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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Moral Agency in the Context of Social Sin: The Perspectives of the Latin American Bishops (CELAM) and John Paul II A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Theology and Religious Studies Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy By John A. Barba Washington, D.C. 2011 Moral Agency in the Context of Social Sin: The Perspectives of the Latin American Bishops (CELAM) and John Paul II John A. Barba, Ph.D. Director: William A. Barbieri, Ph.D. One of the seminal developments in Roman Catholic theology since the Second Vatican Council has been an expanding comprehension of the reality of social sin. The bishops of Latin America identified the systemic poverty around them as a “situation of sin” and called for a “preferential option for the poor” as necessary for both personal and ecclesial conversion. The teachings of John Paul II took cognizance of the “new” reality of social sin while still preserving a sense of individual moral agency. The issue of how best to comprehend moral agency in the context of social sin has persisted, however: the matters of accountability for the perpetuation of social sin and moral responsibility for rectifying the structural manifestations of sin have been difficult to resolve. The dissertation begins with a historical review of some of the core principles and theological suppositions regarding sin and moral agency as articulated in the Catholic theological tradition. Two key sets of post-Vatican II sources are investigated in detail: synodal documents of the Latin American bishops (produced at the conclusion of the CELAM conferences at Medellín in 1968 and at Puebla in 1979), and selected writings from the teaching of Pope John Paul II (most especially the texts, Reconciliatio et paenitentia, Sollicitudo rei socialis, and Ut unum sint). A heuristic framework comprising five questions is established then to reveal how the various texts do in fact explicate moral agency and ethical responsibility in relation to the broad dynamic of social sin. The magisterial documents are examined in detail in terms of their response to each of the five questions posed. A synthesis addressing comparability is constructed: in what respects the documents concur with one another, where their positions diverge, and the degree to which the texts are themselves internally consistent in relation to the five heuristic questions. In light of that synthesis, the dissertation concludes with a short chapter highlighting some additional areas of theological reflection related to the topic of sin which may be of use in future efforts to provide a coherent Catholic accounting of ethical demands in relation to social sin. This dissertation by John A. Barba fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in Theology and Religious Studies, approved by William A. Barbieri, Ph.D. as Director, and by William Loewe, Ph.D., and Cynthia Crysdale, Ph.D., as Readers. _______________________________ William A. Barbieri, Ph.D., Director _______________________________ William Loewe, Ph.D., Reader _______________________________ Cynthia Crysdale, Ph.D., Reader ii To Margell iii The poor man is devoured by the pride of the wicked: he is caught in the schemes that others have made. Psalm 10:2 iv CONTENTS ABSTRACT . i INTRODUCTION . 1 CHAPTER ONE: SIN . 9 CHAPTER TWO: MORAL AGENCY . 71 CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS . 127 CHAPTER FOUR: SYNTHESIS . 218 CHAPTER FIVE: REFLECTIONS . 278 APPENDIX: The Original Spanish Version of Texts Quoted in the Dissertation . 308 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 332 v INTRODUCTION Although some observers, perhaps out of despair over the modern world, might claim that people today seem to have lost all sense of sin, it would perhaps be more accurate to state that commonly accepted ways of thinking and talking about sin have changed considerably over time—in step with evolving conceptualizations of ourselves as moral agents—but that the core understanding of what constitutes sin has actually remained quite consistent.1 To make such an assertion is not to suggest that sin is easily reducible to just one thing, or that its many and full dimensions are easily apprehended; indeed, the idea of sin is complex and historically multivalent in meaning.2 Whichever meaning one chooses to highlight in appraising the nature of sin, the prevalence of its occurrence in human history would appear undeniable. 1Such is the contention of Seán Fagan, S.M. (though he concedes that the notion of sin in the world at large has been “trivialized” to some extent); see his provocatively titled book, Has Sin Changed? (Dublin, Ireland: Gill and Macmillan Ltd., 1978). See also David H. Kelsey, “Whatever Happened to the Doctrine of Sin?” in Theology Today 50 (July 1993), 169-78. 2James Gaffney provides a useful survey of the several terms used to delineate sin in the Bible, highlighting the complexity of the ideas expressed. The various words used in Hebrew for sin are metaphorical, each offering a slightly different aspect of the idea. (1) he??t’ (hattah) refers first to missing the mark or failing to achieve a goal (Jgs 20:16); the term is then used by analogy to describe a failure of duty or obligation—either human or divine (1 Sm 2:25). [The New Testament word, hamartía (:"DJ\"), is a military shooting term and also refers first to a physical “missing” of the mark; it is then extended metaphorically to imply moral irresponsibility.] (2)%~wôn is the second most frequently found term, and is used theologically to describe “crookedness” (in contrast to uprightness or straightness); the implication is not just errant behavior, but perverted character, an inner distortion of what is right before God (as in iniquities, from Ps 38:4). (3) p~ša refers more narrowly to breaking a contract or treaty and the bonds of relationship implicit therein (2 Kgs 8:20, 22); by extension the term refers to violation of the covenant between God and Israel. See James Gaffney, Sin Reconsidered (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1983), 15-21. 1 2 Another feature of the notion of sin that seems ineluctable is the complex relationship between sin-as-action and the sinner-as-actor. Sin may be an abstract term, but it is not just an abstraction: sin binds to the human agent who effectuates it in such a profound way that, at the core, the person can scarcely be separated from her or his actions. Despite the pious admonition that one should “hate the sin and not the sinner,” the two are simply not easily separated. In fact, this intertwining of sin and agent has remained a constant in theological discourse throughout the ages—and is still a topic current today, as this dissertation will demonstrate. We learn early on in the Bible that humankind (actually as a consequence of the Fall), is endowed with the divine attribute of “knowing what is good and what is bad” (Gn 3:22).3 There can be, then, no escaping the moral responsibility to use our human capacity of reason4 to come to know what is pleasing to God—and what is not. What we do with this knowledge, however, especially in the assumed context of God’s free offer of grace and 3All biblical quotations are taken from The New American Bible (South Bend, IN: Greenlawn Press, 1991). 4The use of reason in the context of moral decision-making has been a staple of the Catholic theological tradition since its inception. It was also a particular interest of the German Jewess and twentieth-century moral philosopher Hannah Arendt who was careful to differentiate thinking from knowing. Though not trained formally as a theologian, Arendt was familiar with both Christian theology and modern European philosophy from the Enlightenment forward. Freely ascribing precedence in the idea to Immanuel Kant, Arendt distinguishes thinking—an interior dialogue with the “self” that accounts for the function of reason and leads to understanding and judgment-making—from intellect, a cognitive extension to the world outside of the self that produces knowledge (scientia) and provides the basis for action. See Hannah Arendt, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” in Responsibility and Judgment, edited and with an introduction by Jerome Kahn (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 2003), 163-66. These particular concepts, as well as her overall contribution to the understanding of ethical action in relation to moral responsibility, will be more fully expounded later in the dissertation. 3 humankind’s capacity to be “hearers of the word” (Rahner), is what constitutes the checkered history of humanity’s reception of the love of God. The human striving recorded in the pageant of biblical history has provided the basis for centuries of theological reflection on just what it means for human beings to sin and what the implication is for each one of us individually when we stumble in our fidelity to God. The human motivations for sin appear to be as varied as the number and kinds of sins on display in the section of the Hebrew Bible referred to as Primeval History (Gn 2-11), a virtual catalogue of individual and corporate sinning. This earliest biblical account of the human story moves inexorably through the Fall of Adam, the sin of Cain, the Great Flood, and ends with the Tower of Babel. The disobedience in the Garden of Eden causes both alienation from God and disorder in the world, the latter exemplified most dramatically, perhaps, by the confusion of languages which thwarts the building of the Tower of Babel and results in the scattering of humanity. And so it is that these deeds of our earliest ancestors, these primal sins, become the first recorded disclosures of the human “mystery of sin.” Arguably though, these woeful actions are comprehended most readily as sinful not just as actions in and of themselves, but because they constitute a rupture of relationship between a people and their God.

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