Afghan National Security Forces lead patrol with coalition mentors in Ghowrmach district

U.S. Navy (Brian P. Seymour)

he Afghan barber cutting my hair at an American installation in Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned had a good life by Afghan Tstandards. So when I asked what he thought of the post- era, I had every reason to expect a favorable review. But as he pondered his response, I could tell that he was choosing his words carefully. Finally, he Reforming answered, “I don’t approve of what the Taliban did to the people, but it is now very difficult to move around the country . . . and there is a the Afghan lot of corruption in the government.” The first part of his response was ironic, as it was the Taliban’s insurgent activities that had created National Police the need for the heightened transportation security that made travel slow. But the second part of his response was telling. For him, it would be the success or failure of our nontra- By Lewis G. Irwin ditional, nonmilitary stability and reconstruc- tion operations that would ultimately shape his decision whether to support the popularly Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and elected government of . non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. . . . [T]hese campaigns will fail if waged by military Colonel Lewis G. Irwin, USAR, returned from Afghanistan in February 2008, where he led Focused 1 means alone. District Development, a nationwide effort to reform the Afghan National Police. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University.

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My interest in his response was as much The Mission other elements of the civil justice system and professional as personal, since my mission Arriving in Kabul in August of 2007, Afghan society, in order to enable the Afghans in Afghanistan was to lead the team charged I had no idea that I would be handed the to manage their own security. The North with designing and implementing a nation- mission of a lifetime: in a few short weeks, Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) identi- wide reform of the Afghan National Police I was assigned to the Force Integration and fied these elements as vital steps toward the (ANP). While most Afghan governing institu- Training section of the Combined Secu- ultimate goal of creating a stable, secure, and tions had long been viewed with suspicion by rity Transition Command–Afghanistan self-sustaining Afghanistan.5 the people, the Afghan police were especially (CSTC–A). Our mission was to oversee the Put into a broader context, this undertak- distrusted as a result of their lengthy history design, fielding, and development of the ing would be a daunting one. The local Afghan of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. and ANP, as well as police are organized into almost 400 police Furthermore, these same police officers the Afghan government agencies administer- districts outside of Kabul, as well as dozens of served as the real face of the Afghan govern- ing those security forces. My arrival coincided police precincts in the capital itself. Numbering ment for average citizens, as they were the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine political leaders will expect the military to take a leading basis.2 So in keeping with the basic tenets of role in these missions, given our comparative advantages in our counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and organizational structure, resources, and sustainability the irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, we would have to fix the Afghan police—and the government agencies admin- with the conclusion of a multilateral confer- about 82,000 altogether, the police are often istering them—as a critical step toward con- ence aimed at considering plans to reform called upon to fight as frontline first respond- vincing the people to support the popularly the ANP, as the Afghan government and the ers in the counterinsurgency in addition to elected government instead of the Taliban international community had come to recog- carrying out their basic law enforcement and alternative. This article describes the scope nize both the criticality of the police force to criminal investigative responsibilities. This and challenges of these major stability opera- the COIN effort as well as the ANP’s glaring reform process would be made even more tions missions, while highlighting relevant lack of success to date. The major product of difficult by the fractious nature of internal elements of our new COIN doctrine—central the conference was a set of PowerPoint slides Afghan politics, as well as the remnants of to the IW concept—as they relate to opera- that generally described a district-by-district Soviet organizational culture that persist in tionalization, or using the COIN doctrine as approach to police reform, dubbed “Focused the basis for specific action plans. District Development” (FDD).3 As is often A few comments are appropriate at the case, the Afghans and their international Afghan National Army and the outset. While some of what follows may community partners—except for the Amer- Police assume responsibility sound like criticism, the exact opposite is icans—had hedged their bets by expressing for Bak district after training true. In my experience, our leaders and tentative support for the police reform by U.S. Army Military Police troops are working extremely hard to realize concept in principle while simultaneously success in these missions. As an institution, avoiding any firm commitments of assistance however, we have not gotten our planning or resources. and operating mechanisms right just yet. At Typical of any stability or reconstruc- the same time, it is likely that our military tion mission, reforming the ANP would be will be called upon to carry out many more a multilayered, complex undertaking. In of these missions, given the nature of IW Afghanistan, the police forces consist of seven operations and the “long wars” currently different public safety and security organiza- under way. One only has to look at the struc- tions, with basic missions and organization ture of U.S. Africa Command to see more outlined in the Afghan government’s Strategic evidence of our military’s likely future role Capabilities Plan.4 National civil order police, in the application of soft power instruments border patrolmen, district police, the coun- of American influence. Furthermore, it is ternarcotics force, the counterterrorism force, likely that our political leaders will continue criminal investigators, and even the Afghan to expect the military to take a leading role fire departments all fall under the Ministry of among the other U.S. Government agencies the Interior (MOI) umbrella. But while each participating in these missions, given our of these agencies has its own distinct set of comparative advantages in organizational issues and challenges, the leadership decided structure, resources, and sustainability. to reform the traditional district-level police Accordingly, this article outlines some poten- first, given their direct interactions with tial pitfalls and challenges facing the leaders the people. At the same time, reforming the who will plan and execute these stability mis- police would require further developing the sions in the years to come. MOI’s administrative capabilities, as well as U.S. Army (Casey Ware) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 71 COMMENTARY | Reforming the Afghan National Police

Afghan National Police on patrol return fire on spear in crafting and executing the plan—and combined (allied), joint, interagency, and mul- fleeing Taliban members getting the warfighters’ “buy-in” as a precon- ticomponent headquarters organization, one dition for participation. Unlike conventional ultimately working through the interagency military operations, which derive their unity process while sharing key decisions with the of command through a hierarchical chain, sovereign Afghan government. CSTC–A stability and reconstruction operations by also depends heavily on contracted civilian their nature require negotiation, compromise, police mentors for the Afghan police training and the inclusion of a wide variety of actors effort, though ironically those contractors in the decisionmaking process, each bring- are employed by the State Department and ing to the table different resources, concerns, ultimately accountable to that agency rather and areas of authority. Our COIN doctrine than the military. Conversely, CSTC–A con- speaks to this challenge in its section on trols the massive funds associated with the “unity of effort.” 7 Without question, achieving development of the Afghan forces, and as such consensus around a plan of action is often the can wield disproportionate influence over that most difficult aspect of successful stability aspect of the process. operations. Nevertheless, both our international In the ANP case, the relevant U.S. agen- partners and the Afghan leaders would not cies and actors included the U.S. Ambassador hesitate to let us know when they disagreed and Embassy; U.S. Central Command and with us, or when their interests did not its subordinate CSTC–A; the U.S. national coincide with ours. For example, a senior command element and subordinate brigade representative from an allied embassy stated combat teams; the Department of State’s bluntly to me on one occasion, “If you Ameri- Justice Sector Support Program, U.S. Agency cans succeed, then we are with you. If you

U.S. Marine Corps (Jason T. Guiliano) for International Development, and Bureau fail, you are on your own . . . and we think of International Narcotics and Law Enforce- you will fail.” At another juncture, the U.S. ment Affairs; and numerous others. The Afghan government agencies.6 Added to this long list of relevant international entities and challenging mix was the fact that corruption is nongovernmental organizations included without question, achieving an entrenched feature of Afghan culture, where the European Union Police, United Nations “one-fisted” corruption—or theft perpetrated Assistance Mission–Afghanistan, Interna- consensus around a plan to feed one’s family or tribe—is viewed as just tional Police Coordinating Board, NATO’s of action is often the most another routine feature of life. Any effort at International Security Assistance Force difficult aspect of successful professionalizing the police would have to take (ISAF), and an extensive array of embassies, stability operations place within a context of abject poverty, wide- international organizations, and other actors spread illiteracy, a thriving and well-connected with widely varying interests, resources, and drug trade, porous borders, and an almost agendas. Representative of the convoluted Ambassador directed me not to consult with total absence of the basic elements of rule of decisionmaking structures in these types of one very senior Afghan official because he law, ranging from criminal investigators to operations, CSTC–A answers directly to U.S. felt that U.S. interests were a mismatch with lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and jails. Without Central Command but must consult with the that official’s political goals. Privately, some doubt, we had our work cut out for us, and this Ambassador and Embassy while working in leaders believed that there were governments problem would not be solved in a matter of parallel with the U.S. warfighters, themselves operating with us in Afghanistan that wanted months, but rather years. at least nominally subordinate to the NATO to see the Afghans succeed while the United ISAF commander. It was not unusual to find States failed. But in any event, the decision- The Operational Environment our allies’ military commands disagreeing making authority and jurisdictional centers of Armed then with about 60 PowerPoint with their own embassies regarding the gravity routinely shifted along with changes slides and a rough idea of how this nationwide shape and direction of their countries’ poli- in key leaders, allied government agendas, reform ought to look, our team set to the tasks cies and preferences. Afghan preferences, and various elements of of fleshing out a specific structure for the Similarly, it was commonly under- U.S. policy. Leaders cannot underestimate the FDD program and pitching the concept to stood within NATO, the European Union challenges associated with this tough opera- the numerous players who would have to be Police, and other multinational organiza- tional environment or the amount of effort it brought on board for the initiative to achieve tions that the constituent members were far takes to build and maintain consensus around legitimacy and success. Ultimately, this effort more concerned about the reactions of their any major new initiative. would involve interacting with the highest home governments to their decisions and levels of NATO, U.S., international commu- actions than they were to the reactions of Key Lessons Learned nity, and Afghan leadership, but the nature of the appointed leaders of the organizations in What follows are 10 key lessons I learned the operations would also require involving Afghanistan. Likewise, CSTC–A has to deal from the experience of designing and setting key leaders all the way out to the point of the with its own internal array of interests, as a in motion one of these major stability opera-

72 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu IRWIN tions, offered as food for thought for the rising vincial Reconstruction Teams to the police number of police mentor teams falls far short leaders who will carry out similar missions, reform effort, as he believed that they would of the number needed to provide district-level as well as those charged with refining our continue to pursue their own governments’ coverage throughout the country, resulting in emerging IW doctrine. visions of Afghan redevelopment, regard- some districts only being visited sporadically Fragmented Decisionmaking Author- less of what vision was put forth by the ISAF or not at all.9 At the same time, the civilian ity and Incoherence of Vision. One of the leadership. police mentors hired by the State Department key challenges of the operations in Afghani- While a certain amount of this fragmen- to provide civilian law enforcement expertise stan and in other IW environments is the tation and incoherence of vision is unavoid- to the developing Afghan police forces do not fragmented nature of decisionmaking, with able, there are steps mission leaders can take have the flexibility to deploy into the areas numerous actors bringing their own agendas, to mitigate challenges. Keeping in mind that where they are needed the most, for reasons interests, resources, and areas of authority to “unity of intent” is the goal, constant com- of force protection and nonpermissive threat the table on most decisions of consequence. munication and negotiation are both critical conditions. Nor do they typically bring a Sol- This situation can be frustrating for U.S. to success. Typical mechanisms for bringing dier’s mindset to the tasks at hand. As a result, leaders, as they see the United States pro- about this communication are standing work there is a real mismatch between the force viding the preponderance of the resources groups, joint planning groups, civil-military structure needed to carry out the Afghan earmarked for Afghan development but then operations centers, joint interagency coor- police development mission and the resources having to accommodate various international dinating groups, and other ad hoc steering available on the ground. players who insist on having input into key groups.8 Wherever possible, it is important to In terms of potential corrective courses decisions on the commitment of those funds. get leaders with real decisionmaking author- of action, John Nagl has suggested the cre- The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghani- ity, both host nation and coalition, to partici- ation of a “combat advisory corps,” consist- stan (LOTFA), an international panel charged pate routinely in these groups. By definition, ing of professional Soldiers organized and with setting Afghan police salaries, is a good the decentralized and fluid nature of stability trained to meet these specific needs as their example of this convoluted organizational operations requires leaders at all levels and primary mission.10 At the very least, however, structure. LOTFA is an international body, in all interested organizations to understand there are three corrective courses of action with United Nations and allied representation, the broader goals and specific objectives at that leaders can take to mitigate the effects although the United States provides the great the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of of force structure/mission mismatches. First, majority of the funds used to pay Afghan the effort. Leaders cannot underestimate the we should choose our best leaders to interact police. Thus, the United States often has to amount of effort it will take to get everyone on with the indigenous leaders, essentially negotiate with LOTFA before spending its the same page. placing the “A team” in those positions of own money. Similarly convoluted interagency Force Structure Mismatches with responsibility. Second, we can collocate our decisionmaking occurs between CSTC–A and Mission Requirements. Stability and recon- mentors, supporting staff operations, and the State Department. struction operations usually require a variety the developing indigenous leaders and their With all of these players active in the of skills and resources that do not routinely staffs. Too often, U.S. staffs work so hard to decisionmaking process, the different govern- reside within the U.S. military. Furthermore, meet current mission requirements that they ments and nongovernmental organizations involved often advocate competing visions for Afghanistan’s future, and too often they with all of these players active in the decisionmaking process, pursue these visions regardless of decisions the different governments and nongovernmental organizations or agreements to the contrary. With no one player having enough leverage or authority involved often advocate competing visions for Afghanistan’s future to direct otherwise, this fragmentation leads to incoherence in the collective interna- tional redevelopment effort in Afghanistan, by definition these missions, with their lose sight of the longer term objective of the resulting in a great deal of wasted effort and emphasis on mentoring and coaching, place effort—training the host nation forces and generally ineffective results. Not surprisingly, a premium on senior-level leaders with the agencies to sustain themselves and their own the Afghans often play one international talent, experience, temperament, and cred- operations. Collocating the two parts of the actor off against the other until they find ibility to interact effectively with indigenous team would force that development to occur. the answer that they want. The internal U.S. leaders. Put another way, these operations Finally, strip all nonessential staff personnel organizational structure, with its interagency, require augmentation with subject matter from the supporting staff functions and place combined, and joint flavor, adds to this chal- experts from various fields relevant to the them into positions where they can make the lenge, as each of the key agencies operating in tasks at hand, as well as enough senior leaders most significant and direct contribution to the Afghanistan experiences frequent turnover to build the developing agencies and organiza- mentoring effort. and shifting internal visions, providing the tions. Unfortunately, our force structure—in Weak Interagency Coordinating Mech- Afghans additional opportunities to exploit Afghanistan at least—falls well short of this anisms and Execution. The prevailing model seams. In one telling example, a high-ranking standard, in terms of both the required skill of interagency coordination in Afghanistan NATO ISAF leader felt that he could not sets on the ground and the adequacy of the could be described as the “bubble up” method. pledge the support of his subordinate Pro- mentor coverage. For example, the basic Periodic direct coordination among the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 73 COMMENTARY | Reforming the Afghan National Police highest level leaders occasionally generated Afghan National Police officer stands guard at broad policy compromises, but those meetings checkpoint while Soldiers provide overwatch did not provide the specific terms needed to implement the agreements reached. Instead, routine interagency coordination took place in lower level work groups that identified and attempted to resolve problems at the lowest level possible. Theoretically, then, problems that could not be resolved at the lower level would bubble up to successive levels until they reached a level at which the participants had the authority to make a decision. While this system offers advantages in terms of managing senior-level work load, it also brings with it some major disadvantages. For example, this model assumes that the lower level participants in the process remain engaged, informed, and responsive, and it

assumes away the stovepiping of information U.S. Army (Michael L. Casteel) typical within most agencies, as well as the frequent turnover and absences of agency representatives from the working groups that with our coalition and international com- organization. In a real sense, we are creating occur for all manner of reasons. Given that munity partners is that each player brings dif- and bringing together an ad hoc version of these optimistic assumptions never held up ferent interests, visions, and resources to the what Hugh Heclo called an “issue network,” over time, the bubble-up system tended to table. Furthermore, the NATO and European consisting of all of the players with an interest exacerbate the fragmented and incoherent Union agencies operating within Afghanistan in a desired outcome.11 nature of policymaking and implementation, are not unitary actors, as the various leaders of Challenges of Host Nation’s Politics, too often thwarting the unity of effort that we those organizations ultimately answer to their Leadership, and Society. As military officers, aim to achieve. Likewise, this decentralized, home governments before yielding on policy we are by nature action-oriented people; that bottom-up process too often delayed collec- questions. As a result, it can be difficult to is, give us a mission and get out of the way. tive action because key decisionmakers were gain approval for significant new initiatives, By definition, however, stability operations not engaged until late in the process. Viewed or to steer an existing program in a different take place within a political context, subject comprehensively, the interagency process was direction. to the influences and vagaries of host-nation weak and largely ad hoc in nature. Moreover, it is important to understand politics and economics. In the case of the There are several ways that mission that while all aim to achieve “progress in Afghan police reforms, the impact of Afghan leaders can improve this process, however. Afghanistan,” each country and each partici- politics, leadership, and operating context The first potential corrective for systemic pating organization has different interests that added another—and ultimate—layer to the interagency problems involves seeking senior- they are protecting and different definitions of process of securing approval for the direction leader command emphasis, not only from the that end. Our effort may require overcoming and shape of the nationwide reform. That military side of the interagency process, but outright opposition or resentment, or major is, it was necessary not only to negotiate the also from the senior and midlevel leaders of constraints on resources. Along these lines, shape of the program with the international the other participating agencies. It is also criti- one allied ambassador, for domestic political community, but also to seek guidance and cal to identify key leaders of real ability, with reasons, was quite open about his country’s approval from the Afghan leaders at the outset resources of organizational political capital inability to deliver on its major commit- of the enterprise, as well as final approval once and sharing like-minded visions for the ments to the police reform effort. Another a rough consensus was achieved among the desired endstate, in each of the participating international coordinating body was wholly international community players. Likewise, agencies. Another related and complementary incapable of performing the basic functions the fact that this country is one with no con- approach is to develop ad hoc, agile informa- for which it was created, but it was neverthe- nectivity, no electricity, limited public infra- tion-sharing and decisionmaking structures, less important to include that agency in every structure, no legitimate economy, and a gov- consisting of participants with the ability to deliberation to maintain the legitimacy of ernment with only limited influence across establish priorities, make resource decisions, the process in the eyes of the international the country makes the simplest activities, and pull together the systems, products, community. Therefore, as is the case with the including paying the police or providing uni- consensus, and resources needed to move the interagency process, in dealing with these forms and training, extremely difficult.12 It is mission forward. various players, it is critical to share as much critical to identify the right indigenous “go-to” Allied Relationships. While we like to information as possible, while negotiating leaders and to develop their staffs to set the think that we are all members of the same openly and in good faith with the talented conditions for success. In the case of Afghan team, the basic reality of U.S. relationships and like-minded leaders identified in each police reform, Deputy Minister for Security

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Mohammad Munir Mangal was that critical functions, deadlines, or other benchmarks both Dari and English and involving mission leader in the MOI, though we spent a great and metrics for measuring progress holisti- planning with the U.S., allied, international deal of time with other key Afghan leaders cally. The solution for this challenge involves community, and Afghan leaders who would as well in order to navigate through compet- establishing both the basic doctrine for the actually carry out the reform tasks within the ing Afghan interests and factions. It was also forces as well as creating and implementing districts. This training and mission prepara- necessary to train the midlevel Afghan staff any necessary accountability mechanisms and tion covered a full spectrum of topics and officers needed to support the operations performance measures. Both of these efforts tasks relevant to the reformers, from police within MOI, as those staff capabilities did not are under way now in Afghanistan. Section operations to administration to Afghan yet exist within the Afghan government. 6–64 of the COIN doctrine makes mention of culture to local intelligence, and was taught Lack of Doctrine and Accountability. this challenge, but it is notably thin in terms of by subject matter experts from throughout As members of an action-oriented organiza- proposing particular standards or evaluation the international community and the Afghan tion, another of our tendencies as military techniques.14 As such, the mission leader will government. It is vitally important to listen to officers is to want simply to “get something have to consult with the various players to the indigenous leaders and local citizens on done.” Partly as a result of this tendency, define the standards and implement the cor- the ground in the reforming areas, and there the police force’s basic doctrine lagged well responding assessment mechanisms. is no substitute for the leader’s own consis- behind the actual fielding of personnel, Preparing Junior Leaders for Chal- tent interaction with the personnel actually equipment, and facilities, with many adverse lenging Missions. As a young company executing the mission. consequences. The Army uses the DOTMLPF commander in the 1st Armored Division in Decentralized Execution. IW missions (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, the early 1990s, my professional challenges require leaders who can move easily between leadership and education, personnel, and were fairly straightforward, and the Army had the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of prepared me well for them. Like other young planning and execution. So while my interac- leaders, I fit comfortably into a structured tions with senior U.S., Afghan, and interna- this decentralized, bottom- and hierarchical environment that reinforced tional leaders were vital steps, the truth was up process too often delayed success while self-correcting any problems that these leaders’ agreements and directives collective action because that emerged. Conversely, modern operations would not go far without buy-in and vigorous provide few if any similar opportunities for execution by a wide variety of subordinate key decisionmakers were our junior leaders, in spite of the fact that it leaders spread throughout the operational not engaged until late in the is they who have the most profound impact theater. Furthermore, the ultimate success or process upon the success or failure of these decen- failure of these operations would depend upon tralized operations. Our junior officers and the mission preparation, comprehension of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are the intent, and commitment to the mission by the facilities) model of force development cap- key executive agents, but they typically lack captains, lieutenants, NCOs, and Soldiers car- tured in Field Manual 100–11, Force Integra- the basic frame of reference and experience rying out reform and training missions. Since tion, as the guide for creating and modifying needed for interacting with the local power- U.S. force structure.13 There is good reason brokers, indigenous trainees, local citizens, that the D—doctrine—comes first in that international players, and others who will the police force’s basic acronym. However, in Afghanistan it has been determine the success or failure of the broader doctrine lagged well behind necessary to get as much force structure into effort. the actual fielding of the field as fast as possible due to the ongoing Furthermore, awareness of other cul- insurgency. As a result, there are major gaps tures is not a strong suit in the U.S. military’s personnel, equipment, and in the base doctrine covering police force own organizational culture. So instead of facilities, with many adverse structure, roles, and missions. Likewise, the tapping into the intelligence resources avail- consequences CSTC–A leaders who validate the force struc- able to us through indigenous partners, too ture decisions and the training, equipping, often we draw our own conclusions about and fielding priorities largely do so on the the “good guys and bad guys,” in some cases we were using four different regional training basis of their perception of the current situ- equating speaking English with being a “good facilities spread across Afghanistan for police ation, rather than basing those decisions on guy.” We also tend to impose Western models overhaul, this decentralization meant working some coherent, commonly understood vision where they do not necessarily fit, setting up hard to ensure that all of the players had a of the force’s endstate. the new host nation organizations for failure common operating picture of the standards, Not surprisingly, then, the development and arousing resistance from our partners. procedures, and expectations of the FDD of the Afghan army is well ahead of the devel- A strength of the COIN manual is that it program. opment of the Afghan police, as we are much defines this problem while taking the first Decentralized execution of these mis- more comfortable building an army than a steps forward in changing the military’s basic sions also means that we cannot expect police force, most often applying our own mindset.15 In the case of the Afghan police cookie-cutter results, as variability in local doctrinal template in building their army. The reforms, we sought to overcome this institu- circumstances, resources, and leadership challenges of this process are exacerbated by tional bias through intensive NATO-Afghan will lead to a variety of outcomes. Accord- a lack of accountability mechanisms, forcing combined reform team training, conducted in ingly, it is critical to achieve clear lines of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 75 COMMENTARY | Reforming the Afghan National Police

­communication; common training and ate and poor while the society has a history German model and Afghan circumstances, as reform standards clearly articulated in a of government incompetence and corrup- well as the low rate of production of trained mission order; and centralized mission tion. Leaders need to guard against focusing personnel. Upon taking responsibility for preparation and training. It is important to exclusively on the training of the individual police development, the United States ini- share lessons learned and tactics, techniques, police officers, or the lower level units of tially replaced this focus on quality with an and procedures as the process unfolds. the particular security forces. Additionally, emphasis on quantity. That approach, while This goal involves setting up a robust com- it is important to build a force appropriate fielding individual police at a far higher rate, munications network, securing vertical to that society’s culture and circumstances, did nothing to address the ineffectiveness of and lateral coordinating authority across rather than trying to impose an inappropriate the police leadership at the district level, or in commands, and conducting recurring and Western model or process. In Afghanistan, the administration of the police forces at the widely distributed after-action reviews. the German government had the original national or provincial levels. Instead, leaders Lastly, it is important to create and maintain responsibility for developing the police forces, must take a holistic approach—or systems knowledge centers—secure and nonsecure and it attempted to create a highly profes- perspective on the operational environment share points—where the most current imple- sional Western-style police force comparable approach—if there is to be any chance of mentation documents, such as inspection to ones found in Europe. The approach overcoming the wholesale political, organi- checklists, points of contact, and operations fell short for a variety of reasons, but chief zational, and societal challenges of creating a orders, are available as appropriate. In these among them was the mismatch between the functioning and professional institution. The IW environments, published documents scope of the problem includes economics, cul- tend to be out of date by the time they are tural norms, family issues, pay, basic means of approved and published. In the case of the the ultimate success or failure identification, illiteracy, and a range of other ANP, the Afghanistan National Police Smart- major challenges. book was published just prior to my arrival in of these operations would Impact of the Nonpermissive Security theater, but it was far out of date by the end depend upon the captains, Environment. As our COIN doctrine states, of my assignment 6 months later.16 lieutenants, NCOs, and insurgents understand that the essential Challenges of Training Indigenous Soldiers carrying out reform objective is to undermine the people’s confi- Forces. Training host-nation forces is hard and training missions dence in existing governing institutions. They work, particularly when the people are illiter- use terror as a means to this end, and these nonpermissive security environments have a profound impact upon a leader’s ability to reach out to the people and indigenous leaders who are partners in the enterprise. Given our usual force protection posture, it is common for U.S. forces to rush from one secured site to another, thus limiting their interaction with U.S. Army (Johnny R. Aragon) the average citizens and reducing the sense of actually living with their Afghan partners. The enemy understands the costs and other effects of their asymmetric threats, and they aim to create a “bunker mentality” within the security forces that further separates the people from their government and their protectors. Mission leaders must seek every opportunity to overcome this institutional bias, enhancing the interaction among the people, the indigenous government, its security forces, and our own troops. Ideally, we will find a way to work side by side with our counterparts so that eventually we can “leave quietly,” having helped them to develop procedures, infrastructure, and relationships needed to enable their government and their security forces to function effectively. In the complex world of IW operations, that seam- less transition represents the ultimate success. Afghan National Army soldiers and Border Police confiscate weapons and ammunition found during search

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Implications challenge and to succeed in these soft power Notes Much like Sun Tzu’s Art of War, our missions. Put another way, now is the time to COIN doctrine and the broader IW joint work smarter, rather than harder, and to equip 1 Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare operating concept offer key guiding principles our force with the skills and tools needed to (IW) Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0 (Wash- that help to inform the stability mission leader enable success in these complex, challenging, ington, DC: Department of Defense, September 11, about the challenges of the IW operating envi- and vital tasks—while developing the specific, 2007), 1. 2 See Andrew Wilder, Cops or Robbers? The ronment and the planning and preparation dedicated subject matter expertise within the Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, needed for success in these critical endeavors. force that will enable us to fall in effectively Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit Issues Paper In some instances, the doctrine offers particu- with the various theaters in which we will Series (Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghan Research and lar techniques that can be used to craft spe- likely operate. Evaluation Unit, July 2007). cific action plans, providing our leaders with 3 Police Mentor Synchronization Conference a means to operationalize those key guiding As a joint force we have made great briefing slides, an unpublished and unclassified principles to accomplish their mission. But in strides in the last several years in this “change PowerPoint presentation from the Combined Secu- many more cases, the doctrine and operating of mission,” and it is likely that our military rity Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), concept merely redefine the nature of the will be called upon to conduct many more July 8, 2007; and Focused District Development problem at hand, as our leaders are challenged stability missions in the future, applying Workshop, also an unpublished and unclassified to figure out for themselves how to go about American soft power using the military’s presentation from the same command, August 27–28, 2007. solving complex problems for which they organizational capabilities as the coordinating 4 Zarar Hamad, Strategic Capabilities Plan may have little relevant training, experience, delivery mechanism. So there is no question (Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghan Ministry of the Inte- or background. Without question, the COIN about the importance and relevance of these rior, August 13, 2007), 6–13. doctrine and IW joint operating concept missions, but it is also clear that we have not 5 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Progress make important contributions to our joint quite gotten the model right just yet. The in Afghanistan: Bucharest Summit 2–4 April 2008 force through their respective calls to leaders counterinsurgency manual and irregular (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, April 2008), 10. to rethink the basic approach to stability warfare joint operating concept are fine first 6 Wilder. missions. However, we still have much work steps, and they outline the basic core prin- 7 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsur- to do in preparing our leaders to provide the ciples that are central to mission success. But gency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago innovative, creative, and nuanced thinking these documents are no substitute for innova- Press, 2007), sections I–121 and I–122. 8 that is required for mission success—thinking tive, enlightened, and informed leadership— Ibid. See section 2 for a discussion of these groups. that goes far beyond the traditional mission leadership that must fully understand the 9 Candace Rondeaux, “A Ragtag Pursuit of the preparation that has dominated our institu- cultural, political, and economic parameters Taliban: U.S. Effort to Train Afghans as Counter- tional training and leader development in the of the particular IW environments in which insurgency Force Is Far from Finished,” The Wash- past. Accordingly, the next step forward for they will serve. We simply cannot afford to ington Post, August 6, 2008, A1. Rondeaux quotes our joint force is to redevelop the institutional continue to take an ad hoc approach to mis- CSTC–A commander MG Robert Cone as saying training base, and to identify and dissemi- sions that will be increasingly central to U.S. that the police mentoring effort falls short by 2,300 nate the tactics, techniques, and procedures national security interests in the 21st century. mentors. needed to achieve success, thus enabling our JFQ 10 John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation: leaders to appreciate the magnitude of the It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2007). 11 Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Execu- tive Establishment,” in The New American Political System, ed. Anthony King (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 87–124. 12 These challenges are outlined in Interna- tional Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police (Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 30, 2007). 13 Field Manual (FM) 100–11, Force Integration (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, January 1998). 14 U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, 220. 15 FM 100–11. 16 Task Force Phoenix–Police Advisory Cell, Afghanistan National Police Smartbook (Kabul, Afghanistan: Task Force Phoenix Headquarters, June 30, 2007). Marines provide marksmanship training to Afghan National Police recruits DOD (Gene Allen Ainsworth III)

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