Afghan National Security Forces lead patrol with coalition mentors in Ghowrmach district U.S. Navy (Brian P. Seymour) he Afghan barber cutting my hair at an American installation in Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned Kabul had a good life by Afghan Tstandards. So when I asked what he thought of the post-Taliban era, I had every reason to expect a favorable review. But as he pondered his response, I could tell that he was choosing his words carefully. Finally, he Reforming answered, “I don’t approve of what the Taliban did to the people, but it is now very difficult to move around the country . and there is a the Afghan lot of corruption in the government.” The first part of his response was ironic, as it was the Taliban’s insurgent activities that had created National Police the need for the heightened transportation security that made travel slow. But the second part of his response was telling. For him, it would be the success or failure of our nontra- By LEWIS G. IRWIN ditional, nonmilitary stability and reconstruc- tion operations that would ultimately shape his decision whether to support the popularly Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and elected government of Afghanistan. non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. [T]hese campaigns will fail if waged by military Colonel Lewis G. Irwin, USAR, returned from Afghanistan in February 2008, where he led Focused 1 means alone. District Development, a nationwide effort to reform the Afghan National Police. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University. 70 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu IRWIN My interest in his response was as much The Mission other elements of the civil justice system and professional as personal, since my mission Arriving in Kabul in August of 2007, Afghan society, in order to enable the Afghans in Afghanistan was to lead the team charged I had no idea that I would be handed the to manage their own security. The North with designing and implementing a nation- mission of a lifetime: in a few short weeks, Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) identi- wide reform of the Afghan National Police I was assigned to the Force Integration and fied these elements as vital steps toward the (ANP). While most Afghan governing institu- Training section of the Combined Secu- ultimate goal of creating a stable, secure, and tions had long been viewed with suspicion by rity Transition Command–Afghanistan self-sustaining Afghanistan.5 the people, the Afghan police were especially (CSTC–A). Our mission was to oversee the Put into a broader context, this undertak- distrusted as a result of their lengthy history design, fielding, and development of the ing would be a daunting one. The local Afghan of corruption, cronyism, and incompetence. Afghan National Army and ANP, as well as police are organized into almost 400 police Furthermore, these same police officers the Afghan government agencies administer- districts outside of Kabul, as well as dozens of served as the real face of the Afghan govern- ing those security forces. My arrival coincided police precincts in the capital itself. Numbering ment for average citizens, as they were the representatives of the government most likely to interact with the local people on a routine political leaders will expect the military to take a leading basis.2 So in keeping with the basic tenets of role in these missions, given our comparative advantages in our counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and organizational structure, resources, and sustainability the irregular warfare (IW) joint operating concept, we would have to fix the Afghan police—and the government agencies admin- with the conclusion of a multilateral confer- about 82,000 altogether, the police are often istering them—as a critical step toward con- ence aimed at considering plans to reform called upon to fight as frontline first respond- vincing the people to support the popularly the ANP, as the Afghan government and the ers in the counterinsurgency in addition to elected government instead of the Taliban international community had come to recog- carrying out their basic law enforcement and alternative. This article describes the scope nize both the criticality of the police force to criminal investigative responsibilities. This and challenges of these major stability opera- the COIN effort as well as the ANP’s glaring reform process would be made even more tions missions, while highlighting relevant lack of success to date. The major product of difficult by the fractious nature of internal elements of our new COIN doctrine—central the conference was a set of PowerPoint slides Afghan politics, as well as the remnants of to the IW concept—as they relate to opera- that generally described a district-by-district Soviet organizational culture that persist in tionalization, or using the COIN doctrine as approach to police reform, dubbed “Focused the basis for specific action plans. District Development” (FDD).3 As is often A few comments are appropriate at the case, the Afghans and their international Afghan National Army and the outset. While some of what follows may community partners—except for the Amer- Police assume responsibility sound like criticism, the exact opposite is icans—had hedged their bets by expressing for Bak district after training true. In my experience, our leaders and tentative support for the police reform by U.S. Army Military Police troops are working extremely hard to realize concept in principle while simultaneously success in these missions. As an institution, avoiding any firm commitments of assistance however, we have not gotten our planning or resources. and operating mechanisms right just yet. At Typical of any stability or reconstruc- the same time, it is likely that our military tion mission, reforming the ANP would be will be called upon to carry out many more a multilayered, complex undertaking. In of these missions, given the nature of IW Afghanistan, the police forces consist of seven operations and the “long wars” currently different public safety and security organiza- under way. One only has to look at the struc- tions, with basic missions and organization ture of U.S. Africa Command to see more outlined in the Afghan government’s Strategic evidence of our military’s likely future role Capabilities Plan.4 National civil order police, in the application of soft power instruments border patrolmen, district police, the coun- of American influence. Furthermore, it is ternarcotics force, the counterterrorism force, likely that our political leaders will continue criminal investigators, and even the Afghan to expect the military to take a leading role fire departments all fall under the Ministry of among the other U.S. Government agencies the Interior (MOI) umbrella. But while each participating in these missions, given our of these agencies has its own distinct set of comparative advantages in organizational issues and challenges, the leadership decided structure, resources, and sustainability. to reform the traditional district-level police Accordingly, this article outlines some poten- first, given their direct interactions with tial pitfalls and challenges facing the leaders the people. At the same time, reforming the who will plan and execute these stability mis- police would require further developing the sions in the years to come. MOI’s administrative capabilities, as well as U.S. Army (Casey Ware) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 71 COMMENTARY | Reforming the Afghan National Police Afghan National Police on patrol return fire on spear in crafting and executing the plan—and combined (allied), joint, interagency, and mul- fleeing Taliban members getting the warfighters’ “buy-in” as a precon- ticomponent headquarters organization, one dition for participation. Unlike conventional ultimately working through the interagency military operations, which derive their unity process while sharing key decisions with the of command through a hierarchical chain, sovereign Afghan government. CSTC–A stability and reconstruction operations by also depends heavily on contracted civilian their nature require negotiation, compromise, police mentors for the Afghan police training and the inclusion of a wide variety of actors effort, though ironically those contractors in the decisionmaking process, each bring- are employed by the State Department and ing to the table different resources, concerns, ultimately accountable to that agency rather and areas of authority. Our COIN doctrine than the military. Conversely, CSTC–A con- speaks to this challenge in its section on trols the massive funds associated with the “unity of effort.” 7 Without question, achieving development of the Afghan forces, and as such consensus around a plan of action is often the can wield disproportionate influence over that most difficult aspect of successful stability aspect of the process. operations. Nevertheless, both our international In the ANP case, the relevant U.S. agen- partners and the Afghan leaders would not cies and actors included the U.S. Ambassador hesitate to let us know when they disagreed and Embassy; U.S. Central Command and with us, or when their interests did not its subordinate CSTC–A; the U.S. national coincide with ours. For example, a senior command element and subordinate brigade representative from an allied embassy stated combat teams; the Department of State’s bluntly to me on one occasion, “If you Ameri- Justice Sector Support Program,