Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Mill on Liberty This Routledge Philosophy GuideBook introduces John Stuart Mill and one of his major works, On Liberty. We see that in On Liberty Mill insists on the importance of individuality and, to that end, defends a moral right to absolute liberty with respect to certain self-regarding concerns. ‘In Mill on Liberty Jonathan Riley offers a vigorous, and at times, passionate, defence of Mill’s theory of freedom and of Millian liberalism more generally. Riley has produced a guide which offers a lucid exposition of the arguments in On Liberty, and a powerful case for their coherence against critics who have persistently misinterpreted them.’ Chandran Kukathas, Associate Professor of Politics, University of New South Wales. ‘This is an excellent introduction to Mill’s essay On Liberty. Riley is a sure-footed guide, who has thoroughly mastered the complex literature, and is able to steer his readers through it with an easy authority.’ Professor C.L. Ten, Philosophy Department, Monash University ‘Jonathan Riley’s GuideBook to Mill’s On Liberty can be recommended without reservation both to beginning students and to professional philosophers. To the former he offers a thorough and coherent commentary on the text written in a straightforward and accessible style. To philosophers he offers both a critique of revisionist readings of these doctrines and a vigorous defence of them against many of the standard criticisms commonly accepted as decisive.’ Wayne Sumner, University of Toronto Jonathan Riley is an Associate Professor of the Murphy Institute of Political Economy and the Department of Political Science, both at Tulane University. He is also the author of Liberal Utilitarianism and the World Classics edition of Mill’s Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism. Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks Edited by Tim Crane and Jonathan Wolff University College London Mill on Utilitarianism Roger Crisp Heidegger and Being and Time Stephen Mulhall Locke on Government D.A. Lloyd Thomas Locke on Human Understanding E.J. Lowe Plato and the Republic Nickolas Pappas Spinoza and the Ethics Genevieve Lloyd Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations Marie McGinn LONDON AND NEW YORK ROUTLEDGE Mill on Liberty n Jonathan Riley First published 1998 information storage or retrieval system, by Routledge without permission in writing from the 11 New Fetter Lane, publishers. London EC4P 4EE British Library Cataloguing in Simultaneously published in the USA Publication Data and Canada A catalogue record for this book is by Routledge available from the British Library. 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data This edition published in the Taylor & Riley, Jonathan. Francis e-Library, 2001. Mill on liberty/Jonathan Riley. © 1998 Jonathan Riley (Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks) Jonathan Riley has asserted his moral Includes bibliographical references and right to be named as the Author of this index. Work according to the Copyright, 1. Mill, John Stuart, 1806–1873. On liberty Designs and Patents Act 1988 2. Liberty. I. Title. II. Series. JC585.M75R55 1998 All rights reserved. No part of this book 323.4–dc21 97–35429 may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, ISBN 0–415–14188–5 (hbk) mechanical, or other means, now known ISBN 0–415–14189–3 (pbk) or hereafter invented, including ISBN 0-203-00338-1 Master e-book ISBN photocopying and recording, or in any ISBN 0-203-17454-2 (Glassbook Format) In memory of Patrick Sutherland Fallis (1948–1981) ‘le feu follet’ Contents Contents Contents Contents Contents Contents Preface xi Part one GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 1 Mill and the Liberty 3 Mill’s life and work 3 ‘Text-book of a single truth’ 27 Early reaction 29 Current status 32 Part two THE ARGUMENT OF ON LIBERTY 37 2 Introductory (Chapter I, paras 1–16) 39 Stages of liberty (I.1–5) 39 Absence of a general principle (I.6–8) 43 The exceptional case of religious belief (I.7) 44 CONTENTS ‘One very simple principle’ (I.9–10) 46 Utilitarian form of argument (I.11–12) 47 Absolute priority of self-regarding liberty (I.7, 10, 13) 50 What the liberty principle is not 51 The growing danger of social repression (I.14–15) 52 3 Of the liberty of thought and discussion (Chapter II, paras 1–44) 55 The grounds of some familiar liberties (II.1) 55 The harm of silencing an opinion which may be true (II.3–20) 57 The harm of silencing even a false opinion (II.21–33) 60 The harm of silencing an opinion which may be only partly true (II.34–6, 39) 65 The crucial case of Christian moral beliefs (II.37–8) 68 Must expression be fair and temperate? (II.44) 70 4 Of individuality, as one of the elements of well-being (Chapter III, paras 1–19) 73 The grounds of liberty of action (III.1) 73 The worth of spontaneous action (III.2–6) 76 The worth of obedience to social rules (III.3–6, 9, 17) 77 An ideal type of individual character (III.5–9) 81 Utilitarian case for the equal right to liberty (III.10–19) 83 Holes in the case? 88 5 Of the limits to the authority of society over the individual (Chapter IV, paras 1–21) 91 The nature of utilitarian coercion (IV.1–3) 91 The nature of self-regarding acts (IV.4–7) 93 The self–other distinction: some objections answered (IV.8–12) 99 ‘Gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life’ (IV.13–21) 103 6 Applications (Chapter V, paras 1–23) 111 Mill’s doctrine and its application (V.1–2) 111 Harm to others not sufficient for coercion (V.3) 113 viii CONTENTS The liberty principle distinguished from laissez-faire (V.4) 116 The proper limits of society’s police authority (V.5–6) 120 Society’s authority to enforce ‘good manners’ (V.7) 124 Liberty of public solicitation and its limits (V.8) 125 Legitimate authority to tax sales and limit the number of sellers (V.9–10) 129 Voluntary association and the enforcement of contracts (V.11) 131 Voluntary release and the permission to break contracts (V.11) 135 ‘Misapplied notions of liberty’ (V.12–15) 136 Liberty to refuse to co-operate (V.16–23) 140 Part three GENERAL ISSUES 149 7 Liberal utilitarianism 151 Isn’t liberalism incompatible with utilitarianism? 151 How can utilitarianism prescribe absolute liberty of self-regarding conduct? 157 Don’t ‘natural penalties’ defeat Mill’s self–other distinction? 160 Isn’t there a danger of isolated and disturbed individuals? 163 8 Liberty, individuality and custom 167 Doesn’t Mill’s idea of individuality presuppose a radically unsituated individual? 167 Isn’t the need for liberty inversely related to social progress? 174 Why doesn’t the individual have a right to parade his bad manners and indecent behaviour in public? 176 9 The doctrine of Liberty in practice 189 How can anyone seriously think that Mill’s doctrine is workable? 189 Isn’t it unreasonable to demand a complete ban on paternalism? 196 Doesn’t the liberty principle give crude answers to such hard cases as abortion and the Parfit baby problem? 202 ix CONTENTS Would implementation of the doctrine result in a social revolution? 206 Notes 211 Bibliography 223 Index 235 x Preface Mill’s classic essay on individual liberty is the focus of a large literature. Surely there is nothing new to say about it, some (perhaps most) will think. Anyway, aside from his grand rhetoric, what is the interest for students of philosophy? Isn’t his argument pretty straightforward, at least to the extent that we can make sense of it? Importance of moral rights, respect for rule of law and all that. Who needs a GuideBook to such ho-hum liberalism? But a new guide to On Liberty is very much needed, I shall insist. Mill’s radical argument has largely been obscured by commentators, where it has not been dismissed as incoherent. His doctrine is not now, and has never been, what most people understand by that ambiguous term ‘liberalism’. In its place, much more conventional liberalisms continue to predominate in the philosophical literature. Today, students are likely to be misdirected toward one of these tamer alternatives, or worse, in the name of Millian liberalism. It is my hope that this book might begin to remedy the misunderstandings surrounding Mill’s radical argument. I depart very little from his own arrangement of the argument. But I have subdivided it into more sections, and have otherwise attempted to provide clarification where that seemed possible. At the same time, certain ambiguities are highlighted as they arise in the text, and reference xi PREFACE is made to how they are ultimately resolved, to facilitate the reader’s understanding without unduly interrupting the flow of Mill’s discussion. This exegesis comprises Part Two, the bulk of the GuideBook. Part One of the guide generally introduces Mill’s life and work, and relates the Liberty to his Autobiography. Since his defence of absolute liberty of thought and what he calls ‘purely self-regarding’ action is predicated in part on the great value of self-development or ‘individuality’, the story of his own process of development is of unusual interest. An indication of the Liberty’s early reception and current status in philosophy is also provided. Part Three presents, and briefly discusses, some familiar criticisms which are often levelled against Mill’s form of argument. The criticisms are framed as a series of eleven pointed questions. It is very much a matter of continuing debate whether compelling replies can be given.