Issue 13 2nd Issue 2016 ISSN: 2242-440X nmiotc Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal

TRAINING CENTRE TRAINING NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONAL MARITIME INTERDICTION NATO

1 NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre

8th NMIOTC ANNUAL Conference

The development of maritime security operations as the instrument to cope with the current security challenges and to counter the evolving threats at sea.

06 - 08 JUNE 2017

Attribution Statement

For the paper titled “An Analysis of the Types, Threats and Security Measures of Offshore Drilling Facilities”, published in issue 10 (summer 2015, pages 6-12) of the NMIOTC Jour- nal, due and proper attribution is owed to a significant degree, to Dr Mikhail Kashubsky, Senior Lecturer to the Centre for Customs & Excise Studies, Charles Sturt University, Australia, and his valuable articles on “Protecting Offshore Oil and Gas Installations: Security Threats and Countervailing Mea- sures” (Part I & II), published originally in Journal of Energy Security on August and December 2013 respectively. The author as a well as the director and editors of the NMIOTC Journal would like to express their sincere apologies for the abovementioned lack of proper attribution to the important work of Dr Kashubsky . 2 C O N T E N T S nmiotc COMMANDANT'S EDITORIAL MARITIME INTERDICTION Editorial by Georgios Tsogkas OPERATIONS 04 Commodore GRC (N) JOURNAL Commadant NMIOTC

ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE AND SECURITY Director Commodore G. Tsogkas GRC (N) Chines Hybrid Warfare and its Implications for Maritime Security Commandant NMIOTC 06 by Dr Alessio Patalano

Political Implications of Cyber Space on State Power Executive Director 15 by Elena (Helene) Mandalenakis Captain C. Campana ITA (N) Director of Training Support Considerations on the Mediterranean Migration Crisis 25 by Corrado Campana Captain ITA (N) Editor Lt Commander G. Tzevelekis GRC (N) Transformation Section

OPERATIONAL ISSUES Layout Production Islamic State. A Maritime Threat to Europe? CPO E. Miskou GRC (N) 28 by Michael J. Edey and Journal Assistant Editor Lewis Batch

LEGAL ISSUES

Four Hubs of Maritime insecurity off Africa: 35 From Anti-Piracy to Anti-Crime? by Francois Vrey and Henri Fouche The views expressed in this issue reflect the opinions of the authors, and do not nec- essarily represent NMIOTC's or NATO’s official positions. HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS All content is subject to Greek 48 VIP visitors to NMIOTC Copyright Legislation. Pictures used from the web are not subject to copyright restrictions. NMIOTC TRAINING You may send your comments to: [email protected] 53 Photos from NMIOTC Training Activities

3 NMIOTC Commandant’s Editorial

Last summer at the Warsaw Summit, engage in operational training to pre- involved in both strategic directions, the heads of State and Governments pare the maritime forces prior to their in the broader effort to accomplish all took serious decision aiming at adapt- deployment, their evaluation as [NATO three core tasks and project stability ing the Alliance in a way to enable the Response Force (NRF) - Immediate as well. Allies collectively to be better prepared Response Force Maritime, IRF(M)], for the future in terms of the encoun- Standing Maritime Groups under their Emerging security challenges, such tering the existing threats and coping provisional talking and support ongo- as Critical Infrastructure Protection, with the emerging challenges. ing operations. Secondly to substan- Countering Proliferation of Weapons tially outreach to our partners by pro- of Mass destruction, C-IED in the Among the key decisions the following viding means and capabilities to train Maritime domain, illicit activities and have significant impact to the maritime them so to better prepare in achieving organized crime at sea, interdiction environment but to the geopolitical standardization and enhancing in- at range and cyber defense in the area of NMIOTC’s interest, expertise teroperability. maritime domain have been timely and its potential for improvement. identified and are tackled in acom- The importance of carefully balance prehensive manner by both NMIOTC’s Training being also the most demand- between East and South sets a seri- Education and Training and Transfor- ing Secretary General’s (SG’s) prior- ous burden at NMIOTC for a simple mation departments. Having said that ity shortfall area, in particular in the reason; it is laid at the Southeast side and referring to this journal, I wish to maritime operational environment, is of the Alliance’s footprint and its com- draw your attention to the fact that it considered thus it is used as such, mitment is to dedicate its capacity and presents articles focused on current the self power in two folds: Firstly to potential to provide training to those and future challenges to maritime se-

4 curity. In particular; Power” where she articulates political nally Mr Michael J Edey, and Mr Lewis implications of cyber space on state Batch from Dryad Maritime Limited, at In the lead article, Dr Alessio Patalano power and the interrelations with mari- their paper examine the current try to Senior Lecturer (Associate Profes- time power and cyber power. Captain answer whether the terrorist group has sor) at Department of War Studies, Corrado Campana ITA(N) at his article the intent and the capability to launch King’s College London, on his paper presents some considerations on the and carry out a successful attack on “A Paradigm Shift? Chinese Hybrid Mediterranean migration crisis. shipping transiting the Mediterranean. Warfare and its Implications for Mari- time Security” draws upon the cur- The remaining part of the Journal As a conclusion, taking this opportuni- rent security tensions in the East and deals with legal issues and the ISIS ty, I would like to announce with great South China Seas (or China Seas) to threat within maritime environment. pleasure, the 8th Annual NMIOTC investigate the tactical challenges and Professors Francois Vreÿ and Henri Conference which will be held at our the conceptual implications of Chinese Fouché from Security Institute for premises (Souda Bay – Crete) from hybrid warfare at sea. A different but Governance and Leadership in Africa 6th to 8th June 2017, with theme “The not separate aspect in maritime envi- (SIGLA) of Stellenbosch University, development of maritime security op- ronment is approached by Dr. Elena present arguments in their paper in erations as the instrument to cope with (Helene) Mandalenakis (University of order to accentuate the importance the current security challenges and to Peloponnese) on her paper “Political of maritime crimes other than piracy counter the evolving threats at sea”. Implications of Cyber Space on State off four African maritime regions. Fi-

Georgios Tsogkas Commodore GRC (N) Commadant NMIOTC

5 MARITIME SECURITY

A ‘Paradigm Shift’?

Chinese Hybrid Warfare and its Implications for Maritime Security

Dr Alessio Patalano Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) Department of War Studies, King’s College London [email protected]

1. Introduction is no longer uncontested. Russia and Chinese activities in the maritime do- China are developing a wide range of main, however, are remarkable be- As highlighted in A Design for Main- advanced capabilities to implement an cause they stretch far beyond peer taining Maritime Supremacy, for the anti-access area denial strategy within competition in high-end warfare, within first time in a quarter of a century the their immediate periphery, and to proj- the spectrum of what Ken Booth de- United States navy faces the return of ect national power and ambitions be- fined as a navy’s ‘military roles’. At peer competition. Today sea control yond these confines.1 sea, China is engaged in coercion

1 Admiral John M. Richardson, US Navy, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Supremacy (Washington, DC, 2016), 3.

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and competition ‘below the tradition- metric war in which the quest for sea gional disputes, it has in some cases al thresholds of high-end conflict’.2 control is often contrasted by attempts broader strategic implications beyond Within this context, military planners of sea denial, and access strategies the realm of constabulary functions in Beijing have developed a range of are faced by anti-access responses.6 generally connected to maritime secu- capabilities that are ‘hybrid’ both in However, within the context of ‘con- rity. The control of key island features– composition and in the way they are stabulary roles’, the paper argues that especially in the South China Sea employed. They combine military, Chinese hybrid warfare is challenging – would in fact allow the Chinese mili- paramilitary and militia forces; they are our understanding of maritime securi- tary to project power across the China deployed to pursue national objectives ty. Indeed, the paper suggests that this Seas, de facto using the pursuit of by exploiting the grey areas of interna- challenges is bringing a paradigm shift maritime rights to potentially affect the tional law.3 in two significant ways. First, Chinese freedom of navigation and over flight This paper draws upon the current se- hybrid warfare seeks to exploit the along international sea-lanes linking curity tensions in the East and South grey areas and diverse interpretations East Asia to the rest of the word. China Seas (or China Seas) to inves- of the United Nations Convention on tigate the tactical challenges and the the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to legiti- 2. Maritime Security and Peer conceptual implications of Chinese hy- mise activities aimed at asserting the Competition: Preliminary brid warfare at sea. The paper builds control of disputed features and mari- Considerations upon, but departs from, the existing lit- time boundaries. Second, Chinese erature focusing on the ‘three warfares’ hybrid warfare employs enhanced 2.1 Maritime Security: The Quest for – the Chinese coordinated approach law-enforcement capabilities as well Cooperative Action to media, legal, and psychological as militia forces, seemingly operating warfare – to offer a specific reflection in defence of inherent maritime rights, Before explaining how Chinese hybrid on the impact of Chinese behaviour at to coerce other claimants whilst intimi- warfare is challenging our understand- sea on maritime security and strategic dating responses from other actors. ing of maritime security it is important thinking.4 There are two key ques- Within this paradigm shift, the paper to preliminarily discuss how the con- tions addressed in this paper: Is there further postulates that there are three cept of maritime security has recently anything unique about Chinese hybrid main implications for maritime security. evolved. In the mid-2000s, British warfare at sea that relates to maritime First, maritime security is an increas- scholar Geoffrey Till was among the security? If so, how is this contributing ingly competitive affair. Second, core first authors to systematically assess to change our understanding of it? actors like coast guards are being mili- how, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Irregular warfare at sea is nothing tarised to assert national power rather globalisation was affecting the way in new.5 The history of naval combat than foster cooperation. Thirdly, whilst which navies worldwide were reconfig- is, in many ways, a history of asym- Chinese hybrid warfare focuses on re- uring their structures and capabilities.7

2 Ibid.. 3 The concept of ‘hybrid’ or ‘asymmetric’ warfare remains hotly debated. For a standard overview of its manifestation throughout history, cf. Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 4 Major studies on the topic include Dean Cheng, ‘Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare’, The Heritage Foundation, 18 May 2012; Stefan Halper, China: Three Warfares (Washington, DC: Office of Net Assessment, 2013); Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, The People’s Liberation Army General Political Department: Political Warfare with Chinese Characteristics (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2013); Michael Raska, ‘China and the “Three Warfares”’, The Diplomat, 18 December 2015. 5 Well explained in Lt Cdr. Benjamin Armstrong, US Navy, ‘The Most Daring Act of the Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare’, Naval War Col- lege Review, Vol. 63, 2010:4, 106-118; and. Naval History and Heritage Command, Irregular Warfare Special Study, (Washington, D.C., 2006). 6 On the evolution of maritime warfare and strategy, see Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chapters 8-10. 7 A first collective attempt to assess the links between globalisation and maritime affairs is Sam J. Tangredi (ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2002).

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In particular, his observations pointed inately maritime mission, appropriately economies. It is no coincidence that towards a trend whereby some navies resourced and enabled maritime forc- this point is affirmed both in the Japan- – including leading European maritime es have critical roles to fulfil, defending US Security Treaty of 1960 and the forces - were heading towards a ‘post- and promoting the collective interests North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, sharing modern’ configuration, one in which of the Alliance across a spectrum of similar views in relation ‘to the promo- military roles as defined in Cold War defence and security challenges’.10 tion of free institutions, economic col- missions – sea control and power pro- On the other hand, the lack of naval laboration and political cooperation’.13 jection in a military contested space competitors challenging sea control In 2007, the US navy-sponsored - would receive less emphasis. Their corresponded to an increased need for ‘Thousand Ship Navy’ concept be- capabilities were being optimised to cooperation to defend the international came one of the clearest and most in- work together with others to deal with trading system from non-state actors- clusive articulations of the cooperative missions that focused on maintaining sponsored disruptions, stretching from spirit aimed at tackling transnational sea control, fostering governance, and terrorism to piracy. Such a need de- issues affecting the stability of the allowing for the projection of power pended from the growing centrality of maritime order. At heart, the Thousand in crises.8 This model, Till argued, maritime communications to the global Ship Navy embraced a view that no stood in contrast with the more ‘mod- economy and the coming into force of single state actor can afford to main- ern’ model of development, one that the United Convention on the Law of tain maritime governance alone. This pitched military roles as centred on the Sea (UNCLOS). should be a cooperative effort, which competing over sea control. Within The result was a broad awareness to- for the US navy meant working in co- this model, deterrence and war fight- wards the diverse issues to maritime operation with its network of allies and ing were regarded as core missions.9 governance and security prompting partners.14 A year later, the interna- For Till, the paradigm shift in maritime state actors into cooperative forms of tional coalition that started operating missions away from the struggle for action.11 Indeed, maintaining ‘good off the Somali coast to fight piracy command of the seas towards con- order at sea’ to prevent disruptions became the most significant case in certed efforts to maintain order and to shipping and managing ‘exclusive point of the practical value of such an stability was determined by two fac- economic zones’ (EEZs) have become approach. tors. On the one hand, sea control was endeavours common to maritime forc- regarded as firmly in the hands of the es worldwide. Navies came quickly to 2.2 Peer Competition: Beyond Power United States and its allies. It is inter- perform these types of missions alone Politics? esting to note, for example, that by the and, frequently, together with others, time NATO’s maritime strategy was within national maritime boundaries Till’s reflections on the relationship published, its content took sea con- and beyond.12 Implicit in this devel- linking security priorities to naval de- trol as an established precondition for opment was a shared understanding velopments and maritime cooperation the alliance maritime operations. The within the community of western lib- well captured the debate of the time, strategy in fact underlined that ‘(w) eral democracies as well as in close informing the way in which in the US, hether in support of Alliance joint op- US partners like Japan about the link NATO, and non-NATO US allies mari- erations, or when leading in a predom- between democratic values and liberal time security came to be understood.

8 Geoffrey Till, ‘Maritime Strategy in a Globalised World’, Orbis, Vol. 51, 2007:4, 571-572. 9 Ibid., 573-574. 10 NATO, Alliance Maritime Strategy, Brussels, 18 March 2011. 11 Ibid., 151-152. 12 For a definition of ‘Good Order at Sea’, cf. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2004), 333-350. 13 Masashi Nishihara, ‘Can Japan be a Global Partner for NATO?’, in Ronald D. Asmus (ed.), NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside (Riga Papers, Riga, Latvia: Nov. 2006), 35. 14 Cf. Admiral Michael Mullen, US Navy, ‘A Global Network for a Free and Secure Maritime Commons’, Report on the Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2006), 3-8.

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Today, the cooperative drive emerged In the Asia-Pacific, there are similar seas protection’ in addition to the well- a decade ago is in part challenged by changes taking place – if anything, known ‘offshore waters defence’.20 the return of peer competition at sea at an even faster pace. It is perhaps Indeed, practice seems to be support- aimed at redefining power balance worth underlining that China is the pro- ing these stated ambitions. Chinese and international influence. In the Eu- pelling engine of the military moderni- submarines and surface assets have ropean context, defence planners in sation and expansion of capabilities in increased their exercises, stepped- NATO and in some of its core state a region that has surpassed Europe in up their shadowing activities vis-à- members have observed a decisive defence spending in 2012, with a gap vis American surface groups, and increase in Russian military activities, that continues to widen.17 In 2011, for- increased maritime intimidation of with missiles fired from the Caspian mer President Hu Jintao stressed that China’s neighbours, raising the pro- and the Mediterranean Seas into Syria The People’s Liberation Army Navy file of coercion and deterrence in the and submarine activities in the North (PLAN) had to speed up ‘its transfor- East and South China Seas.21 Within Atlantic surging to unprecedented lev- mation and modernisation in a sturdy this context, the most provocative ac- els in the post-Cold War era.15 Rus- way, and make extended preparations tion occurred in January 2013, when sian motivations seem pre-eminently for warfare in order to make greater a Chinese warship reportedly locked to be rooted in a quest for power and contributions to safeguard national its weapons-guiding radar on a Japa- status with the aim to re-establish security’.18 Premier Xi Jinping further nese destroyer.22 Further, Chinese spheres of influence in the Baltic and articulated this idea by outlining his vi- military authorities have substantially in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea re- sion of a ‘true maritime power’, on with increased their military footprint across gions. Russia’s new maritime doctrine, a neo-Mahanian styled fleet with the the confines of the South China Sea. for example, would suggest as much task to protect and expand overseas The recent deployment of missile bat- in its attention to stress the importance interests.19 teries and the development of long of the Artic regions as the country aims Such a notion seems to be now em- airstrips on artificially created islands to give sanctuary to its submarine fleet bedded in the official national strategy – the so-called New Spratly Islands in the Barents Sea.16 that emphasises increasingly ‘open – are ‘changing the operational land-

15 ‘Russia Hits Targets in Syria from Mediterranean Submarine’, BBC News, 8 December 2015; Nicholas de Larrinaga, ‘Russian Submarine Activity Topping Cold War Levels’, HIS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 02 February 2016; A. Larsen, Tome to Face Reality: Priorities for NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit (NATO Research Paper, No. 126, Rome: January 2016), 7-8. 16 For a brief discussion on the nature of Russian maritime ambitions, see A. Larsen, Tome to Face Reality: Priorities for NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit (NATO Research Paper, No. 126, Rome: January 2016), 10; also, Judy Dempsey, Why Defense Matters: A New Narrative for NATO (Brus- sels: Carnegie Europe, 2014), 25. 17 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2013 (Abingdon, OX: Routledge for IISS, 2013), 41; David Tweed, ‘China Tensions Fuel Acceleration in Military Spending in Asia’, Bloomberg, 22 February 2016. 18 Quoted in ‘Hu Jintao tells China navy: Prepare for warfare’, BBC News, 07 December 2011. 19 Sukjoon Yoon, ‘Implications of Xi Jinping’s “True Maritime Power”: Its Context, Significance and Impact on the Region’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 68, 2015:3, 40-63; Sukjoon Yoon, ‘Xi Jiping’s “True Maritime Power” and ESCS Issues’, Chinese Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, 2014:4, 887-889; ‘China Firm in Its Resolve to Build Sea Power’, People’s Daily Online, 27 August 2014. 20 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Military Strategy’, China Daily, 26 May 2015. For a brief analysis of the document, cf. Caitlin Campbell, ‘Highlights from China’s New Defense White Paper, “China’s Military Strategy”’, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Issue Brief, 01 June 2015. 21 Alastair Wanklyn, ‘Chinese Sub Targeted U.S. Carrier, Report Says’, The Japan Times, 16 December 2015; Helene Cooper, ‘Patrolling Disputed Waters, U.S. and China Jockey for Dominance’, The New York Times, 30 March 2016. Ryan D. Martinson, ‘Deciphering China’s Armed Intrusion Near the Senkaku Islands’, The Diplomat, 11 January 2016; John Chen and Bonny Glaser, ‘What China’s “Militarization” of the South China Sea Would Actually Look Like’, The Diplomat, 05 November 2015. Also, Alessio Patalano, ‘Sea Power, Maritime Disputes, and the Evolving Security in the East and South China Seas’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 158:6, 48-57. 22 Author’s interview with senior Japanese naval official, Tokyo April 2013.

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scape’ of this maritime theatre.23 as well as the exact boundaries of the period 2012-2014.26 In relation to the In these maritime theatres, however, 9-dashed line, but its claims seem in- boundary dispute, Japan has thus far Chinese behaviour and actions are consistent with its obligations under proposed the application of the equi- not merely motivated by competition UNCLOS. This ambiguity, combined distant approach, whilst China insists for regional hegemony. China has a with the development of military ca- for the use of the principle of the pro- number of outstanding maritime dis- pable outposts in the Spratly islands, longation of the continental shelf, ar- putes – encompassing both boundary leave freedom of navigation – includ- guing that in the East China Sea would delimitations and the sovereignty of ing the conduct of lawful peacetime entitle China an area extending up to island features – which are informing military activities - and the safe move- the Okinawa Trough.27 its activities. ment of shipping in most of the South Taken altogether, therefore, the expe- In the South China Sea, Chinese au- China Sea at the discretion of Chinese rience in the China Seas suggests that thorities are employing military capa- political will. 25 competitive types of behaviours are bilities, law-enforcement agencies, In the East China Sea too, Chinese ac- not merely caused by power struggle as well as fishing militias to harass tivities can only in part be explained by for control of the seas and is not lim- competing claimants and impose strategic competition with the United ited to the realm of high-end warfare. its maritime territorial and sovereign States and its closest regional ally, The assertive pursuit of territorial and claims over more than 80% of the Japan. There are, in fact, two different maritime claims strongly suggests that South China Sea. The claimed area, types of disputes between Japan and competitive behaviour applies to the which encompasses island features China. One concerns the sovereignty realm of constabulary functions too. of the Spratly and Paracel groups, is over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; This means that the implementation delimitated by a so-called ‘9-dashed the other concerns the demarcation of core maritime security missions – line’. Statements from senior Chinese of their maritime borders and EEZ as law-enforcement activities to manage officials, as much as the behaviour of defined by UNCLOS. Unsurprisingly, EEZs or prevent illegal acts in territorial fishing militias and law-enforcement the question of the sovereignty of the waters – is not regarded as an oppor- agencies point to a view to regard it as islands is the core-dividing factor in tunity for cooperation; rather, maritime ‘Chinese jurisdiction’, if not territory.24 Sino-Japanese maritime interactions security operations are an assertion of China has yet to fully clarify this point and escalation of tensions during the national rights that are carried out with

23 Admiral Harry Harris, US navy, quoted in David Brunnstrom and Arshad Mohammed, ‘China Gearing Up for East Asia Dominance: U.S. Com- mander’, Reuters, 23 February 2016. The Admiral’s comments were offered in the context of a ‘Statement’ given on 23 February 2016 before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Structure. For a broader assessment of the ‘New Spratly Islands’, cf. James E. Fannell, ‘The “New Spratly Islands”: China’s Words and Actions in the South China Sea’, Military Power Review, 2016:1, 27-38. 24 Adam Rose and David Brunnstrom, ‘China Warns U.S. It Will Not Allow Violations of Its Waters’, Reuters, 09 October 2015,; Laura Zhou, ‘China’s Military is Prepared “to Defend Sovereignty” in South China Sea: Military Chief’, South China Morning Post, 28 February 2016; Xu Wei, ‘South China Sea Economic Cooperation Zone Proposed’, China Daily, 06 March 2016. 25 Bill Gertz, ‘Pentagon Concerned by Chinese Anti-Ship Missile Firing’, The Washington Free Beacon, 30 March 2016,; ‘China’s Missile Offense: Beijing is Militarizing Island Outposts in the South China Sea’, Wall Street Journal, 19 February 2016. Also, see Admiral Harris, ‘Statement’, op. cit., 5. 26 Akio Takahara, ‘The Senkaku Trawler Collision Incident, September 2010’, in Mike Mochizuki (ed.), The Okinawa Question: Regional Security, the US-Japan Alliance, and Futemma (Washinton, DC: Sigur Centre for Asian Studies, forthcoming 2013). The author wishes to thank professor Takahara for sharing a draft of his chapter. See also, Yusuke Anami, ‘Japan-China Discord and Cooperation over the East China Sea’, Japan Foreign Policy Forum, No.12, November–December 2012. 27 Clive Schofield and Ian Townsend-Gault, ‘Choppy Waters Ahead in “A Sea of peace Cooperation and Friendship”?: Slow Progress towards the Application of Maritime Joint Development to the east China Sea’, Marine Policy, 2011:35, 26-28. Japan and China hold also different positions as to the legal status of Okinotorishima. This atoll, located some 1,700km to the east of Tokyo, is considered by Japan as an island – and therefore capable of generating EEZ rights – a notion objected by Chinese authorities. This position is of no secondary importance for the Japanese government since the atoll sits over an area that is recognised to possess significant natural resources, which would be exploitable by the country

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the intent to exclude other claimants’ ity of the State Ocean Administration advanced non-lethal equipment such right to do so.28 In one case, that of (SOA). The CCG included the China as water cannons and sirens. In 2014, the South China Sea, Chinese actions Maritime Surveillance (CMS), the Mar- incidents occurred with other regional whilst related to its territorial claims, itime Border Police (MBP), the Fishing coast guards showed that Chinese they can easily affect the wider access Regulation Administration, and the water cannons are capable of project- and freedom of navigation of the entire General Administration of Customs.30 ing jets of seawater out to some 100m basin. A fifth organisation, the Maritime Safe- with the ability to disable the communi- ty Administration remained under the cation gear of other vessels and sirens 3. The Hybridity of Chinese responsibility of the Ministry of Trans- capable of deafening noise.33 Recent Hybrid Warfare at Sea: Ac- port. Reportedly, the merger aimed at additions to the CCG would suggest, tors and Tactics achieving two goals: firstly, it sought to nonetheless, a change in terms of increase command and control mech- deck armament for larger vessels. The How is this competitive behaviour car- anisms; and secondly, it was designed new super cutter feature not only a ried out? What does ‘hybridity’ mean in to reduce the risk of uncoordinated 76mm main gun, but also a helicopter Chinese constabulary activities? The actions by separate commanders.31 pad.34 In addition, the coast guard has evidence from the China Seas would The merger, which was coupled by a added to its list a number of decom- suggest that Chinese hybridity has significant enhancement of the CCG missioned PLAN frigates, featuring two levels of interpretations. The first capabilities, resulted in the creation two 37mm guns.35 The ensemble of concerns the actors involved – a com- of one of the largest coast guards in qualitative and quantitative data rela- bination of coast guard and irregular the world, albeit one that is still striving tive to the CCG supports the notion forces, including the maritime militias to possess relevant professional stan- of an organisation that is distinctively known as the ‘little blue men’ – and the dards across its forces. As of 2015, ‘hybrid’, increasingly closing the gap capabilities they field. The second per- the CCG commanded at least 24 ves- between coast guard and navies. tains to the tactics they employ. sels displacing more than 3,000t and The coast guard is not the only act in Insofar as the ‘actors’ are concerned, at least 79 ships more than 1,000t.32 China’s constabulary landscape. Civil- the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) is for- In 2015, the CCG has commissioned ian assets such as oilrigs and offshore mally the primary agent designated to also the lead ship of a new class of drilling platforms have been used to implement national maritime rights.29 ‘super cutters’ with an astonishing showcase the country’s intention to Institutionally, the CCG came into 12.000t displacement. exert its EEZ rights in contested areas existence in the aftermath of a major This brings about the question of ca- – notwithstanding the opposition of structural reform conducted in 2013, pabilities. The majority of vessels pro- other claimants.36 when four organisations were merged cured before the merger is not armed More importantly, over the past year, together and put under the responsibil- with deck guns, although they possess international observers have gained a

28 In some cases, such assertions of national rights draw upon principles that are inconsistent with mainstream interpretations of UNCLOS. See Yoon, ‘Xi Jiping’s “True Maritime Power” and ESCS Issues’, 887; Raul Pedrozo and James Kraska, ‘Will China Decide to Reduce Tension in the South China Sea?’, The Straits Times, 31 May 2016. 29 Nong Hong, ‘China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Reform and its Implication on the Regional Maritime Disputes’, Asia Maritime Transparency Initia- tive, 01 April 2015; also, for a detailed account of the transformation, cf. Ryan D. Martinson, ‘From Words to Action: The Creation of the China Coast Guard’, Paper Presented at the Conference ‘China as a Maritime Power’, Arlington, VA, 28-29 July 2015. 30 Hong, ‘China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Reform and its Implication on the Regional Maritime Disputes’, op. cit.. 31 Ibid.. 32 Martinson, ‘From Words to Action’, op. cit., 45. Ibid., 46. 33 Ibid., 46. 34 Ryan D. Martinson, ‘East Asian Security in the Age of the Chinese Mega-Cutter’, CIMSEC, 03 July 2015. 35 Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘How China is Expanding its Coast Guard’, The Diplomat, 30 July 2015. 36 ‘China Moves Controversial Oil Rig Back towards Vietnam’, Reuters, 26 June 2015; Nicholas Szechenyi, ‘China and Japan: A Resource Showdown in the East China Sea?’, The National Interest, 10 August 2015.

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much better understanding of China’s and CCG) are deployed in contested was initially prompted by the Japa- maritime militias, also known as ‘the areas to pro-actively advance claims; nese government purchase of three little blue men’ in reference to Russia’s the second pertained to more passive of the islands in September 2012.41 In ‘little green men’ deployed during the operations in Crimea. The Chinese mi- litias are pre-eminently recruited from local fishing communities, especially on Hainan Island. They are trained, provided with advanced communica- tion and other specific equipment, which in some cases include capa- bilities like mines and PRGs to engage with foreign ships, and available for government tasking.37 Reportedly, these irregular forces draw upon a tra- dition established in the early days of Fig 1. Number of. Intrusions within Territorial Waters of Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands the PRC, when irregular forces were responsible to carry out the ‘people’s opposition to other actor’s seemingly response to this action, Chinese au- war at sea’.38 Today, these militias conducting activities to challenge al- thorities authorised the deployment of are regularly deployed in harassment leged Chinese maritime rights and vessels on a regular basis within the activities – with the most notable ex- sovereignty claims. Examples of the territorial waters of the islands. The amples including the harassment of latter tactics would include the harass- incursions lasted for a few hours dur- the USNS Impeccable in 2009, and ment of US warships and military sur- ing which CCG vessels chased away the obstruction of supplies to the Fili- vey ships as much as he obstruction Japanese fishermen and confronted pino detachment on an outpost at the and harassment of Japanese, Viet- JCG cutters. These deployments in- Second Thomas Shoal in 2014.39 namese, and Filipino fishing boats and creased throughout 2013 and settled In terms of tactics, a preliminary ob- coast guard cutters. 40 on a ‘routine’ of three incursions per servation is that both military and One of the most remarkable exam- month (with the exception of July 2014 constabulary forces have been used ples of attempts to advance Chinese and 2015 – when there were only two in the China Seas. For the purpose claims concerns the on-going stand- incursions) since June 2014.42 In Jan- of this paper, it is worth stressing that off within the territorial waters of the uary 2016, the incursions featured a the above mentioned actors and their Japanese-administered Senkaku Is- former-frigate converted into maritime capabilities have been used used for lands in the East China Sea. The is- patrol cutter armed with cannons.43 two primary objectives: the first con- lands are claimed by China under the The above example clearly indicates cerned the so-called ‘salami slicing’ name Diaoyu. The current situation a willingness to intimidate but a clear tactic whereby Chinese forces (militias

37 Simon Tisdall, ‘Little Blue Men: The Maritime Militias Pushing China’s Claims’, The Guardian, 16 May 2016; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Ken- nedy, ‘Meet the Chinese Maritime Militia Waging a “People’s War at Sea”’. The Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2015; Erickson and Kennedy, ‘Irregular Forces at Sea: Not “Merely Fishermen” – Shedding Light on China’s Maritime Militia’, CIMSEC, 02 November 2015. 38 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, ‘Tanmen Militia: China’s “Maritime Rights Protection” Vanguard’, The National Interest, 06 May 2015. 39 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, ‘China’s daring Vanguard: Introducing Sanya City’s Maritime Militia’, CIMSEC, 05 November 2015. 40 Robert Haddick, ‘Salami Slicing in the South China Sea: China’s Slow, Patient Approach to Dominating Asia’, Foreign Policy, 3 August 2012; Pe- drozo and Kraska, ‘Will China Decide to Reduce Tension in the South China Sea?’, op. cit.. 41 ‘Japan Government “Reaches Deal to Buy” Disputed Islands’, BBC News Asia, 05 September 2011. 42 Author’s interview with Japan MoD official, London, November 2015. 43 ‘Japan Spots Cannon-like Equipment on Chinese Ship near Disputed Isles’, Agence France Press, 22 December 2015.

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aim at keeping the level of conflict ative in nature. Governance and good their demands in the anarchical situa- under controlled escalation. The wide order at sea in contested areas is not. tion that will prevail’. This, he further spectrum of Chinese capabilities is In the contested waters of the China observed, will produce a ‘less publi- used in a calibrated fashion to exert Seas, the constabulary activities con- cised’ scramble for ‘ the military instru- pressure in different ways depending ducted by Chinese maritime forces are ments that will enable nations to make on the capabilities of opposing claim- part of a strategy aimed at maximising good their claims: patrol boats, surveil- ants. In particular, the aim seems to the benefits of states’ control at sea. lance aircraft, anti-ship missiles, attack force other claimants in a difficult po- In the mid-1980s, Hedley Bull pon- submarines’.47 Today, his words seem sition to have to choose if to elevate dered the possibility of such a type of to be truer than ever. tensions by responding in kind. A re- behaviour. He suggested that the po- As a result, there should be a clear sponse to match Chinese forces would tential scramble for resources and ter- distinction today, within the realm of open other claimants to criticisms by ritorial claims nurtured a potential form ‘maritime security’ activities, between Chinese official media seeking to pres- of ‘new mercantilism’, intended as ‘the competitive behaviours to enforce ent Beijing as the ‘victim’ of an actor use of force not to defend resources sovereign and maritime claims and seeking to ‘escalate tensions’. This is already possessed and legally owned cooperative type of missions aimed exactly what happened when Japan but to seize resources belonging to at maritime governance and the main- signalled that with the appearance of others’.46 As he pointed out, ‘nations tenance of good order at sea, includ- armed vessels in the territorial waters will still seek to exert military power at ing activities such as counter-piracy, around the islands the government sea to ensure that these rights are up- the interdiction of drug and weapons would consider re-activating a law held. If they do not, nations will employ smuggling and human trafficking. In- authorising the navy to intervene in military force in any case to advance deed, taking Booth’s framework as a support of the JCG.44 The Chinese official media responded denouncing the Japanese declared intention to es- calate matters within a matter of a few hours.45

4. Challenging the ‘Coopera- tive’ Vocation of Maritime Se- curity?

What does this all say about the chal- lenges to maritime security? The evidence from the China Seas clearly suggests that there is a need to partly revise the implicit assumption that maritime security activities are cooper-

Fig 2. The Constabulary Roles of Maritime Forces

44 ‘Japan Sends China warning over Incursions near Disputed Isles’, Reuters, 12 January 2016. 45 ‘China Warns Japan against “Provocation” around Disputed Islets’, Reuters,13 January 2016. 46 Hedley Bull, ‘The New Environment: Sea Power and Political Influence’, in Jonathan Alford (ed.), Sea Power and Influence: Old Issues and New Challenges (London: Gower and Allanheld, Osmun for IISS, 1980), 5. 47 Ibid., 5.

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reference, the lower part of the com- time security missions will continue to increasingly competitive affair and it is ponent of the triangle dealing with represent one expression of maritime likely to remain so in the future. Sec- constabulary roles should clearly be security activities. ond, core actors like the CCG are be- regarded as encompassing competi- Nonetheless, it is undeniable that ing militarised – with the introduction of tive type of actions that are closer in in the context of ill-defined maritime deck guns and other armament - to as- nature to the military roles at the base boundaries and of disputed island sert national power rather than foster of the triangle. Within this context, features maritime security too is at the cooperation. Thirdly, whilst Chinese it seems particularly appropriate to centre of peer competition. The experi- hybrid warfare focuses on regional dis- consider the decision of the Japan ence of the China Seas suggests that putes, it is undeniable that in the South Ministry of Defence to call these com- compliance with the principles of free- China Sea, the assertion of national petitive activities as ‘grey zone contin- dom of navigation and UNCLOS will claims overlaps with broader strate- gencies’, for they concern competition define the extent to which competitive gic implications, linking the pursuit of over maritime boundaries, economic constabulary behaviours will define maritime security to power competition interests and unresolved sovereignty maritime activities. for control of the sea. The control of disputes.48 Within this context, Chinese hybrid key island features– especially in the warfare requires a change in our un- South China Sea – would in fact allow Conclusions: derstanding of maritime security. The the Chinese military to project power A Paradigm Shift? ability to ‘enforce’ national jurisdiction across the China Seas, de facto using in contested EEZs or in the territorial the pursuit of maritime rights to poten- There is a sea change taking place in waters of a given set of islands is an tially affect the freedom of navigation maritime security, and Chinese hybrid expression not so much of genuine and over flight along international sea- warfare at sea is shaping it. Compe- governance; rather, it showcases na- lanes linking East Asia to the rest of tition at sea has returned, but this tional control. Chinese hybrid warfare the word. The extent to which other ac- come back is unlikely to witness the seeks to do just that. It strives to legiti- tors, including NATO, will decide how emergence of a purely Cold War style mise activities aimed at asserting the to engage with this challenge is open binary type struggle for control of the control of disputed features and mari- to debate. Yet, as every journey of a oceans. Today, the world is economi- time boundaries by means of a variety thousand miles starts with one step, cally interdependent and frameworks of law-enforcement capabilities as well integrating the competitive charac- like UNCLOS have contributed to cre- as militia forces, seemingly operating ter of some actions at sea within the ate awareness within the international in defence of inherent maritime rights. spectrum of the constabulary roles is community about the importance of The implications are, therefore clear. the first step in the one leading to the good order at sea. As such, coopera- First, the experience in the China Seas future of maritime security. tive behaviour in the pursuit of mari- suggests that maritime security is an

Dr Patalano is Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Department of War Studies, King’s College Lon- don, and specialises in East Asian maritime security and Japanese naval history and strategy. He is also Visiting Fellow at the Japanese Navy (JMSDF) Staff College, and Temple University Japan, both in Tokyo. Dr Patalano published in professional and academic journals in English, Japanese, and Italian languages. His most recent monograph titled Post-war Japan as a Seapower: Imperial Legacy, Wartime Experience, and the Making of a Navy was published Bloomsbury in 2015

48 Japan Ministry of Defence, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond (Tokyo, 17 December 2010), 2-3.

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Political Implications of Cyber Space on State Power

Dr. Elena (Helene) Mandalenakis

Globalization is most commonly used national threats. This apparent re- traditional expression of state power. to describe the increased economic duction of state power sparks political These forms of power are not evenly interdependence of states and the debates as to whether the nation-state distributed to the states and the pos- shrinking of their physical boundaries. remains sufficiently intact to pursue its session of one does not assume the The technological and information rev- domestic and international interests, possession of the other thus, mak- olution have created new challenges or is withering away. ing their relation puzzling for foreign- for the states vis-à-vis other state and This paper will explore the state’s abil- policy decision-makers. Hence, there non-state actors in the international ity to deal with new threats arising is a need to determine the degree of system. Interdependence, renders from the asymmetrical distribution of interaction and interdependence of unilateral state actions unrealistic due the cyber power, a new form of power the maritime and cyber domains along to their ineffectiveness against trans- and its influence on maritime power, a with their impact on the overall state

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power. The interaction of these forms and will threaten its survival. This is tilateral action by leading or participat- of power challenges traditional for- best described as a security dilemma ing in state alliances led by a dominant eign policy formation and determines on which the states respond to by al- state. Multilateralism requires coop- a state’s position in the international tering the distribution of power in the eration and creates procedures for the system. international system. Kenneth Waltz’s resolution of disputes thus, restraining Structural Realism, states that any the escalation of war. The establish- On State Power structural changes in the international ment of international regimes and in- system will alter the state relations and stitutions regulates the behaviour of Different schools of thought in Inter- thus, state behaviour.3 Hence, war the states for the peaceful attainment national Relations aim to explain state may be avoided due to the deterrence of their common interests and objec- relations in the international system effect arms races have on interstate tives. This is achieved by providing and the formation of state preferenc- relations and not because of state co- a set of “principles, rules, norms and es. Although they are formed on dif- operation.4 The weakness of Realism decision-making procedures around ferent assumptions, their main goal is however, is that although it explains which actors’ expectations converge.5” to describe the relation between state change in state behaviour it fails to ex- More specifically, security regimes are power and state preferences, domes- plain change in state interests. these “principles, rules, and norms tically and internationally as well as The Realist assumption that military that permit nations to be restrained in to prescribe means to avoid conflict power is the state’s main objective, their behaviour in the belief that oth- or war. The predominant theories of cannot account for other state interests ers will reciprocate.6” Such a regime Realism and Liberalism will be used to such as economic ones. Although Re- was the Concert of Europe, in the 19th relate state maritime and cyber power alists expanded the definition of power c. after a coalition of states defeated with state behaviour. to include the state’s maximization of Napoleon. In the economic sphere, In Realist theory, the states are the utility, Liberal theory is best suited to the General Agreement on Tariffs and primary actors operating in an anar- account for changes in state interests Trade (GATT) regime set international chic international system. In this sys- based on the assumption that the ben- trade regulations favouring the reduc- tem there is no overarching authority efits of economic exchange, make the tion of tariffs and other trade barriers above the state and states are consid- occurrence of war unlikely. Although and thus, eliminating trade preferenc- ered unitary,1 sovereign and rational2 the international market regulates in- es for all signatories. actors. All states possess the same terstate free trade and profit, it does Multilateralism however, does not im- interest, to survive in an anarchic en- not necessarily minimize the escala- ply equality among the participants. vironment through the maximization tion of wars, in the military and eco- The most powerful states have earned of their power. In this system, military nomic sense. the advantage of directly influencing power guarantees state security. The The attainment of security and eco- the design of these regimes, organiza- state’s need to maximize its military nomic interests is central in foreign tions and alliances. Regarding state power rises from the assumption that policy and once these cannot be at- security, states have the choice to re- other states are potential enemies tained unilaterally, states turn to mul- spond to a threat by allying with other

1 Unitary states act as single entities. Mark R. Brawley, Turning Points: Decisions Shaping the Evolution of International Political Economy, (Ontario: Broadview Press, 1998), 32. 2 States are rational because they form their choices based on perfect information which reveals all their possible choices. Then, they assess the costs and benefits of all available options and choose the one that serves best their highest preference. Ibid., 34 and ft. 15, 53. 3 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 81. 4 Hegemonic stability theory claims that the existence of a hegemonic state in the international system guarantees the peaceful coexistence of states. 5 Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), I. 6 Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization, 36, 2, (Spring 1982), 357-378, at 357.

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states against the threat, which is a Maritime Power interests, with significant political impli- balancing act or by bandwagoning, cations for state relations. The 2015 which is the alliance with the threat- Alfred Tayer Mahan in the late 19th c, appearance of Chinese naval ships’ in ening state. The power of the state, examined the importance of a state’s the Bering Sea, which coincided with the availability of allies and the context geographical position in the deter- the US president’s visit to Alaska, was of the states’ decision determine their mination of sea power. Accordingly, a clear statement concerning China’s choice. Accordingly, state power, in geography and sea power determine naval capabilities vis-à-vis the United terms of high capability and low vul- national security policy in the anarchi- States.9 A more aggressive policy is nerability, determines state behaviour cal international system.8 the imposition of a naval blockade to and state relations in the international The state’s geographical location di- coerce states to comply with specific system.7 rectly influences its maritime power demands or to oblige a state to respect State power has tangible and intan- and defines the significance of its the imposed economic sanctions. Ex- gible components. Diplomatic power, maritime policy in the advancement amples of such naval blockades are for example, is non-tangible. How- of its security and economic interests. the US blockade of Cuba during the ever, its strength is founded upon the Therefore, coastal states have an im- Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the measurable capabilities of the state as mediate interest in a strong maritime 2015 Saudi-led blockade of Yemen. well as the intention to use these capa- presence that will guarantee the safety In the first case, the US maritime de- bilities thus, making the threat for retal- of their sea borders along with the pro- terrent policy’s military objective was iation credible and acting as deterrent tection of their ports, natural resources the elimination of an enhanced Soviet against enemy actions. The power of and vital energy infrastructures, locat- military threat across the border and persuasion or the threat to use force, ed within these borders. the maintenance of its balance of pow- is often as effective as the actual use Historically, states surrounded by sea er during the Cold War. On the other of military force but certainly less had to defend themselves from hostile hand, the American political objective costly. The emergence and the rapidly powers or alliances of those. Empires was the maintenance or the enhance- increasing dependency on electronic have been built upon their maritime ment of its domestic and international systems for rapid and accurate com- dominance and sustained their pow- credibility as a hegemonic power fac- munication coupled with the capacity er through their naval forces. The ing another hegemonic power. The for instantaneous control of infrastruc- strength of the British navy secured credibility of US’s threat to strike first, ture, has led to a new power (although and expanded the empire’s borders coupled with its real and perceived not exclusive to a state) that is capable and guaranteed the protection and ad- capability to follow through this threat, of affecting all other powers available vancement of its economic interests in significantly supported the intense dip- to the state. For the purposes of this the seas (through shipping and control lomatic efforts made by the superpow- discussion, we will examine the do- of trade routes). Hence, the safety of ers, to avoid a nuclear war. Hence, main, the means and the weight (i.e. commercial shipping operations en- both policy objectives served the US geopolitical strengths and weakness- hances national trade interests. interests to maintain its sphere of influ- es) of maritime and cyber power in the Maritime power is used as a foreign ence and to avoid the occurrence of a achievement of state power along with policy tool, directed towards the ad- devastating nuclear war. their level of interdependence, if any. vancement of military and commercial The 2015 naval blockade imposed to

7 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 8 Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1890). 9 Phil Stewart, “Five Chinese ships in Bering Sea as Obama visits Alaska,” Reuters, 2 September 2015, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa- china-military-idUSKCN0R22DN20150902

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Yemen, was a foreign policy tool for the the state’s maritime borders but span gional maritime alliance will not only realization of military and security ob- across international waters depending increase the security of the states’ jectives of Saudi Arabia and its allies. on the state capabilities. In Asia, the maritime borders but will also enhance The US and the UK mainly offered lo- US foreign policy has been challenged the regional and international security gistical and intelligence support to their by China’s maritime territorial claims in of trade routes with economic benefits Saudi ally. The blockade restricted the the East China Sea, the South China for the UK. arrival of commercial ships to Yemen Sea and the Yellow Sea. In these cas- Other maritime interests are the pre- and drastically reduced its energy ex- es, China, by expanding its maritime vention and response of navy patrol ports with devastating effects on Ye- borders, is interested in increasing its vessels to illegal actions at sea, such meni economy. The naval blockade, energy and fisheries resources and as piracy, drug, weapons and people- supported the airstrikes carried out by in controlling significant trade routes. trafficking, water pollution, over-fishing the Saudi coalition and weakened the These regional disputes cause politi- and most recently illegal migration. Yemeni government’s ability to reor- cal instability in the region, with secu- Germany’s recent decision to send ganize its defence as it prevented the rity implications for the states’ foreign 650 troops to join the “Sea Guard- import of weapons. The foreign policy policy and international trade routes. ian” NATO mission in order to combat interest, shared by the allies, was the The US, although not directly involved arms smuggling by ISIS in the Mediter- end of the internal conflict in Yemen, in the disputes, is announcing its inter- ranean Sea is an example of such ac- as it posed a regional security threat, est in maintaining the peace and free tion.13 Also, in the past few years the while at the same time securing the “oil commerce in the area. By doing so, it Italian and Greek coast guards have supplies through the Bab al-Mandab is actually protecting its ability to sail assumed principal roles in the combat shipping lane, a vital energy gateway in these waters and at the same time of illegal migration and in the rescue of from the Gulf to Europe and North supporting its allies in the Asia-Pacific illegal migrants crossing the Mediter- America.”10 by honoring defence and cooperation ranean Sea. The US had a military interest in se- treaties it has previously signed with It is evident then that the maritime do- curing the al-Annad airbase, critical to states like the Philippines, Japan, main is governed by geopolitics and as US drone operations against Al-Qaeda etc.11 the navy is considered an extension of and the American war against terror- National economic and trade interests the state, maritime policy has profound ism. Failure to do so, could impact US may also be shared by other states political implications on state power. counter-terrorism operations against in the name of profit through coop- Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. eration. The UK’s attempts to revive Cyber Power US navy vessels, such as the USS the economic partnership of the Com- COLE missile destroyer in 2000 and monwealth states is such a policy. Studies on the role of state power in the USS THE SULLIVANS, have been India, hesitant in the past to ally with the digital or information age are not subject to terrorist attacks at the Aden its former colonial power, is now con- yet adequate to build a theory that port in the past. sidering joining a maritime coalition of can conceptualize the impact from Consequently, maritime concerns and the Eastern Hemisphere with the US, the use of cyber technology in state preferences are not confined within Japan, Australia and the UK.12 A re- relations. The political relations of the

10 “Egypt Initiates Naval Attacks in Yemen,” The Maritime Executive, March 30, 2015 at http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/egypt-initiates-naval-attacks-in-yemen 11 B. Dolven, S. A. Kan and M. E. Manyin, “Maritime Territorial Disputes in East-Asia: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, January 30, 2013, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42930.pdf 12 C. Raja Mohan, “Britain could Join India in a Maritime Coalition,” World Today, August 17, 2016, at http://carnegieindia.org/2016/08/17/britain-could- join-india-in-maritime-coalition-pub-64347 13 “Germany to send 650 troops to fight ISIS smuggling in Mediterranean,” Alarabiya Net, 14 September 2016 at http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/ middle-east/2016/09/14/Germany-sends-650-troops-to-fight-ISIS-smuggling-in-Mediterranean-.html

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state in the context of cyber space are nature of strategic information lead- or state of emergencies. In such cas- still largely unexplored as it is difficult ing to assumptions that states have es, they could be used to cause dis- to place them in terms of traditional been superseded. State responsibility ruption of communication between the forms of power such as sea, air and regarding any offensive and defensive chain of command on all political, eco- land powers. The reasons lie behind cyber actions, cannot be dismissed, nomic and military levels due to their the non-physical nature of this form of as “physical infrastructure of cyber- interconnectivity and thereby depriving power, the multiplicity of stakeholders space” is geographically located and the state of an effective reaction to the and the transnational consequences regulated by state laws regardless of crisis. of cyber actions that differentiate it who owns this infrastructure.15 Gov- The perception of threat of cyber in- from the traditional forms of power. ernmental agencies, private actors, terference is a powerful psychologi- “War” in cyber space has not yet been even individuals operating within a cal tool that can be used to enhance regulated, if ever, “by legal provisions state’s territory must abide to its laws the notion of insecurity on the safety as to the principles of military conduct and regulations. and validity of the information at stake and rules of engagement of just war.14” and to demoralize decision-makers. This is due to the fact that the rules Cyber Interferences on State Although the effect is not as hazard- of engagement and conduct were Power ous as a real cyber-attack, it can lead designed for sovereign state actors. the affected state to either engage in The use of cyber technology is not the In cyber advanced states, the state in- elaborate additional security protocols exclusive domain of military and intel- frastructure is entirely digitized and all or entirely abandoning procedures in ligence agencies and is largely domi- the information can be located in cyber favor of more outdated but more se- nated by non-state actors such as le- space. Cyber systems are globalized, cure means of protection and com- gal entities and individuals who may or inter-connected and highly integrated munication. A return to an analogue may not act in their own interest. Cy- which facilitates the spread of any dis- age if you wish. This obviously leads ber espionage, for example, is being ruption in the local system with unfore- to considerable delays in the relay of currently practiced at various levels by seen risks and consequences. Cyber any information, as physical validation state and non-state actors alike. Of interferences take the form of remote and security is implemented. This is course, the use and level of advanced electronic system manipulation, particularly the case for governmen- technology varies and is dependent on through existing hardware or software tal and military institutions that have the user, the sector it is applied in and vulnerabilities. Depending on the type already been attacked, as in many the purpose it aims to achieve. The of the systems attacked as well as the cases cyber-attacks are not easily de- lack of evidence of cyber operations scale and level of expertise of the at- tectable, resulting in the exacerbation further complicates the strategic theo- tackers, they can affect both domestic of insecurity after the discovery of their rizing of cyber warfare. Therefore, and international stakeholders. Such effects. what would constitute cyber war be- interference could have varied effects, This capability of cyber interference tween states? Where can we draw the ranging from simple business disrup- can act as a deterrent for enemy states line between war and muscle-flexing tions to potentially threatening the from acting in any hostile or provoca- between states in cyber space? security of the state itself. They can tive manner. This capability, like other As discussed earlier, territorial sover- cause malfunctions or even deny ac- types of capability, does affect the dip- eignty is the foundation of the realist cess to electronic systems operated lomatic and military power of a state paradigm for state relations. When by the state, companies and individu- as well as its reputation by allies and talking about cyber space, emphasis als and have the capacity to become enemies alike. is being given on the non-physical more exacerbated in crisis situations

14 Ugo Pagallo, “Cyber Force and the Role of Sovereign States in Informational Warfare,” Philos. Technol., 28, 2015, 407-425. 15 John B. Sheldon, “Geopolitics and Cyber Power: Why Geography Still Matters,” American Foreign Policy Interests, 36, 5, 286-293, at http://dx.doi. org/10.1080/10803920.2014.969174

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Positive Effects of Cyber layers of encryption that are employed ing the high seas. Ports and Oilrigs Power over Maritime Power to maintain security and integrity of the have also taken advantage of the ex- various systems. The same, however, isting technologies to increase their Modern warships have taken advan- cannot be said for commercial vessels efficiency and their safety margins. tage of the advent of technological in- engaged in the global supply chain of They have been largely the testbeds novation by automating their functions commodities. They also rely heavily for technological concepts that would to render them capable to be manned on automated systems for their navi- have been perceived as a byproduct of and operated at maximum efficiency gation and control to achieve maxi- science fiction no more than a decade by considerably fewer personnel. The mum efficiency in their operations. ago. The Delta Terminal of the Port of Rotterdam is otherwise known as the Ghost Terminal. The reason behind this, lies in the fact that the loading and stacking of containers is handled by autonomous robotic cranes and computer controlled guided vehicles, thus entirely eliminating the human factor from these operations. In the Oilrig industry, the level of automation is as aggressive with Dynamic posi- tioning for station-keeping on floaters being amongst the first fully automated systems in the offshore industry. Cur- rently there is technology in the testing phase that allows for unmanned drill- ing operations through the develop- ment of an innovative autonomous ro- botic drilling rig. The concept intends Arleigh Burke class Destroyer, first Granted, the drive behind commer- to eliminate the human factor from the deployed in 1991, has a crew comple- cial vessel automation lies purely on most dangerous part of drilling opera- ment of 329 sailors. By comparison, economic considerations rather than tions, one that is plagued by repetitive the first example of the Zumwalt class security, but the effect is one and the actions and thus, subject to high de- Destroyer, launched in 2013, has a same: the ability to man the ship with grees of mistake. crew complement of only 158 sailors the fewest personnel possible while at but manages to improve strike group the same time considerably increas- Negative Effects of Cyber defense 10 times over. The benefits ing its efficiency. In the commercial Power in the Maritime Do- of automation are self-evident. How- industry this drive is aggressively im- main ever, the total reliance on electronic plemented. A point of example is the systems for navigation, defence and 400-meter-long Triple-E ship series on Taking into account the current inter- offense, renders them susceptible to order by Maersk Line. They are larger connectivity of the maritime and cyber the threat of cyber-terrorism, as it may than any vessel of any kind currently spheres, it is obvious that cyber inter- be the only efficient means of disabling on the water, yet they are designed ference can and does take place in the a warship, short of directly engaging it to be operated with a minimum crew maritime domain. The intent behind in combat. complement of 13 and a maximum an interference is none other than the The possibility of a successful cyber- one of 34. disruption of the normal maritime op- attack on a warship may be far reach- This degree of automation however, erations. According to ENISA in 2011, ing, considering the levels and multiple is not limited to the vessels travers- maritime cyber security is very low, as

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existing maritime security standards possibilities are endless. The actual cessful cyber-attacks, however are focus on physical security alone.16 threat however, is to take advantage even more frightening. A cyber-attack As the electronic aids employed in of the vulnerabilities in the commercial can target nearly everything con- the maritime industry are designed to maritime operations and use them to nected, directly or indirectly, through provide highly accurate results, they disrupt military maritime operations. A a public network of communications. require to be remotely connected to plausible scenario would be to remote- This includes the internet, satellite land-based services for their continu- ly hijack commercial vessels and put transmissions, wireless and cable ous update and maintenance. This them on collision course with military communications. Through these data is their greatest strength and at the vessels. streams, a hacker can gain access to same time their greatest weakness. A The interference however, is not lim- the most critical of infrastructures in- cyber-attack can either be performed ited to sea vessels but extends to the cluding the military. A person worthy directly on the vessel or via the link to ports and Oilrigs as well. There has of reference to that effect is Gary McK- these services. The extent of such an been a case reported in the port of innon, a Scottish hacker, who was ac- attack can range from disabling parts Antwerp where the vulnerabilities of cused of hacking into 97 United States or the whole of the vessel, to directly the electronic cargo ID system were military and NASA computers over a assuming control of its navigation, or exploited to allow the deletion of con- 13-month period between February even indirectly, by feeding false infor- tainers with illicit substances from the 2001 and March 2002. His cyber-at- mation to the instruments demanding system. Essentially, the containers tack was dubbed the biggest military a certain reaction from the crew. The became invisible and were delivered computer hack of all time.19 Although possibilities are only limited by the in- to the smugglers without any control this attack was limited to the collecting genuity of the attacker. The GPS can from the port authorities and the po- of information, it is the perfect example be manipulated to veer a vessel of its lice.17 In regards to Oilrigs, hackers to demonstrate that even the military plotted course, the ECDIS (Electronic managed to shut down drilling for a infrastructure is not impervious to a Chart Display and Information Sys- week in 2014 by tilting an Oilrig.18 The dedicated and imaginative individual. tem) can be hijacked via an internet financial damage was estimated in the This becomes even more apparent download or through the insertion of millions of dollars from this unsched- after the events of 4 December 2011, a simple USB flash drive enabling ac- uled interruption. where the Iranian government an- cess to the entire shipboard network, nounced that an American unmanned the AIS (Automatic Identification Sys- Information is Power and aerial vehicle (UAV), a Lockheed tem) can be deceived to create ghost He who Controls the Flow Martin RQ-170 Sentinel specifically, vessels or false alarms for collision or of Information, Controls the was captured by its cyberwarfare unit weather conditions or even making World. which commandeered the aircraft and the vessel disappear by repeatedly safely landed it.20 However, random delaying the transmission time. The Actual threat scenarios based on suc- or even targeted cyber incursions on

16 ENISA, “Critical Infrastructures and Services,” November 2011 at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services 17 Tom Bateman, “Police warning after drug traffickers’ cyber-attack,” BBC News, October 16, 2013 at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-eu- rope-24539417 18 “All at Sea: Global Shipping Fleet Exposed to Hacking Threat,” Reuters, April 23, 2014, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-shipping- idUSBREA3M20820140423 19 Clark Boyd, “Profile: Gary McKinnon,” BBC News, July 30, 2008 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4715612.stm 20 Scott Peterson, “Exclusive: Iran Hijacked US drone says Iranian Engineer,” The Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2011, at http://www. csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer-Video

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military infrastructures are not the real tack code similar to Stuxnet that was Proposals On Possible Mea- threat. designed to destroy. It is generally re- sures For The Protection of Targeted cyber-attacks on the civil garded among cyber security experts Maritime Power From Cyber critical infrastructure are even more that spreading a malware like Stuxnet, Power Abuse hazardous in effect. Specifically, by one that could hit critical infrastructure, targeting the critical infrastructure is considered an act of war.26 The unchecked development and use such as the power grid, water supply, If such a threat scenario is realized, of cyber power is not just a national communications and the stock market, one that would involve a declaration of concern but a transnational threat they have the capacity to cripple a war or even the initiation of hostilities that demands international coopera- country from within and lead to a state between two states, with one using its tion. Sadly, at this time, there are no of national emergency. In September cyber power and the other its maritime concrete measures at the international 2007, American researchers conduct- power, the result would favour the cy- level. There are only certain propos- ed an experimental cyber-attack that ber capable state. The deployment of als but we may be quite far from any changed the operating cycle of a gen- a military navy requires planning, the effective solution. Specifically, within erator, causing it to stop. The experi- reconnaissance and identification of the EU, ENISA concludes that mari- ment was intended to demonstrate the targets and a sufficient amount of time time security awareness is almost vulnerabilities of the system .21 Similar to render the effective deployment of non-existent and thus, proposes to attacks on the power grids, although the fleet at a distance favouring its its member-states to include cyber not government sanctioned, have al- attack capabilities. In contrast, the security aspects in their maritime ready occurred in Ukraine22 and Is- deployment of cyber power requires policies. In addition, ENISA calls for rael.23 In respect to cyber-attacks on considerably less time, the infrastruc- better information exchange on cyber financial institutions, in October 2010 ture required is mobile and dispersed, security, reducing the risk for the mari- Nasdaq was breached by an unknown the target identification is already clear time sector, as well as for the close intruder24 and more recently in June and present and the effects of con- cooperation and alignment of maritime 2016, Anonymous hacked the London tinuous and coordinated attacks could policies at the international, Europe- Stock Exchange (LSE).25 The differ- bring a country on its knees without an and national level.27 The US has ence between the two lies in the fact firing a single shot. It is clear that if taken a more practical approach and that the LSE attack was attributed to one deconstructs a state from within, it developed a specific cyber protection hacktivism while the Nasdaq attack, to denies it the effective deployment and system called RHIMES (The Resilient a still unknown or undisclosed foreign use of its military assets. Hull, Mechanical and Electrical Securi- intelligence service, which used an at- ty). RHIMES protects the ships’ physi-

21 “Sources: Staged Cyber Attack Reveals Vulnerability in Power Grid,” CNN, September 26, 2007 at http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/index.html?iref=topnews 22 J. Robertson, M. Riley, “How Hackers Took Down a Power Grid,” Bloomberg, January 14, 2016, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti- cles/2016-01-14/how-hackers-took-down-a-power-grid 23 Pierluigi Paganini, “Israeli Public Utility Authority hit by a severe cyber attack,” Security Affairs, January 27, 2016 at http://securityaffairs.co/word- press/43989/hacking/israeli-public-utility-authority-under-attack.html 24 M. Riley, “How Russian Hackers Stole Nasdag,” Bloomberg, July 21, 2014, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-17/how-russian- hackers-stole-the-nasdaq 25 A. Cuthbertson, “Anomymous Hackers Target London Stock Exchange,” Newsweek, June 6, 2016, at http://europe.newsweek.com/anonymous- hackers-london-stock-exchange-icarus-tech-466790?rm=eu 26 Pierluigi Paganini, “Cyberwar – The Cyberspace is Already a Dangerous Battlefield,” Security Affairs, August 6, 2016, at http://securityaffairs.co/ wordpress/50059/cyber-warfare-2/cyberwar-cyberspace.html 27 ENISA, “Critical Infrastructures and Services,” November 2011 at https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/critical-information-infrastructures-and-ser- vices

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cal systems from any interferences, of jurisdiction and responsibility as harmonization problems as each state even when these are in progress, by no political acts can exist in vacuum, interprets the existing or potential dan- diversifying the controller systems and they must be situated within a political gers of cyber abuse in a different way. avoiding the infection of all linked sys- context as their outcomes do. This is The fact that the majority of regulation tems with one attack.28 So in the event even more exacerbated by the general resides in the national domain and of a cyber-attack onto the shipboard, unwillingness of the states to reveal taking into account the transnational the hacker would not be able to attack their true cyber powers which could nature of the cyber domain, the pros- more than one hardware system using only be quantified by measuring the ecution of an offence will be limited by the exact same exploit. In addition, the effects of cyber-attacks that they took national jurisdiction. US Coast Guard has already adopted responsibility for. In the realm of cyber In addition, there is a general law- a cyber security strategy, oriented on power, admitting to a cyber-attack is lessness dominating the cyber do- the prevention, response and recovery tantamount to taking responsibility for main. Currently the public internet from cyber-attacks. an offensive military action. is comprised of the surface web and On the theoretical plane there are sev- On the other hand, states attempt to the deep web. The deep web is the eral proposals to counteract cyber in- extend their sovereign control over part which is not indexed by standard terference that should be considered: cyberspace in order to eliminate se- search engines, is considered to be 1) The creation of cyber al- curity risks to their economic interde- 550 times larger than the surface web liances is a controversial topic and pendence and military vulnerabilities. and its mere existence and continuous highly interesting from a political sci- The case of the Heartbleed bug is use for nefarious purposes speaks vol- ence point of view. The idea is based just an example of e-insecurity due to umes on the state of effective regula- on the traditional aspects of strategic some states’ attempts to regulate en- tion. Any other attempt to regulate on military alliances, which were neces- cryption and not allow the public use the physical location of the servers is sary for neutralizing or deterring a mili- of the highest encryption for security merely scratching the surface. tary threat. The problem with this idea purposes.29 The point is that cyber 3) Self-regulation is another lies in the fact that although a military power exercised as a state power is controversial option. Proponents of alliance is based on tangible and mea- more akin to clandestine operations. the idea, suggest that universities surable military assets that are situat- Departing from that veil of protection should apply academic vigilance and ed in defined state borders, the same could compromise a state’s ability in undertake the responsibility for a se- is not possible in a cyber alliance. This exercising its sovereign rights through cure and open cyberspace, “since it is due to the fact that there is neither more public avenues. was from ‘the university’ that the In- a quantifying measure of cyber power 2) Regulation of the cyber do- ternet was born, and from which its capacity nor territorial boundaries to main at the national and international guiding principles of peer review and limit its effect and application. levels is another controversial topic. transparency were founded.”30 The The discussion about sovereignty and Currently, there are various pieces creation of Linux was one of the suc- territoriality relates to the issue of ju- of legislation worldwide attempting cess stories for the proponents of the risdiction and responsibility. It is not to regulate the use of the electronic theory. The source code of Linux was a matter of borders in cyberspace but domain. These attempts suffer from distributed freely and the hacking com-

28 RHIMES is expected to protect systems related to anchoring, hydraulics, electric power, climate control, damage control and firefighting, steering and engine control. “Protecting Navy ships from cyberattacks,” Homeland Security News Wire, September 25, 2015 at http://www. homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20150925-protecting-navy-ships-from-cyberattacks 29 James A. Lewis, “Heartbleed and the State of Cybersecurity,” American Foreign Policy Interests, 36, 5, 2014, 294-299, at http://dx.doi.org/10.108 0/10803920.2014.969176 30 Ronald J. Deibert, “Bounding Cyber Power: Escalation and Restraint in Global Cyberspace,” Internet Governance Papers, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 6, October 2013,1-22, at p.14 at https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no6_2.pdf

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munity took it upon itself to provide eas, they overlap and interfere with Consequently, the lack of territorial their input in securing the vulnerabili- each other. The success of maritime boundaries in cyber space, the difficul- ties of the system. It should be noted operations depends on the security of ty to determine the source of a cyber however, that this should be regarded cyber space. operation, which allows states to re- as a romantic approach to state secu- Maritime power is closely connected frain from claiming responsibility along rity, as it is largely based on the notion to defined territorial borders and inter- with the amplitude of cyber operations that all entities and individuals share ests within and beyond state borders. in a technologically advanced state, the same notions regarding the protec- It manifests itself in the expansion or makes this source of power invalu- tion of national interest. shrinking of state territory, in economic able. Furthermore, the importance benefits or loss and inevitably in the of cyber space (except for the obvi- Conclusion state’s international position. Cyber ous technological reasons) lies on its power is not as affected by geopolitics interference with the sources of state The state benefits from both the mari- thus, it strives away from traditional power (in this case, maritime power) time and the cyber sector. Although determinants of power such as territo- thus, affecting essential policy areas the maritime and cyber domains are rial boundaries, powerful economies domestically as well as internationally. separate and autonomous policy ar- and natural resources.

Dr. Elena (Helene) Mandalenakis obtained a B.A. in Political Science from McGill University (Canada) and was awarded with a Masters’ degree in European Studies from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) in Belgium. She received her Doctorate in Political Science from McGill University (Canada). Her doctorate research on Recognizing Identity: The Creation of New States in Former Yugoslavia, was supported by the Research Group on International Security (REGIS) of McGill University and Université de Montréal with scholarships, and fellowships from the Greek-Canadian Association and McGill University. She has been a researcher –Fellow and Associate- at the Institute of International Relations of Pan- teion University (Greece) and McGill University (Canada). Among her responsibilities during her stay at the Institute of International Relations (Greece), has been the editing of books and scholarly works of its senior members. Dr. Mandalenakis’ teaching experience includes courses on foreign policy, international political economy, european politics and minorities at McGill University and the University of Peloponnese. She has presented her work in international conferences and has published in peer-reviewed academic and policy journals as well as in books on issues of foreign and security policy, migration, ethnic relations, state formation and identity, european affairs and resource management. Dr. Mandalenakis is a member of the “Regional Stability in the South Caucasus” PfP Consortium Study Group and has participated in the “Regional Stability in South East Europe” and the “Emerging Security Challenges” PfP Consortium Study Groups. Her current research interests involve international security, cybersecurity, european affairs, policy formation, international migration and identity.

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Considerations on the Mediterranean Migration Crisis

by Corrado Campana Captain ITA (N)

The Mediterranean Sea, given its world’s highest number of refugees Irregular migration in the Mediter- geographic position that makes it the since World War II. These conflicts ranean Sea is a particularly complex hub between different continents and involve a broad and diverse array of phenomenon as it crosses through cultures, is particularly sensitive to the entities and issues, and are character- and involves the continents of Europe, current record-breaking dimension of ized by a violence that often occurs in Africa, and Asia. the immigration to Europe. an asymmetric manner in which civil- A glance to the Mediterranean may Ongoing hybrid conflicts along the ians are frequently the victims and form the image that this Sea consti- Mediterranean shores and in its neigh- even the targets of fighting, causing tutes a natural barrier between south- boring regions provide the framework large numbers of refugees and inter- ern Europe, northern Africa, and the and the context for understanding the nally displaced persons. Middle East. However, throughout the

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history of human civilization, the Medi- foreign fighters transit, and the fragile gration, Europe’s conventional policy terranean has provided connective tis- economic situation of the Euro-zone. framework has been designed to sue between the three continents just A very important consideration to make distinguish the forms of migration, in as much, if not more, than it has acted is that migrants crossing the Mediter- particular ‘voluntary’ versus ‘forced’. as a barrier between them. ranean are in no way representative Simply put, the question is whether the The Mediterranean Sea has witnessed of a single or homogenous group. For migrants are choosing to migrate to several consequences of interactions this reason, rather than using the term improve their own economic condition between diverse empires, ethnicities, “illegal migration” when referring to the and prospects, in which case they are religions, and cultures. Historically, Mediterranean crisis, the terms “mixed most commonly referred to as “eco- such interactions have at some times migration” and “irregular migration” ap- nomic migrants”, or whether they are led to conflict and hostility and, at other pear to be more accurate to describe forced to escape from their countries times, they have led to the sharing of the situation. Indeed, different types of origin out of fear of political, ethnic, ideas, traditions and technologies that of migrants are subject to different in- religious or other forms of persecution. fostered and helped the progress of ternational laws and, because on this, Through the international legal prin-

humankind. Today, there are dis- they will face different treatments in ciple of Non-Refoulement, established similar socio-economic and geopo- their host countries. In other words, by the European Convention on Hu- litical realities on the different sides of “irregular migration” is a broader term man Rights (Article 3) in parallel with the Mediterranean, and yet they are that refers in general to migrants trav- the Geneva Convention on Refugees strung together by mass human popu- eling between countries without the of 1951 (Article 33), this latter group lation movements which are a dramat- officially authorized travel documenta- of migrants is protected from being ic demonstration of how occurrences tion for doing so. Given the legal rights returned to a country where their lives on one part of the Mediterranean re- to which they may be entitled under or freedom would be threatened or en- verberate across all of its shores. This certain circumstances, some of the ir- dangered, and they may be granted a phenomenon is causing particularly regular migrants and asylum-seekers form of asylum. high tensions in Europe as it is taking may therefore not be considered ille- In order to process the applications place at a time when Europeans are gal migrants. of migrants for asylum their identities particularly concerned with terrorism, To address different forms of immi- must be verified and their reasons for

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entry must be evaluated. In reality this plained by differentiating the country arrived. already complex matter is complicated of origin from the transit countries, and In addition to its impact in Europe on by the fact that migrants travel to Eu- also the destination country is often the legal, the social and the economic rope by irregular means from all across different from the first European coun- level, the migration crisis in the Medi- West Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and try they reach. terranean Sea also entails significant the Middle East for varied reasons, The majority of migrants do not intend security challenges, which are so com- and the distinctions between ‘chosen’ to stay in the European countries in plex and so strongly perceived that versus ‘forced’ forms of migration are which they first arrive, like Italy, Greece some European countries are tempted increasingly unclear. Indeed, it is not or Malta. In general, these are primar- to cope with them nationally, though it easy to determine at what point the ily planned as transit countries while is evident that the transnational and conditions of life in the country of origin migrants aspire to ultimately reside cross-continental nature of this phe- are so bad and the human rights are in more northern European countries nomenon requires a strong collective so seriously endangered that staying like Germany and Sweden, where they and multilateral approach which must becomes intolerable, and consequent- perceive they will find more opportuni- take into consideration the intercon- ly emigration is no longer a voluntary ties and better treatment. nected character of the wider Mediter- option but a necessity. An additional Europe’s Dublin regulations are in con- ranean basin and its particular socio- complication of the process is given by flict with these migrants’ aspirations economic and geopolitical realities. the fact that some migrants may also to reside in their planned destination The former president of Malta, Profes- attempt to claim certain nationalities, countries, as they affirm that the coun- sor Guido de Marco, has probably said such as Syrian, that would more easily try through which an irregular migrant it best when he stated that, “there can entitle them to the desired protection. first enters the European Union is re- be no security in Europe unless there The majority of migrants crossing sponsible for processing that migrant’s is security in the Mediterranean and the sea arrive to Europe from Libya, application for asylum. Furthermore, there can be no security in the Medi- though most of them are not Libyan a migrant caught illegally residing in terranean unless there is security in nationals, thus in order to provide clar- another European country is sent back Europe.” ity, irregular migration may best be ex- to the country through which they first

Captain Corrado Campana Attended the Italian Naval Academy from 1987 until 1991, when he was commissioned as Ensign. He has achieved the qualification in Naval Artillery and Missile Systems and the specialization in Naval Weapons Direction. He served onboard several Italian Navy ships such as the frigates Libeccio and Maestrale and the destroyers Ardito and Luigi Durand de la Penne, and was appointed as Commanding Officer of the auxiliary ship Ponza and of the frigate Granatiere. He served in international staffs such as the Force HQ of the Multina- tional Force and Observers (M.F.O.) in El-Gorah (Sinai, Egypt) as Naval Advisor, and the EU Naval Force OHQ in Northwood (UK) as ACOS CJ3 Operations within the anti-piracy Operation ATALANTA. He served in national staffs such as the Command in Chief of the Italian Fleet as Head of the Artillery and Missile Systems Section, the Command of Italian Maritime Forces in Taranto as ACOS N3 Operations and at the Italian Joint Operations HQ in Rome, as Head of Maritime Operations Section (J3). He attended the Italian Joint War College and the Course in International Humanitarian Law at the Centre for Defence High Studies in Rome and also served as Tutor for the attendees. Captain Campana has achieved the Degree in Maritime and Naval Science at the University of Pisa, the Degree in Political Science at the University of Trieste, and the Master in International and Military-strategic Studies at the L.U.I.S.S. University “Guido Carli” in Rome. Since the 1st August 2013 he is appointed at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre in Souda Bay, Crete, Greece as Director of the Training Support and Transformation Directorate.

27 OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Islamic State

A Maritime Threat to Europe ?

by Michael J. Edey Lewis Batch Dryad Maritime Limited, United Kingdom, [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract from ISIS’s intent and capabilities to 1. Introduction disrupt to the flow of shipping and the The paper examines the current and current state of terrorism and civil war The purpose of this paper is to identify emergent threat to shipping posed by in Libya and the Mediterranean, to the the effects on the commercial shipping Islamic State/Daesh from an Open impact to shipping were a successful industry by the maritime security threat Source perspective, and will look to attack to happen. posed by the terrorist group known as answer whether the terrorist group has Islamic State/Daesh. The report will the intent and the capability to launch Keywords evaluate its intent and capabilities, and and carry out a successful attack on look at its recent activities to provide an shipping transiting the Mediterranean. Maritime; Security; Terrorism; Ship- intelligence-based assessment of the It will cover a wide range of topics; ping; Daesh; IS threat it poses to commercial shipping.

28 OPERATIONAL ISSUES

It will also consider whether there is Spanish and French security services to do so on Europe’s doorstep, with any evidence to suggest that ISIS are has done this effectively. However, the ability to destabilise neighbouring using shipping routes to transport ma- with tourism to Morocco increasing regions who have not fully recovered terials and fighters to its strongholds, due to threats to security in Turkey, political stability following the Arab and if maritime led attacks, such as Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco is likely Spring. Whilst ISIS in Iraq and Syria the one on an oil terminal in the Libyan to become a more appealing target to have used oil as an important source port of Zuetina earlier this year, could ISIS cells. In December 2015, the Mo- of income on the black market, ISIS signal a change in modus operandi for roccan BCIJ foiled an attack aimed at soon established that it would be dif- the terrorist group. attacking busy areas and nightclubs in ficult to sell black market oil so close Fez, as well as busy areas in the ports to western nations in Southern Europe 2. ISIS in North Africa of Tangier and Kenitra. and western back states in North Af- and Mediterranean Tunisian authorities have largely failed rica. Subsequently, ISIS has begun to to counter the terrorist threat through- target Libyan oil to agitate Western oil 2.1 ISIS in North Africa out the country. The attacks on west- flow and importantly to demonstrate erners in the spring of 2015 deeply up- ISIS presence in the area while limit- North Africa has continued to struggle set the Tunisian government, who until ing the Libyan economy’s ability to re- with severe social problems, including the attacks had successfully protected cover from the civil war. poverty and high youth unemployment its predominantly tourist based econo- Similar to Tunisia, Egyptian authori- rates, which contribute to produce a my. In response, the country declared ties have failed to counter the terror- fertile recruitment ground for terror- a state of emergency, which was re- ist threat throughout the country. In ist operations in the area. Currently, newed for a further three months on 23 Egypt, the military is engaged in fierce several of the North African countries March 2016. The presence of extrem- fighting against ISIS in Sinai and other are incapable of defeating the militant ist elements in Tunisia, as well as the local terrorist groups; however, in the Islamist groups in the area, whilst oth- collapse of security in neighbouring short term, the military have not been ers such as Morocco have so far suc- Libya, continues to pose a significant able to defeat the militant Islamism ceeded in producing an effective coun- threat to foreign travellers. This said, that resides throughout the country. ter terrorism operation. the country has started to develop a The bombing of a Russian airliner and In Morocco and Algeria, the security successful counter-terrorism outfit, attacks in Sharm El Sheik, which have situation will continue to be better than disrupting several ISIS sympathisers previously thought to have been safe, that further east. Algeria has a his- in Tunisian port cities. On 07 February have had a dramatic effect on tourism, tory of dealing with Al Qaeda in the 2016, Tunisia said it has completed forcing the country to increase security Magreb (AQIM) terrorists in both the the first stage of a 200km barrier along efforts. mountainous north and oil rich south, its border with Libya, designed to deter holding years of experience in fighting terrorism through its power void neigh- 2.2 ISIS Intent in North Africa/ the terrorist threat. Similarly, Morocco bour. Maghreb has been successful in developing The downfall of Gadhafi and subse- its counter terrorism outfit, regularly quent Libyan civil war provided ISIS The Islamic State is overall a land- disrupting ISIS cells and preventing with the opportunity to exploit a nation based organisation focused on the es- sympathisers from reaching Libya. of lawlessness with Al Qaeda based tablishment of a caliphate both within The creation of the newly formed Cen- groups and other Salafist organisa- Syria/Iraq but also across the whole tral Bureau of Judicial Investigation tions active throughout the Maghreb. of the Islamic world1. Libya was very (BCIJ), dubbed as Morocco’s FBI by Its presence in Libya has not only al- much seen as the next stage of the ca- the media, as well as assistance from lowed ISIS to create a caliphate, but liphate’s expansion and acknowledges

1 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/; http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/pa- pers/2015/03/ideology-of-islamic-state-bunzel/the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state.pdf

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its strong position in the Mediterra- attacks; a threat that came to nothing. stating an intent to use Libya in partic- nean and its vicinity to Europe. More Whilst it is evident that ISIS has a ular as a springboard to attack south- recently, with the sustained attacks on desire to disrupt the flow of shipping ern Europe. ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Libya is begin- through the Mediterranean, from the Despite warnings and declarations of ning to be seen as ‘Plan B’ if the ca- Strait of Gibraltar to Port Said and the attacks at sea over the years, the ma- liphate in Iraq/Syria fails. ISIS propa- Suez Canal, how much of this is the jority of terrorist activity remains land ganda has highlighted the possibility of actual goal of the ISIS leadership in based across the globe. In addition, using Libya as a springboard to attack Syria and Iraq is unclear. While the the vast majority of terrorist activity southern Europe and to support the Libyan based ISIS organisation may that does take place at sea is logistical ‘closure of shipping lines because of have long-term objectives that include in nature to facilitate attacks ashore, the targeting of “Crusader” ships and attacking commercial vessels, the such as occurred in Mumbai in 2008. tankers’. It should be recognised that establishment and maintenance of a According to the Global Terrorism Da- the analysis by the organisation that permanent foothold on land carries a tabase, seaborne terrorism incidents produced the original report on which much higher priority. Put shortly, ISIS were only 2 percent of all international the intelligence alert was based, The is a land based phenome that seeks incidents in the last 30 years and of Quilliam Foundation, judged that the to assert a caliphate and destabilise these only a handful were actual at- unnamed propagandist was not seek- neighbouring companies of which it tacks at sea, a rather small figure con- ing to intimidate enemies, but attempt- can exploit. Whilst Al Qaeda linked sidering the global scale of the ship- ing to recruit jihadists to the cause of groups have an experience of multi- ping industry. assisting the ISIS mission in Libya. operational approach to targeting sym- This statistic has been borne out by Furthermore, the publication sought bols of the West and capitalism, ISIS’s recent events within Libyan waters to highlight the strategic advantages main aims are less diverse. involving the repeated use of small of access to the maritime domain, pri- boats to resupply the militias across marily for logistic access to southern 3. ISIS Maritime attacks and the country with only limited attempts Europe, and did not take into account Capability in North Africa to use the maritime domain to conduct the significant international naval forc- an attack, notably the reported attempt es in the Mediterranean when discuss- 3.1 ISIS attacks on the port of Zuetina on 09 January ing the possibility of ‘closing shipping 2016. Three ISIS boats attempted to [lanes]’. Infamous for its violence, particularly attack the oil port of Zuetina, before This is not the first time that Islamic towards captured non-combatants, being repelled by guards from Libya’s jihadists have declared an intent to and its use of social media to commu- Petroleum Facilities Guard. At the attack western shipping. The attacks nicate its message of fear and show- time of writing, ISIS have not launched on the MV Limburg and USS Cole in case its brutality, particularly against any attack on maritime vessels in 2000 were followed by a threat to ship- Westerners, ISIS has established it- Libya; however, reports continue to be ping in the Strait of Gibraltar, whilst self as an alternative jihadist group to received that suggest the use of the Al Qaeda made a declaration to at- Al Qaeda, amongst others, in its fight maritime domain for resupply using tack shipping in 2014. These earlier against the West. Over the last few small boats the Libyan’s call 8″bulldoz- threats have extended to the Mediter- years, the group has sought to expand ers. In 2015, merchant shipping oper- ranean as well with a leaked Russian its reach from its central inland bases ating close to Libya was more at risk of Intelligence Agency (FSB) report from in northern Iraq and eastern Syria to attack by the Libyan air force than by 2011 assessing that sixty AQIM opera- Libya, Pakistan, Yemen and Saudi terrorists2. tives were ready to conduct maritime Arabia and beyond, with the group Despite the lack of maritime success,

2 The Libya air force attacked MT Araevo 4 Jan, MV Tuna 1 11 May, MT Anwar Afriqya 24 May

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ISIS is attacking oil terminals both and fund its future operations; in Libya suggest that they are not all Libyans; inland in Libya and also across the they appear far more interested in their total numbers are reported to be in coastline of the Gulf of Sirte. There destruction. the region of 7,000. The numbers of have been several attacks already ISIS supporters, sympathisers and ac- this year. Between the 4 - 6 January 3.2 ISIS Maritime Capability tive members in other North African 2016, ISIS launched land-based at- countries is more difficult to judge but tacks on the oil terminals of As Sidr This section will look at Manning, Tunisia is acknowledged as one of the and Ras Lanuf, resulting in the death Equipment, Training and Sustainabil- major recruiting grounds with recent of 18 guards and leaving more than ity. estimates of 6,000 to 7,000 Tunisians 50 people injured as ISIS’ rockets Dryad estimates that ISIS’s presence fighting for the self-proclaimed caliph- caused fires at seven oil storage tanks within Libya has increased to several ate, whilst as many as 15,000 others at those terminals. Just days later, on thousand militants. ISIS’s leadership have been barred from international 9 January, three boats attempted to is dedicating significant resources to travel.3 attack the oil port of Zuetina. A repre- Libya from Iraq and Syria, seeking to Numbers have increased with esti- sentative for Libya’s Petroleum Facili- perpetuate instability in the country mates of around 7,000 fighters operat- ties Guard stated that his guards had and set conditions for ISIS to capture ing in and around Sirte. Despite being repelled the attack before any of the Libya’s oil wealth. At the same time, a land-centric organisation, it is likely craft managed to enter the port. It was there are fears that a strong Libyan ISIS have recruited or co-opt some of believed that the raid was instigated by cell can act as a launch pad for attacks the local fisherman to operate some militants allied to ISIS forces. On 21 in neighbouring Tunisia and Europe. boats. At this stage, the numbers in- January 2016, militants affiliated with It is reported that at the core of the volved would likely be small, if any. ISIS reportedly attacked oil installa- Libyan organisation is around 400-500 The majority of ISIS fighters will be ful- tions and set fire to several crude stor- fighters that have returned from opera- ly occupied with fighting both the offi- age tanks near the port of Ras Lanuf. tions in Iraq, although other reporting cial Libyan government and Operation Targeted in the attack were storage tanks and a pipeline leading from the Amal oilfield to As Sidr, and in a video posted online by one of the perpetra- tors threats of further attacks on the ports of As Sidr, Ras Lanuf, Brega and Tobruk were issued. These attacks highlight the threat ISIS poses east of their stronghold in Sirte, and the possible risk to com- mercial vessels that transit close to these ports. The wider attacks on the oil infrastructure demonstrates ISIS’s intent to disrupt the flow of oil whilst displaying their presence to the inter- national community. In Iraq, ISIS’s ap- proach was to seize oil installations in order to sell oil onto the black market

3 http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tunisia-became-a-top-source-of-isis-recruits-1456396203

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Dignity forces as well as the opposing could be more easily identified as be- of the operating ports. Libya Dawn Islamists, especially with ing out of the ordinary. the recent reports (May 2016) of the Dryad is aware of reports of ISIS using 4. Does ISIS have an op- LNA massing for an attack on the ISIS small boats locally called ‘Bulldozers’, portunity to disrupt Western stronghold. It is unlikely that with such from which militants have attempted to shipping? pressure ashore they will be able to launch attacks on oil instillations and release the manpower to mount an have used to transport weapons and Having looked at the intent and capa- extensive maritime offensive, however operatives along the Libyan coast. bility of ISIS to attack shipping in the the possibility of a limited one off at- These are assessed as not being ca- Mediterranean, the final aspect is the tempt cannot be discounted. pable of launching attacks on ships off- opportunity. While it has been shown shore but could be used to attack slow that it is unlikely that ISIS have the ca- Equipment & Sustainability moving or anchored vessels close to pability or really the intent at this stage Libyan ports. to disrupt Western shipping ‘on the While there is little doubt that ISIS in open sea’, to be even a small threat Libya has sufficient weapons to con- Training they must have the opportunity to do duct a maritime attack on shipping so and must therefore maintain access deep in the Mediterranean, it is not Prior to conducting a successful mari- to the coast. clear if they have access to suitable time attack offshore there would likely The most notable evidence of this in- vessels. To attack a vessel underway need to be some level of rudimentary tention was the taking of the port town in the Mediterranean, maritime terror- training in operating the mothership, of Derna in eastern Libya in Decem- ists normally require boats that have the launching of the boats and in how ber 2014, which saw the absorptions both a speed advantage over their in- best to approach a vessel underway. of local jihadist organisations already tended targets and the ability to oper- However, it is highly unlikely that this established in the town. It was this ac- ate at considerable distance from their training would take place in any formal tion that initially prompted the concern base, possibly for an extended period. manner, given the desperate and sui- over ISIS’s ability to attack Mediterra- The way that Somali pirates have cidal nature of the fighters involved, nean shipping. ISIS’s decision to es- achieved this in the past is by the use but could be more likely represented tablish itself in the town of Derna was of small, fast craft with relatively lim- by attacks on smaller vessels closer not a random event, as it has a long ited endurance that are supported by a to Libya, some of which will fail. This history of extremism and supplying for- ‘mothership’ to enable them to conduct was the manner of the development of eign fighters to Al Qaeda in Iraq. The and sustain long-range operations. Somali piracy before they reached the loss of the town to local Islamist forces Dryad judges that the typical Mediter- height of success in 2010-2011; even and the eventual expulsion of ISIS ranean fishing vessels of around 500 then, the majority of attempts were un- from the region has limited its access tonnes, supporting two or three small successful for a variety of reasons. to the sea. In many ways Derna was boats would be suitable. However, Dryad has no positive evidence to an ideal location from which to conduct analysis of available overhead imag- suggest that ISIS currently have the maritime attacks on Western shipping ery and open source photographs of capabilities to successfully conduct as it was relatively close, approximate- the Libyan ports assessed to be under an offshore attack. It is possible that ly 80NM to the main shipping channels ISIS control suggests that the num- such a capability could be developed but during ISIS’s 12 months in control bers of this type of vessel are possibly in the future, but this would probably no attacks took place. limited. It should also be noted that be preceded by a stronger foothold in Similarly, the capture of Sirte also her- another Somali pirate method of using Libya, providing the necessary launch alded a new opportunity for ISIS. How- slower ‘whalers’, with barrels of fuel on points and logistics for such activity. ever, at approximately 250NM from board to tow faster skiffs to an attack However, the requirements for an at- the main sea-lanes of communication, position, is unlikely to be successful, tack on a vessel close to port are far Sirte represents less of an opportunity given that this type of fishing is not as easier to achieve and could result in a to attack shipping than Derna. ISIS’s widespread in the Mediterranean and Limburg or Cole incident close to one capture of other towns in the Sirte re-

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gion, along with propaganda material get offshore to conduct a successful for large quantities of cannabis and outlining the advantages to ISIS’s ex- attack transiting western shipping. cocaine, transnational crime agencies pansion into new regions of Libya, is such as Interpol and Europol closely also deeply concerning but highlights 4.1 Does ISIS pose a threat to ship- monitor the country’s maritime border. the main intent of the group at this ping ‘arteries’ such as the Gibraltar It is therefore unlikely that a serious stage: to expand its influence in the strait, Straits of Malta, Suez canal etc? ISIS maritime threat could be estab- country. lished on the North African country’s A further factor that limits ISIS oppor- Away from the Central Mediterranean coastline. tunity is the level of scrutiny it is under. and the ISIS forces based in Libya, Since ISIS established itself in Derna there remains concern that Western Egypt and the Suez Canal and then Sirte, US and other western shipping still could be targeted at the nations have been closely monitoring ‘chokepoints’ of the Strait of Gibraltar The security of shipping in the Suez its activity, with the US increasing its in the west and the Suez Canal in the Canal has long been of concern, and reconnaissance flights by patrol air- east. rightly so. On 16 July 2015, Islamist craft and UAVs from Sigonella in Sic- militant group ‘Sinai Province’ at- ily. Overall, the central Mediterranean Strait of Gibraltar tacked an Egyptian naval patrol vessel could be considered to be relatively off the Sinai Coast close to the border well policed with forces from EUNAV- In 2003, the fear of an Al Qaeda at- with Israel. A rocket fired from shore FOR MED, as well as Italian and Greek tack in the Strait of Gibraltar, prompted struck the coastguard vessel, fortu- Coastguards4 and NATO’s Operation NATO to begin escorting shipping nately with no crew fatalities. Two Active Endeavour. Finally, since the through the gateway to the Mediter- years previously, a group calling itself ISIS takeover of Derna, it is almost ranean. Whilst the threat in 2003 the ‘Al Furqan Brigade’, fired an RPG certain that if NATO or the EU has any was from an active Al Qaeda cell, one at Panamanian-registered MV Cosco concerns of possible attacks by ISIS at which still exists through Morocco and Asia in July 2013 whilst transiting the sea then there will be a further build-up Algeria, there has been an increasing Suez Canal. In July 2015, there was a of naval forces in the region. As the ISIS presence in Morocco since the Muslim Brotherhood plot to target the military command and control (C2), Libyan Civil war; Frontex estimated canal’s infrastructure, rather than ship- as well as the political mandate, is al- 2,500 Moroccans have left the country ping. However, despite the inclusion ready in place, it would not suffer the to fight for ISIS, in Syria and Iraq, with of a Suez Canal Authority employee, delays and arguments seen in estab- a proportion travelling to Libya. Egyptian authorities disrupted this at- lishing the NATO and EU operations However, a series of security and crim- tack and it failed to achieve anything in the Indian Ocean to counter Somali inal networks prevent a serious ISIS significant. pirates. In addition, the Libyan coast- threat from disrupting Western ship- Whilst not much is known about the ‘Al guard continues to be active with a ping in the Gibraltar Strait. Morocco Furqan Brigade’, who carried out the number of vessels detained, mainly for has for decades suffered from severe attack, apart from a loose association fishing, throughout 2015.5 This is not issues of drug smuggling and has a to Al Qaeda, the attack did enough to the Gulf of Aden and while not a per- history of counter-terrorism operations increase what was already good se- fect blockade this level of naval activity against AQIP militants. Subsequently, curity. It is highly unlikely ISIS could further limits the opportunity for ISIS to due to its position as a transit country pose any sustained activity in the area

4 Operation Sophia was announced on 07 October 2015, and has enabled naval vessels to board, search, seize and divert vessels suspected of smuggling migrants, operating 40km off the Libyan coast 5 http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/libya-navy-releases-statistics-intercepted-vessels-territorial-waters t

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of Suez without response from the in- 5. Summary the possibility remains that a tanker or ternational community - in particular merchant ship approaching one of the the US who are considering directing a The threat from ISIS to western ship- ports could be attacked in the same greater presence to the Sinai. Recent ping transiting the Mediterranean is way as the USS Cole or MT Limburg. improvements including the building of limited. They do not really have the However, even here security in the a security wall and fence will signifi- intent, despite propaganda saying ports remains high. With forces pre- cantly reduce any opportunity terror- otherwise. They also lack the capa- paring for an attack on the ISIS forces ists have of attacking the Canal Zone, bility and, with the level of naval and in Sirte, the chances of a major attack thereby reducing the overall threat to air force activity off the coast, have a offshore is reduce further. vessels. As the canal continues to ex- limited opportunity for a successful off- pand so security is likely to increase. shore maritime attack. Closer to Libya

Mike Edey - Head of Operations, Dryad Maritime

Mike Edey served over 21 years in the Royal Navy, both at sea and ashore, in operational as well as instructional, capability management and maritime intelligence roles in support of the UK’s strategic decision makers. Mike’s operational experience includes the Middle East, West Africa and the Mediter- ranean, but he has also participated in exercises in other parts of the world, including South America and Southeast Asia. Mike has a great deal of experience in working in multi-national environments, including NATO and Coalition Maritime Forces in the Middle East, and presenting on the subject of maritime crime and piracy to high-level international audiences.

Lewis Batch – Analyst, Dryad Maritime

A graduate with First Class Honours in Politics, Lewis spent three years at Portsmouth University, where he focused his studies on Strategic and Security activities, International Relations, Conflict and Cooperation as well as other areas which have helped him in his role as a junior analyst and in developing a comprehensive understanding of regional risk, cause and response. Since joining Dryad Maritime, Lewis has been principally involved in the development of an online risk map that provides the latest information on threats at sea and ashore in more than 100 countries.

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FOUR HUBS OF MARITIME INSECURITY OFF AFRICA: FROM ANTI-PIRACY TO ANTI-CRIME? Francois Vreÿ & Henri Fouché Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) Stellenbosch University

Piracy and counter-piracy dominated galvanised international will towards maritime threats off Africa as singularly the African maritime security scene greater efforts for its eradication. Pi- related to piracy. The piracy fixation for the best part of the last decade racy also served as a catalyst for Afri- became detrimental to an organised/ and in the process served construc- can decision-makers to take a greater structured approach for dealing with tive and damaging agendas. On the interest in defending their maritime other maritime crime off Africa that constructive side, piracy raised a mari- zones. On the damaging side, anti-pi- co-existed within, or on the periphery time awareness of piracy at sea that racy drives became a conduit to view of real or constructed piracy threats.

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Other maritime crimes played second ters before shifting the focus to briefly what they are or what they hold, but fiddle to piracy and hold dangerous address crime and response profiles a matter of more attention to how to antecedents if left unchecked. in each of the four regions. The pa- respond.4 It is therefore prudent to Anti-piracy took centre stage by way per concludes with a brief summary of map out threats and opportunities that of renewed attention to international crime at sea off Africa as the threat that have a reciprocal impact to reinforce law and conventions which had hith- requires effective policing, prosecution or marginalise the other. Inherently, erto not been applied and which had and sentencing of perpetrators. the Danish critique is about more than to be “re-discovered and re-learned” to piracy, and in all probability an ap- a certain extent. The anti-piracy learn- DISCUSSION proach that is more critical by asking ing curve generated a knowledge and questions about the wider maritime skills base that shaped an internation- Although piracy off the Horn of Af- security landscape, one beyond piracy al and transnational anti-piracy coali- rica accentuates the threat of maritime and a challenge to the confines of the tion of note.1 The learning also por- crime to the international community, it preferred or embedded piracy – anti- trays how actors used the piracy threat also highlights the urgent need for mul- piracy mind set. to bring their own “maritime houses” in tiple responses, not only anti-piracy. order. They deployed or acquired na- The piracy threat to Africa’s maritime African maritime economic val assets, joined international bodies landscapes rapidly entered the African opportunities and other collective arrangements, security agenda since circa 2005, but and adjusted their legislation to pro- important and neglected crime dimen- Good order at sea relates to uphold- mote maritime security in their own, as sions remain. One outcome of the ne- ing safe and secure access to marine well as international waters.2 Africa’s glect is unfolding off North Africa, an- resources, minerals, transport routes, responses to its maritime landscapes other lies latent along southern Africa, information and opportunities on and shows its own repertoire as Africa’s at- and probably continues off West and below the oceans. Multiple security ac- tributed rise as a continent of note is East Africa. The neglect and perceived tions and from several agencies pro- hardly credible if the continent’s mari- dangers that lurk are often over-dis- motes and sustain good order at sea time landscapes are seas of criminality cussed, but the 2014 report from the in times of peace5 and for Africa it is adjacent to unstable littoral states. The Danish Maritime Days programme no different. What is on offer for Africa setting for, as well as the architecture contrasts and depicts the preferred is becoming increasingly important of the African responses are both in reality of maritime security off Africa and one can flag the following aspects need of closer attention as Africa’s lit- by offering three interdependent per- that serve to accentuate how maritime torals house much of the potential to spectives that collectively re-frames opportunities and other scenarios play co-create the future growth of the con- the need to secure Africa’s maritime out:6 tinent. waters more comprehensively: • Trade: Coastal trade to com- • An African Vision: Secure pensate for the limited overland trans- SCOPE port facilities and maritime domain port infrastructure on the continent. awareness (MDA) • Port operations: Available, Arguments in the paper aim to ac- • Industry’s vision: Unhindered but limited and thus a brake on the in- centuate the importance of maritime access to trade routes and seafarer ternational growth and African impera- crimes other than piracy off four Afri- safety tives to grow its blue economy. can maritime regions. First mapped • Seafarers’ vision: To sail with- • Fishing: The economic and out are governance indices off the four out attack risks and feel secure, as human dependence of African coun- maritime regions – East Africa, North well as state and industry protection tries on the fishing industry. As an in- Africa, Southern Africa and West and against threats. 3 come, for job opportunities and food Central Africa. The second argument The underlying notion of the Danish security activity. frames maritime crime as the emer- Maritime Days report reflects that it is • Tourism: A latent potential gent and a salient threat to Africa’s wa- no longer about whether threats exist, where crime is perhaps the greatest

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obstacle. At sea as well as on land, but While piracy directly and indirectly threats in terms of stable governance within the land-sea interface in particu- interferes with shipping, crimes re- and effectively functioning criminal lar. lated to fishing, pollution, smuggling of justice systems. Here the threat is • Oil, gas and minerals: Both drugs, counterfeit medicines, fire arms more about possible spill-overs from present and upcoming with the scope and illegal cargoes to the likes of hu- further north, and low-keyed maritime of significant new discoveries emerg- man trafficking, collectively make Afri- crime in regional waters with environ- ing. can waters insecure. As a result, the mental crimes probably the one mat- • Submarine infrastructure and collective impact of maritime crimes, ter in need of attention.12 South Africa landing points where international in- not just piracy, interferes with the la- has the requisite agencies to address formation networks develop alongside tent potential that Africa’s littoral zones maritime crime, but all indications are more traditional infrastructure. house and as such, must be disrupted, that of an unexplained void between Accepting that maritime crime off Af- prosecuted, and dealt with at sea and the ways and means, and dealing with rica is a major deterrent to economic on land.8 maritime crime. activities that depend upon good order Africa harbours four important mari- All 54 African countries form part of at sea, successful strategies against time regions alongside rather volatile regional economic communities, al- maritime crime off Africa unlock oppor- regions or countries in some cases. though overlapping memberships do tunities that are often not understood To the east, the Horn of Africa is best occur. Each region reflects a number or expressed in maritime terms. Afri- known and generally viewed as a typi- of littoral countries tied into the Indian can products, harbours, and regional cal example of how weak and often Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the South- communities all stand to benefit if au- absent governance on land cultivate ern Ocean and the Mediterranean thorities successfully combat crimes at voids that allowed sea piracy to es- Sea. In total 38 coastal countries make sea. Some advantages to consider are calate as a major threat to interna- up the African littoral region.13 Of the as follows. tional shipping in general.9 The Gulf top ten African countries, the coastal First, connectivity of African products of Guinea off the densely populated states include five of the largest Af- to global markets through its maritime West Africa came to be known for rican states, eight with the largest gateways becomes more of a reality. petro-piracy against installations and populations, nine with the highest HDI, Second, removal of a criminal overlay energy product carriers due to the in- nine states with the highest literacy to Africa’s ageing maritime infrastruc- ability of Nigeria in particular to contain rate, nine harbouring the lowest arable ture softens the further limitation of a mixture of criminality and rebellion in land, and the top ten countries with the growing maritime fleets that bypass its oil-rich south-eastern littoral.10 To highest life expectancy at birth. Alto- Africa. Third, landward preferences the north in the Mediterranean, the gether eight Regional Economic Com- also constrain maritime opportunities maritime narrative assumed a stark munities (RECs) depict the regional and thus isolates a socio-economic humanitarian face that overshad- setting of African countries with each landscape that is then further plun- ows seemingly all the other maritime belonging to one or more RECs.14 Ir- dered by criminals amidst uncalled for landscapes off Africa. Events in North respective of the particular REC, each political ignorance. Fourth, led by, or African countries and the space it of- one harbours a maritime domain on masked by piracy, unchecked crime fers for migrant flows portray how a the long African coastline. In alphabet- curtails the delivery of goods from Af- lack of good maritime governance of- ical sequence, the 38 African coastal rica’s maritime zones. This curtailment fers room for events at sea to assume countries are distributed through the functions in spite of the rising aware- crisis proportions where the cause is RECs as follows: (Due to overlapping ness, and selective responses from on land, but the spill-over to the sea memberships the total does not add Africa’s leadership to integrate the sea is all about neglected human secu- up to 38.) in their overall strategies to grow their rity.11 Around southern Africa threats • Central Africa (Economic economies, foster development and at sea are low-keyed off a coast line Community of Central African States): raise public goods delivery to African where clusters of governance on land Angola Cameroon Congo DR Congo societies.7 and at sea are equipped to deal with Equatorial Guinea Gabon São Tomé

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and Príncipe. countries in each of the RECs shows statistics kept by maritime bodies such • East Africa (East African the following counts and brings the as the ICC IMB in London.15 The Community and IGAD: Kenya, UR of maritime and littoral states into closer UN places a strong focus upon East Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, proximity. Although the littoral index is Africa, the HoA, and West Africa, the Sudan. somewhat higher than overall regional Gulf of Guinea in particular. Attacks, • North Africa : Arab Maghreb indexes it forms part of, the counts attempted attacks and robberies top Union – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, are still average or lower. Southern the reports and totals are as follows. Morocco, Tunisia. • Southern Africa (Southern African Development Community): Angola DR Congo Madagascar Mauri- tius Mozambique Namibia Seychelles South Africa UR of Tanzania. • West Africa (Economic Com- munity of West African States): Benin Cabo Verde Côte d’Ivoire Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea Bissau Liberia Nigeria Senegal Sierra Leone Togo. The extent to which weak governance on land is judged to promote weak maritime security governance, the fol- African littoral states show the highest • East Africa - Attacks and lowing indicators from the 2015 Mo governance index to support the better attempted attacks: 224 [IMB] Ibrahim Index portray the landward- landward-maritime governance con- • North Africa - Attacks and maritime governance interplay. Table nection. attempted attacks: 22 [Clingendal 1 depicts the levels of landward gover- Perspectives on maritime Report] nance that are argued to be average or crime off African regional • West Africa - Attacks and below average, and generally seen as communities. attempted attacks: 184 – [IGD study] a contributing factor to questioning the • Southern Africa - Attacks and overall state of maritime governance. The piracy – anti-piracy attempted attacks: 11 [IMB] Broadly, the weak landward-maritime focus. [Compiled from various sources] security governance nexus is visible in In assisting to determine the the country index, but one in need of a All RECs experienced attacks or effectiveness of governance in a state’s closer interface. attempted attacks [2011-2015] in its maritime domain, Nincic16 suggests, a The index of governance in the littoral waters which form the focal point of number of factors which could possibly

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also have an effect on such governance 2015 a recorded high adherence to were kidnapped from vessels at as, official corruption; failed or failing the rule of law in terms of the absence anchor and in three of the incidents states; presence of conflict and a low of civil conflict. Similarly, states which involving ships whilst steaming crew risk of getting caught and punished. A experienced 2 or less low level thefts members were kidnapped (World desktop comparison of perceptions of a from berthed or anchored vessels, Justice Project,2015:125), (ICC- number of states, members of various with the exception of Ghana which IMB,2015:59-67).20 REC’s in Africa, regarding the absence experienced 1 hijacking of a vessel Effective investigations are necessary of crime, effectivity of investigations underway, also have in 2015 a high if prosecutions are to be successful. and regulatory enforcement, level of adherence to the rule of law in terms None of the countries in the Rule corruption in police/military against of the absence of civil conflict. of Law Index table above have the backdrop of levels of civil conflict, Nigeria, on the other hand, which significantly high scores, indicating that the World Justice Project, (Rule of has a recorded low adherence to the investigations are effective. Kenya, law index 2015)17 offers interesting rule of law in terms of the absence however, which has the lowest score information. When compared to the of civil conflict, has a high number in terms of effective investigations, manifestation of attacks against ships of incidents against ships while has in fact successfully convicted over 100 pirates. These successes can possibly be attributed in part to greater or successful cooperation with the international community and international organisations such as the United Nations in terms of the capability to deal with transnational crime.

Crime in four African maritime hubs: Beyond piracy

Although piracy styled or attributed attacks (real or attempted) receive the bulk of the attention as demonstrated in the strong naval responses off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea,21 attacks do not expose the horizontal expanse of crime at sea off Africa. Each of the regions that monitoring institutions target to map out the presence of attacks and off Africa during the same period, steaming (4), at anchor (3) and while attempted attacks on vessels, also reported by the ICC International berthed (2) including 3 attempted houses other crimes at or from the sea. Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed thefts from anchored vessels and 2 This prioritising of piracy raises the Robbery against Ships report for the from berthed vessels. In one of the important question on maritime crime period 1 January-31 December 201518 incidents against vessels underway, beyond the piracy threat. As piracy the following results emerge. the vessel was hijacked and the off Africa is increasingly contained or In comparing the tables above, states crew held hostage while the fuel oil shut out in some quarters, it does not which had no attacks or attempted cargo was transferred into another suppose the decline of maritime crime attacks against ships in 2015 have in vessel. In two incidents ship’s crew in general. Although dangerous and

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costly, piracy in some cases merely to more than 40% of heroin seizures matters related to human security, remain part of or even peripheral to the for all of western and central Europe in and seemingly more closely tied into scope of larger crime landscapes at 201223 . In 2015 Australian navy ships the lack of good landward governance sea - whether inter- or intra-regional. alone seized 2 tonnes of heroin24 . The and weak or limited extension of public In a certain way Southern and North problem, however, is that the drugs are goods to societies – security and Africa seems somewhat marginalised being destroyed at sea, thereby once policing in particular. and one could argue that it is due to again destroying valuable evidence for the absence of incidents that serve prosecution. Navy coalition warships West Africa: The paradigm of as a conduit to place the said two have also seized large quantities of petro-piracy regions in the piracy fold. Both regions weapons destined for the Horn of however depict a maritime threat Africa region under United Nations Crime at sea spills into the Gulf of landscape of their own. The following sanctions which authorise interdiction Guinea from states belonging to regional outlines offers some insight on the high seas of illicit weapons ECOWAS and ECCAS. Some point on maritime crimes beyond piracy.

East Africa: The piracy - anti- piracy paradigm

Off the Horn of Africa the tendency to prioritise piracy in spite of decreasing numbers of incidents, remains a salient factor. As a prioritised maritime crime, sea piracy off East Africa solicited a surprising naval response in terms of its international compilation, staying destined for Somalia25. to the often neglected crime against power and eventual decline of attacks In essence, the drop in piracy offers fishing vessels of all kinds in the upon shipping. The naval response leeway to use available, even limited Gulf of Guinea and it being a double to other crimes, in the absence of a resources to respond uniformly assault on the fishing industry if one coordinated approach, initially varied to crimes at sea. Maritime crimes also takes into account the matter of according to the individual rules of other than piracy, from the outset illegal and under-reported fishing. The engagement, which required specific received lesser attention which is energy-fishing crime cluster reflects a ROUs for intervention in crimes other a typical outcome of securitisation significant assault on two – existential than piracy. Subsequently, off the and prioritization of a particular risk for some - industries off West Africa. Horn of Africa the naval responses that actors frame and elevate to the For individuals, as well as some dealt with adjacent maritime crimes existential threshold of threats and governments, interference with fishing as well in terms of UN Resolution vulnerabilities. Lesser crimes are also and oil flows are disastrous. Add to 2184 (2014) which calls upon willing dangerous and for example play out this the parallel crime on land, and the states to contribute to fighting piracy as illegal fishing, people smuggling, threat escalates significantly for the oil and armed robbery at sea off Somalia drugs, smuggling of firearms and other industry and individual GDP readings in particular, but also members of weaponry and environmental crime26 in particular. criminal syndicates involved in some The discrepancy one can attribute While threats to energy product way.22 In 2014 the multinational naval to differing rules of engagement carriers, and the energy infrastructure partnership effectuated more than 10 which in most cases did not make at sea itself make headlines, analysts seizures for a combined total of more provision for the interdiction of other accentuate other Gulf of Guinea than 16000 kg of hashish and more crimes Collectively the latter cluster of crimes less so. Two publications from than 2,200 kg heroin. This is equivalent crime has a more direct impact upon the Frederik Ebert Stiftung (2013)

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and International Crisis Group (2012) unpunished as the perpetrators do not Southern Africa: Anticipating however, frame these lesser crimes often set foot on land in West African the piracy wave clearly. Smuggling of drugs, fake harbours.30 The crime of illegal fishing and sub-standard pharmaceuticals, thus intersects with human security Littoral states of Southern Africa are human trafficking, small arms transgressions and environmental located alongside seemingly safer trafficking, illegal migration, illegal concerns. Transnational networks sea routes and maritime regions fishing and ecological risks remain raise a regional threat as transgressors as one moves further south. While threatening, but of a lesser concern. from different West and Central Angola and Tanzania experienced Although not as prominent as piracy African countries are involved. The some piracy and robbery incidents in and illegal oil bunkering, the human transnational character points towards the past, Mozambique, Namibia and and environmental risks of the lesser actors, as well as the scope or reach of South Africa hardly feature in records crimes are deeply humanitarian and their networks with the drug and fishing of credible monitoring agencies. environmental in kind. The impact of networks stretching well- beyond West Non-piracy crimes off Southern illegal and available small arms, drugs Africa while the humanitarian threat Africa feature more prominently in and their fake counterparts, smuggling is much more regional in kind. While the absence of high-profile reporting of people given the densely populated region (highest in Africa) and denial or scarcity of protein intakes, as well as environmental pollution from energy production and illegal dumping, all hold stark humanitarian dangers, as opposed to the state and corporate financial losses of the oil piracy threat.28 Attacks from the sea on land targets such as banks, also take place. Criminal groups are skilled in using the sea as gateways to rob onshore targets and to escape after committing crimes such as bank robberies. geographics are important, the second- on piracy, armed robbery, kidnapping Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea order spill-overs and consequences of and related attacks on shipping. experienced this particular avenue of maritime crime in the Gulf of Guinea is South Africa acts as the de facto attack.29 The flip-side of oil-piracy in summarised in Table 4. lead-nation to counter threats to the Gulf of Guinea is thus a horizontal crime expanse that impacts people more severely than regime security. Illegal fishing in the Gulf of Guinea also ties in with numerous other crimes. INTERPOL links illegal fishing to crimes such as corruption as far as legalities of fishing rights and permissions are concerned. In addition drug trafficking, people smuggling and exploitation of labour, as well as larger transnational networks come into play. It is the latter that complicates prosecution and allows for transgressions at sea to go

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the region’s maritime province and and responses not dominated by The Mediterranean transit and the views the less-than-satisfactory state navies. threat it holds for the migrants, of order at sea on SADCs northern as well as the large number of maritime boundaries as dangerous.32 North Africa: “People piracy” undocumented refugees that arrive in South Africa also reflects a deficit as Southern Europe from Africa (Spain far as maritime crime responses are With very little reporting done on and Italy in particular) feature at the concerned and still lacks a coherent attempted attacks, and robberies of core and in need of attention. Here and integrated maritime strategy – a vessels in the North African region, the security of European countries as matter only showing some growing criminal exploiting of a humanitarian cultural and social stability remain at national concerns with the recent turn crisis starkly reflects the absence odds with the rights of the migrants. to Operation Phakisa.33 Any crime of maritime governance off North It is the latter security interest that spill-overs from the north stand to Africa. The scope of the migration is at stake as preventing the loss of upset the beneficial good order at sea flows also increased the scope and life, protection against smugglers and in southern African waters and this sheer numbers of the smuggling ensuring the rights of migrants are perception remains the reigning threat practices. Events in Libya and Tunisia blatantly flouted.41 Off North Africa paradigm to South Africa and the in particular stimulated drug flows the interplay of collapsed landward region.34 The perception is strongly and contraband. In Libya the room and maritime governance is starkly piracy related as stated in 2011 by for criminality grew due to the lapsing visible at sea in the loss of innocent the then South African Minister of governance situation. Drugs, arms lives of civilians. Defence and this perception continues and oil derived from easier access to The varying levels of maritime security to direct the regions first attempts at a Libyan military arsenals and contested off Africa raises the next logical regional maritime strategy.35 Regional control over oil fields, which collectively question – that of fitting responses responses to maritime crime in facilitated an illegal export trade from to the said maritime crimes off Africa. southern Africa show room for a more Libya.38 Egypt is hard hit by the illicit The following sections outlines preventative profile or architecture as drugs trade and the country remains a response array that is strongly the threat levels are still sufficiently a traditional hub for international drug founded upon the legal framework low to allow for early warning and flows.39 However, the most prominent set by the UN and then its required corresponding responses. SADC and widely reported crime at sea off interface with national legislation understands the required responses North Africa remains illicit smuggling whether existing or in process. The to piracy, illegal fishing, pollution, or trafficking in people. section also offers current responses and smuggling of human and other Illegal migration flows remain the as far as possible in order to bring cargoes as expressed consistently in core security matter that reflects an responses into step with the threat a declaratory manner. The region’s inherent maritime security bond. landscapes outlined earlier. maritime strategy is unfortunately The migration-criminal syndicate link heavily, but wrongly slanted towards became particularly salient through the Reponses a naval emphasis upon the goal of threat to human life from dangerous good order at sea as the basis for the conditions at sea and the loss of The UNODC 2015 Global Maritime desired maritime security of Southern life. Libya remains at the core and Crime Programme,42 highlights Africa.36 All threats are at a rather Tunisia and Egypt lesser so. During the collective responsibility of low-level and thus more amenable to the second quarter of 2014, 88% of states to adopt a coordinated and address from the land, as well as at the estimated 53000 migrants came comprehensive approach to dealing sea by regulating and policing actions through Libya.40 Libya as a transit hub, with maritime crime and that includes at national and regional levels.37 and as a source in itself, contribute to -interrupting criminal activities at sea Militarised responses to uphold the migration flows, most of which is -strengthening domestic maritime maritime governance off Southern illegal, and where the sea crossing in law-enforcement capacity addressing Africa are thus not cognisant of the particular results from extended, but the root causes of maritime crime on superior interface between security highly dangerous smuggling networks. land.

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The responses of the various regions capacity of states to carry out effective and maritime surveillance systems.55 in Africa to dealing with, in some maritime law enforcement.49 In June instances burgeoning crime in the 2013 twenty two West African states Southern and East Africa maritime domain, or the threat of such became signatories to an anti-piracy crime is dealt with regionally. code of conduct for West and Central In southern Africa the region’s Africa, which incorporates many responses are naval, regional and West and Central Africa: elements of the successfully applied South African dominated. Maritime Regional and national Djibouti Code of conduct signed by 20 security matters are much less response profiles states, including South Africa, in East regulated or directed by explicit UN and Southern Africa.50 Countries in the and resolutions as found off West and In September 2011 Nigeria and Benin GOG region began increasing their East Africa in particular. In response to concluded a bilateral agreement to capacity to deal with maritime crime. attacks on ships in the waters of SADC jointly patrol the waters off Benin. Between 2000 and 2013 Nigeria, members off the east coast of Southern This led to a successful decrease in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana Africa, South Africa, Mozambique the number of attacks against ships in and Sierra Leone acquired vessels and Tanzania have been patrolling Benin waters.43 In September 2012 a from China.51 By 2015 the EU had the Mozambique channel since spokesperson from the Nigerian Navy, set up Critical Maritime Routes for 2011, pursuant of a Memorandum stated that due to the success of the the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) and the of Understanding between their operation it was being contemplated to USA had started the AFRICOM at- governments on maritime security widen its scope by including the navies sea maritime exercises and an Africa cooperation which gives their forces of Togo and Ghana, if possible.44 partnership Station (APS) program the right to patrol, search, and arrest, According to Dr Augustus Vogel45, to support capacity building for anti- seize and undertake hot pursuit in 2011, there were fewer than 25 piracy missions in the region.52 In operations on any maritime crime maritime craft longer than 25 meters response to the high number of attacks suspect in their waters.56 Much, if not available off of west and central Africa against ships in Nigeria in 2015 the all of these efforts turned upon the for interdiction operations. A report Nigerian authorities conducted a anti-piracy drive as the main catalyst of the United Nations assessment security operation in which 1,600 for policy-decisions and operational mission on piracy in the Gulf of guinea suspected pirates, militants and deployments and cooperation. 46, recommended that international criminals believed to have been By 2015 joint action, authorised by partners provide funding and support involved in piracy, illegal bunkering as United Nations Resolutions, by foreign to Benin for the purchase of navy well as kidnapping, were reportedly navies culminated in the arresting, vessels. It had become clear that arrested by Nigerian military officials.53 investigating and prosecuting of to keep the sea lanes in the Gulf of In addition, Nigeria’s Maritime pirates operating from Somalia. This Guinea open one would first need to Administration and Safety Agency proved to be a successful deterrent to assess the effectiveness of capacity (NIMSA) is calling for the expediting of attacks against ships as no incidents building assistance in the region and the passage of anti piracy laws being of attacks on ships off Somalia were concomitant ability of states to singly considered by the National Assembly reported for this period.57 Restoring or jointly patrol their territorial waters. to address the burgeoning crime.54 security governance off Somalia in Pursuant to United Nations Security Till points out that relatively moderate particular became the acid test for Council resolutions in 201147, and forces, acting with determination, can moving from stark naval operations 201248, the UNODC developed a achieve disproportionately effective to de facto softer security roles for strategy in relation to piracy, armed results. He also lauds the positive the multi-national naval contingents. robbery against ships, and maritime approach adopted by African countries In 2016 South Africa, Kenya, crime in the Gulf of Guinea Region with towards investing in the defence of Mozambique, Tanzania and the a core focus on criminal justice capacity their waters and highlights Nigeria’s Seychelles participated in a regional building, geared at enhancing the acquisition of patrol boats, helicopters military exercise, sponsored by the

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US Africa Command and designed North Africa SUMMARY AND to improve regional cooperation CONCLUSION to increase participating nations’ North Africa shows its own share capabilities to counter sea-based illicit of UN based responses, but ones Piracy tends to mask the reality and activity.58 largely vested in UN resolutions prosecution of maritime crimes other Concurrent to exercises and joint such as UNSC Resolution 12072 than piracy off the African coast. cooperation to improve naval that provides for member states to Crime at sea ties in with governance responses to illicit activities at sea the intercept suspected refugee carrying on the African continent and regarding United Nations and other international vessels off Libya. Resolution 12072 the latter, only southern Africa, organisations are providing on-going operates in the face of the Libyan shows some exception to the general assistance to improve the efficacy of lack of resources and their landward argument on the land-sea governance Eastern and Southern African littoral commitments to restore governance nexus. From a prosecution and rule of states’ criminal justice systems, over its territory.60 A second law perspective, African littoral states thereby increasing their ability to deal observation is the absence of African also show weaknesses. Here South with maritime crime. The UNODC has, contributions to stem the humanitarian Africa/Southern Africa again seems to for example, provided assistance to tide in the heavily affected zones north be the exception. Overall however, the following countries in East Africa, of Libya. International responses from each of the four maritime hubs show Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and southern Europe appear to dominate, the horizontal expanse of maritime Tanzania to train judges, prosecutors, and later from a larger European effort crime, but it is the array of responses, prison staff, police and coast guard to operationalise European Union (EU) as highlighted by the Danish Maritime officers and to Somalia to establish responses through a wider and better Days Report that requires closer maritime law enforcement institutions funded operation visible in the move attention. Four matters are of .59 In reality, this translates to judicial from Italian rescue missions (MARE importance and play out in the regions capacity building to complete the NOSTRUM) to FRONTEX, Triton61 discussed. First, West-Central Africa, justice cycle of arrest, prosecution, and as of late, Operation Sophia to East Africa, as well as Southern Africa sentencing and incarceration with intercept suspected refugee-carrying have responded to maritime threats the latter reflecting a growing African vessels north of Libya. The latter in their water, whether individually, profile. operation reaches down to the 12 regionally, or in partnership with The key to dealing effectively with nautical mile mark of Libya’s territorial international actors. Second, North maritime crime in this region lies thus waters.62 Responses off North Africa Africa remains the exception with in capacity and resource building to also show the same uncertainty and Europe taking most of the responsibility provide the tools to law enforcement initial lack of cooperation that once to deal with the humanitarian crisis and navies (operating as coast guards characterised the actions of the naval and the criminal syndicates that are at large) to interdict perpetrators and contingents arriving off the coast of the true perpetrators. Third, stark to follow up with prosecution through Somalia. The humanitarian side of naval responses paved the way for effective criminal justice systems while the refugee flows does not allow for more extensive interventions to build at the same time empowering coastal the learning curve that took shape the crime-prosecution capacities and communities. All three are in process off Somalia. It is rather a matter of off East Africa in particular. Fourth, off East Africa in particular (Somalia, a willingness to cooperate properly maritime crime off Africa probably Kenia, Tanzania & Seychelles) with and to operationalise the existing drew together one of the largest civil- the reliance on naval power gradually EU agreements on human security military alliances to respond to a rising balanced with enhanced prevention, on Europe’s southern doorstep, as security sector long neglected. prosecution and sentencing to fill in on opposed to the Gulf of Guinea or the Piracy is in effect the trail blazer for absent governance not offered by the Gulf of Aden. lessons how to fight other maritime military intervention of naval platforms. crimes simmering in the shadow of

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anti-piracy priorities. Although the criminal justice systems, together the investigation and prosecution of politico-military (naval) coalition led with other African and international other crimes, including environmental the way and, if sustained, could well partners, has had an impact on crimes, perpetrated in the maritime also drive back piracy, North Africa the combating of the other, less domain, and which could negatively demonstrates the reality of maritime sensational crimes, burgeoning and affect a state’s ability to benefit from crimes other than piracy reaching existing parallel with piracy. the economic potential available for crisis levels with harsh and direct The focus of resources on dealing with utilisation from within the maritime humanitarian consequences if left piracy and the ensuing prosecutions domain. unimpeded. of perpetrators will have a deterrent The need to focus on maritime crimes, Africa’s heightened awareness of effect on would be perpetrators of other than piracy, and their potential to the need to take responsibility for other maritime crimes, as the myth of also have a devastating effect on the the defence of its maritime zones, impunity when committing crime in the governance and economies of African as a requisite for reaping their maritime domain is challenged. states, is plainly demonstrated by the latent potential economic benefits, The key to obtaining successful opportunistic criminal exacerbation has fostered an awareness of the prosecution resides in the efficacy of a humanitarian crisis through the manifestation of maritime crime, other of the criminal justice system and illicit smuggling or trafficking of people than piracy, as also posing a serious in particular on the ability to conduct from North Africa to Europe. North threat to governance and economic effective investigations. The weakness Africa is thus a clarion call for African development. in this regard, in some of the African countries to deal with crime at sea as The ensuing response, by building states, underlines the need for the the piracy and a refugee crisis at sea up and exercising naval assets, continued training of investigators as demonstrate how unchecked criminal broadening maritime legislation, and well as officials in the criminal justice syndicates raise criminal threats to engaging in capacity building in terms system. Such training also needs international crisis proportions if left of enhancing the capacity of their to focus, in addition to piracy, on unchecked.

Endnotes

1 Bueger, C. and J. Stockbruegger, Security communities, alliances and macrosecuritization: The practices of counter-piracy governance, in Piracy and Maritime Governance, Forthcoming in Michael J. Struett, Michael, Mark T. Nance and Jon D. Carlson, (eds). (London: Routledge, 2012): Chapter five. (See The Future of the Counter-Piracy Governance Arrangement in particular). 2 Bueger and Stockbruegger, op. cit., 2012, p. 21. 3 Danish Maritime Days, Maritime crime and the effects on growth and development in the African region, Seminar Report, 2014, p. 2. 4 Danish Maritime Days, op. cit., p.3. 5 Till, G. Seapower – A guide for the twenty first century, Oxon: Routledge, 3rd Ed, p. 283. 6 Ncube, M. & L. Baker, Beyond piracy and drugs: Unlocking Africa’s maritime potential and economic development, African Security Review, 20/1 2011. p 62. 7 Ncube and Baker, op. cit., p. 61. 8 United Nations, (UNDC Maritime Crime Programme, 2015) Available: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ en/piracy/index.html?ref=menuside Accessed 3 April 2016. 9 Middleton, R. Trends in piracy: A global problem with Somalia at the core .Selected Briefing Papers from Conference on Global Challenges, Region- al Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy, Dubai, 18-19 April 2011, p. 21. 10 Hawkes, R. Securing the off-shore oil industry in the Gulf of Guinea in Berube, C. and P. Cullen (eds) Maritime private security. Market responses to piracy terrorism and waterborne security risks in the 21st century, Routledge: London, p. 138. 11 Gartenstein-Ross, D.; Barr, N, Willcoxon, G. and N. Basuni, The crisis in North Africa. Implications for Europe and options for EU policymakers, Clingendael Report, April 2015, p.10. 12 Coelho, J.P.B. Southern African maritime security: Problems and prospects, in van Nieuwkerk, A. and K. Hofman (eds) Southern African Security Review, 2013, Fredrich-Ebert Stiftung and School of Governance, University of Witwatersrand, p. 127. 13 Google Maps, Maps of the World, Available: http://www.mapsofworld.com/africa/thematic/ Accessed 15 March 2015. 14 African Union, Regional Economic Communities, African Regional Economic Communities, Available: http://www.au.int/en/organs/recs Accessed 13 March 2016. 15 Calculated from ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, ICC IMB London, Report 1 January- 31 December 2015, January 2016, Table 1, p.5. 16 Nincic, D. State failure and the re-emergence of maritime piracy. Paper presented at the 49th Annual Convention of the International Studies

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Association, March 26-29, 2008, San Francisco pp. 12-19. 17 The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2015, World Justice Project, Washington DC. 18 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, London, Report 1 January- 31 December 2015, January 2016. 19 The scores range between 0 and 1, where 1 signifies the highest score [high rule of law adherence] and 0 signifies the lowest score [low rule of law adherence]. 20 World Justice Project, 2015, p.125; ICC-IMB, 2015, pp.59-67’. 21 Off the Horn of Africa, as well in the Gulf of Guinea, one finds heightened naval activities by way of international task forces (CTF-150 for example) or international naval exercises with African navies (EXERCISE OBANGAME EXPRESS) in the Gulf of Guinea to respond to maritime security threats, piracy in particular . 22 United Nations, Resolution 2184(2014), S/Res/2184/2014, 12 November 2014, p. 6/9. 23 UNODC, Afghan Opiate Trafficking Through the Southern Route, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2015, p. 90. 24 The Sydney Morning Herald. HMAS Melbourne seizes 427kg of heroin off smuggling ship in Indian Ocean. October 7, 2015. Available at http://www. smh.com.au/national/hmas-melbourne-seizes-427kg-of-heroin-in-indian-ocean-20151007-gk3ap2.html. Accessed 20 April 2016. 25 Mutambo, A. Cache of weapons headed for Somalia seized: Australian Navy. Daily Nation 7 March 2016. Available at http://www.nation.co.ke/ news/Australia-Navy-seizes-2000-weapons-on-Somalia-bound-boat/-/1056/3107002/-/p7c814/-/index.html. Accessed 20 April 2016. 26 United Nations, Maritime Crime Programme, UNODC, Annual Report 2014, p. 3. 27 Compiled from: Country analysis, African economic outlook 2015, ADBG, OECD, UNDP, Available: http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/. Accessed 19 March 2016. 28 Ukeje, C. and E. Mvovo, African approaches to maritime security: The Gulf of Guinea, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), FES: Abuja, 2013, pp. 21-23. 29 International Crisis Group, The Gulf of Guinea: The new danger zone, Africa Report No 195, International Crisis Group, p. 15. 30 INTERPOL, Study on fisheries crime in the West African coastal region, Environmental Security Sub-Directorate, Project Scale, September 2014. p.25. 31 Calculated from ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, ICC IMB London, Report 1 January- 31 December 2015, January 2016, Table 1, p.5. 32 Coelhoe, J.P.B. African approaches to maritime security: Southern Africa, Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013a, FES Mozambique, p.13. 33 Kahn, S. and S.B. Sing, The economics of transnational organised crime in the maritime domain: Drug trafficking in Africa and the southern African continent, Journal of Social Science, 41/3 2014, p. 532. 34 Coelhoe, 2013a, op. cit., p. 13. 35 South African Department of Defence, Address by L N Sisulu, MP, Minister of Defence and Military Veterans at the SADC Extraordinary Meeting on Regional Anti-Piracy Strategy, 25 July 2011. 36 Coelhoe, 2013a, op. cit. pp.16-17. 37 Royeppen, A. Rethinking challenges to SADCs maritime security model, 12 July 2015. [In]Focus, Refereed Blog of the Institute of Global Dialogue, Available: http://www.igd.org.za/index.php/11204-rethinking-challenges-to-sadc-s-maritime-security-model. Accessed 20 March 2016. 38 Gartenstein-Ross et al, op. cit., p. 18. 39 Ibid, p. 21. 40 Ibid, p. 41. 41 Lutterbeck, D. Policing migration in the Mediterranean, Mediterranean Politics, 11/1 2006. p.64. 42 United Nations, UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme, 2015. Available: https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/piracy/index.html. Accessed 20 April 2016. 43 United Nations, Report of the United Nations assessment mission on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea 7 to 24 November 2011, S/2012/45 dated 19 January 2012. 44 Ross, W. BBC News, Lagos. Surviving the pirates off the coast of Nigeria. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19555334. Accessed 20 April 2016. 45 Vogel, A. Investigating in Science and Technology to meet Africa’s Maritime Security Challenges, Africa Security Brief: A publication of the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, No 10 February 2011. Available: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/AfricaBriefFinal_10.pdf . Accessed 20 April 2016. 46 United Nations, 19 January 2012, op. cit. 47 UN Resolution 2018. 48 UN Resolution 2039. 49 United Nations, UNODC Maritime Crime Programme, 2015. Available: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/index.html?ref=menuside. 20 April 2016. 50 Lloyd’s, Lloyd’s List. 2013. Regional anti piracy code for West Africa. Posted on Tuesday July 2nd by Debbie. Available: http://www.intermanager. org/2013/07/west-african-states-sign-anti-piracy-code/ Accessed 20 April 2016. 51 Hang Zhou & K. Seibel, Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea: A greater Role for China? China Brief 15/1 The Jamestown Foundation, Jan- uary 9 2015. Available: http://www.jamestown.org/regions/africa/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43373&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=55&- cHash=483fbf16901b97355cef6d1dcc362e91#.VxZBi-ZO7IV. Accessed 20 April 2016. 52 UN Resolution 2039. 53 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, London, Report 1 January- 31 December 2015 p.29. 54 Agha, E. NIMSA raises alarm over frequent pirate attacks on ships, Daily Trust, 01 April 2016. Available: http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/news/nimasa-raises-alarm-over-frequent-pirates-attacks-on-ships/140530.html. Accessed 20 April 2016. 55 Till, G. Good order at sea: Revisiting the Imperative. In Vrey and Mandrup (eds). Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences. Sun Press,

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Stellenbosch, pp. 28-30. 56 Mashamaite, K.P. Minister Sisulu signs Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Maritime Security Cooperation with Tanzania and Mozambique, 16 February 2012. Available: http://www.dod.mil-za/news/news2012/february/mar-sec-coop-tan-moz.htm. Accessed 20 April 2016. 57 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships, London, Report, 1 January- 31 December 2015, p. 27. 58 Hensley, C. Cutlass 2016 concludes. 8 February 2016. Available: http://cne-cna-c6f.dodlive.mil/cutlass-express-2016-concludes/ Accessed 9 April 2016. 59 United Nations, UNODC Maritime Crime Programme 2015, op cit. 60 United Nations, United Nations Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2240 (2015), Security Council Authorizes Member States to Intercept Vessels off Libyan Coast Suspected of Migrant Smuggling, SC 12072, 9 October 2015, Available: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12072.doc.htm Accessed 14 April 2015. 61 Amnesty International, Europe moves to close the search and rescue gap in the Mediterranean, 27 May 2015. Available: https://www.amnesty.org/ en/latest/news/2015/05/european-union-moves-towards-closing-search-and-rescue-gap-in-the-mediterranean/ Accessed19 April 2016. 62 Tardy, T. Operation Sophia: Tackling the refugee crisis with military means. Brief 30/2015, European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2015, pp. 2-3.

Francois Vreÿ Associate Professor Faculty of Military Science Stellenbosch University Prof Vreÿ completed his PhD with the Institute for Futures Research of Stellenbosch University Business School with a thesis on emergent alternative military futures. He lectures in the Faculty of Military Science, Stellenbosch University, and is also the Research Coordinator for the Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA), Stellenbosch University. Prof Vreÿ is a C1 Rated Researcher of the National Research Foundation of South Africa, a former editor of the accredited academic journal Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies. He is also the South African associate of a partnership with the Faculty of the Royal Danish Defence College on strategic culture and Africa – a partnership that has culminated in four international conferences since 2009 on African military affairs and three books – the latest being Good Order at Sea: African Experiences (2014) and forthcoming The African Standby Force: Beyond 2015. His research interests include future warfare and Africa’s emerging maritime security setting. He also lectures to military staff courses of the SA National Defence Force and the Royal Danish Defence College, is visiting lecturer with the University of Namibia (UNAMIB) and serves as supervisor, co-supervisor, and examiner for Masters and PhD candidates within the faculty as well as externally. Contact particulars : E-mail - [email protected] Phone - +27 22 7023106

Prof Henri Fouché Prof Henri Fouché is a Senior Researcher at Stellenbosch University’s Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa (SIGLA) After matriculating from school he attended the South African Merchant Navy Academy in Cape Town after which he spent 3 years at sea, sailing on various merchant vessels. After leaving the sea he embarked on a career in law enforcement, retiring in 1995 from the South African Police in the rank of Colonel. During his law enforcement career he served in various positions, including Area Com- mander at the International Airport in Johannesburg and Deputy Director of the Interpol National Central Bureau (NCB) in Pretoria. In 2001 Henri embarked on a career in tertiary education and has experience in lecturing on the investigation of crime, contemporary crime issues and supervising masters and doctoral students. In 2006 he was awarded a doctorate from the Tshwane University of Technology for a thesis on the policing of maritime piracy and in 2007 his name was included in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) roster of experts. In 2009 Henri was awarded a scholarship “Criminal Law and Sea Piracy” at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, Germany, and has since published on the policing of piracy in national and international journals and has presented papers on the subject at national and international conferences. Henri lives on the West Coast of South Africa and his interests include research on crime at sea, policing and the criminal justice system.

47 HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

7th NMIOTC Annual Conference, 07-09 JUN 16

Visit of COM JFC NAPLES Adm. Michelle Howard US (N), 22 JUN 16

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Visit of the Romanian Chief of the Navy Real Admiral(UH) Alexandru Mirsu Ph.D. , 07 JUL 16

EUNAVFORMED delegation site survey, 22 JUL 16

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1st Cyber Security Conference, 4-5 OCT 16

Visit of SACEUR Gen. C. Scaparrotti USA (A) , 04 OCT 16

50 HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

8th Birtday of NMIOTC, 14 OCT 16

In Brief meeting for op. SEA GUARDIAN, 05 NOV 16

51 HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

Visit of Egyptian delegation, 10 NOV 16

Exercise MEDUSA 16, 05,07-08 DEC 16

52 NMIOTC TRAINING

Resident Course 14000, 13-17 JUN 16

Training of ITS BERGAMINI, 21-23 JUN 16

53 NMIOTC TRAINING

Training of German FBD Team, 11-22 JUL 16

Weapons Proficiency Training 11 OCT 16

54 NMIOTC TRAINING

Resident Course 18000 Maritime Biometrics Collection and Tactical Forensic Site Exploitation, 17-21 OCT 16

Resident Course 12000 C-IED Considerations in MIO, 31 OCT - 04 NOV 16

55 NMIOTC TRAINING

Resident Course 7000 MIO in support of Counter Piracy, 07-14 NOV 16

Resident Course 13000 MIO in Support of Migration Related Operations, 14-18 NOV 16

56 57 Hellenic Army Printing Office Hellenic Crete, Hellas NMIOTC/ΚΕΝΑΠ Phone: +30 28210 85710 Souda Bay 732 00 Chania

58 www.nmiotc.nato.int Webpage: E mail: [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]