Guidebook on Mill's on Liberty

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Guidebook on Mill's on Liberty Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Mill on Liberty This Routledge Philosophy GuideBook introduces John Stuart Mill and one of his major works, On Liberty. We see that in On Liberty Mill insists on the importance of individuality and, to that end, defends a moral right to absolute liberty with respect to certain self-regarding concerns. ‘In Mill on Liberty Jonathan Riley offers a vigorous, and at times, passionate, defence of Mill’s theory of freedom and of Millian liberalism more generally. Riley has produced a guide which offers a lucid exposition of the arguments in On Liberty, and a powerful case for their coherence against critics who have persistently misinterpreted them.’ Chandran Kukathas, Associate Professor of Politics, University of New South Wales. ‘This is an excellent introduction to Mill’s essay On Liberty. Riley is a sure-footed guide, who has thoroughly mastered the complex literature, and is able to steer his readers through it with an easy authority.’ Professor C.L. Ten, Philosophy Department, Monash University ‘Jonathan Riley’s GuideBook to Mill’s On Liberty can be recommended without reservation both to beginning students and to professional philosophers. To the former he offers a thorough and coherent commentary on the text written in a straightforward and accessible style. To philosophers he offers both a critique of revisionist readings of these doctrines and a vigorous defence of them against many of the standard criticisms commonly accepted as decisive.’ Wayne Sumner, University of Toronto Jonathan Riley is an Associate Professor of the Murphy Institute of Political Economy and the Department of Political Science, both at Tulane University. He is also the author of Liberal Utilitarianism and the World Classics edition of Mill’s Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism. Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks Edited by Tim Crane and Jonathan Wolff University College London Mill on Utilitarianism Roger Crisp Heidegger and Being and Time Stephen Mulhall Locke on Government D.A. Lloyd Thomas Locke on Human Understanding E.J. Lowe Plato and the Republic Nickolas Pappas Spinoza and the Ethics Genevieve Lloyd Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations Marie McGinn LONDON AND NEW YORK ROUTLEDGE Mill on Liberty n Jonathan Riley First published 1998 information storage or retrieval system, by Routledge without permission in writing from the 11 New Fetter Lane, publishers. London EC4P 4EE British Library Cataloguing in Simultaneously published in the USA Publication Data and Canada A catalogue record for this book is by Routledge available from the British Library. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data This edition published in the Taylor & Riley, Jonathan. Francis e-Library, 2001. Mill on liberty/Jonathan Riley. © 1998 Jonathan Riley (Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks) Jonathan Riley has asserted his moral Includes bibliographical references and right to be named as the Author of this index. Work according to the Copyright, 1. Mill, John Stuart, 1806–1873. On liberty Designs and Patents Act 1988 2. Liberty. I. Title. II. Series. JC585.M75R55 1998 All rights reserved. No part of this book 323.4–dc21 97–35429 may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, ISBN 0–415–14188–5 (hbk) mechanical, or other means, now known ISBN 0–415–14189–3 (pbk) or hereafter invented, including ISBN 0-203-00338-1 Master e-book ISBN photocopying and recording, or in any ISBN 0-203-17454-2 (Glassbook Format) In memory of Patrick Sutherland Fallis (1948–1981) ‘le feu follet’ Contents Contents Contents Contents Contents Contents Preface xi Part one GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 1 Mill and the Liberty 3 Mill’s life and work 3 ‘Text-book of a single truth’ 27 Early reaction 29 Current status 32 Part two THE ARGUMENT OF ON LIBERTY 37 2 Introductory (Chapter I, paras 1–16) 39 Stages of liberty (I.1–5) 39 Absence of a general principle (I.6–8) 43 The exceptional case of religious belief (I.7) 44 CONTENTS ‘One very simple principle’ (I.9–10) 46 Utilitarian form of argument (I.11–12) 47 Absolute priority of self-regarding liberty (I.7, 10, 13) 50 What the liberty principle is not 51 The growing danger of social repression (I.14–15) 52 3 Of the liberty of thought and discussion (Chapter II, paras 1–44) 55 The grounds of some familiar liberties (II.1) 55 The harm of silencing an opinion which may be true (II.3–20) 57 The harm of silencing even a false opinion (II.21–33) 60 The harm of silencing an opinion which may be only partly true (II.34–6, 39) 65 The crucial case of Christian moral beliefs (II.37–8) 68 Must expression be fair and temperate? (II.44) 70 4 Of individuality, as one of the elements of well-being (Chapter III, paras 1–19) 73 The grounds of liberty of action (III.1) 73 The worth of spontaneous action (III.2–6) 76 The worth of obedience to social rules (III.3–6, 9, 17) 77 An ideal type of individual character (III.5–9) 81 Utilitarian case for the equal right to liberty (III.10–19) 83 Holes in the case? 88 5 Of the limits to the authority of society over the individual (Chapter IV, paras 1–21) 91 The nature of utilitarian coercion (IV.1–3) 91 The nature of self-regarding acts (IV.4–7) 93 The self–other distinction: some objections answered (IV.8–12) 99 ‘Gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life’ (IV.13–21) 103 6 Applications (Chapter V, paras 1–23) 111 Mill’s doctrine and its application (V.1–2) 111 Harm to others not sufficient for coercion (V.3) 113 viii CONTENTS The liberty principle distinguished from laissez-faire (V.4) 116 The proper limits of society’s police authority (V.5–6) 120 Society’s authority to enforce ‘good manners’ (V.7) 124 Liberty of public solicitation and its limits (V.8) 125 Legitimate authority to tax sales and limit the number of sellers (V.9–10) 129 Voluntary association and the enforcement of contracts (V.11) 131 Voluntary release and the permission to break contracts (V.11) 135 ‘Misapplied notions of liberty’ (V.12–15) 136 Liberty to refuse to co-operate (V.16–23) 140 Part three GENERAL ISSUES 149 7 Liberal utilitarianism 151 Isn’t liberalism incompatible with utilitarianism? 151 How can utilitarianism prescribe absolute liberty of self-regarding conduct? 157 Don’t ‘natural penalties’ defeat Mill’s self–other distinction? 160 Isn’t there a danger of isolated and disturbed individuals? 163 8 Liberty, individuality and custom 167 Doesn’t Mill’s idea of individuality presuppose a radically unsituated individual? 167 Isn’t the need for liberty inversely related to social progress? 174 Why doesn’t the individual have a right to parade his bad manners and indecent behaviour in public? 176 9 The doctrine of Liberty in practice 189 How can anyone seriously think that Mill’s doctrine is workable? 189 Isn’t it unreasonable to demand a complete ban on paternalism? 196 Doesn’t the liberty principle give crude answers to such hard cases as abortion and the Parfit baby problem? 202 ix CONTENTS Would implementation of the doctrine result in a social revolution? 206 Notes 211 Bibliography 223 Index 235 x Preface Mill’s classic essay on individual liberty is the focus of a large literature. Surely there is nothing new to say about it, some (perhaps most) will think. Anyway, aside from his grand rhetoric, what is the interest for students of philosophy? Isn’t his argument pretty straightforward, at least to the extent that we can make sense of it? Importance of moral rights, respect for rule of law and all that. Who needs a GuideBook to such ho-hum liberalism? But a new guide to On Liberty is very much needed, I shall insist. Mill’s radical argument has largely been obscured by commentators, where it has not been dismissed as incoherent. His doctrine is not now, and has never been, what most people understand by that ambiguous term ‘liberalism’. In its place, much more conventional liberalisms continue to predominate in the philosophical literature. Today, students are likely to be misdirected toward one of these tamer alternatives, or worse, in the name of Millian liberalism. It is my hope that this book might begin to remedy the misunderstandings surrounding Mill’s radical argument. I depart very little from his own arrangement of the argument. But I have subdivided it into more sections, and have otherwise attempted to provide clarification where that seemed possible. At the same time, certain ambiguities are highlighted as they arise in the text, and reference xi PREFACE is made to how they are ultimately resolved, to facilitate the reader’s understanding without unduly interrupting the flow of Mill’s discussion. This exegesis comprises Part Two, the bulk of the GuideBook. Part One of the guide generally introduces Mill’s life and work, and relates the Liberty to his Autobiography. Since his defence of absolute liberty of thought and what he calls ‘purely self-regarding’ action is predicated in part on the great value of self-development or ‘individuality’, the story of his own process of development is of unusual interest. An indication of the Liberty’s early reception and current status in philosophy is also provided. Part Three presents, and briefly discusses, some familiar criticisms which are often levelled against Mill’s form of argument. The criticisms are framed as a series of eleven pointed questions. It is very much a matter of continuing debate whether compelling replies can be given.
Recommended publications
  • Hayek's the Constitution of Liberty
    Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty An Account of Its Argument EUGENE F. MILLER The Institute of Economic Affairs contenTs The author 11 First published in Great Britain in 2010 by Foreword by Steven D. Ealy 12 The Institute of Economic Affairs 2 Lord North Street Summary 17 Westminster Editorial note 22 London sw1p 3lb Author’s preface 23 in association with Profile Books Ltd The mission of the Institute of Economic Affairs is to improve public 1 Hayek’s Introduction 29 understanding of the fundamental institutions of a free society, by analysing Civilisation 31 and expounding the role of markets in solving economic and social problems. Political philosophy 32 Copyright © The Institute of Economic Affairs 2010 The ideal 34 The moral right of the author has been asserted. All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a PART I: THE VALUE OF FREEDOM 37 retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the publisher of this book. 2 Individual freedom, coercion and progress A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. (Chapters 1–5 and 9) 39 isbn 978 0 255 36637 3 Individual freedom and responsibility 39 The individual and society 42 Many IEA publications are translated into languages other than English or are reprinted. Permission to translate or to reprint should be sought from the Limiting state coercion 44 Director General at the address above.
    [Show full text]
  • American Civil Associations and the Growth of American Government: an Appraisal of Alexis De Tocqueville’S Democracy in America (1835-1840) Applied to Franklin D
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2017 American Civil Associations and the Growth of American Government: An Appraisal of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835-1840) Applied to Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and the Post-World War II Welfare State John P. Varacalli The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1828 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] AMERICAN CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: AN APPRAISAL OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE’S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835- 1840) APPLIED TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S NEW DEAL AND THE POST-WORLD WAR II WELFARE STATE by JOHN P. VARACALLI A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York 2017 © 2017 JOHN P. VARACALLI All Rights Reserved ii American Civil Associations and the Growth of American Government: An Appraisal of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835-1840) Applied to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal and the Post World War II Welfare State by John P. Varacalli The manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts ______________________ __________________________________________ Date David Gordon Thesis Advisor ______________________ __________________________________________ Date Elizabeth Macaulay-Lewis Acting Executive Officer THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT American Civil Associations and the Growth of American Government: An Appraisal of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835-1840) Applied to Franklin D.
    [Show full text]
  • Mill's "Very Simple Principle": Liberty, Utilitarianism And
    MILL'S "VERY SIMPLE PRINCIPLE": LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM AND SOCIALISM MICHAEL GRENFELL submitted for degree of Ph.D. London School of Economics and Political Science UMI Number: U048607 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U048607 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I H^S £ S F 6SI6 ABSTRACT OF THESIS MILL'S "VERY SIMPLE PRINCIPLE'*: LIBERTY. UTILITARIANISM AND SOCIALISM 1 The thesis aims to examine the political consequences of applying J.S. Mill's "very simple principle" of liberty in practice: whether the result would be free-market liberalism or socialism, and to what extent a society governed in accordance with the principle would be free. 2 Contrary to Mill's claims for the principle, it fails to provide a clear or coherent answer to this "practical question". This is largely because of three essential ambiguities in Mill's formulation of the principle, examined in turn in the three chapters of the thesis. 3 First, Mill is ambivalent about whether liberty is to be promoted for its intrinsic value, or because it is instrumental to the achievement of other objectives, principally the utilitarian objective of "general welfare".
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of Liberal Utilitarianism: Bentham and Mill Piers Norris
    The Rise of Liberal Utilitarianism: Bentham and Mill Piers Norris Turner, Ohio State University [DRAFT: final version forthcoming in The Blackwell Companion to 19th Century Philosophy, ed. J.A. Shand] I. Introduction By the turn of the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was a well-known moral and legal reformer. A child of the Enlightenment, writing at the time of the American and French revolutions, Bentham had offered wide-ranging critiques of customary institutions and ways of thinking. He was particularly critical of appeals to natural law and intuition that, consciously or not, provided mere cover stories for people’s preferences. Such appeals, he argued, fail to provide real reasons: The various systems that have been formed concerning the standard of right and wrong… consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing upon the reader to accept of the author’s sentiment or opinion as a reason in itself. (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [IPML], II.14; B i.8)1 Because these cover stories are guided by people’s preferences, Bentham also argued that they are incapable of grounding a principled and well-organized set of public institutions. They instead protect established powers, whose likes and dislikes carry the most weight. His earliest writings, for instance, detail how the vagaries of the common law served entrenched interests rather than the public at large. What Bentham needed was a public principle that could guide a scientific program of legal codification and political reform.
    [Show full text]
  • [5] Mill Selections from on Liberty
    On Liberty Mill, John Stuart Published: 1859 Categorie(s): Non-Fiction, Human Science, Philosophy Source: Feedbooks 1 About Mill: John Stuart Mill (20 May 1806 – 8 May 1873), English philo- sopher, political theorist, political economist, civil servant and Member of Parliament, was an influential liberal thinker of the 19th century whose works on liberty justified freedom of the individual in opposition to unlimited state control. He was an exponent of utilitarianism, an ethical theory developed by Jeremy Bentham, although his conception of it was very differ- ent from Bentham's. He clearly set forth the premises of the scientific method. Also available on Feedbooks for Mill: • Utilitarianism (1863) Note: This book is brought to you by Feedbooks http://www.feedbooks.com Strictly for personal use, do not use this file for commercial purposes. 2 "The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity." Wilhelm von Humboldt, Sphere and Duties of Government 3 To the beloved and deplored memory of her who was the in- spirer, and in part the author, of all that is best in my writ- ings—the friend and wife whose exalted sense of truth and right was my strongest incitement, and whose approbation was my chief reward—I dedicate this volume. Like all that I have written for many years, it belongs as much to her as to me; but the work as it stands has had, in a very insufficient degree, the inestimable advantage of her revision; some of the most im- portant portions having been reserved for a more careful re-ex- amination, which they are now never destined to receive.
    [Show full text]
  • In Praise of Liberalism: an Assessment of Liberal Political Thought from the 17Th Century to Today
    Review of Contemporary Philosophy Vol. 14, 2015, pp. 11–36, ISSN 1841-5261 IN PRAISE OF LIBERALISM: AN ASSESSMENT OF LIBERAL POLITICAL THOUGHT FROM THE 17TH CENTURY TO TODAY MICHAEL B. FRIEDMAN [email protected] School of Social Work, Columbia University ABSTRACT. The author of this essay maintains that liberalism has been the primary source of progressive change in the United States since its earliest history. To support his claim, he traces the philosophical and political history of liberalism in England and the United States. The specific forms of liberalism have varied in different periods of history; but, he maintains, there is an underlying spirit of liberalism that has persisted throughout the past 350 years and can be the source of dynamic progressive social change in the 21st century. Throughout history, he maintains, liberalism has been committed to social progress and has sought to improve the lives of populations that are economically and politically disadvantaged. This underlying spirit, the author argues, can be the source for an energized liberal agenda for the 21st century. Keywords: liberalism; political philosophy; political history 1. Introduction Conservative – and even centrist – opponents of liberalism reject it because they identify it with cumbersome government; reckless spending; high tax- ation; naiveté about economics, crime, and world power; and lack of moral values. What a mistake! In fact, liberalism has been the source of social and political progress in the Western world since the 17th century. The idea that rights set a limit on the legitimate power of government is a liberal idea. The idea that govern- ment must respect the liberty of individuals is a liberal idea.
    [Show full text]
  • Limited Government
    03 008-010 Found2 Limit 9/13/07 10:54 AM Page 8 LIMITED GOVERNMENT Thomas Jefferson accurately represented the executing them in a tyrannical manner as well. In his convictions of his fellow colonists when he famous draft of a constitution for the commonwealth observed in the Declaration of Independence that of Massachusetts, Adams declared that the a government, to be considered legitimate, must be “legislative, executive and judicial power shall be based on the consent of the people and respect their placed in separate departments, to the end that it natural rights to “life, liberty and the pursuit of might be a government of laws, and not of men.” happiness.”Along with other leading members of the This document, along with his Defence of the founding generation, Jefferson Constitutions of Government of understood that these principles the United States of America, dictated that the government be containing a strong case for checks given only limited powers that, and balances in government, ideally, are carefully described in were well known to the delegates written charters or constitutions. who attended the Constitutional Modern theorists like John Convention of 1787. Locke and the Baron de James Wilson, one of the Montesquieu had been making foremost legal scholars of the the case for limited government founding period and a delegate and separation of powers during from Pennsylvania at the the century prior to the American Constitutional Convention, agreed Revolution. Colonial Americans with Adams’ insistence that the were quite familiar with Locke’s power of government should be argument from his Two Treatises divided to the end of advancing of Government that “Absolute the peace and happiness of the Arbitrary Power, or Governing without settled people.
    [Show full text]
  • The Constitution and the Other Constitution
    William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 10 (2001-2002) Issue 2 Article 3 February 2002 The Constitution and The Other Constitution Michael Kent Curtis Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons Repository Citation Michael Kent Curtis, The Constitution and The Other Constitution, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 359 (2002), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol10/iss2/3 Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj THE CONSTITUTION AND THE OTHER CONSTITUTION Michael Kent Curtis* In this article,Professor Michael Kent Curtisexamines how laws thatshape the distributionof wealth intersect with and affectpopularsovereigntyandfree speech and press. He presents this discussion in the context of the effect of the Other Constitutionon The Constitution. ProfessorCurtis begins by taking a close-up look at the current campaignfinance system and the concentrationof media ownership in a few corporate bodies and argues that both affect the way in which various politicalissues arepresented to the public, ifat all. ProfessorCurtis continues by talking about the origins of our constitutional ideals ofpopular sovereignty and free speech andpressand how the centralizationof economic power has limited the full expression of these most basic of democratic values throughout American history. Next, he analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the controlling precedent with respect to the constitutionality of limitations on campaign contributions. Finally, ProfessorCurtis concludes that the effect of the Other Constitution on The Constitution requires a Television Tea Party and a government role in the financingofpolitical campaigns.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpretations of Mill's Harm Principle and the Economic Implications Therein
    Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University Political Science Theses Department of Political Science Fall 11-16-2012 Beyond Libertarianism: Interpretations of Mill's Harm Principle and the Economic Implications Therein Matthew A. Towery Georgia State University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses Recommended Citation Towery, Matthew A., "Beyond Libertarianism: Interpretations of Mill's Harm Principle and the Economic Implications Therein." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2012. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/45 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BEYOND LIBERTARIANISM: INTERPRETATIONS OF MILL’S HARM PRINCIPLE AND THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS THEREIN by MATTHEW TOWERY Under the Direction of Mario Feit ABSTRACT The thesis will examine the harm principle, as originally described by John Stuart Mill. In doing so, it will defend that, though unintended, the harm principle may justify several principles of distributive justice. To augment this analysis, the paper will examine several secondary au- thors’ interpretations of the harm principle, including potential critiques of the thesis itself. INDEX WORDS: Mill, Harm principle, Libertarianism, Redistribution,
    [Show full text]
  • The Market Economy of the U.S. Constitution
    HOW DO CONSTITUTIONS SHAPE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS? LESSON 1 ACTIVITY 1.1 THE MARKET ECONOMY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION Directions: Read Part A and Part B. Use information from Part A and B to complete the grid in Part C. Part A. Characteristics of a Market Economy 1. Private Property Labor resources, natural resources, capital resources (e.g., equipment and buildings), and the goods and services produced in the economy are largely owned by private individuals and private institutions, not by government. Private ownership combined with the freedom to negotiate legally binding contracts permits people, within very broad limits, to obtain and use the resources they choose. 2. Freedom of Enterprise and Choice Private entrepreneurs are free to obtain and organize resources for the production of goods and services, and to sell goods and services in markets of their choice. Consumers are at liberty to buy the goods and services that best satisfy their economic wants. Workers are free to seek any jobs for which they are qualified. 3. Motive of Self-Interest The “Invisible Hand” that is the driving force in a market economy is each individual pursuing his or her self-interest. Consumers aim to get the greatest satisfaction from their purchases; entre- preneurs try to achieve the highest profits for their firms; workers want the highest possible wages and salaries; and owners of property attempt to get the highest possible prices from the use, rent, or sale of their resources. 4. Competition Economic competition means that buyers and sellers act independently in the marketplace. Buyers and sellers are free to enter or leave any market as they choose.
    [Show full text]
  • Hate Speech C. Edwin Baker* Given the Evils of Hate, Any Argument for Protecting Is, at Best, an Uphill Effort And, at Worst, Simply Misguided
    Hate Speech C. Edwin Baker* Given the evils of hate, any argument for protecting is, at best, an uphill effort and, at worst, simply misguided. Many people either accept or, at least, wonder whether they should accept, an argument that goes something like this: Anyone sensitive to the horror of genocide knows that hate pervades the atmosphere at such times. Few goals can rank higher than preventing genocide and the murderous racial conflicts presented to the world during the twentieth century. Moreover, it is difficult to find any value in the freedom to engage in racist hate speech. Important but ultimately less significant values such as free speech cannot, for any sensitive person, lead to any pause in outlawing the speech that contributes to these horrors. Whether or not the ban will be effective in even a few cases at preventing genocide or racial violence, the mere possibility that it will more than justifies the ban. As an advocate of almost absolute protection of free speech, I should explain the grounds for my valuation of free speech and rejection of the above claim. That explanation, it turns out, is too ambitious for this essay. Nevertheless, Part I describes but does not defend a theory of why racist or hate speech should be protected – a theory that I believe provides the best, though often unrecognized, explanation of existing American case law but one that is surely a controversial, probably minority, view even in the United States. Most readers will realize, as do I, that these theoretical grounds do not really answer my imagined proponent of regulation.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom
    Anne Barron Kant, copyright and communicative freedom Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Barron, Anne (2011) Kant, copyright and communicative freedom. Law and philosophy . pp. 1- 48. DOI: 10.1007/s10982-011-9114-1 © 2011 Springer Netherlands. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com. This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37521/ Available in LSE Research Online: September 2011 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final manuscript accepted version of the journal article, incorporating any revisions agreed during the peer review process. Some differences between this version and the published version may remain. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom forthcoming, Law and Philosophy (2011) Kant, Copyright and Communicative Freedom Anne Barron, Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science Abstract The rapid recent expansion of copyright law worldwide has sparked efforts to defend the ‘public domain’ of non-propertized information, often on the ground that an expansive public domain is a condition of a ‘free culture.
    [Show full text]