Why the United States Needs a National Political Warfare Center and Regional Embassies
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Georgetown Security Studies Review 4:2 1 Georgetown Security Studies Review Volume 4, Number 2 June 2016 A Publication of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service http://gssr.georgetown.edu Georgetown Security Studies Review 4:2 2 GEORGETOWN SECURITY STUDIES REVIEW Published by the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Ashley L. Rhoades, Editor-in-Chief Devon Hill, Deputy Editor Jacob Goldstein, Associate Editor for Africa John Chen, Associate Editor for Asia Michael Sexton, Associate Editor for Cyber Security Joe Pedley, Associate Editor for Europe Brendan Kinslow, Associate Editor for the Middle East Morgan Byrne-Diakun, Associate Editor for National Security & the Military Access Georgetown Security Studies Review online at http://gssr.georgetown.edu Connect on Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/GeorgetownUniversityGSSR Follow GSSR on Twitter @gssreview Contact the Editor-in-Chief at [email protected] DISCLAIMER The views expressed in Georgetown Security Studies Review do not necessarily represent those of the editors or staff of GSSR, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University. The editorial board of GSSR and our affiliated peer reviewers strive to verify the accuracy of all factual information contained in GSSR. However, the staffs of GSSR, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Georgetown University make no warranties or representations regarding the completeness or accuracy of information contained in GSSR, and they assume no legal liability or responsibility for the content of any work contained therein. Georgetown Security Studies Review 4:2 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS A Sacred Defense: Iranian Defense Policy in the Syrian Civil War.................................................4 John Arterbury Additive Manufacturing and Future Forces: A Realistic Look at the Promise of 3D Printing for the Military....................................................................................................................................13 Theresa Campobasso Analyzing the Threats from Nonstate Actors and Internal Conflict to Algerian Stability: A Risk Assessment..............................................................................................................................20 Abigail Casey Intelligence-Policy Relations in the 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Flawed Foresight or Neglect?............32 Jonathan Challgren Assessing and Prioritizing Domestic Terrorism Threats: The Case for Focusing on Right-Wing Extremism......................................................................................................................44 Colette Clark The Ethics of Military Intervention for National Security Purposes.............................................54 William A. Douglas Dynamic Stagnancy: America’s Israeli-Palestinian Mediation Role in a Changing Middle East.......................................................................................................................................................63 Elijah Jatovsky Why the United States Needs a National Political Warfare Center and Regional Embassies.............................................................................................................................................84 Kyle Johnston Conditioned to Kill: The Sociological and Psychological Mechanisms for Overcoming Inhibitions to Lethal Violence...........................................................................................................98 Nicole Magney Love in the Time of Terror: From Breaking the Spell of the Red Army Faction to Dispelling the Allure of Al Qaeda....................................................................................................110 Ashley Rhoades Nigeria and Boko Haram: A Fight that Cannot Be Won on the Battlefield Alone....................127 Sam Rosenberg Hacking in the Name of Isis: Should Americans Fear a Cyber Doomsday?...............................134 Sarah Sheafer The New Venezuelan Exceptionalism? Absence of Armed Insurgency from 1989-2016...........145 Wesley Stukenbroeker Georgetown Security Studies Review 4:2 4 A SACRED DEFENSE: IRANIAN DEFENSE POLICY IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR John Arterbury The Syrian civil war provides a complex challenge for Iranian security managers. Because of its close historic relationship with Syria and a need for strategic depth, Iran is deeply committed to preserving the rule of Bashar al-Assad’s government, as Iran views the conflict as critical to its security interests in the Middle East. Iran has realized this commitment on the battlefield by offering multi-layered support to the Syrian government, ranging from the clandestine involvement of Iranian Special Forces to the deployment of state-backed Shia militias alongside conventional Syrian forces. Given the existential crisis still facing the Assad government and the high stakes for Iranian interests in the region, Iran is likely to maintain or even increase levels of support to the Syrian government in what has become Iran’s largest and most lethal military engagement since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Georgetown Security Studies Review 4:2 5 Introduction The relationship between Iran and Syria constitutes one of the stronger and more persistent interstate bonds in recent Middle Eastern history. The alliance is a result of historic necessity, and keeping it intact is directly beneficial to the Iranian government from a strategic and ideological standpoint. Preserving this alliance is a cornerstone of Iranian foreign policy, and Iran’s policies toward Syria are intended to sustain and grow these ties so long as the Assad dynasty or a favorable successor or alternative remains in control. The Syrian civil war represents a pivotal moment in relations between the two countries, and Iran has oriented its policies toward Syria in direct reaction to the conflict. In doing so, Iran has leveraged proxy forces such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias to help play a key role in supporting the Iran-Syria bridge. To understand the dynamics of this relationship and how Iranian policy toward Syria is crafted, this paper will use a qualitative lens to explore how this relationship arose, how it relates to Iranian strategic interests, and how Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war influences and embodies this relationship. Doing so will challenge the publicly held assumption that fear of the Islamic State is the chief driver of Iran’s involvement in Syria, and will analyze the effect Iranian involvement has had on the direction of the war. Lastly, this essay will explore the implications of Iran’s policies toward Syria going forward, as well as for the future of relations between the two nations more broadly. Historic Context and Strategic Considerations The lessons and experiences of the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s provide the basis of the Iranian government’s foundational bedrock. The conflict was a formative experience for modern- day Iran’s political and military elite, and the war’s hardships etched themselves into the Iranian public’s collective memory.1 The Syrian government’s stalwart support for the nascent Islamic Republic in Iran during this challenging era is not lost on Iran’s modern-day leaders. Partly as a function of the Iraq-Syria Ba’athist split, Syria was one of the few nations to provide Iran with arms during the course of the war, in spite of the Soviet Union’s support for Saddam Hussein.2 This split stemmed from ideological differences in Ba’athism that bubbled to the surface during the 1960s as Syrian Ba’athists gravitated further toward the political left and away from pan- Arabism, and a deep personal antipathy between the administrations of Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein expanded this divide.3 Syria demonstrated a substantial loyalty to the embattled revolutionaries, and relations between the Syrian Ba’athist regime and the Islamic Republic have held steady in subsequent decades as Iran has sought to maintain influence in the Arab world and Syria has worked to counterbalance Iraq.4 Good relations with Syria offer Iranian leaders substantial benefits and operational capacity. The country provides Iran a friendly intermediary for logistical support to Hezbollah, Iran’s foremost ally in the Levant and primary mechanism to confront Israel, and as such remains 1 Ray Taykeh,. Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009), 105-108. 2 Gregory F. Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010), 68. 3 John F. Devlin, "The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis," The American Historical Review 96, no. 5 (1991): 1396-407. 4 Jubin Goodarzi, "Iran and Syria," The Iran Primer, August 2015, accessed February 28, 2016, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-syria. Georgetown Security Studies Review 4:2 6 central to Iran’s Lebanon policy.5 The alliance has been mutually beneficial as well, since retaining Iranian support has helped Syria keep its role as kingmaker in Lebanon—at least until the 2005 Cedar Revolution—and friendly relations with Syria are integral in broadcasting Iran’s antagonistic posture toward Israel. An Iranian ally in Syria also guarantees Iran a toehold in the eastern Mediterranean, further projecting Iranian influence. Close relations with Syria have also meant that Iran enjoyed a formidable counterbalance to Iraq in the years following the Iran-Iraq War,