Reaper attack involves not only high tech- launched many other attempts, some failed, and others only par- nology, but requires elaborate intelligence to confirm the target. tially successful. Spread out over many countries and linked to As relations with Pakistan went steadily downhill, and domestic other groups by various understandings, associations and collabo- criticism of U.S. operations using Predators and Reapers grew to rations, al-Qaeda recently has been put under intense pressure by unprecedented levels, the quality and accuracy of intelligence the U.S., most noticeably in Pakistan. grew in importance. Making a mistake involving civilian casualties now involves more than an apology or payments to the victims. It Elsewhere, al-Qaeda has been doing better, for example in Ye- is strongly destabilizing to the Pakistani government. men where U.S. intervention to stop their operations seems to have triggered an uprising against the sitting government. Even This April pressure on the Pakistani government became so strong in Libya it is reported that al-Qaeda has been advising and fight- that Pakistan announced, in the person of a senior official, that ing alongside the opponents of Quadaffi. There, working in an American personnel were no longer operating at Shamsi. Respond- alliance with other African terrorists and the Iranian-backed He- ing through a spokesman, the U.S. said there “were no U.S. forc- zbollah, al-Qaeda got its hands on chemical weapons (reportedly es” at the base, which could mean that anyone with a uniform mustard gas and nerve gas) and shipped them on their way to was out, while the CIA and contractors remained, or it could mean Lebanon. The Israelis, it seems, caught on and interdicted the that operations had, at least temporarily, stopped. Putting such a smuggling operation, killing its managers in a bold counter-move. base out of operation would, of course, be a victory for al-Qaeda and for the Taliban. Second, Pakistan. Over the past year Pakistan’s relationship with the United States has deteriorated. Inside Pakistan there is grow- Fourth, al-Qaeda and the Taliban need to stop U.S. Predator and ing anti-Americanism, which has reached a near universal level. Reaper attacks because they have been enormously successful in Common Defense Quarterly 18 Policy

eliminating their leadership. The most recent victim of a Preda- ria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya and Chad. They target Algeria, tor attack was Abu Hafs al-Najdi, also known as Abdul Ghani, an France, Spain and the U.S. important al-Qaeda regional commander in Afghanistan, who di- rected suicide bombers and handled large financial deals for the Getting terrorists into the United States is relatively easy, even in terrorist organization. Al Nadji was killed along with a number of the wake of 9/11. American borders are porous, there are count- other insurgents. less smugglers willing to move people for a fee, and by now there are ample reports of alliances between drug cartels, smugglers Fifth – and looking forward - with al-Qaeda and the Taliban and and terrorist organizations. We know, for example, that Middle their allies among Islamic forces in Pakistan still taking heavy Eastern and African members of terror organizations have been losses, al-Qaeda and its allies will try to do something dramatic smuggled across the southern American border; only a few have against the U.S. to bring a halt to the Predator and Reaper strikes. been caught. We know, too, that in Mexico, there are camps where Middle Eastern and African people are learning enough There is already some indication of what this will be; an attack on Spanish so they can pass for Hispanic. They are then supplied with the U.S. critical infrastructure, just like 9-11, but with different forged papers and supported by organizations both outside and tools. And this time the part of the critical infrastructure might inside the U.S. There is little hope that American border weak- well be America’s defense industry, especially if the defense in- nesses will be fixed any time soon. The raging controversy over dustry is involved in building the hated Predators and Reapers. the border fence, the sophisticated capability to make infiltrators [For the record, Predators are no longer manufactured; the last look good enough to get across “legally,” and the availability of model was delivered back in February of this year. The Reaper a variety of smuggling systems, including underground tunnels, has replaced the Predator because it is larger, can carry more adds to the growing danger. weapons (guided bombs along with Hellfire missiles), and has more elaborate sensors and radars than its predecessor. Reaper Therefore, al-Qaeda in principle has the tools to attack infrastruc- uses the same ground stations and flight components as Predator, ture targets -but instead of aircraft as bombs or suicide bombers so these units can be run side by side.] or trucks stuffed with fertilizer, the next level could be biological attacks aimed at defense industry, with Reaper manufacturing Since the 1990’s Osama Bin Laden has promoted work, mainly in and Hellfire missiles maybe near the top of the list. Afghanistan, on chemical and biological weapons. Testimony to that are grisly films showing the killing of animals, mainly dogs, Given the potential risk and the rising angst of the enemy, what with home-brew chemical agents. There are credible reports that can be done? On the offensive side, trying to ferret out threats al-Qaeda recruited experts from the Ukraine and former USSR to inside the U.S. is of utmost importance,. This means much more help them build biological weapons, with a focus on agents such intensive FBI and CIA efforts coordinated with other key agencies as anthrax and bubonic plague. It has also been reported that such as the Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs and Border more than one hundred “students” from Pakistan and other Mid- Protection. On the defensive side, not only is intelligence-gath- dle Eastern locations tried to get jobs abroad, particularly in Brit- ering essential but protective measures need to be put in place at ish laboratories. As is now known thanks to Wikileaks, it seems the key defense facilities. British were allowing many of these operatives into the United Kingdom, many of whom wound up working in sensitive facilities. Most U.S. defense facilities are not properly hardened, and few if any have on hand medicines, antidotes and plans to deal with The U.S. has long been concerned about al-Qaeda and biologi- chemical or biological events. A chem-bio attack not only contam- cal weapons. In 2003 in the U.K. six Algerians were arrested in inates work areas and involves elaborate and complex cleanup London where they had set up a ricin laboratory in their home. that takes time and costs money, but sickness in a work force has Ricin is the poison which was famously used by the Bulgarians in even graver implications for restarting production. Our govern- 1978 to kill dissident writer Georgi Markov. It was also a material ment certainly knows about the threat. But right now the govern- produced by Saddam Hussein’s laboratories in the 1980’s. ment is not sponsoring and financing the effort to build better protection for our commercial defense installations, pre-position- In 2005, the French government announced, according to Robert ing supplies or providing vital training. Maginnis (“Al Qaeda and the Plague,” Human Events, 1/23/2009), that al-Qaeda cells in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia were Our grainy photograph is gaining focus and resolution. Are we? producing agents including anthrax, ricin and botulism toxin. Our job is to try and stay more than one step ahead. Right now, we are two steps behind. In 2008 the al-Qaeda biological weapons guru, Midhat Mursi al- Sayid Umar, was killed by a Hellfire missile. His heritage is a 5,000-page manual on how to build crude chemical and biological Dr Stephen Bryen is CEO and President at SDB Partners, past weapons. President of Finmeccania North America and a member of the On January 19th 2009, in an exclusive story, the British newspaper Common Defense Quarterly Editorial Advisory Board. The Sun reported that 40 terrorists were killed by bubonic plague at a training camp in Algeria. Most experts think it was what the Editor’s Note: This article was prepared before Bin Laden Israelis often refer to as a “work accident.” While plague can was killed and before a cache of Al Qaeda documents be treated with antibiotics, successful remediation requires rapid revealed the targeting of both U.S. government officials and treatment and the prompt availability of strong antibiotics. Nei- defense industry leaders. The article was also submitted ther of which it seems was available as an antidote. The camp before the Chicago terrorist trial where star witness David in which they died is part of AQIM - Al-Qaeda Land of the Islamic Headley said al-Qaeda planned to kill the head of Lockheed Maghreb. AQIM is composed of Salafi Muslims who operate in Alge- Martin “because of drone attacks.”

19 Common Defense Quarterly Policy NATO Phased Ballistic Missile Defense: Protecting the Euro-Atlantic Region By John F. Morton, CAPT George V. Galdorisi, USN (Ret) & Scott C. Truver, PhD

and NATO-Russia defense working groups are to reconvene in early April with the expectation that they will make concrete progress on the joint threat assessment and efforts leading to missile defense cooperation by the June NATO-Russia Council defense ministers meeting in Brussels occurring alongside the NATO ministerial.

Threat and Framework

U.S. Navy photo. (RELEASED) In a series of speeches during the October run-up to the 2010 summit, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen addressed the immediate threat ballistic missiles pose to the Alliance and its partners. “Some can already hit Europe,” he told the Paris Institut Francais des Relations Internationale (IFRI). “We can’t just turn a blind eye to this problem. It is real. It is growing. We must have the means of preventing a missile strike on one of our cities. And we must not be held hostage by a regime that could and would launch missile attacks against us.” Secretary Rasmussen added that the cost of a missile defense system to provide an expanded 021121-N-0000X-002 framework for the protection of NATO European states would amount to $200 million from the common NATO budget, spread Ballistic missile defense for the Euro-Atlantic area is now an over ten years and divided among 28 countries. “To my mind,” he explicit North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission under offered, “that is affordable, even in times of financial restraint,” the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept—the first new strategic stating further: “Missile defense presents the greatest potential concept in more than a decade. At the November 2010 summit for enhancing our cooperation.” meeting in Lisbon, NATO leaders agreed to develop a missile- defense system to protect the populations and territory of all As part of the expanded NATO missile defense framework––dubbed member states. Significantly, the NATO member states invited the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD)––the Russia to join the effort. Indeed, NATO and Russia have agreed to United States will operate the upper-layer (high-altitude) missile- cooperate on missile defense, undertake a joint ballistic missile defense systems and European allies will operate the lower-layer, threat assessment, resume theater missile-defense exercises, and terminal-defense systems. NATO ballistic missile defense will thus explore further territorial missile-defense cooperation. become an integrated and networked effort. Alliance members are not building and deploying systems in isolation and instead Russian cooperation was one of the byproducts of President are providing opportunities for regional and global partners to Obama’s 2009 decision to make a major shift in ballistic missile participate. policy and defer the planned fixed-site ground-based system in Europe in favor of Aegis BMD afloat and ashore. This new This Alliance commitment comports with priorities in the U.S. approach has been instrumental in turning Russia’s previously Defense Department’s 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review strident criticism of NATO BMD into a desire to join in this (BMDR), which aligns U.S. missile defense posture with near- collective defence, with Russian President Medvedev describing term regional missile threats to ensure capabilities are fiscally the US decision to scrap previous plans as, “A constructive step sustainable yet sufficiently flexible and effective to respond to in the right direction that deserves a positive response from the evolving threats. Further, the U.S. approach intends to bolster international community.” regional deterrence against states on the road to acquiring weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the United The importance of securing Russian cooperation on missile States seeks to engage Russia in a strategic dialogue. The fruits defense was underscored during a March 2010 visit by Secretary of these efforts were evident in the NATO-Russia Council Lisbon of Defense Robert Gates with his Russian counterpart Anatoly communiqué; the overwhelming ratification by the Russian lower Serdyukov and later with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. parliamentary chamber, the State Duma, in December 2010, days President Medvedev, Serdyukov and Gates spent fully half their after conclusive ratification by the U.S. Senate, and the Gates/ meeting addressing missile defense and further agreed that Serdyukov dialogue in March. the U.S.-Russia defense working groups would reconvene in the late spring to continue to explore ways to cooperate on missile Phased Adaptability I defense. An outgrowth of the BMDR, the United States is pursuing the At their March ministerial in Brussels, NATO defense ministers Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to address regional threats on agreed to construct a “road map” highlighting the political, a worldwide basis. Emerging plans call for adapting the PAA to military, organizational and financial aspects of European missile each U.S. regional commander’s area of responsibility. Given defense to serve as the basis for missile defense discussions at the regional threat now facing Europe, the PAA for the NATO the June defense ministerial. In addition, bilateral U.S.-Russia command is the most advanced in these plans. The first phase of

Common Defense Quarterly 20 Policy

the four-part PAA approach is being implemented this year with the ballistic missile threat presented by North Korea. Following existing systems already fully operational and able to serve as a several patrols of BMD-equipped Aegis ships, the BMD-capable USS deterrent, thus supporting Alliance and partner diplomacy. Monterey (CG-61) deployed to the Mediterranean and “chopped” to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. The represents the The centerpiece of the U.S. PAA is the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense first phase of the U.S. contribution to NATO’s missile defense (Aegis BMD) program, funded by the Defense Department’s Missile framework under the EPAA strategy, and Monterey is tasked to Defense Agency (MDA) and the Navy. Aegis has been in the U.S. raise awareness of the Navy’s BMD capability among NATO allies. fleet since 1983—with numerous updates—providing an air/missile defense. Aegis ships are also in service with four other navies. MDA and the Navy are now developing the “Aegis Ashore” program, a critical element of the PAA framework. A land-based Aegis Taking advantage of a half-century of design, engineering and BMD system designed to be re-locatable to support worldwide operational excellence and some $50 billion investment in deployment, Aegis Ashore leverages the proven success of the at- Aegis technologies, systems and ships, the Aegis Weapon System sea Aegis BMD system. The U.S. Government sees the shipboard consists of four major components: (1) the SPY-1 radar system; Aegis BMD and Aegis Ashore as the near-term fix to provide (2) Aegis Combat System; (3) Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS); a deterrent framework against regional threats from short- and (4) Standard surface-to-air missiles. Aegis BMD capability is and medium-range ballistic missiles. In the NATO area, these developed and delivered in “spiral upgrades” providing increased conjoined elements of the PAA are the latest U.S. contribution capabilities at every step. The 2011 configuration of Aegis BMD–– to NATO ballistic missile defense. The PAA is a four-phase plan. the Aegis 3.6 weapon system––includes the Aegis BMD weapons Aegis Ashore plays in Phases II, III and IV. Aegis BMD has come on system teamed with the advanced SM-3 Block 1A missile, operating line immediately in Phase I with the Monterey deployment. at sea since the mid-2000s. PAA Phase I also involves this year’s deployment of existing SM-3 The ballistic missile version for Aegis BMD has been the Standard missiles with the sea-based Aegis system. The current Aegis BMD SM-2 Block IV and now includes the more advanced SM-3 series. system 3.6.1 configuration provides long-range surveillance and Phased upgrades to Aegis BMD and the SM-3 will provide the track and ascent, midcourse, descent and terminal-engagement counter to short- to intermediate-range ballistic missile threats capabilities. Later in 2011, an initial BMD 4.0.1 capability will be within and above the atmosphere. In October 2008, the delivered with the SM-3 Block IA missile to go on board Aegis BMD Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force found, “The ships. Deployments will be in European waters, in the Eastern Aegis BMD System is operationally effective and operationally Mediterranean and Adriatic seas. Plans also include deployment suitable.” Because of the inherent multi-mission qualities of the of a land-based TPY-2 X-band radar in southern Europe. The ABMD warships and their strategic and tactical mobility, they are shipboard Link-16 will tie the TPY-2 to the battle management also highly survivable against a broad spectrum of threats, not center, the U.S. command node at the Ramstein Air Force Base, just ballistic missiles. thus increasing the size of the area that can be defended, and Aegis BMD and the SM-3 achieved a widely reported success early linking to the U.S. elements of the PAA to NATO’s missile defense in 2008 with the “Burnt Frost” operation. A non-functioning framework. U.S. satellite was headed toward the earth and threatening to The Aegis BMD 4.0.1 is expected to be operational by the end endanger population centers. An Aegis cruiser fired an SM-3 of 2012, improving the Aegis capability against intermediate- Block IA that intercepted the satellite, destroying it in the exo- range threats. The BMD 4.0.1 modifications focus on a new radio atmosphere. Later in 2008, during the “Pacific Blitz” exercise, frequency discrimination and tracking capability, the Aegis BMD an Aegis BMD destroyer fired an SM-3 missile and scored another signal processor and integration of the Block IB upgrade. The direct hit on the target ballistic missile. Through early 2011, Block IB carries an improved kill vehicle that seeks out and the BMD-modified Aegis cruisers and destroyers have achieved collides with the target. The Aegis BMD 4.0.1 will fire either the 21 of 25 intercepts in increasingly demanding test and complex Block IA or Block IB missile. operational environments. As this was written in the March 2011, the Missile Defense Agency planned the Flight Test Mission 15 Phases II-IV event that would pit an Aegis BMD-equipped ship firing a Standard Missile-3 Block IA against a modified intermediate-range Trident PAA Phase II comes in 2015 and will involve system installation I/C-4 ballistic missile target––the first ABMD attempt against this of the first Aegis Ashore element in Romania. The Aegis Ashore type of target. If successful, this will expand the Aegis envelope site will include one land-based SPY-1 S-band radar and a re- far beyond what was originally planned. locatable and modified VLS capable of housing and launching 24 SM-3 missiles. This deployed capability will use the Aegis BMD 5.0 By way of comparison, the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense and SM-3 Block IB. Re-locatable, forward-based, directional TPY- (THAAD) system went zero-for-six during the 1990s before two 2 X-band radars and space-based satellites and airborne sensors successes, then a five-year hiatus. After a redesign, the system currently in development will link with the Aegis BMD ships and has had an eight-for-eight record. And, the last two tests of the Aegis Ashore system and via Link-16 to the Ramstein command Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD) system, in January and center. Altogether, this network will expand the coverage area December 2010, were failures. The GMD system has had eight to allow for missiles to engage on remotely obtained sensor data, successful intercepts in 15 attempts, and the GMD test program is thus extending the range for intercepts and thereby providing for being completely reworked. full theater missile defense across Southern Europe. The U.S. Navy in March 2011 has 21 ships outfitted with Aegis Negotiations have been underway within the Alliance to BMD: five cruisers and 16 destroyers. Five of these ships are in determine where to deploy two TPY-2s during Phase II. Along the Atlantic to support the NATO requirements, and 16 are in the with Aegis BMD, these radars will link to the U.S. Army’s Terminal Pacific, supporting U.S., Japanese and allied efforts to counter High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot batteries under the 21 Common Defense Quarterly Policy

This phase will initiate deployment of the SM-3 Block IIA missiles, in Poland and at the original site in Romania. Now in cooperative

U.S. Navy development with Japan, the Block IIA missile is a faster and more capable variant of the Block IB. This deployed capability will use Aegis BMD 5.1 with the Block IB and IIA missiles. Currently in development, Aegis BMD 5.1 will integrate the Block IIA missile into the combat system and provide for improved data links to enable engage-on-remote track data to defeat threats at an even longer range. In 2020, Aegis Ashore in Phase IV will involve deployment of another SM-3 upgrade, the Block IIB with an improved kill vehicle, at sites in both Romania and Poland. In addition, these Aegis Ashore system sites will be upgraded with the latest versions of the Aegis BMD software. The future developments will focus on engage-on-remote to provide the Block IIB with the capability to intercept a medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missile early in its flight and before it deploys its countermeasures. The fully networked Phase IV system will also have the capability to defend against an intercontinental ballistic missile. Aegis Ashore will serve to plug “holes” when naval BMD assets are not in position to provide a layered defense against threats to Europe. At the same time it will reduce the Navy’s need to maintain multi-mission Aegis BMD ships on station, which would constrain their availability for other BMD and naval missions. For their part, NATO Allies, partners, and U.S. regional commanders can appreciate how integrating Aegis BMD and Aegis Ashore capabilities into a cost-effective, realigned and enhanced regional missile defense will make for an effective, adaptive, flexible, dispersed and resilient ballistic missile defense network, for the 071217-N-0000X-001 KAUAI, Hawaii (Dec. 17, 2007) A Standard Missile-3 is common defense. launched from the Japanese Aegis Destroyer JS Kongo (DDG 173) enroute to an intercept of a target missile launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility. ABMD at Sea… The successful intercept occurred during Japan’s first Aegis missile test. In short, Aegis BMD continues to “press the envelopes” of national NATO missile defense framework, as well as to the Ground-based and global BMD capabilities––a common defense against a growing Midcourse Defense (GMD) system that provides missile defense for threat. It is effective and survivable and affordable. More North America against intercontinental ballistic missiles. Halfway importantly, in 2011 Aegis BMD is at sea…on patrol…and soon to around the world is another TPY-2 site in Shariki, Japan, providing be ashore, as well. BMD coverage for Japan and South Korea. By 2015, the Navy will have 38 Aegis BMD warships in operation worldwide. At the same time, current plans are to have 436 John F. Morton is a principal staff engineer in the National SM-3 missiles for U.S. and foreign land- and sea-based Aegis BMD Security Programs group, Gryphon Technologies LC, systems. By fiscal year 2024, the U.S. Navy will have operational Greenbelt, Maryland. Retired Captain Galdorisi is Director 60 Aegis BMD ships. of the Corporate Strategy Group at SPAWAR Systems Center As part of PAA Phase III, in 2018 Aegis Ashore will “deploy” to Pacific, San Diego, California. Dr. Truver is Director of Poland, the second site to support defense of Northern Europe. National Security Programs at Gryphon Technologies.

Common Defense Quarterly 22 Technologies DoD Leads Industry in Augmented Reality By Tom Zysk Augmented Reality is a term new to the modern tech keep one on the highway if the windows are covered, or at night. vernacular; however, a mature version of the technology Why? Augmented Reality provides that drive to position. For maritime craft this “drive to” position also causes the operator to self correct is already in use by military forces. for the effect of wind and current, enabling precise piloting. When used by vehicles on land (As shown in the screen shot to the left), operators have been able to navigate precisely along cleared lanes through simulated mine fields. A variety of geo-referenced data can be overlaid to further enhance the operator’s Situational Awareness.

Today, the Naval Air Systems Command Irregular Warfare Cell has conducted small unit tactics with riverine craft, trucks, and dismounted troops, all using information enabled by a distributed Common Operational Picture (COP) served up with Augmented Reality. Mission accomplishment results have been dramatic. A command vehicle and the Tactical Operations Center have distributed COP on large screen monitors, and certain command personnel also have smart phones enabling the sharing of information. These systems are all connected through a server application which delivers a robust Distributed COP. Missions are shared, chat is available, and units can share screen shots from other units.

Applications of Augmented Reality on Amphibious Assault Vehicles have demonstrated the utility of the technology on land, in the water and through the hazardous surf zone, delivering precise routing through The simplest example of Augmented Reality is the technology that cleared transit lanes. The system is intuitive to operate. Operators creates the artificial first down line on a football game broadcast. For with little or no training in the use of the Augmented Reality system the military, Augmented Reality is exemplified by a software application are able to execute precise maneuvers through lanes planned with which combines real-time video imagery with virtual images to provide bends and turns. a new dimension in Situational Awareness and navigation piloting accuracy. The screen shot to the right is an Augmented Reality display on a high speed boat showing the navigational route marked by rails. This Augmented Reality view is shown along with a two dimensional chart view on the right side of the display. The Augmented Reality display fuses information from multiple sensors into a common picture which enhances human cognition.

Augmented Reality can overlay critical chart information such as buoys and channel markers, as well as radar or Automated Information System contacts. In fact, any information that has a geo-registration component (geographic position attached) can be precisely overlaid on a real time camera or infrared camera view. Operators have reported that they have been able to maneuver in unfamiliar waters at high speed with confidence, especially at night or in inclement (rain / fog) weather conditions!

An operator using Augmented Reality does not have to look down at a chart, radar display or AIS display then up at the real world to put this information into context. Charts, radar and AIS all output two dimensional (2D) information which must be made relevant to a three Technology Systems Inc. of Brunswick Maine developed the software dimensional (3D) world. Analysis has shown that the process of 2D to 3D known as Augmented Reality Visualization of the Common Operational conversion is a strenuous task for the brain and the process is prone to Picture (ARVCOP). The software has been approved for international error. Many accidents can be caused by an initial mistake (Discovered sale. It has been used for vehicles, ships, boats and personnel in by Root Cause Analysis) which is then compounded by other decisions manned and unmanned applications. Today it is the foundation for made with incorrect information. Augmented Reality automates the an Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection Threat Identification system conversion process, allowing the human to focus on other relevant currently in development. tasks. Testing using NASA TLX methodology showed humans were 342% more effective at accomplishing a side task while using Augmented Reality to perform a primary function of navigation / piloting. Tom Zysk is the Chief Operating Officer of Technology Systems Driving or piloting accuracy is enhanced in Augmented Reality by Inc. Tom is a 27 – year Navy Veteran. Experience includes projecting a “drive to” position to the operator. GPS can deliver Command at Sea, Pentagon Tours, Aegis Acquisition Director extremely accurate position information; however it is insufficient to and stand up of the original, “Smart Ship” effort.

23 Common Defense Quarterly Policy MIDS Across Borders and Around the World

By Michael Posner and Kathryn Peterson

To that end, MIDS-LVT terminals have been successfully integrated into a diverse yet complimentary set of platforms, including ships, aircraft, missile defense systems, and national and international command and control agencies. Thirty-five nations and two international organizations currently possess MIDS-LVTs or have been approved to acquire them. In addition, the MIDS Program Office recently entered production, in 2010, with the “form, fit, function” upgrade to MIDS-LVT known as the MIDS Joint Tactical Radio System (MIDS JTRS). The second limited production lot of MIDS JTRS was awarded in February 2011. The MIDS JTRS terminal is a software-defined radio equipped with all MIDS-LVT capabilities plus three empty channels into which qualified waveforms can be installed. This will allow for the expansion beyond Link-16, to create even greater connectivity and communication among its operators. MIDS JTRS can also be used as a replacement for MIDS- LVT with only minor host platform modifications.

MIDS: A WORLDWIDE SUCCESS MIDS terminal overlaying an aircraft’s tactical Link-16 display. The MIDS program’s success is clearly demonstrated by the large number of countries and platforms using and procuring MIDS- Today’s Soldiers and Marines struggle to gain instant and persistent LVTs. As of late 2010, there were over 7,800 terminals delivered access to essential situational awareness information such as or on contract, worldwide. The most significant reason for this enemy and friendly locations and force disposition. Unfortunately, success is that the MIDS-LVT provides reliable, advanced, real- current technology has yet to consistently provide this information, time communication capabilities at a relatively low cost. Its which is a critical tool in the warfighting effort on the ground. tactical data link capabilities enhance situational awareness Ground force’s communications will enjoy a generational leap in the battlespace and enable the warfighter to cooperatively in capability when terrain-flattening man-portable and vehicle engage multiple hostile targets and monitor those suspected of mounted networking radios are fielded. Until then, real-time being hostile while simultaneously avoiding the fratricide that can situational awareness will remain solely within the domains of be caused by more poorly-communicated missions. tactical aircraft operations and strategic command and control. Airborne operations must constantly distinguish friends from Another reason for the success of MIDS-LVT is its versatility. This foes throughout the full spectrum of warfare operations, from versatility not only refers to the number of platforms into which passive surveillance to the heat of battle. In these situations, the terminals are incorporated, but also to their operational warfighters have depended upon the Multifunctional Information usage. MIDS-LVT allows the U.S. to conduct both peacetime Distribution System (MIDS) to give them the information and and wartime operations with Allied partners. For example, communication abilities they need to be successful. MIDS is a the advanced communication that MIDS provides has been used secure, scalable, modular, wireless, and jam-resistant digital in combat operations in Iraq, the Balkans and Afghanistan. It information exchange system currently providing real-time Link- was especially useful in Afghanistan, where the absolute paucity 16, Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN), and voice communications to of a pre-existing air traffic control system suitable for tactical airborne, ground, and maritime platforms. MIDS has completely air operations made coordinating aerial attacks, defenses, and changed the way the warfighter sends and receives data, not just logistics incredibly challenging. With the original introduction of in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also within and between the military MIDS-LVT in 2000, U.S. and Allied aircraft were able to join a real- forces of many countries around the world. time battlespace command and control system that helped them better organize and carry out their missions. The MIDS Assistant The MIDS program was established by a multinational Program Program Manager for Foreign Military Sales, Steve Kolbert, Memorandum of Understanding (PMOU) signed in 1991. The MIDS summarizes the advancement, saying, “This was the first time Program Office, located in San Diego, California, is part ofthe the warfighter got a real-time picture of what was going on in the Joint Program Executive Office for the Joint Tactical Radio System air, and that’s huge.” and is a consortium of five nations—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United States. MIDS entered production with the MIDS- MIDS-LVT use is not limited to active war zones. NATO is currently Low Volume Terminal (LVT) in 2000. The MIDS-LVT product is built in the process of incorporating MIDS-LVT into a unique system by three vendors: ViaSat and Data Link Solutions, LLC (DLS) in the designed to connect the Allies across the entire European U.S. and EuroMIDS in Europe. The program’s mission is to develop, continent. The program, entitled the Air Command and Control field, and support interoperable, affordable and secure MIDS System (ACCS), will allow NATO members “to integrate their tactical data link and programmable networking technologies and air traffic control, surveillance, air mission control, airspace capabilities for the Joint, Coalition, and International warfighter. management, and force management functions.”1 Their goal is

Common Defense Quarterly 24 Programs

to “provide a unified air command and control system, enabling stand for years to come. Meanwhile, MIDS JTRS is expected to NATO’s European nations (including new Alliance members) to enter full production in 2011. Current platforms procuring MIDS seamlessly manage all types of air operations over their territory JTRS include the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, E-8C JSTARS, RC- and beyond.” 2 The end result will be an airborne tactical 135 Rivet Joint, and EC-130H Compass Call. Future MIDS JTRS network that is unprecedented in size and scope. This increased platforms include the EA-18G Growler, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, communication ability will be a major boost to Allied defensive EC-130E Senior Scout, F-15E Strike Eagle, B-1B Lancer, and B-52H efforts and operational coordination. Stratofortress. Concerning near term fielding, the MIDS Program Manger, Captain Scott Krambeck, remarks, “I am extremely MIDS-LVT can also be used to coordinate actions in crisis areas pleased with the progress the team is making, the new trails we around the world. Such areas may include nations experiencing are blazing, and the lessons learned that we are sharing with our humanitarian or natural disasters, political unrest, or military JTRS teammates. The outstanding government and industry MIDS tensions. In these instances, it is often the case that multiple JTRS Team continues to advance and demonstrate JTRS technology outside parties will orchestrate a joint effort to send aid or to and soon the warfighter will benefit. I am anxious to get MIDS prevent tensions from worsening. This type of coordination JTRS operating in the fleet.” With both the fielding of MIDS JTRS can be problematic if the participants do not speak the same and the upgrade to MIDS-LVT, the MIDS program will advance even language. MIDS-LVT provides a solution to this language barrier closer toward its goal to increase situational awareness across because the tactical data link technology, as the MIDS Program borders and around the world. Office Director of Operations, Michael Posner, explains, makes it possible for those who “do not share a common spoken language Michael Posner is a retired U.S. Navy Commander, currently to share a common operational language.” working as the Director of Operations in the MIDS Program Office. Kathryn Peterson, currently employed by intelliSolu- LOOKING AHEAD tions, Inc., is working as the MIDS Operations Support Special- ist. This is a very exciting time for the MIDS Program Office. As MIDS- LVT use continues to expand and MIDS JTRS continues to reach References critical milestones, the MIDS Program Office is looking toward the future. All MIDS-LVTs are planned to undergo a major upgrade, 1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Topic: Air Command and Control Agency (ACCS), NATO. known as Block Upgrade 2, from 2015-2020. Block Upgrade 2 Retrieved from will provide frequency remapping, enhanced throughput, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8203.htm. cryptographic modernization, and other significant software 2 Ibid. updates to ensure that MIDS-LVT’s operational pre-eminence will

More information about MIDS may be found at the Joint Program Executive Office for the Joint Tactical Radio System website at http://www.public.navy.mil/jpeojtrs/pages/MIDS.aspx.

25 Common Defense Quarterly Programs

Embracing Technological and Strategic Convergence to Increase Capability and Reduce Cost By Jesse Bonfeld

“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” Albert Einstein, physicist, Nobel laureate (1879-1955)

Successful efforts in almost every endeavor require development or availability of a well thought out strategy, the ability to acquire accurate raw data, the capability to derive meaningful information from the data, and the ongoing utilization of this information as the strategy evolves. For the modern defense establishment, and its customers, there is a need to continuously improve these elements to meet future threats, and address ongoing budget limitations. In many areas, improvements in product performance, computational power, and bandwidth are helping to drive a convergence of needs with solutions. One element of this convergence involves the vast array of new types of sensor technologies that are now available, their capabilities, and how both new and existing strategies en- vision their use. This technology convergence can be capitalized upon with significant benefits, but it also requires a strategic con- As well, the prevailing sentiment within the US Government is one vergence to fully realize these benefits. If properly developed, of reduction and ever increasing scrutiny of DoD spending, as cap- managed and supported, such a strategy can greatly leverage the tured in the following quote: technology, with the potential to dramatically improve situational awareness, data integrity, data value and security, while at the “We need to relearn the discipline of affordability….appropri- same time distributing and minimizing acquisition and operational ate trade craft… right incentives to the performer to reduce costs. cost , and to the government to contain its appetite….” Historical Example Dr. Ashton Carter, Und. Sec. Def. ATL History shows us several examples where a combination of good strategy, and the embracing of new technology, converged to gen- erate cost effective results that continue to deliver value and performance long after their inception. A fairly simple and recent example is the Interstate Highway System in the United States. Conceived as a strategic requirement to expand and enhance commerce, as well as to provide flexibility for defense strategies in the Cold War Era, the concept capitalized upon several well thought out strategic elements (a novel funding scheme, cohesive num- bering system, buy in from both Federal and State entities, urban feeder designs, improvements in safety); the convergence of several technological advancements (improved roadway materials and construction techniques, faster, more reliable, and more capable vehicles, improved fuel distribution options); and the foresight and vision of several key individuals, in both the political and corporate We have all heard the mantras that now define our time…do more realms. Although now showing its age, and challenged with main- without more, do more with less, etc. We also recognize the ex- tenance requirements and funding channels, few could argue the istence of an environment of increasingly innovative threats that Interstate Highway System’s positive impact on growth, commerce cannot be ignored. These circumstances demand that new strate- and security in the United States. gies, along with the use of innovative technologies, are needed to Challenges for the Defense Industry address these threats within the budget limitations that exist. In many instances, various types of sensors can act as key data ac- The funding challenges for the defense industry, especially in Eu- quisition tools to enable and enhance mission success. The real rope and North America, have been well publicized over the last challenge that exists is to recognize the roll these sensors can play, few years. In the United States, estimated decreases in DoD spend- understand the technology convergences that are now happening ing as a percentage of GDP are outlined to the right: to enable their use, and develop a strategy that exploits these two elements in a complimentary and constructive manner. A further squeeze will be put on defense budgets as the fiscal burden of social priorities grows.

Common Defense Quarterly 26 Programs Convergence of Technology An Example Fortunately, we find ourselves in a technological environment The risk of a chemical or biological weapon attack on a large, urban where several capabilities are converging at the same time to en- environment is widely known, and has garnered significant funding able cost effective and highly capable sensors and sensor system, as to develop technologies and plans to at best thwart such an attempt, well as the downstream capabilities needed to make their outputs and at worst, mitigate the effects. A major challenge in planning valuable. These capabilities include miniaturization, increased for such an event is the ease with which the threat could potentially computing capacity, and communications bandwidth. Each can spread from the inception location. This could occur through a vari- play a key role in the technical side of a coherent strategy for sen- ety of methods, including seepage into the ocean and ground water sor implementation supplies, through the air, carried by wind; through the food chain, as air and water born contaminants are absorbed by consumable items; Miniaturization – Expansion of the basic manufacturing principals used and through the normal pace of commerce and human interaction in to deliver computer chips has now enabled a vast industry that can a highly industrialized and heavily populated area. produce very capable sensors in very large volumes, at relatively low unit costs. Pressure, temperature, acceleration, torque, proximity, Sensors currently do exist to detect many of the threat agents, and angle are just a few examples of the sensors available. Addition- but they are not widely proliferated, and are not integrated into ally, biomedical science has tapped into the structures and chemistries cohesive systems that can react quickly with the needed data and of several naturally occurring biosensors, and can now manufacture resources. Ideally, a system would exist where information on the artificial versions of these structures for commercial and military use level and extent of the threat could be known in real time. The greater the number of detection nodes, the better, assuming the Increased Computing Capacity – Moore’s Law, which was developed infrastructure is designed to handle the volume, and the existence by Dr. Gordon Moore of Intel Corporation in the 1960’s, continues of the nodes is not intrusive to everyday life. Such a system could to this day to accurately predict that the number of transistors that conceivably consist of elements that include: • Small, inexpensive, self powered sensors that are integrated into can be placed on an integrated circuit inexpensively (computing mobile devices or clothing power) will approximately double every two years. The continued • A transmitting device that could send data from the sensor to a data availability of inexpensive, ever more capable computing power is management location • Software that could process the data in real time, providing graphical central to the technology convergence being enabled. representations and other interfaces giving the needed situational awareness. This information could be used to alert the proper Communications Bandwidth – The pervasive availability of mobile authorities, and provide them with plans for the most efficient communication nodes in the commercial space is now common- treatment, containment and evacuation scenarios based on the location and magnitude of the threat place, a vastly different situation than existed just a few years ago. • A communications network that could route the incoming sensor For the defense and military establishments of the world, similar ex- data, and output plan selectively, to notify only the needed resources pansions in communications capabilities and bandwidth are also be- for dispatch ing realized. Real- time transmission of huge data streams for video The convergence of miniaturization, increased computing power surveillance, telemetry, and other elements to enhance situational and expanded bandwidth make it conceivable that the mechanical awareness is happening today, with continued advances in technical components of such a system can be developed. An environment capabilities at ever more attractive unit costs seemingly attainable. of “do more with less” is completely consistent with this technology convergence, as volume efficiencies should make such a system Convergence of Strategy much less expensive to field and maintain than attempts using existing components, or those developed by individual efforts. The key We must first understand and differentiate the concept of “doing element, though, is the strategic plan that is needed to develop and more with less” or “do more without more” as it applies to existing proliferate such a system. Using the United States as an example, a needs versus those anticipated for the future. In the current needs strategy of this type would need to encompass civil authorities from environment, doing more with less often translates into cutting the Federal, State and Local levels. It would also require the active waste, operating more efficiently, leveraging common resources, participation in the development, fielding and maintenance phases and simply delaying appropriation. It also encompasses the con- by the providers of the various components, such as all the mo- cept of looking back at existing, developed technologies to see if bile phone manufacturers, network switch gear manufacturers, the they are applicable to current needs, rather than automatically sensor manufacturers, and the wired and wireless communication starting with the notion that a new, novel, and often expensive service providers. Coordination with military resources and assets design undertaking is the only viable path. would also need to be a significant element of the strategic plan.

The future needs environment may not allow implementation of If such a strategic approach were then expanded to include a group any of these savings methodologies. New and innovative threats of sovereign states such as those making up the EU, an extremely by definition will exclude many if not all existing and conventional complex situation now becomes that much more so. This does not in- technology approaches. Iterative technology development may be clude the complexity of having highly competitive companies working feasible, but it is just a matter of time before truly new solutions together to standardize and manufacture equipment that can be in- will be required. Part of the strategy requires that we start plan- stalled, operated and maintained seamlessly. How are development ning now, rather than later. resources best allocated ? Who owns the intellectual property? Who will ultimately pay for the development and ongoing costs? An even more challenging and compelling element of the needed strategic plan resides in the capitals and boardrooms across the globe. Most To address future threats within the budgetary constraints, coun- countries and companies face the same funding and resource limitations, tries and companies need to embrace a more collaborative and some more than others. Leveraging the technical convergence alone will strategic approach to technology development. Funding, facilities, only yield limited savings in time and development costs if it is prolifer- manpower, and capabilities need to be evaluated to determine how ated in an ever repetitive, singular fashion, with silos of resources and they can best be utilized and leveraged across an enterprise that spans political and economic borders. goals isolated and protected from each other, unable to work together, as we find too often in the corporate and political worlds. Jesse Bonfeld is VP of Business Development for Sherborne Sensors.

27 Common Defense Quarterly Policy Pre-Positioned Expeditionary Assistance Kit (PEAK) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration

By Dr. Russell Horn

Even though more than a year has passed, when one mentions the and technical support. Executive oversight is provided by OSD. country of Haiti, many immediately remember the magnitude 7.2 Marine Expeditionary Command at Marine Forces Pacific serves earthquake that struck on January 12, 2010 and the overwhelming as the Independent Assessor. US Pacific Command and US African destruction and suffering that followed and even continues to Command are actively engaged in the deployment of the kits and this day. In the days that immediately followed that catastrophic subsequent transition. event, widespread assistance came from many agencies and countries to fill the void. But with that assistance there was some disorganization in helping the citizens of Haiti. Help was flowing into the country, but communications and logistics were often hampered creating delays and inefficiencies. The ability to properly assess and coordinate in the first days of the disaster was severely limited.

Within the US government, the Department of Defense (DoD) is a key organization with the global reach and breadth of capabilities to provide an immediate response to distressed populations such as in Haiti following the earthquake. During periods of distress, the security and stability of partner nations is often undermined by the lack of capacity to provide or maintain essential services. Regional security and stability can be threatened by the absence of critical services that are enabled by potable water, power, information sharing and communications. Moreover, the lack of appropriate U.S. response may create a national strategy gap and opportunities for potential adversaries. Authorities in-theater often lack the capacity to develop or repair essential services in times of crisis. DoD and partner nations can improve their ability to provide critical services for targeted purposes during the first Figure 1 days of a natural or man-made crisis through a structured process involving public-private, whole of government and trans-national PEAK is designed to provide sustainable, essential services in participants. Additionally, DoD can help build partner nation the first 72 hours after a disaster event. These services include capacity to carry out key missions through proactive engagement potable water from local sources, reliable power from primarily with various international partners. renewable sources, local situational awareness & information sharing, and communications to transmit & receive voice, data “The Joint Force, Combatant Commanders, and Service Chiefs and images. Diagram 1 shows how these four capabilities will shall actively partner with other U.S. Government agencies operate. PEAK was further defined by the following derived to pursue theater security cooperation to increase collective specifications to provide a non-proprietary, portable, integrated security skills with a wider range of partners. We seek to kit providing: Hybrid Power: 2.2 KW Solar, 2KW Diesel Generator, facilitate interagency and enable international interoperability 38KWH Battery Storage, Desalination: 1800 gallons/day of potable, before crises occur. Preparation is indispensable when conditions disinfected water, Portable Cell Network: 2NM radius, 20 users, demand collaboration.” (National Military Strategy, Feb. 2011, p. SATCOM: narrow band connection to web, and GIS display: geo- 17) tagged imagery, video, text from smart phones. PEAK services are meant to support the crisis response team in their coordination Given this background, there was an unmet gap for capabilities and assessment efforts and not the population in general. The that can be pre-positioned to help provide sustainable, essential notable exception to this is water filtration unit that has capacity services in time sensitive events. These capabilities will support to support populations of up to 800 or more people. U.S. and enhance Partner Nations to carry out key missions. These capabilities will also provide critical services for targeted purposes The PEAK JCTD project is scoped in three distinct spirals. These during the first days of a crisis through structured planning that three spirals are designed to provide rapid feedback on individual includes public-private, whole of government, and trans-national component capabilities of the kit while also providing the participants that collaboratively enhance regional stability. opportunity to quick deploy initial versions of PEAK where they can be operational viable. The first spiral consists of selection, From these developments the Pre-Positioned Expeditionary testing and deployment of the water filtration capability with Assistance Kit (PEAK) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration power supplied by a diesel generator. The second spiral consists (JCTD) project was enacted. US Southern Command is the sponsor of all four component capabilities (water, renewable power, and provides the operational manager and operational support. situational awareness, and communications) loosely integrated National Defense University provides the technical manager in a transport container. The third spiral will consist of a refined

Common Defense Quarterly 28 Policy

set of the four, integrated components that will be ready for response with Honduran response. The pre-positioned scenarios transition. were focused on a response effort to a Category 4 hurricane. The unanticipated emergency response was focused on an earthquake Six of the spiral one kits have been deployed for initial feedback of magnitude 8.0 or greater earthquake in the Central American across the three combatant commands. Two kits were sent to US region. During each scenario, the participants were to operate the Southern Command, two were sent to US Africa Command, and full range of capabilities of the kit. The scenarios were designed two were sent to US Pacific Command. Operational military units to demonstrate the storage, training, deployment, employment, and NGOs in each command have received training on the spiral maintenance, redeployment, and transportation of the kits by one kits. The kits have been operated at various locations within both US personnel and Honduran personnel. each theater to gather initial operational feedback on PEAK’s capabilities. This data was incorporated into the later spirals of PEAK.

JJTF-B, HONMIL, and COPECO using situational awareness tools

Consistent with similar programs, an Independent Assessor (IA) observed the demonstration and gathered data for a utility assessment. The IA observed the users as they completed the Figure 2 scenarios using the PEAK capabilities and gathered subjective data through direct observation, interviews and surveys. As with To date, several technical demonstrations have been conducted the spiral one kit feedback, the spiral two IA utility assessment at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Fort AP Hill. Emphasis was will inform the PEAK spiral three configuration and deployment. placed on validating the safety and certification of the individual component capabilities and the four component capabilities as an Following OD-1, there were several notable observations. As integrated kit. In preparation for each technical demonstration an a whole, the PEAK system was well-received by US military analysis of alternatives was conducted for each of the individual and Honduran military and civilian personnel. First, the water component capabilities. This analysis determined the best filtration unit remains the most mature and well-received solution in the trade space based on cost and features. Selected component capability of the system. Second, the spiral two component capabilities were then tested and demonstrated to transport container requires modification to allow internal or verify and validate them against the requirement set. sling-lifted transport on fixed wing or rotor wing platforms. Third, the situational awareness computer system and remote hand-held Having been technically demonstrated and integrated, PEAK, in devices need simple user interfaces and to be translatable into its spiral two configuration, was ready for its first operational languages other than English. Fourth, training documentation test. Diagram 2 shows the PEAK solution tested at operational needs to be as simple as possible to allow quick and efficient demonstration – 1 (OD-1). In early February 2011, OD-1 occurred training for a wide variety of end users. at Joint Task Force – Bravo (JTF-Bravo) at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. OD-1 engaged the participation of JTF-Bravo personnel, Additional technical and operational demonstrations will be a humanitarian assistance unit of the Honduran military (HONMIL), conducted during the latter part of FY11. Once this work is and NGO members of Comisión Permanente de Contingencias completed, PEAK will operationally transition. Potential transition (COPECO) personnel. COPECO is the Honduran equivalent of the options are under evaluation. These include adding PEAK and its Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the US. Soto modular components to the GSA schedule, encouraging security Cano Air Base, Honduras and operates a forward, all-weather assistance components of the regional combatant commands day/night C-5-capable airbase. JTF-Bravo organizes multilateral to distribute and pre-position PEAK, integrate PEAK with other exercises and supports, in cooperation with our partner nations, DoD humanitarian assistance / disaster relief organizations such humanitarian and civic assistance, counterdrug, contingency and as the USAF Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team, and disaster relief operations in Central America. integrate PEAK with other USG agencies such as USAID.

At OD-1, three operationally realistic scenarios were used to demonstrate the PEAK capabilities: (1) unanticipated emergency with US response, (2) pre-positioned emergency response with US Dr. Russell Horn is a Naval Science Officer at US Southern and Honduran participants, and (3) pre-positioned emergency Command, J72

29 Common Defense Quarterly ComDef 2011

Washington, DC Conference | National Press Club | September 7th, 2011

A Conference designed to explore the requirements for Joint and Coalition Cooperation.

Who should attend • Government Industrial policy staff • Industry government relations executives • Government international agreements staff • Industry business development executives • Government FMS staff • Industry sales and marketing executives • Government R&D community • Industry merger and acquisition staff • Embassy officials • Aviation and defense financial analysts • Procurement • Think Tanks • R&D • Defense media • Defense Cooperation Attaches • Service Attaches http://www.ideea.com/comdef11/ Talk Softly and wear a hard hat: Defense in the age of terrorism

Force drawdowns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab Spring and continuing economic uncertainty present huge challenges for the incoming US Secretary of Defense. The increasing ability through cyberspace of non State actors to threaten the established order will also be addressed.

• What are the capabilities needed and how can these be afforded? • How do we speed research and development to fielding equipment? What can we learn from our friends and allies? • What technologies can be shared between friends and allies? When and how will the Export Control Reform process make an impact? • and what leadership responsibilities can be left to alliance partners to resolve critical world emergencies.

Program Confirmed speakers are marked with ◄

Co-Moderators: Frank Kenlon, Director, International Negotiations, OUSD (AT&L) ◄ & Gideon Meretz, Director, Defense Cooperation, Embassy of Israel, Washington, DC ◄

Wednesday September 7th, 2011 0800-0830 Welcome: 0830-0900 Keynotes:

• The Hon. Ashton B. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L, Office of the Secretary of Defense ◄ • MGEN Udi B. Shani. Director General, MOD, Israel

0905-1015 Keynote - Affording Defense Capability: Shortening the Development Cycle • Alan R. Shaffer, Principal Deputy Director, Defense R&E, DUSD(S&T) • Dr. Regina Dugan, Director, DARPA

1015-1030 BREAK 1000-1100 Targeted Investments in Critical Technology • Dr. Yeoh Lean Weng, Counselor, Head, Def. Tech. Office (USA), Embassy of Singapore, Washington, DC • Dr. Christoph Ebell, Counselor, Office of Science & Technology, Embassy of Switzerland, Washington, DC ◄ • Col. Nicholas Hué, Defense Cooperation Attache, Embassy of France, Washington, DC ◄ • Dr. Devapriya Dutta, Counselor, Science and Technology, Embassy of India, Washington, DC

1100-1130 Foreign Military Sales Initiatives • VADM, William E. Landay III, USN, Director, DSCA 1130-1145 BREAK 1200-1330 Lunch: Creativity and Enterprise: Drivers for International Defense Cooperation • HE. Dr. Michael B. Oren, Ambassador of Israel to the United States

Introduced by: Hon. Jeffrey P. Bialos, Partner, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP ◄ 1345-1440 1440-1545 Industry Initiatives for Dollar Efficiencies Roundtable

• Lars Bjerde, Executive VP, Head Strategy & Business Development, SAAB North America Inc. ◄ • Susan L. Cote, Corporate VP, Contracts & Pricing, Northrop Grumman Corporation ◄ • Ado A. Machida, VP, Government Relations, BAE Systems, Inc. • MG Dennis Moran, USA (Ret.), Vice President, Government Business Development, Harris Corporation • Steven A. Roser, VP Marketing, Elbit Systems of America Moderator: Remy Nathan, Asst. VP, International Affairs, AIA ◄

1545-1600 BREAK 1600-1700 Progressing Export Controls for Coalition Interoperability

• James Hursch, Director, DTSA ◄ • Beth M. McCormick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade & Regional Security, U.S. Department of State ◄ • Kevin J. Wolf, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration, US Department of Commerce ◄ • Gibson G. LeBoeuf, VP Washington Relations, Raytheon ◄ • Gideon E. Meretz, Director Defense Cooperation, Embassy of Israel, Washington, DC ◄ • Steve Williams, Corporate Director, Europe and Eurasia, Lockheed Martin Corporation ◄

Moderator: Ron Genemans, Attache Defense Cooperation, Embassy of the Netherlands, Washington, DC ◄ Paying for Defense • Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL), Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations

1700-1930 Defense & Service Attache Reception

Venue National Press Club, 13th Floor, (14th and F St., NW), 529 14th St. NW, Washington, DC 20045 (202)662- 7500 Main Click Here ComDef 2011 for Online Washington, DC Registration! September 7th, 2011 | National Press Club

Please reserve the following space: Earlybird Regular Until July 20 After July 20 Per Person INDUSTRY U.S. $495.00 U.S. $695.00 GOVERNMENT (Domestic or International) U.S. $325.00 U.S. $395.00

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vation. 70 percent of the liquid crystal screens in the world are made in Israel. Chips are made in Israel - almost all the major high tech companies have R & D in Israel. We’re hooked in.

CDQ: We at CDQ see similarities in the physical economic, re- ligious and ethnic diversities of Israel, Singapore and Switzer- land. How is Israel different?

MBO: I don’t know enough about the culture and diversity of Switzerland or Singapore - I can only tell you about our cultural diversity – we have Jewish communities who speak 70 different languages, we have 20 per cent of the population which is Arab, significant number of Russian speakers now because we incorporated close to a million Russians and that is about as ethnically diverse as you can get - no other country in the world is as ethnically diverse and yet we adhere as a country, and we cohere as a democracy and there is a sense of national identity and that’s not taken for granted because many countries in the Middle East don’t have strong national identities. They’re cobbled together from various areas - Syria is a good example ……Lebanon is another good example – where they have competing identities. In fact Singapore has a number of ethnic divisions but nothing like 70 and the same as Switzerland the has a number of high ethnic divisions, the French, the Germans, the Italians – and so it is the 70 languages that is remarkable – we have two official languages and two unofficial languages – the two official languages are Ara- CDQ: We are observing the impact of social networks across bic and Hebrew and the unofficial languages are Russian and Eng- the Arab world. How is this phenomenon affecting the young lish - and we are bringing a million Russians into the country of people of Israel? 7.5 million people, that’s a lot - and in entire regions you see signs in Russian – usually road signs are in English - and you see MBO: The social networks have two major impacts on the Arab World and the Middle East in general including Iran, Turkey, and road signs in Arabic, Hebrew and English. it cuts two ways. One is the young people who are educated and western oriented and largely secular use these networks as a way of getting in touch with one another and mobilizing for political purposes, usually for greater freedom and job opportunities. But other groups who are no less significant and perhaps larger, CDQ: All three countries have leadership positions in science, are the extremist groups who also use the social networks to technology, medicine and advanced manufacturing to name a mobilize and to educate, everything from spreading Jihad’s mes- few. How would you explain this? sage as to how to make a bomb and that goes over the internet - and in particular in the United States you have seen how this MBO: There’s a book - It’s called “Start Up Nation” - it’s a whole works with home grown terrorists. So it cuts two ways. Israel book devoted to explaining that – Israel has more start-ups per has more computers per household than any other country in the capita, more scientific patents - more technological patents and world - double - we are the pioneers of the wired family. That, more scientific papers per capita than any other country in the and cell phone use went viral in Israel very early, and so the en- world. We come from a scholastic tradition and we put a premium tire country works on the net - everything. What we call SMS on scholarship. It’s a country that rewards innovation and gives an messages, texting for kids and marketing. Groupon was an early enormous amount of latitude to junior executives. It has a tradi- Israeli innovation and very widespread in Israel. Today you can tion that comes out of the army – most of our population serves in actually find parking spaces in Tel Aviv on line just by using your the army. The Israeli army is not like any other army - no it’s not hand held – you subscribe to a service and it will tell you where like the British army - it’s not spit and polish. You don’t salute and an empty space is and you can pay for your parking space - all you don’t march and it puts an enormous premium on initiative. online. All on your hand held computer. So it’s very advanced It allows an enormous amount of latitude. Israel is a country that and almost all computers utilize Israeli made parts, both hard- because we are isolated regionally we have had to develop indus- ware and software, and they are all developed here - all Israeli tries that are global in nature and we are accustomed to dealing made parts – no computer these days would work without these with uncertainty – something that has dealt a very serious blow systems - everything from intuitive search, when you hit Common to Western countries. We are uncertainty. I’m not sure we would Defense, Common Defense Quarterly comes up as an Israeli inno- be able to deal with certainty.

Common Defense Quarterly 34 Interview

CDQ: Why does the US position on Israel and its relationship with its neighbors differ so very greatly from that of Europe?

MBO: First of all, the America/Israel relationship is multi layered - not all of these layers exist on the Israel/European front. First of all there is a deep spiritual tie between the American people Noam Barkan Photo: and the people of Israel and the land of Israel that goes back to the 17th century, to Puritan times – they studied Hebrew – they loved Hebrew and that’s why they gave their kids Hebrew names and they gave their towns Hebrew names and there was a built-in support for Israel in this country and it is always very high. 8 out of 10 Americans regard Israel as a friendly allied country - and about 67 percent of the American public define themselves as pro Israel and that number is much higher in churchgoers – that group is in the 80s. America is the most religiously observant country of the Western Industrialized countries. If you go to church and you read the bible, the chances are you feel good about Israel. So we have that basis and then we have the democratic connection and democracy is also a form of American religion. American people Israeli Field Hospital after the Haiti earthquake feel very strongly towards a democracy particularly one that’s don’t understand that Israelis have become a nation, that Israel had to struggle in a very undemocratic environment. And finally has a national identity and that was by no means taken for grant- there’s the strategic connection which emerged only after the 67 ed. I think the European countries that are struggling with ethnic war when American policy makers woke up to realize this in a very minorities who don’t want to be part of their nation is an issue. deep way And it is in many areas, it is in intelligence sharing, it’s The fact that there’s an external threat helps the cohesion. joint maneuvers, shared development of defense systems, just about any area of defense you could imagine - the 6th fleet ports CDQ: Can you say something about defense equipment coop- of call in Haifa, American aircraft will land and refuel in Israel, eration between the United States and Israel – challenges and also Israel’s strategic position is unequalled. So what you have opportunities. in the Middle East for example right now where there is so much instability, looking five years down the road, you have one country MBO: As you know, Israel receives nearly 3 billion dollars of assis- that is democratic, stable, and unequivocably pro-American and tance - over 2 billion of these are used for Israeli defense acquisi- that country has military that is larger than the British and French tions in the US – these annual acquisitions support the US defense armies together. That’s an asset –you don’t find assets like that industrial base, whether we’re talking about the Big 5, first tier and it’s also technologically advanced–if you didn’t have Israel as defense giants or smaller local vendors. an ally, you would have to invent it. Try. On the other hand, the Israeli defense industry, which is export CDQ: Israel is by no means the newest member of the United oriented, is making more in-roads into the US market. Companies Nations. What achievements can it point to in its 60 years as like Elbit, Rafael, IAI or IMI, as well as many smaller companies, a modern State? are all supporting the US warfighter. Just to give one example – admittedly an extraordinary one - Plassan – a company based in MBO: Israel’s greatest achievements have been development of a Kibbutz on the Lebanese border, Sasa, has been providing the the Hebrew culture to the language that for 2,000 years hadn’t armor for the MATV’s, and MRAP’ used by the Marines and the been a spoken language – they revived it - and has made it into Army, saving US soldiers lives on a daily basis. We are proud of this a thriving literature, including a Nobel Prize winner in literature kind of assistance, this kind of cooperation. and world class authors and great rock music in Hebrew. Israel created a democracy which I think is really its crowning achieve- CDQ: What are the hurdles you face in cooperation with the ment - it’s not so much that we created a democracy, it’s that we United States? created democracy out of such a diverse population and that we have been able to maintain the democracy in spite of unrelenting MBO: The issues are the sale of American weaponry to Arab coun- pressure. Wars always end democracies It’s very difficult for tries most of whom consider themselves in a state of war with democracies to get through wars - less than half the world’s coun- us. And America has to counterbalance that by maintaining our tries are democracies - Israel is older than more than half those Qualitative military edge. It is a resolution passed by Congress, democracies and Israel is part of a very small group of countries, whereby Israel can defend itself against any Middle eastern ad- the United States, Britain, that have never had an interregna of versaries or combination of adversaries. So the United States non democratic rules. You can’t say that about France, Italy, is now thinking of selling sixty billion dollars worth of arms to Germany –go through the whole thing – Spain – you can’t find it. the Saudis and that has to be counter balanced to enable us It is extremely rare. That’s an amazing accomplishment. We’ve to defend against them – it is always a challenge. There is the created a very advanced economy, member OECD, we have one challenge of the peace process where we don’t always agree - of the highest birth rates in the OECD. Again in the face of ad- we agree on the ends of the peace process but not necessarily versity and isolation. We’ve done this while maintaining one of always the means. Though I think that those disagreements are the world’s most formidable armies and perhaps the greatest ac- very much overplayed in the press. And generally speaking we complishment is that we have forged a nation and I think that this have to defend ourselves against attacks from say Hezbollah or is insufficiently understood in this country - even American Jews 35 Common Defense Quarterly Interview Rafael

Iron Dome is Israel’s newly active missile defense system designed to shoot down rockets and tactical missiles. Hamas and sometimes this involves large scale operations that CDQ: How important to Israel is a final peace settlement with are often wars and we have to be in close contact with the US. its neighbors. There is a pressure on us from the world community – we get a lot of criticism but by and large America stands by us. MBO: It is in Israel ‘s paramount strategic and national interest to achieve a comprehensive peace treaty with all the Middle East including Iran, but beginning with the Palestinians – right now CDQ: What is Israel’s relationship with International Peace- that goal does not seem in sight –the Palestinians are abandoning keeping initiatives? the peace process and declaring the statement unilaterally - they have just made a unity pact with Hamas which is regarded by Is- MBO: Our experience with international peacekeepers has been rael and by the quartet as a terrorist organization so that doesn’t mixed. You have the negative side. In Lebanon you have the move us forward very well. We have lived without a peace for 63 United Nations interim force in Lebanon which has been in place years and it hasn’t been a pleasure but we would like very much since 1978 and received a new mandate after the second war in to achieve peace with our neighbors . A bad peace compromises 2006 and it has proved spectacularly ineffective in carrying out our security and renders us vulnerable and would not be prefer- its mandate stopping Hezbollah from re-arming. Hezbollah now able to the current situation. We’ve had examples of that – we has four times as many rockets in its arsenal as it had in 2006 pulled out of Lebanon in 2000, we pulled out of Gaza in 2005 and it has fortified dozens of villages in Southern Lebanon - all because we felt it would be conducive to peace, but instead, we in violation of the UN resolution. Generally peacekeepers work were being bombarded by thousands of rockets. So its not true when all sides wants them to work - when they are necessary. So that any peace treaty necessarily would enhance our security – it since 1974 you’ve had peacekeepers on the Golan Heights and could be quite the opposite - it could greatly heightens the dan- that border has been quiet. But it has been quiet because the Syr- gers - it has to be genuine and it has to be a peace preferably not ians wanted it to be quiet. You have peacekeepers in Jerusalem, just between governments but between peoples. We don’t have (the UN does not recognize either our peace treaties with Jordan this yet – we have treaties with the Jordanian government - with or with Egypt) so you have UN peace keepers under United Na- the Egyptian government - and I can’t say with all frankness that tions Truce Observatory on both borders that are observing truces we have a peace treaty with the Egyptian people. And that is and armistices from 1948 and 1949. So where they are actually something we have to aspire to. It is a generational quest and not needed they do a great job but where they are desperately I don’t think it’s going to happen overnight. There are those in needed they can’t do a good job and that has been our experience the world community who feel that any peace is acceptable. We and so we are rather sceptical about the efficacy of international cannot consider peace at any price because the price is our lives peace keepers. and our childrens’ lives - we can’t be frivolous with that.

Common Defense Quarterly 36 Programs Interview with Dr. Jennifer E. Stewart

Union and many other countries have human rights legislation that conflicts with the current ITAR approach to deny access to certain individuals based on where they were born. The new rule is designed to address this conflict and, in the process, save time, resources and the burden of unnecessary transactions. Its creation involved changing a paradigm and it wouldn’t have happened without an extraordinary team effort with Administration colleagues - in particular Chuck Shotwell, Director of Defense Trade Policy at State and Brian Nilsson, a Director at NSC and Coordinator of the Export Control Reform Task Force, both of whom promised that the rule would be published as final before I left Washington on May 20, 2011. And it was -with four days to spare.

CDQ: And the greatest disappointments?

JES: It’s hard to think of any real disappointments. I would have liked to have conducted a successful hybrid procurement (combining an FMS alternative with elements of commercial sales, so that the FMS option can be considered in a competitive acquisition process). The closest we came to this was when we acquired four C-17 aircraft through a combination of DCS and FMS, whereby the airframes were purchased commercially and all government-furnished equipment, including engines and in-service support, was acquired through FMS. But that’s not the same thing as having FMS and DCS alternatives going head to head in a standard competitive solicitation.

CDQ: Canada is embarking on major procurements at a time of downturn in most defense budgets elsewhere. What are the key items on the menu?

JES: I would have to refer you to the Canada First Defence Strategy, the government’s detailed road map for modernizing and building the capability of the Canadian Forces. The list of major procurement projects that have been announced (and CDQ: You have been in Washington for many years now, and is published on our National Defence website) addresses the have become something of an institution. It is a challenging equipment and in service support needs of all Services and environment. What successes have given you the greatest military operations on air, land and sea. I have been privi- satisfaction? leged to play a part in the first of these programs out of the gate, such as Strategic Airlift (4 C-17s) and helicopters for Af- JES: The “coming of age” of the international networks – the ghanistan (6 model D Chinooks) and MRAP vehicles and other Foreign Procurement Group and the Defense MOU Attaches lifesaving equipment. On that note, I remember when we de- Group. In the last three or four years, their various presenta- livered the first MRAPs to Afghanistan. We got them via the tions and whitepapers have been factored into a wide number accelerated approval and delivery processes for purchases of initiatives relating to export control reform, a more global related to Operation Enduring Freedom and the day after the approach to defense trade, improvements and transforma- vehicles arrived in theatre, one was hit by an IED. The sol- tions in security cooperation and foreign military sales. The diers walked away unharmed, which would not have happened two groups are being consulted by many of the Administration had they not had the protection of this life-saving equipment. and industry association’s movers and shakers in these areas. Since then this scenario has been repeated countless times. Our C-17s and helicopters have transported tens of thousands And of course the publication of a new ITAR regulation revis- of our military and civilian men and women, who would oth- ing the treatment of dual and third country nationals (Section erwise have had to face the risks of ground transportation in 126.18). This was a significant breakthrough in export control the very dangerous southern region of Afghanistan where our reform for many close US allies. Canada, NATO, the European troops and reconstruction teams are engaged.

37 Common Defense Quarterly Programs

CDQ: Do you believe US industry has a clear appreciation of CDQ: You have been a determined advocate of export con- Canadian technology and capability? trol reform, not only for the US but for the US’s partners and allies. What are the main problems with the current JES: Yes and no. There are some great partnerships between approaches and, in your view, are they being addressed by US and Canadian companies, such as Heroux Devtek and Lock- the President’s Export Control Reform initiative announced heed Martin, but it would be good to have a comprehensive, in the spring of 2010? easily accessible list of the products and capabilities of our industry. Right now this information is scattered among differ- JES: The issues with the current US regime are well docu- ent Canadian departments and Canadian industry associations. mented, including by the two international networks. In a The US and Canadian defense industrial bases are very closely nutshell, the current regime was designed for the Cold War integrated and Canada is a trusted provider and partner (they era and is widely recognized as an obstacle rather than an en- do say that Canadians are only unarmed Americans with health abler of defense cooperation, with negative impacts on both care). But in the security cooperation arena, I think we may the US and its allies, from an economic and national secu- be missing opportunities because we don’t have all the infor- rity perspective. The reform effort aims to “build higher walls mation we need to connect the dots between US needs and around a smaller yard” (Secretary Robert Gates, 20 April 2010 Canadian products and capabilities. address to the Business Executives for National Security). Its end state is four “singles” (sometimes likened to the “one ring to rule them all” from the Lord of the Rings): a single CDQ: You are Chair of the Washington DC Foreign Procure- licensing agency; a single control list a single coordinated en- ment Group and Vice Chair of the Defense MOU Attaches forcement agency and a single IT infrastructure. While achiev- Group. Together these international networks represent a ing these singles will require legislative change, an enormous very large group of Embassies - NATO and NOT - working amount can be done through regulatory changes to the ITAR harmoniously together - quite an achievement in fractious and Export Authorization Act and their control lists. Over the times. Tell us a little bit about these networks and how you last year, the Export Control Reform Task Force have made became involved. impressive progress and we have seen a Presidential Directive creating a nationals coordinated enforcement center, as well JES: The FPG is a network of 33 countries involved in Foreign as revised guidance and proposed rule changes including the Military Sales/Financing and/or who buy commercially from new dual national rule) that go a long way towards realizing US suppliers. The DMAG comprises the 21 countries who have the desired end state. We have been most appreciative of the reciprocal defense procurement MOUs with the Department excellent communication and consultation that we have en- of Defense (basically best efforts to minimize domestic pref- joyed with the Task Force. erence on both sides). As you note, the networks work harmoniously together and offer a well thought-out voice of the CDQ: What will you miss most when you leave DC for Ot- international customer based on their mounting body of white tawa? papers and presentations, which US colleagues have told us has contributed to reform efforts in security cooperation, ex- JES: That’s easy. The wonderful people in the US government, port control reform and defense trade cooperation. industry and other Embassies with whom I have had the pleasure and the privilege of working. I’ll look back with pride and As to how I became involved, it’s a long story. I arrived in satisfaction that I played at least a small part in some large Washington at the end of August 2001 to head up a quiet little and important initiatives that are making huge strides at en- procurement shop, mostly engaged in logistics and training. hancing defense and security cooperation. Then there was September 11 and the most significant ramp- up in our National Defence history, in terms of a long-term CDQ: As a founder Board Member of Common Defense Quar- strategy to build the capability of our forces: the Canada First terly, we hope very much you will be able to remain en- Defence Strategy that I mentioned earlier. As the Defence Pro- gaged in your new capacity. What particular value do you curement Office and I struggled to rise to the challenge, Wer- think the Quarterly offers the international defense coop- ner Kaelin, the Defense Cooperation Attaché from Switzerland eration community? for a record-breaking 22 years, who was currently chairing the FPG and acting as Vice Chair of the DMAG, approached me out JES: Like the ComDef Conferences, the Common Defense of the blue. He said he was planning to retire within the next Quarterly provides for a sophisticated and in-depth airing of year and was highly motivated to find a suitable successor, issues of importance to the US and its allies and partners. It because he believed passionately in the importance of the two brings together all the stakeholders and, while we are some- networks. So I asked, “Why me? I’m not sure that I’m up to times preaching to the choir, more often we are cementing the my own job, never mind taking on the challenge of leading my synergies that lay the foundation for real defense cooperation counterparts in other Embassies.” To which, Werner replied: and advancing the initiatives that I’ve touched on in this in- “It’s all about energy and communication skills. And you have terview today. an abundance of both.” So I agreed on condition that Werner stay on as Past Chair to mentor me in my first year. It’s a great Jennifer Stewart, PH.D. is Director General for Defense Pro- source of pride that he’s always told me that he made the curement at the Canadian Embassy and Chairman of the For- right choice. eign Procurement Group.

Common Defense Quarterly 38 Round the Beltway Key Washington, DC Embassy Groups engaged in International Defense Cooperative Activity

Defense MOU Attaché Group (DMAG) Foreign Procurement Group Members Members Washington DC-based group of countries that partici- 21 countries with bilateral reciprocal defense pro- pate in Security Assistance; meets bi-monthly. Cus- curement agreements with the US. Founded in 1986. tomer focal point on initiatives for Foreign Military “Parent” of the Foreign Procurement Group. Meets Sales; founded Feb 1999 as a result of ‘FMS Reinven- monthly except for August tion’. Also considers other issues related to global defense trade and international materiel cooperation. 1999 –17 members, 2007 –33 members. Australia Argentina Austria Australia Belgium Austria Belgium Canada Brazil Canada Denmark Chile Egypt Denmark Egypt Finland Finland France France Germany Germany Greece Indonesia Greece Israel Italy Israel Japan Italy Korea Netherlands Luxemburg New Zealand Norway Netherlands Pakistan Norway Poland Portugal Portugal Saudi Arabia Singapore Spain Spain Sweden Sweden Switzerland Switzerland Taiwan Turkey Turkey UK United Kingdom Yemen

Chair: Ronald E. Genemans, MA, Defense Cooperation Chair: Dr. Jennifer Stewart, Director General, Attaché, Embassy of the Netherlands Defense Procurement, Embassy of Canada

39 Common Defense Quarterly Round the Beltway Washington DC Embassy Defense Attachés

Embassy of Albania Col Idriz Haxhiaj Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Australia MGen. Tim McOwan Defense Attaché Col. Jeff Quirk Chief of Staff & Asst. Def. Attache Brig. Rod West Military Attache CDRE Stephen Woodall Naval Attache ACDRE Leo Davies Air Attache Embassy of Austria BGen Peter Resch Defense, Military, Naval, Air Attaché Embassy of Argentina MGen Mario Baeza Defense & Air Attaché Col Eduardo Horacio Carlucci Military Attaché RADM Roberto R. Pereyra Bordon Asst.Def.Attache & Naval Attache Embassy of the Republic of Armenia Lt. Col Mesrop Nazaryan Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Kingdom of Bahrain Maj Abdulla Mohamed R. Alkhalifa Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Belgium BGen. (Air) Mike Delobel Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Bolivia Col John Alvarez Defense Attaché Embassy of Brazil Maj Gen Antonio Carlos Egito do Amaral Defense & Air Attaché MGen Joao Cesar Zambao Da Silva Military Attaché RADM Carlos Autran De Oliveira Amaral Naval Attaché Embassy of Canada MGen Douglas W. Langton Defense Attaché Col Mitchel Duhamel Military Attaché & Asst. Defense Attaché Col Scott Howden Air Attaché & Asst. Defense Attaché Capt R. Bergeron Naval Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Chile RADM Marcelo Barbieri Wiedmaier Defense & Naval Attaché Col Maximiliano Larraechea Loeser Air Attaché General Juan Biskupovic Embassy of Colombia MGen Edgar Ceballos Mendoza Defense Attaché Col Emiro Barrios Jimenez Military Attaché CAPT Carlos Eduardo Gil De Los Rios Naval Attaché Col Carlos Eduardo Bueno Vargas Air Attaché Embassy of the Czech Republic BGen Premysl Skacha Defense, Military & Air Attaché Royal Danish Embassy BGen Joergen Jacobsen Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Dominican Republic MGen Andres Apolinar Disla Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Ecuador Commandant Victor Javier Ricaurte Naval Attaché Col Esteban Fernando Benitez Air Attaché Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt MGen Mohamed A. Elkeshky Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of El Salvador BGen Julio Armando Garcia Oliva Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Estonia Col Paul-Indrek Rajamae Volmer Defense, Military & Naval Attaché Embassy of Finland CAPT Jaakko Henrik Savisaari Defense, Military,Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of France MGen Gratien Maire Defense Attaché Col Brice Houdet Military Attaché CAPT Bruno Demeocq Naval Attaché Col Vincent Cousin Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Georgia Major Malkhaz Jamureli Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Federal RADM Karl W. Bollow Defense Attaché Republic of Germany Col Hans Olaf Jessen Deputy Defense & Military Attaché Col Manfred Rudolf Antes Deputy Defense & Air Attaché Commander Ralf Schmit-Raiser Deputy Defense & Naval Attaché Embassy of Greece Col Taxiarchis Sardellis Defense Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Hungary Col Istvan Pasztor Defense, Military & Air Attaché Embassy of India Brigadier Bhupesh Kumar Jain Defense & Military Attaché Commodore Monty Khanna Naval Attaché Air Commodore Jasbir Singh Walia Air Attaché Embassy of Indonesia BGen Abdul Chasib Defense & Military Attaché Col Benny Rijanto Rudy Sewandono Naval Attaché Col Yuyu Sutisna Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Iraq BGen Ali Alaarajy Defense & Military Attaché Staff Col. Mazin Al jaaf Asst.Mil & Def. Attaché Embassy of Israel MGen Benjamin Gantz Defense & Defense Cooperation Attaché Col Nadav Padan Military Attaché CAPT Yoram Laks Naval Attaché BGen Shmaya Avieli Air Attaché & Asst. Military Attaché Embassy of Italy MGen Gabrielle Salvestroni, IT AF Defense Attaché Col (P) Pietro Tornabene, IT A (BGen fr 7/1/11) Military Attaché Capt. Fabrizio Simoncini, IT N Naval Attaché Col Flavio Danielis, IT AF Air Attaché Lt.Col. Giuseppe Battaglia IT Carabinieri Asst. Defense Attache Embassy of Japan MGen Mitsuru Nodomi Defense & Military Attaché Col Yoshinori Ozaki Air Attaché & Asst. Defense Attaché CAPT Hiroshi Egawa Naval Attaché & Asst. Defense Attaché Embassy of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan BGen Ziad Hamdi Atallah Majali Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan Col Assylbek A. Mendygaliyev Defense, Military & Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Kenya Col. Hesbon Malweyi Defense Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Korea BG Kim Kook Hwan Defense Attaché Col Soon Yeong Cha Military Attaché CAPT Yangsun Choi Naval Attaché Col Hoon Kim Air Attaché Embassy of Latvia Col Juris Bezzebovs Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania Col Antanas Jurgaitis Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Malaysia Col Otham Bin Abdullah Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Common Defense Quarterly 40 Round the Beltway

Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania Col Mohamed Znagui Ould Sidahmed Ely Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Mexico BGen Cruz Isaac Munoz Navarro Defense, Military & Air Attaché RADM Victor Francisco Moreno Barrera Naval Attaché Embassy of Mongolia Col Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog Defense, Military Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Montenegro Lt. Col Rajko Pesic Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco Col Jawaharlal Layachi Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Royal Netherlands Embassy Air Commodore Antoine Adriaan Herman De Bok Defense Attaché Col Johan Anton Van Der Louw Military Attaché Col Robert De Rave Air Attaché Col Joseph Christiaan Coumans Naval Attaché Embassy of New Zealand Commodore David Vernon Anson Defense, Naval & Air Attaché Lt. Col Peter Te Aroha Emile Kelly Military Attaché Embassy of Nigeria Group Capt S. Abubakar Dambo Defence, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Lt. Col Aliyu Adanogu Asst. Defense Attaché Royal Norwegian Embassy RADM Trond Grytting Defense Attaché Col Ole Martin Hojem Military & Naval Attaché Embassy of Pakistan BGen Nazir Ahmed Butt Defense & Military Attaché Col Zafar Iqbal Thathal Defense Attaché (Procurement) CAPT Muhammad Fayyaz Gilani Naval Attaché Group CAPT Ahmer Shehzad Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines BGen Antonio I. Supnet Defense & Military Attaché Colonel Eusaquito Poral Manalo Air Attaché & Asst. Defense Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Poland BGen Leszek Soczewica Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Portugal Col Antonio Temporaeo Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the State of Qatar BGen Abdulrahman Ibrahim Al Hemaidi Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Romania BGen Liviu Serban Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Russia MGen Alexander Parshin Defense Attache CAPT Pavel Anatolyevich Belyaev Naval Attaché Col Nikolay Vasilyevich Blednykh Air Attaché Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia BGen Amin M. A. Shaker Defense Attaché Lt. Col. Ahmed Ali Modhei Al Dabeis Military Attaché Comm. Mohammad A. Al Ghanim Naval Attaché Col Ahmed Alqahtani Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Serbia Col Branislav Anocic Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Singapore BGen Siak Kian Cheng Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Slovak Republic Col Jaroslav Gofjar Defense, Military & Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia Col Ladislav Graber Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of South Africa BGen Mogoruti J. Ledwaba Defense & Air Attaché Embassy of Spain RADM Javier Romero Defense Attache Col. Luis A. Boixareu Defense Cooperation Attache Col Miguel Conde Lopez Military Attaché CAPT Javier Nieto Naval Attaché Col Jose Enrique Rodriguez Gonzalez Air Attaché Embassy of Sweden MGen Jan Robert Andreas Andersson Defense Attaché Col Dag Liden Military & Army Attaché Col Ken Tommy Lindberg Air Attaché Col Lars Olof Hilmer Corneliusson Naval Attaché Anders Florenius Counselor for Def. Industry Coop’n. Nils Johansson Sr.Advisor, Def.Ind.Coop’n. Embassy of Switzerland MGen Urban Siegenthaler Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania Col Emmanuel Edward Magangna Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Thailand Col Nothapol Boonngam Defense & Military Attaché CAPT Pichet Tanaset Naval Attaché Group CAPT Surasak Toongtong Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago Lt. Col Anthony W. J. Phillips Spencer Defense & Military Attaché Embassy of Tunisia Col Brahim Ouechtati Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Turkey BGen Murat Yildirim Defense & Air Attaché Col Abdulkerim Unlu Military Attaché CAPT Gurel Kaynak Naval Attaché Embassy of Turkmenistan Lt Col Begench Gundogdyyev Defense & Military Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Uganda Col Leopold Eric Kyanda Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of Ukraine Col Yurri Syvokon Defense Attaché Col Andriy Yakovliev Military Attaché Commander Sergiu Fedorchuk Naval Attaché Lt Col Vadym Maletskyi Air Attaché Embassy of the United Arab Emirates Col Waleed Mohamed Abdulla Alshamsi Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché British Embassy Air Vice-Marshal Michael John Harwood Defense Attaché Brigadier Tim Lai Military Attaché CDRE Eric Fraser, CBE Naval Attaché ACDRE Ken McCann (March 2011) Air Attaché Embassy of Uruguay Gen. Sergio N. D’Oliveira Defense Attaché Col Oscar R. Ospitaletche de Carlos Military Attaché Air Attache Col Julio Cesar Silva Ledesma Alvarez Embassy of the Republic of Venezuela Col Alberto Lovera Air Attache Embassy of Vietnam Col Bien Dien Truong Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Yemen Col Taiseer Saleh Abdullah Saleh Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché Embassy of the Republic of Zambia BGen Jackson Dally Nsofu Defense, Military & Air Attaché

41 Common Defense Quarterly Round the Beltway Foreign Government Buyers in DC of U.S. Defense and Aerospace Equipment

Australia David Marshall Counselor Defence Materiel Michael Garrety Defence Materiel Attaché Wg Cdr Debbie Richardson Director, FMS Malcolm Edwards FMS Policy and Procedures Manager Peter Etherington Director Finance and Business Liaison Mac McCuskey FMS Finance Manager

Austrian Embassy Col Leo Radlingmayer Defense Cooperation Attaché

Argentina Carlos Spinetto FMS Program Director

Embassy of Belgium Lt Col (Army) Luc Simoen Defense Cooperation Attaché Belgian Military Supply Office Sr Capt Philippe Loots Procurement Officer 1Lt. Koen Devos Freight Forwarding Officer Sr Capt Patrick Bielen Finance & Administration Officer

Brazilian Army Commission Colonel Roberto Escoto Chief Luis Baioni Brazilian Naval Commission Cdr Sergio Guida, Head of Purchasing Department Cdr Mauricio Botelho Vivian Carvalho Brazilian Aeronautical Commission Col Rogerio Jose Mendes

Canadian Embassy Col David Erickson Defense Cooperation Attaché Sandi Branker Manager, FMS Procurement Lynda Bolfek Manager, Finance and Systems Dr. Jennifer Stewart Director General, PWGSC- Washington, DC Ian Williamson Senior Contract Officer NAVICP Philadelphia Maj Chris Dann Canadian Liaison Officer

Chilean Air Force Col Juan Hernandez Chilean Air Force Mission Maj Max Carcamo Chief of Acquisitions

Royal Danish Embassy Lt. Col. Per L. Rasmussen Defense Industrial Cooperation Attaché Neils Olsen Asst to the Defense Attaché

Finland Capt. Harri Korhonen Lt Col. Kim Juhala Asst.Def.Mil.Nav. & Air Attache

Embassy of France Col. Nicolas Hue Defense Cooperation Attache Lt.Col. Francis Mathiot Procurement Officer

German Armed Forces Command Alexander Prillwitz FMS Branch Chief

German Liaison Birgit Schulze Office for Defense Materiel Arno Trebbin Head of Economics & Legal Branch

Embassy of Greece Major Christos Hatzinikolis Army Procurement Officer Major Georgios Kondylidis Army Financial Procurement Officer

Embassy of Indonesia Lt Col Anton Santosa FMS Officer

Embassy of Italy Lt Col Giovanni Genzano Assistant Air Attaché Cdr Lorenzo Poliseno Assistant Naval Attaché Lt Col Enrico Rinaldi Assistant Army Attaché

Japan Motohiko Kasai Liaison Official, Equipment Procurement Office

Common Defense Quarterly 42 Round the Beltway

Embassy of Korea Lt Cdr Woosam Joo Transportation Officer MAJ Kim, Kang S. Army Logistics Programs Officer Col Choi, Sun Yup Defense Logistics Attaché MAJ Park, Yong-Suk Kim Seok

Embassy of New Zealand LtCdr, RNZN Paula McKenzie Defense Logistics Officer Terence MacKenzie FMS Business Manager

Royal Netherlands Embassy Ronald E. Genemans Defense Cooperation Attaché/Chief Defense Procurement Cdr. Martin Noordzy FMS Procurement Officer for US Navy equipment/services LtCol Marc Slevens FMS Procurement Officer for US Airforce equipment/services LtCol Rob Wildenberg FMS Procurement Officer for US Army equipment/services LtCol Cor Diepeveen Controller Raymond Bruyn Commercial Buyer Gonnie Hartley Administrative Assistant Marian Blokland Administrative Assistant

Royal Norwegian Embassy Maj Ann-Karin Sondov Assistant Air and Defence Cooperation Attaché

Embassy of Pakistan Col Zafar I. Thathal Attaché Defense Procurement (Army) Capt.M.Abdul Rehman Qureshi Attache Defense Procurement (Navy/Air)

Embassy of the Republic of Poland LCDR Konrad Szymansky Assistant Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché

Embassy of Portugal Col. Antonio Temporaeo Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché da Costa

Embassy of Singapore Gar Yin Hor Head Defence Technology Office Kian Wee Tan

Embassy of Spain Col. Luis A. Boixareu Defense Cooperation Attaché Lt Col Jose R. Velon Assistant Defense Cooperation Attaché Lt Col Javier Echeverria Assistant Defense Cooperation Attache First Sgt. Juan P. Corregidor FMS Office Assistant

Embassy of Sweden Anders Florenius Counselor for Def. Industry Coop’n. Nils Johansson Sr.Advisor, Def.Ind.Coop’n. Bjorn Uggla Counselor for Defense Procurement

Embassy of Switzerland Hubert Steinhauser Counselor, Defense Procurement

Embassy of Turkey LCDR Atalay Ucar Naval Supply Attaché

Taipei Economic Capt. Alex Chen Chief, FMS Section and Cultural Representative Office Lt Col Fisher Huang Armaments Attaché Lt Col Yi-Chien Tsou Staff

UK Defense Procurement Office David Grace Head FMS & Finance Willie MacMillan FMS Case Manager George Spencer Attaché Defense Equipment (Legal)

British Defence Staff Washington Martin Neill Counsellor Defence Acquisition and Technology Julia Filer First Secretary Defence Acquisition Policy & Trade George Spencer Attaché Defence Equipment (Legal) Stephen Woodger First Secretary Defence Equipment (Commercial)

43 Common Defense Quarterly Round the Beltway OUSD (AT&L) International Cooperation

Common Defense Quarterly Workshop Wednesday, June 29th, 2011 | British Embassy, Washington, DC

Future of Industrial Cooperation

1345 – 1400 Welcome – SDSR and UK-US Treaty . Martin Neill, Counsellor Def. Acquisition & Tech., British Embassy (Confirmed)

1400 – 1430 Keynote: . Brett Lambert, Director, Industrial Policy, OUSD, AT&L (Confirmed)

1430 – 1540 Future Defense Industry Landscape – Implications for Defense Budgets and Innovation . Dr. Robbin Laird, President, ICSA, LLC (Confirmed) . Pierre Chao, Managing Partner, Renaissance Strategic Advisors (Confirmed)

Moderator: Vago Muradian, Editor, Defense News (Confirmed)

1540 – 1600 BREAK

1600 – 1700 Security in the Global Supply Chain . John Erb, President, SOLE – The International Society of Logistics (Confirmed) . A.R. “Trey” Hodgkins, III, CAE, Sr. VP for National Security & Procurement Policy, TechAmerica (Confirmed) . Ian Bryant, Information Assurance (IA) Advisor, Ministry of Defence, UK (Confirmed) Moderator: Don Davidson, Chief Outreach and Standardization (CNCI-SCRM), Trusted Mission Systems & Networks (TMSN), OASD(NII) / DoD- CIO (Confirmed)

1700 – 1730 Government/Industry Cooperation Discussion . Will Jessett, CBE, Minister, Defence Materiel, British Embassy (Confirmed)

1730 – 1800 Technology Innovation for Industry Programs . Benjamin L. Cassidy, International Operations & Policy, Government Operations, The Boeing Company (Confirmed) . RADM Terrence McKnight, USN (Ret.), Senior Director, Government Relations, Cobham (Confirmed)

Moderator: Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, President, SDB Partners & Editorial Advisory Board, Common Defense Quarterly (Confirmed)

1800 – 1930 Reception

http://www.ideea.com/FICworkshop/ Trusted Partner

Every day, Raytheon customers undertake vital missions across air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. Our mission is to provide innovative, integrated technologies across these domains to ensure customer success. Raytheon delivers proven and powerful solutions in four core markets — Sensing, Effects, C3I and Mission Support — that bring our Mission Assurance promise of NoDoubt™ performance to new levels. Our expertise means customers can trust Raytheon to deliver a true operational advantage, mission after mission. www.raytheon.com