The Role of Unconscious Memory Errors in Judgments of Confidence for Sentence Recognition
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Memory & Cognition 2009, 37 (2), 158-163 doi:10.3758/MC.37.2.158 The role of unconscious memory errors in judgments of confidence for sentence recognition CRISTINA SAMPAIO Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington AND WILLIAM F. B REWER University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois The present experiment tested the hypothesis that unconscious reconstructive memory processing can lead to the breakdown of the relationship between memory confidence and memory accuracy. Participants heard decep- tive schema-inference sentences and nondeceptive sentences and were tested with either simple or forced-choice recognition. The nondeceptive items showed a positive relation between confidence and accuracy in both simple and forced-choice recognition. However, the deceptive items showed a strong negative confidence/accuracy relationship in simple recognition and a low positive relationship in forced choice. The mean levels of confi- dence for erroneous responses for deceptive items were inappropriately high in simple recognition but lower in forced choice. These results suggest that unconscious reconstructive memory processes involved in memory for the deceptive schema-inference items led to inaccurate confidence judgments and that, when participants were made aware of the deceptive nature of the schema-inference items through the use of a forced-choice procedure, they adjusted their confidence accordingly. There has been much disagreement in the literature as an inferential process based on cues that are available on the issue of the degree to which memory confidence at the time of the judgment and on metamemory beliefs predicts memory accuracy (Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & about how these cues relate to accuracy. More specifically, Brigham, 1987; Perfect & Hollins, 1996; Read, Lindsay, & we think that the main sources of information on which Nicholls, 1998; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). One memory confidence is based are (1) the process used in a proposal that can account for some of the dramatic differ- memory task (e.g., recall vs. familiarity judgments) along ences found among experiments on memory confidence is with the products of the memory task (e.g., an image) and the hypothesis that unconscious memory errors are respon- (2) the metamemory beliefs about how different memory sible for some of the inaccuracies of confidence judgments processes and products relate to memory accuracy (e.g., (Koriat, 1995; Leippe, 1980; Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982, the belief that memory information in recollective recall pp. 248–249). For example, Leippe argued that is likely to be accurate). In many memory situations, these metamemory beliefs are valid, and their use leads to a as reconstructive processes become more extensive, positive relationship of confidence and accuracy. How- the accuracy–confidence relationship should be- ever, there are situations in which the relationship breaks come correspondingly smaller. The reason for this down (Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000; Kel- is that, while people may have a veridical feeling ley & Lindsay, 1993; Koriat, 1995; Koriat & Goldsmith, about how accessible or “strong” their memorial 1996; Tomes & Katz, 2000). For example, in a previous representations of objects are, they are not likely to recognition experiment (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006) we be conscious of the transformations that these repre- showed that individuals assign appropriate levels of con- sentations may have gone through during encoding, fidence for standard nondeceptive experimental materials storage, and retrieval. (p. 264) but assign inappropriately high levels of confidence for Although the hypothesis of the role of unconscious mem- deceptive materials. In that experiment, when participants ory processes influencing memory confidence has consid- were presented with a sentence such as The hungry python erable theoretical appeal, it has not been explicitly tested. caught the mouse and tested with a deceptive foil such as We have proposed a metamemory approach to the study The hungry python ate the mouse in a simple recognition of confidence (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006, 2008; Brewer, test, they frequently judged the foil to be old and showed Sampaio, & Barlow, 2005) in which we view confidence high confidence in their false judgment. We assumed that C. Sampaio, [email protected] © 2009 The Psychonomic Society, Inc. 158 CONFIDENCE IN SENTENCE RECOGNITION 159 in this experimental condition, participants were not aware tences of varying length, grammatical structure, imagery, and level of the operation of the gist-based memory processes and of abstraction. For example, The zebra outran the lion is an example that their lack of awareness about their incorrect responses of an easy sentence; The Federal Reserve sets the discount interest led to the breakdown of the usual positive relationship be- rate is an example of a moderately difficult sentence; and Deductive logic depends on entailment among propositions is an example of a tween memory confidence and accuracy. It seems to us difficult sentence. that the hypothesis of unconscious memory errors pro- vides a very plausible account of these data. However, in Presentation Lists (Items Presented During Acquisition) that experiment we provided no direct empirical evidence Two presentation lists were counterbalanced for schema-inference to support the crucial hypothesis. item type (i.e., the schema-inference items that were in original form Our goal in the present experiment was to provide the on one list were in inferred form on the other, and vice versa). Each list contained a total of 102 sentences (12 original schema-inference first empirical test of the hypothesis that unconscious sentences, 12 inferred schema-inference sentences, all 72 base sen- memory errors are responsible for some of the inaccuracy tences, and 6 filler sentences). The order of the sentences in the list of confidence judgments that have been reported in the was randomized. literature. In this experiment, we included a test proce- dure that should lead participants to be more aware of the New Test Items (Foils) deceptive nature of schema-inference items. Specifically, Deceptive schema-inference foil sentences. The deceptive items were the foil schema-inference sentences that expressed the we contrasted the data from a group of participants tested expected schema-based inference (an inferred item) when the ac- with a simple recognition procedure against the data from quisition sentence was an original item (e.g., the presentation of The a group of participants tested with a forced-choice proce- hungry python ate the mouse as a test item when The hungry python dure. Our reasoning was that a participant presented with caught the mouse was the acquisition item). These items were con- a sentence such as The hungry python caught the mouse sidered deceptive because we hypothesized that participants pre- and later asked to choose between The hungry python sented with the original sentence of a schema-inference item would be likely to make a schema-based inference and thus would falsely caught the mouse and the deceptive foil The hungry py- recognize the sentence that expressed that inference. thon ate the mouse would be more likely to become aware Nondeceptive schema-inference foil sentences. The nondecep- of the deceptive nature of this type of item than would a tive items for the schema-inference items were the schema-inference participant who was asked to carry out a simple recogni- sentences that contained information that was designed to lead to tion memory task. If this was found to be the case, then a schema-based inference (an original item) when the acquisition on the basis of the metamemory theory of confidence we sentence was an inferred item (e.g., the presentation of The hungry python caught the mouse as a test item when The hungry python ate predicted that individuals tested with a forced-choice pro- the mouse was the acquisition item). Across the schema-inference cedure would continue to make memory errors but would foil sentences, half were deceptive and half were not. drop their confidence levels for these items. This would Nondeceptive base foil sentences. We constructed 216 sen- lead to a stronger confidence/accuracy relationship for tences to be foil items for the base sentences in the recognition tests. the schema-inference items in the forced-choice condition The base items had been written to vary in intrinsic difficulty, and than in the simple recognition condition. their foils were developed to vary widely in similarity with respect to the base items in order to provide an even broader range of dif- ficulty in the recognition memory tasks. A set of three sentences METHOD was written for each base presentation sentence. The first sentence Participants of the set was written to be highly similar to the list sentence, the second was written to be moderately similar to the list sentence, The participants were 36 undergraduate students from the Univer- and the third was written to be dissimilar to the list sentence (e.g., sity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign who carried out the experiment base list sentence, The tornado picked up the elm tree; highly similar as part of a course requirement. sentence, The tornado picked up the oak tree; moderately similar sentence, The tornado picked up the cow; dissimilar sentence, The Materials mermaid swam to the sailor). There were 72 highly similar foils, Acquisition Items 72 moderately similar foils, and 72 dissimilar foils.