• • • \ -- ·• U. S. S. BATAAN CVL 29 • Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California CVL29/20:ABS Al6-l3 Serf 0'; 1 POWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: IID:JASSIFIED AfTER 12 .YEARS , Doo DIR 5200.JQ 1P.~JUN 1~1.

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29) To: Chief of Naval Operations Via: (l) Commander Task Force 95 (2) Commander Seventh Fleet (3) Commander Naval Forces Far East (4) Commander in Chief, U.~. Pacific Fleet Subj: Action Report; period 12 May 1951 - 13 June 1951; subm1s sion of Ref: (a) Navy Regulations, 1948 (b) CNO ltr Op345/aa, Ser ll97P34 dtd 3 Aug. 1950, NDB 15 Aug. 1950 Enol: (l) Action Report period 12 May 1951 - 13 June 1951 1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1), with parts I, II, III, IV, v, and VI, is submitted herewith. 2. During the period covered by this report u.s.s. BATAAN operated with TG 95.1.

•

W. JaLLER

Copy to: ComAirPac ComCarDi v 15 ' '

U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29) ACTION REPORT (period 12 May 19Jl - 13 June 1951)

PART I Narrative PART II Chronology PART III Performance of Ordnance !Via terial and Equipment and Ammunition Expenditure PART IV Battle Damage

PART V Personnel; Performance and Casualties PART VI Comments and Recommendations PART 'I NARRATIVE During the period 13~18 llay BATAAN replenished and made ready to operate at Sasebo against the North Korean and Chi~ nese Comm'llllists trom 20 lfay to 3 June, 195'1 orders ot CTG 95'.1. 1 ~ursuant to the At o64l 19 llay, Rear A<111111'al Allan E. Slll1th1 IJSN, CT.F 9? together with barked 1 members ot his start, em~ and broke IUS flag in USB BATAAN. At 0700 BATAAN with CT.F King 95' and V1lB 312 embarked, and with ~ VAN GALEN lDD) as escor_!,__ '!ailed 1'rom o:r Korea. Basebo tor the west coast At 0945' liiW3 WARRAIIlJNGA (DD), which had sailed earlier from Kure, 3oined ott the northern as an additional approach to Sasebo escort. From 1035' to ll45' all three ships participated in a pre-arranged AA ution tiring exercise. The tor­ arrived 1n operating area I!IKE at l9ll00Z USS BATAAN relieved at which time llllS GLORY 1n TE 95'.11, Captai11. W. lfiller, lJSir 111. BATAAN becoming OTC and CTE 95.11. TE 95' .11 then comprised USB BATA~~SB RUPERTUS (DD 85'1) ;~Gl·~~;) 32 andem=~h ~c (DD). ~: g:~: 'd=oyers jo1ned the :rormation at 200730 37-00N King 1n the vic111.1ty o:r Lat. Lo!!.g. 125'-00E where the task element operated during daylight thereafter. daily

Operations duriq the period 20 llay - 3 June in accordance with were conducted CTF 95' OpOrder 1~5'1, CTG 95'.1 OpOrder 1-5'1 and CO, USS BATAAN OpOrder 3·5'1 comprised (revised) • Sur:race operations those necessary to conduct air operations ment, and radar surveillance 1 replenish­ ot the northern part or the Yellow Sea at night. Formation <4<1 was used throughout, screen during daylight with a circular and an anti-submarine screen at night. c.....,ncing 22 lfay radar patrol "Bngatti", to provide early warning o:r aay enemy sur:race or air tung peninsula movemeat betweea the Shan­ and Korea was conducted nightly 1n accordance with CTG 95'.1 OpOrder 1-~1. This complished patrol formerly had been ac~ by CTE 95.12. As conducted by CTE 95'.11 was detached at a ilestroyer the end o:r each day's flight operations to patrol along :l.ongitude 124-00E between 39.00 latitudes 37-40 and North, search as prescribed, and rejoin the to resumption ot flight formation prior operations the next morning. des­ troyers only were used in view u.s. capabilities. ot their superior radar search On the night o:r 31 llay USS ROPERTUS radar and RADCII contact reported a 111.1tially evaluated as "possible sub­ arill.e", later reevaluated as •doubttul was reported submsrill.e". This contact to COIIl'(avFE who concurred 111. the till.al evaluation. Results ot other"BUgatti" patrols were negative. Air operations comprised armed•reconnaissance, close air support, airspot, and combat air patrol missions. The primary task ot armed reconnaissance was the interdiction ot enemy shipping on the west coast ot Korea. Emphasis was placed on the destruction of 3unks and sampans in the Taedong Gang estuary. Land transportation routes in the Bwangbae-Do region also were 111tlird1cted when feasible, with emphasis being placed on the systematic destruction of railway bridges and the location and destruction of vehicle parks. At the request ot Commander First Corps, Eighth Army in Korea, the Ban river estuary was kept under close air surveillance to detect &DT unusual activity that would indicate an enemy attempt to cross the estuary from the vicinity ot Kaesong to the Killpo peninsula above Inchon. Res Illts of this surveillance were negative and it was discontinued as unnecessary after 26 May due to the advance or friendly ground forces north ot the-Ban. Close air support missions performed were those required to cover ths various Army Corps sectors as assigned by the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Korea. Coabat air patrol was maintained over TE 95.11 when weather permitted and over United Nations forces conducting mine sweep­ ing and d!versionary amphibious operations on the Nampo coast near Cho Do Island during the period 2Q-22 lfay in accordance with CTG 95.1 OpOrder 3-51. Armed-airspot also was provided tor the diversionary forces and, when feasible 1 was made an additional task of the combat air patrol furnished those forces. Air operations were seriously curtailed by inclement weather, characterized by heavy rains and dense fogs, which made flights impossible on 21 25, 26, 27 29, and 30 May, and which curtailed operations on 3 June. Despite the bad weather 407 sorties were flown of which 305 ware offensive and 102 defensive (combat air patrol). Offensive sorties consisted of 159 armed-reconnaissance missions, 104 close air support missions1 14 combined armed-airspot and combat air patrol missions, and 28 strikes on railway and high­ way bridges. One pilot was lost during these operati.ep when, on 28 May lst Lt. Austin "E" Brenneman was shot down one east ot Wit­ Anak, korth Korea1 while on an armed-reconnaissance mission. nesses stated that his plaae was hit in the cockpit by 40 mm. flak after which it made a right gliding turn into the ground and ex­ ploded on impact. No radio contact with the pilot was established and be made no attempt to parachute after being hit. Witnesses stated that there was no possible chance ot survival. Replenishment operations consisted ot refueling the various on 21, 23, 25, .?~ 1 and 31 lfay and refueling and rearm- 1ng BATAAN on 2; lfay. BATAAll was refueled 3l MA;r. I-2 On 21 :May W.ARRAliUNGA and T.Al'l r..u;n were detached to refuel f'r0111 the Brihsh ,jiler WAVE PREMIER about 15' west of the Clifford Islands, IDICB SIOUX, which had been escorting WAVE or P~ joined the screen temporarily

lllllllt:IJ' I-3 ._...,,. ceed to the east coast of Korea and report to CTG 95.2 for operational control. At 1330 King, 3 June, flight operations were cancelled due to rain and fog. In view of the prevailing bad weather and its expected continuation tor the remainder of the day, TUCKER and MASON were detached to conduct radar patrol "Bugatti" and, on completion the following morning, to ;loin l!lo!!l-GLORY. -USS BATAAN, escorted by W~GA and VAN GALEN, proceeded to Sasebo and, at 2100 King, was relieved in TE 9.5,11 by ID!S GLORY and escorts as previously scheduled by CTG 95.1. Between 0800 and 0845, 4 June, BATAAN, WARRAM011GA, and VAN GAI:EN conducted a pre-arranged anti-aircraft firing exercise in the gunnery area off Sasebo, At 094.5 King, while operating about 6o miles west or Fulruoka, Japan, BATAAN launched all flyable aircraft or VMF- 312 to proceed t.o Itam1 Al'B Japan, by way of Itazulci Al'B because of weather. At 1038 WARRAM011GA and VAN GALEN were detached to proceed to Kure, Japan as pre­ viously scheduled, BATAAN proceeded unescorted via the northern swept channel to Sasebo tor logistics, and on arrival at 1250 King reported to CTF 9.5 tor operational control. At 0700 King, debarkation of 5 June1 BATAAN sailed tor , Japan to complete VMF 31Z personnel and equipment. BATAAN arrived atKobe at 1030 King, 6 June, and departed for Yolcosulca, Japan at 1300 King, 7 June. On arrival at Yokosulca at 1000 King, 8 June a conference was held with representative officers of uss SICILY {eVE 118), which was enroute to the Korean operating area as relief for BATAAN in TG 95,1. The purpose of this conference was to turn over operational information and intelligence material to SICILY, as well as to arrange for the transfer or eritieal material items between the two vessels. This accomplished, SICILY sailed from Yokosuka the following afternoon. On 11 June USS BATAAN assisted ComCarDiv 15 in conducting the annual administrative inspection of USS BAIROKO (CVE 115). Meanwhile, during the period 8-12 June, BATAAN made ready to sail for the United States, and at 0800 King 13 June departed Yokosulca, Japan for San Diego, California, PART li CHRONOLOqi (ALL TIM;ES KING)

13-18 May 1951 Sasebo, Japan for logistics, 95, 19 May 1951 o645 Rear Admiral Allan E. Smithh;~ embarked and broke his flag in B , company with 0700 departed Sasebo1 Japan in HNMS VAN GALEN (D803J enroute north of Quelpart Island and west of Jlakau for the operating area off west coast of Korea, 0945 IlMAS WARRAMUNGA joined, 2100 relieved !IllS GLORY and two British destroyers in TE 95,11, Captain w. Miller in USS BATAAN assumed duties as CTE 95,11. the west coast of 20 Jllay 1951 Operating as TE 9 5.11 off Korea. o63o-2030 launched l2 CAP and 37 offensive sorties, including 25 Armed Recco and 12 Tar.­ C&p in support of TE 95,12 in the Jfanap-to area, near Cho Do Island, 0855 the USS FECHTELER (DD 870) and USS RUFERTUS (DD 85'1) joined, The Screen Com­ mander was Captain Becher in WARRAMlJliGA,

21 May 1951 Operating as before, re­ 0730 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN proceeded to fuel from WAVE PREIIIER. 0855 HMCS SIOUX joined the screen while the WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN refueled, 1250 WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN rejoined SIOUX: WAVE PREMIER. No digllt departed to rejoin area, operations due to dense fog in the operating as before, 22 !lay 1951 Operating sort­ 063Q-2030 launched 12 CAP and 33 offensive 25 CAS and 8 Armed Recco, ies including tti" 204~ RUPERTUS proceeded on radar patrol "Buga between Paengnyong-Do and the Shantung promontory of detecting any enemy surface or for the purpose and air movement between the Shantung peninsula Korea during the night, before, 23 !lay 1951 Operating as nega­ 05'50 RUPERTUS rejoined, Night radar patrol tive. from o6l0-09l5 RUFERTUS and FECHTELER refueled (AO 58) , USS MANATEE sorties, o630-2031' launched l2 CAP and 36 offensive including 20 CAS and 16 Armed Receo, II-l 2042 l!'EC~ departed on night radar patrol "Bugatti•, - 24 May 1951 Operating as before. 0645 ~C~ rejoined, Nigkt radar patrol negatiTe, 0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 32 otfensl. ve S>rt­ ies including 16 CAS and 16 ADDed Recco sorties. 1330 CTF 95, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, departed via TBMtor a conference at Inchon. 2040 ~ departed to patrol "Bugatti•. 25 May 1951 Operating as before. 0545 BDPERTUS rejoined, Night patrol negative. 0700-1220 Tll 95 .11 retueled tro111 :MANATEE (A.O 58) and BATAAN rear111ed tro111 USS DIPHDA (AKA 59). 1313 CTF 95 returned aboard, '!'hare were no air operations due to fog in the operating area, 1955 ~OHTELER departed to patrol "Bugatti•, 26 May 1951 Operating as before. 0725 FEOHTELER rejoined, Night radar patrol negative, '!'here were no air operations due to tog in the operating area, 2000 ROPERTUS departed on radar patrol "Bugatti•. 27 May 1951 Operating as before, 0510 RUPERTUS rejoined. Night radar patrol neg­ ative. 'l'here were no air operations due to tog in the operating area, 1900 FEOHTliLER departed on radar patrol "Bugatti•. 28 May 1951 Operating as before. OSlO FEOHTELER rejoined; patrol negative, 0540 '/IAllil.WIJNGJ and VAN GAIJ

30 May- 1951 Operating as betore. 0~34 RUPER~S rejoined. Reported encountering a possible submarine. ComNavFE intormed. This contact later reevaluated as 0 doubttUl submarine• on receipt or additional intormation. The task . element was unable to replenish trom USS MANATEE (AO 58) as schedUled due to dense tog in the operating area. MANATEE and escort remained with­ in radar contact until the weather cleared. 1810 ~CKER departed to patrol "Bugatti•. 31 Yay 1951 Operating as betore. 0445 ~CKER rejoined; patrol negative. o6>0-2030 launched 10 CAP and 28 ottensive sorties, including 24 Armed Recco and 4 Strikes in the Yqnan area. Ob45 ~ 95.11 retueled trom MANATEE, completing at 1050. 201$ ~RUmP~ER~TUS departed to patrol "Bugatti•. l June 1951 Operating as betore. 0518 RUPERTUS rejoined; patrol negative. 0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 44 otfensive sorties, including 40 Armed Recco and 4 Strikes in the Haeju area. 0750 VAN G;II.EN proceeded to WAVE PRll1oiiER tor mail and topped ott with fuel While alongside. 2023 TUCKER departed to petrol."Bugatti•. 1717 VAN GALEN rejoined. ~ . 2 June 1951 Operating as betore. 0500 TUCKER rejoined; patrol negative. 0630-2030 launched 12 CAP and 40 ortensive sorties, including 31 Armed Reece and 9 CAS. 2045 RUPERTUS departed to patrol "Bugatti•. 3 June 1951 Operating as betore. 0207 the USS MASON (DD 852) joined the screen. 0530 RUPERTUS rejoined; petrol negative. 0647 ROPERTUS was detached to proceed to the east coast or KOrea and report to CTG 95.2 tor opera­ tional control. II-3 0630-1330 launched 6 CAP and 19 orfensive sorties, including 15 CAS and 4 combined CAP and Airspot in support of !DIS CEYLON in the vicinity of the Cho Do Island, 1410 BATAAIII, escorted by WARRAMUNGA and VAN GALEN, proceeded toward Sasebo and ~TUnumXER~ and MASON were detached to patrol ~Bugatti" With orders to join !DIS GLORY and screell. the folloWing m.orn1ne;. 2100 GLORY and escorts relieved BATAAIII, WARIWI!JNGA and VAN G.AI:EN in 'fE 95,11, CO, !DIS GLORY became OTC and C~ 95,11. 4 lune 1951 Enroute Sasebo, lapan. 0800-0845 conducted AA firing exercises for all ships of the formation. 0945 launched 25 aircraft for Itaai AFB, Japan, All planes landed at ItazUke AFB because of weather. 1038 W~GA and VAN GALEN were detached to proce­ ed on to Kure, Japan. 1250 the BATAAN arrived Sasebo for logistics, 5 June 1951 0700 departed Sasebo, enroute Kobe, Japan to disambark VMF 312 personnel and equipment, 6 lune 1951 Enroute Kobe, Japan. 1030 arrived Kobe, Personnel and equipment of VMF 312 off-loaded. 7 June 1951 0700 departed Kobe for Yokosuka, Japan. 8 June 1951 Enroute YokosUka, 1000 arrived Yokosuka, 9 June 1951 At YokosUka, Japan, made turnover to USS SICILY (C'IE 118), , 10 June 1951 At Yokosuka, Japan. 11 ;rune 1951 At Yokosuka, Japan, The BATAAN assisted ComCarDiv-15 to conduct an administrative inspection of USS BAIROKO ( C'IE 115) , 12 June 1951 At Yokosuka, Japan. 13 June 1951 0800 Underway for San Diego, California. U.S.A,

II-4

/0 PAR~ III PEIU"'I!JIAJICE OF OIIDI!AirCE llATERIAL AND EQUIPIIEIIT AND AMWNITIOII EXPEIIDITURE 1. Jlaterial and Equipment During this and the preceding two weeks operating period Fun Extension lUi in c011bination with Noze Fuze AR-10.03 ns employed ;Ith oo, 5'oo, .and 1000 lb. GP b011bs for anti­ personnel purposes in lieu of the Anti-Personnel Attach­ ment (daisy cutter) extension formerly employed. Pilots reported that the new combination was definitely superior in producing above ground b\U'sts and that the percentage of "duds" was much lower than with the old rod type "daisy cutter•. Whereas the old "daisy cutter• assembly required careful handling to avoid bending the extension rod, the new ruze extension was used by ordnance personnel as a grip to assist in manhandling bOilbs, with no apparent ill result. Koveover, since the ruze was attached to the for­ ward end of the extension inatead or at its base it could be set with a delay, if desired1 without removing the ax• tension. ~his reature permitted ruze settings to be changed expeditiously on the ruses or bombs already loaded on aircrart as reqUired to obtain best results when last minute changes in target assignments were made. 2. Ammunition Expanded Cal. 5'0 KG 216,400 rds 100# GP Bombs 5'63 5'00# GP Bombs 113 1000# GP Bombs 5'2 5'.on HVAR Rockets 1,746 200 CJO 40 Mil 1,994 llapalll thickener 5',715' lbs llapalll tanks 127

III

II PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE A, Own l, No damage was suffered by surface units. 2, Damage to aircraft by enemy anti-aix•craft and small arms fire is summarized below, Details of these casualties were re­ ported separately in Aircraft Vulnerability Reports, OPNAV-55• 120-(7-50) forms, Mission No, A{.C hit Times Hit, T)Jle F;j.re Dama~e ~ (Note 1) Close Air Support 2 l Light AW Minor l l Unknown iv!inor Armed Recco 7 1 Light AW Minor 3 1 Light AW Moderate l 1 Unknown Minor 1 1 Heavy AW Major (Note 2)

Notes: 1. Machine guns of caliber .50 and smaller are reported as Light Automatic Weapons, Heavy Automatic Weapons comprise those firing 20 and 40 mm type ammunition, 2, Plane hit in cockpit, crashed, and exploded, Pilot not re­ covered, 3. No damage was incurred by aircraft assigned AIRSPOT or CAP missions.

DESTROYED DJ\I{iAGED Buildings 297 Buildings 141 Locomotives 1 Warehouses 4 Bridges 3 Bridges 8 Field Pieces 10 Railcars 20 Pack Animals 10 Locomotives 3 Trucks 23 Boxcars 15 Sampans 30 Trucks 17 Sampans 87 Junks 2 Barges 2 Casualties inflicted on enemy troops, estimated 722 IV-1 ;1.. PART' V' PERSONJIEL; PERFORMAIICE A1'ID CASUALTIES 1. The performance of all personnel was excellent. 2. Personnel casualties were as follows: 28 !lay lst Lt. A.E. Brenneman 039340, USMCB 1 crashed in enemy held territory when the plane or which he was pilot was hit in the vicinity of the cock:pi t by enemy anti-aircre!t fire. The aircraft ex­ pleded on impact and there was no chance of lst Lt. Brenaeman•s survival. 31 l!ay lst Lt. R.D. Bianehi 0372,41 USMC, received cuts on his right hand ana1 the lert side of his face from pieces of plexiglass when the canopy of the aircraft he was piloting was shattered by enemy light machine gun fire.

V-1 ' PART VI COJ.ll!ENTS .lED RECOlldMENDATIONS Operations: oc­ Cmpm'Njt: During the period of this report and on previous pilots who had never qualified aboard casions some replacement were a carrier, and others who had qualified over five years ago Under normal circumstances qualification and received aboard, rlth USF requalifica.tion woul.d have been conducted in accordance directives but operational requirements 5'0 and type commander's it and aircratt availability made tbls impracticable. However, to conduct the qualification of replacement was found possible or pilots in three phases without setting up special flights interfering with combat operations. phase, aircraft familiarization and field The first a carrier landing drill, was conducted at a Japanese base by Jlarine service squadron, In general the time spent by replace­ was less than the desirable mizUJnum ment pilots in this phase Air due to the urgent need for replacement throughout the Jlarine of sufficient aircratt for trajnlng purposes. Wing and the lack to Except in one instance, the Landing Signal Officers assigned to participate 1n this phase. Phase two the ship were unable cog­ consisted of a thorough brief1ng on carrier operations by nizant ship and squadron officers, plas two days shipboard operations, During this period replace­ observation of actual them with ment pilots were used only as taxi pilots to familiarize The third phase commenced with employing flight deck procedure. dusk the new pilot on all combat air patrols except the dawn and made at the conclusion of these CAP tlights patrols. The landings succes­ were considered to be their qualiticetien landings. Two landings in connection with CAP missions were sive satisfactory fly required before each new pilot was considered qualified to or &l'llled reconnaissance missions in his regular tarn, air support pilot con­ Even when tlying on these missions however 1 each new observation and if hls landing technique tinued under critical tech­ was below par he was again assigned CAP missions until his Biqae improved, Between 15' January and 3 June 195'1 sixteen replacement pilots were successfully qualified by using !he method outlined, Only one pilot thus trained failed to qualify tor unlimited em­ felt tllat by this method of carefUl briefingl ployment, It is to "make deck training, pr0limjnary flight tra1n1ngtand incentive can earn whiJ.e they learn, It is the team", replacement pilo

Co~: Target information received from covert sources dur- ing s and previous operating periods proved to be both ac­ curate and uset'lll.. Enough tar11ets ware recOllllllended and de­ scribed in detail to enable almost every armed reconnaissance flight to be pre-briefed on at least one "covert• target in the area assigned to reconnoiter.- This was insurance against an llllproductive JllissiOA. It also provided each flight lea4er a worthwhile target on which to expend external stores it it becaae necessary to "streamline" his flight in order to attain high speed to reconnoiter with reasonable safety a heavily defended area. Covert sources often reported res'lll.ts of attacks on the targets they had recoamsnded. These reports were always heartening to the pilots who so often never learned whether their efforts had been really productive. They also proTided a basis tor correcting lllistakes in technique or arlll1ng which may have been made in ex­ ecuting attacks. cc!it: Ai:!'eratt sometiaes returned from flights with rockets • ung Oil wing rackS. As a res'lll.t ot arrested landings these rockets frequently dropped from their suspension pylons and skid­ ad up the flight deck. The rocket tins sometiaes engaged an ar­ resting gear wire or a partially lowered barrier and thus brought the rocket to rest. Others lost their fins or failed to engage a wire and continued 11p the clack, endangering parked aircraft and flight deck personnel. In order to decrease the prebability of wild rockets in the forward flight deck area, the forward elevator was lowered about eight inches during the recovery ot aircraft with "h1111g• rockets. It was found that rockets which came adr11't and were not otherwise stepped were almost invariably caught 1a the shallow pit thus iaposed in their line of travel. The elevator structure suffered nc significant damage due to this practice. Cmtntl Comments en the inadeq'llacy of the aviator's immersion. slii: Jrark II, ]{cd l, and recommendations for its improvement have been submitted in previous reports. During this paried of oper­ ations a further difficulty associated with the t.marsion suit became evident as set forth below. Water t8lll]lerature in the operating are& during the period averaged 5'3b F. tor which tamperatura most surTival lll&ll"aals and instructions recOIIlllend immersion suits be worn. However, air temperatures at lcnr altitudes over the target area averaged 1>5"' F. end' together with the bright sunshine which frequently prevailed over the land, caused relatively high cockpit temperatures in air­ craft engaged in close air support &Dd armed reconnaissance ais­ sions. Siace pertol'll&llca at these Jlissions required tm.us'llal phy- ' ' trol the exercise as much as possible in order maximum number of personnel to train the in the fundamentals of AA coordination, Rec~eQ4ationt This type of training sma l formations, exercise is recommended for It is considered that the short shell remains visible in daylight period a star of the furnishes an excellent criterion alertness and effectiveness of condition taking a target under fire. watch gun crews in improvement Successive exercises showed marked in the performance of all ships. &erolpu:

~!l..f!~ __ Haze aloft was prevalent in the Korean theater after dust storms, associated two or ment of a high with the eastward move­ pressure eir mass, hed been reported Desert and Lake Baikal regions, in the Gobi · twice during This condition was experil:enced the period covered by this report was forecast one of these and its occurrence apparently times, At one time the dust blanket extending from about 200 feet surface, was clearly visible to lO,OOOfeet above tbe from the ship for several hours, The principal char.cteristic of this is the high surface visibility weather phenomenon while at which prevails (average 8-10 miles) the same time air-to-eir and air-to-surface only 1-3 miles, When the haze visibility is obtained prevailed, surface contacts were with the SPS-6B air search radar the maximum scope range. at ranges up to 200 miles, terrain These contacts incl'llded both ships features. In one instance USB TUCKER and continuously while she proceeded (DD 875) was tracked miles from on patrol to a distance of 103 the formation and rejoined. The and SP redar in detecting performance of' the SG-6 only surface contacts was also improv::i to the extent of about 150% of normal but were obtained on air contacts range. No unus ranges with any of the three radars named, RecOI!!J!l•pdatioru It is recommended cribed be broUght that the weather phenomenon des­ to the attention of fleet serological and that forecasters in the Korean personnel ty of exceptional theater indicate the probabili­ redar coverage in their forecasts ditions outlined above pertain. when the con­ C"M@lt! During this and earlier operating periods weatliar reporting stations to the absence of area in the the westward of the carrier operating Yell<>W Sea made if difficult to forecast the time, extent, and duration with accuracy Detailed information of impending non-flyable weather. was lacking concerning orientation their direction and rate .of of fronts 1 frontal movement, and the nature and extent activity, The latter was very difficult or due to the Yellow Sea to prognosticate particularly being a veritable "mixing pot" for at this season of the year. weather, fronts changed during The characteristics of their passage over the area and complicated • " .

forecasting. Consequently, on several occasions when the weather deteriorated earlier and to a greater extent than forecast, soma difficulty was experienced in recovering flights which had been launched in anticipation of the weather remaining flyable for their scheduled duration. IJiost of these occurrences could have been avoided had it been possible to obtain reports Of the weather 80 to 100 miles north and west of the carrier operating area as of 0600 and 1300 LZ:r daily. :rhe aerial weather recon­ naissance made daily at 1130 by the Fifth Air Force covered the area satisfactorily but the information obtained, although COIIIplete, was not tl..ely from the carrier's viewpoint. Commaruler Fifth Air Force was requested to modify his weather flight schedule to provide coverage at the times mentioned aboh:A but as of the and of this reporting period the action requested not yet been taken. Recoll!!!8!ldat1on1 It is recOIIIIIlended that nathar flights be conduct­ ed along the China coast, as far north as the Shantung Promontory in the early morning and late afternoon, in order to provide data tor forecasting the flying weather for the Yellow Sea. In event restrictions on aerial penetration of Chinese territory are lifted it is suggested that this area be used as a proving ground for the automatic weather transmitting station recently developed by Navy Electronics Laboratory. (See Naval Aviation Confidential Bulletin, April 1951). Cemnmica!;3,pQII C9ll!!!entl While Commander, United Nations Blockade and Escort Foree (CTF 95) was embarked in BAT.AAI!I communications operated at peak load. Considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping up with traffic due to the overcrowded communication spaces, and over­ loaded equipment. :rhe largest single deficiency was the lack of sufficient transmitters to handle the additional flag traffic. :rhe six (6) high frequency transmitters available ware already committed to circuits required by the task element communication plan. Despite special transmitter guard arrangements made with screening ships, adequate communications could BOt be maintained. Outgoing C:rF 95 traffic was of such volume that delays in delivery resulted even though CTF 95 controlled his own (:rask Force COII!Ill&ruler 1s) net. Inadequacy of working space in Radio Central, the IJiain Communication Station, and the Crypto Room has been apparent since BA:rAAN was recommissioned. Enlargement of these spaces has been recommended DY the Board of Inspection and Survey and approved by the Bureau of Ships for accomplishment during the next major over­ haul of this vessel. Until modernization and expansion of present eommunicati~:~uipment and spaces is accomplished, it is considered that the co cation facilities ot the CVL 22 class carriers are woefully inadequate to accommodate a flag officer's requirements.

n-; " .

• Csmpaent1 Previous reports have commented on misuse of the tacti­ cal primary voice net (~S) for passing administrative traffic. As a result of local representations to responsible commanders a great improvement 1n the aae of this :net was apparent during the period of this report. !lo administrative traffic was heard on the tactical .net. Ia addition, tactical communications were much im­ proved. It was evident that other c0111111a.nds present 1.n the oper­ ating area had given this matter serious attention with the result that at all times the tactical .net was clear for tactical use.