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Application Signature Database Release Notes V 4.12.41

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Application Signature Database Release Notes V 4.12.41 Application Signature Version: 4.12.41 Application Signature Database Release Notes Version 4.12.41 th -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Database Release Notes Date: 19 August,--------------- 2015 Release Information Upgrade Applicable on Application Signature Release Version 4.12.40 CR200i, CR250i, CR300i, CR500i-4P, CR500i-6P, CR500i-8P, CR500ia, CR500ia-RP, CR500ia1F, CR500ia10F, CR750ia, CR750ia1F, CR750ia10F, CR1000i-11P, CR1000i-12P, CR1000ia, CR1000ia10F, CR1500i-11P, CR1500i-12P, CR1500ia, CR1500ia10F Cyberoam Appliance Models CR25iNG, CR25iNG-6P, CR35iNG, CR50iNG, CR100iNG, CR200iNG/XP, CR300iNG/XP, CR500iNG- XP, CR750iNG-XP, CR2500iNG, CR25wiNG, CR25wiNG-6P, CR35wiNG CRiV1C, CRiV2C, CRiV4C, CRiV8C, CRiV12C Upgrade Information Upgrade type: Automatic Compatibility Annotations: None Introduction The Release Note document for Application Filter Database version 4.12.41 includes support for both, the new and the updated Application Signatures. The following sections describe the release in detail. New Application Signatures The Cyberoam Application Filter controls the application traffic depending on the policy configured, by matching them with the Application Signatures. Application Signatures optimize the detection performance and reduces the false alarms. Report false positives at [email protected], along with the application details. The table below provides details of signatures included in this release. Page 1 of 5 Document Version – 1.0- 19/08/2015 Application Signature Database Release Notes Version 4.12.41 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------- This Application Filter Release includes nine (9) Application Signatures to address two (2) Application Categories. Also, a total of Eight hundred and twenty four (824) Application Signatures are updated for ten (10) Application Categories. New signatures are added for the following Application Categories: Rev Applicable from Application Name Risk Category No. Version Facebook Chat 6.0 2 Instant 10.04.0 Build 214 Messenger Manual Proxy Surfing 6.1 4 Proxy and 10.04.0 Build 214 Tunnel TeamViewer 6.2 3 Conferencing 10.04.0 Build 214 Conferencing DCERPC 3.9 1 Infrastructure 10.04.0 Build 214 Skype 8.8 4 Instant 10.04.0 Build 214 Messenger Skype Services 8.6 5 General 10.04.0 Build 214 Internet Torrent Clients P2P 33.7 5 P2P 10.04.0 Build 214 Freegate Proxy 31.6 5 Proxy and 10.04.0 Build 214 Tunnel Ultrasurf Proxy 8 5 Proxy and 10.04.0 Build 214 Tunnel TOR Proxy 8.4 5 Proxy and 10.04.0 Build 214 Tunnel Psiphon Proxy 5.4 5 Proxy and 10.04.0 Build 214 Tunnel Secure Socket Layer 3.8 1 Infrastructure 10.04.0 Build 214 Protocol Orkut Android 3.4 4 Mobile 10.04.0 Build 214 Applications Orkut Website 3.4 4 Social 10.04.0 Build 214 Networking Hotspotshield Proxy 2.7 5 Proxy and 10.04.0 Build 214 Tunnel Amazon AWS 2.1 1 General 10.04.5 Build 007 Business More than One QNAME 1.3 3 Infrastructure 10.04.5 Build 007 (Questions) in single DNS query WeChat Mobile 1.3 3 Mobile 10.04.0 Build 214 Application Applications Page 2 of 5 Document Version – 1.0- 19/08/2015 Application Signature Database Release Notes Version 4.12.41 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------- Facebook Website 1.3 3 Social 10.04.0 Build 214 Networking OkCupid Android 1.2 4 Mobile 10.04.0 Build 214 Application Applications Line Messanger 1.5 2 Instant 10.04.0 Build 214 Messenger Multi Threaded 1.1 4 File Transfer 10.04.0 Build 214 Download Using HTTP Uproxy 1.0 5 Proxy and 10.06.1 Build 631 Tunnel JB Hi-Fi Streaming 1.0 1 Streaming 10.06.1 Build 631 Media 9jumpin Streaming 1.0 1 Streaming 10.06.1 Build 631 Media Network TEN Streaming 1.0 1 Streaming 10.06.1 Build 631 Media SBS Channel Streaming 1.0 1 Streaming 10.06.1 Build 631 Media Yahoo 7 TV (Plus7) 1.0 1 Streaming 10.06.1 Build 631 Streaming Media ABC iView Streaming 1.0 1 Streaming 10.06.1 Build 631 Media Page 3 of 5 Document Version – 1.0- 19/08/2015 Application Signature Database Release Notes Version 4.12.41 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------- Application Name & Version: Name and version number of the Application that can be identified by Cyberoam Application Filter. These Application Filtering signatures support prior versions of respective application. Rev No.: Threat signature revision number. Risk: Describes the level of risk for the application. The levels of risks are described in the table below: Risk Level Risk Criteria 1 Very Low 2 Low 3 Medium 4 High 5 Very High Category: Identifies the category of the Application. Applicable from Version: Application filters are available in a specified Cyberoam Firmware Version and above. Page 4 of 5 Document Version – 1.0- 19/08/2015 Application Signature Database Release Notes Version 4.12.41 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------- Important Notice Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd. has supplied this Information believing it to be accurate and reliable at the time of printing, but is presented without warranty of any kind, expressed or implied. Users must take full responsibility for their application of any products. Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd. assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd. reserves the right, without notice to make changes in product design or specifications. Information is subject to change without notice. USER’S LICENSE Use of this product and document is subject to acceptance of the terms and conditions of Cyberoam End User License Agreement (EULA) and Warranty Policy for Cyberoam UTM Appliances. You will find the copy of the EULA at http://www.cyberoam.com/documents/EULA.html and the Warranty Policy for Cyberoam UTM Appliances at http://kb.cyberoam.com. RESTRICTED RIGHTS Copyright 1999 - 2015 Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd. All rights reserved. Cyberoam, Cyberoam logo are trademark of Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Corporate Headquarters Cyberoam Technologies Pvt. Ltd. 901, Silicon Tower, Off. C.G. Road, Ahmedabad – 380006, INDIA Phone: +91-79-66065606 Fax: +91-79-26407640 Web site: www.cyberoam.com Page 5 of 5 Document Version – 1.0- 19/08/2015 .
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