Curriculum Vitae Mathew D. Mccubbins
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Curriculum Vitae Mathew D. McCubbins Publications Authored Books: 1. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (with D. Roderick Kiewiet). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Spring 1991. 1.1 Chapter 2 reprinted in Readings in American Politics: Analysis and Perspective. Ed. Ken Kollman. W. W. Norton & Company, December 2009. 2. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (with Gary W. Cox). Berkeley: University of California Press, Spring 1993. 2.1. Pages 253-273 reprinted in Classics in Congressional Politics. ed. Lisa Campoli, Eric Heberlig, and Herb Weisberg. Longman Press, 1999. 3. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (with Arthur Lupia). Cambridge University Press, 1998. 3.1. Translated and reprinted in Japanese by Bokutakusha Ltd. 2005. 3.2. Chapter 1 reprinted in, An American Government Reader, Pearson Custom Publishing, 2007. 3.3. Pages 205-227 reprinted in Norton American Politics Online Reader, W.W. Norton & Company, 2008. 4. Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy. (with Elisabeth Gerber, Arthur Lupia, and D. Roderick Kiewiet). Prentice-Hall, 2001. 5. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives (with Gary W. Cox). Cambridge University Press, 2005. 5.1 Pages 17 – 36 reprinted in Readings in American Politics: Analysis and Perspectives, W. W. Norton & Company, forthcoming. 6. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House Second Edition (with Gary W. Cox). Cambridge University Press, 2007. Edited Books: 1. Congress: Structure and Policy (with Terry Sullivan). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 2. Under the Watchful Eye: Managing Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, August 1992. 3. Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States: An Institutionalist Approach (with Peter Cowhey). New York: Cambridge University Press, August, 1995. 4. The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World (with Paul Drake). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. 5. Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel Popkin). Cambridge University Press, 2000. 6. Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (with Stephan Haggard). Cambridge University Press, 2000. 7. Party, Process and Political Change in Congress, Volume 1: New Perspectives on the History of Congress (with David Brady). Stanford University Press, 2002. 8. Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress, Volume 2: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress (edited with David Brady). Stanford University Press, 2007. Articles in Journals: 1. Policy Components of Arms Competitions , American Journal of Political Science, August 1983. 2. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms (with Thomas Schwartz), American Journal of Political Science, February 1984. 2.1. Reprinted in: McCubbins, Mathew and Terry Sullivan, Congress: Structure and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 1987; 2.2. Reprinted in: Johnson, William C., Public Administration: Policy, Politics, and Practice, Dushkin Publishing Group; 2.3. Reprinted in: Cohen, Joshua and Archon Fung (eds.), Constitution, Democracy and State Power: The Institutions of Justice, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2.4. Reprinted in: Susan Rose-Ackerman, Economics of Administrative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007. 3. Policy Choice as an Electoral Investment (with Gary W. Cox and Terry Sullivan). Social Choice and Welfare, December 1984. 4. Constituency Influences on Legislative Policy Choice (with Terry Sullivan). Quality and Quantity, Vol. 18, 1984. 5. Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), Journal of Politics, February 1985. 6. Appropriation Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game Between the President and Congress (with D. Roderick Kiewiet). Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 1985. 7. The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, American Journal of Political Science, November 1985. 8. The Politics of Flatland (with Thomas Schwartz). Public Choice, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1985. 9. The Congressional Foundations of Agency Performance (with Talbot Page). Public Choice, May 1986. 10. Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game (with Gary W. Cox), Journal of Politics, May 1986. 11. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Fall, 1987. 11.1. Reprinted and excerpted in: Bonfield, Arthur E. and Michael Asimow, State and Federal Administrative Law, West Publishing, 1989; 11.2. Reprinted in Paul Joskow (ed.) Economic Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 11.3. Reprinted in Cary Coglianese and Robert Kagan, eds., Regulation and Regulatory Processes, the International Library of Essays in Law and Society, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007. 11.4. Reprinted in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Economics of Administrative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007. 11.5 Reprinted in Torun Dewan, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Rational Choice Politics. London. Sage Publications, January 2009. 11.6 Reprinted in Pablo Spiller ed. Institutional Law and Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming. 12. Congress, The Courts and Public Policy: Policy Consequences of the "One Man, One Vote" Rule (with Thomas Schwartz), American Journal of Political Science, May 1988. 13. Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriation Decisions (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), American Journal of Political Science, August 1988. 14. Structure and Process; Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Virginia Law Review, March 1989. 14.1. Reprinted in Thomas Lyon, The Political Economy of Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2007. 15. A Theory of Political Control and Bureaucratic Discretion (with Randall L. Calvert and Barry R. Weingast). American Journal of Political Science, August 1989. 16. Parties, Committees, and Policy Making in the U.S. Congress (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, November 1989. 17. Positive and Normative Models of Due Process: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 1990. 18. On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress (with Gary W. Cox). Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1991. 19. Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Georgetown Law Journal, February 1992. 19.1. Reprinted in Sutherland Statutory Construction 5th, 6th and 7th Editions. 20. Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter 1994. 20.1. Reprinted in Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Public Law. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2007. 20.2 Reprinted in Legal Institutions and Economic Development. Ed. Robert D. Cooter and Francesco Parisi. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Forthcoming. 21. Designing Bureaucratic Accountability (with Arthur Lupia), Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter 1994. 21.1. Excerpted and reprinted in E. Gellhorn and Byse (eds.) Administrative Law, Ninth Edition. 22. Learning From Oversight: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms Reconsidered (With Arthur Lupia). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, March 1994. 23. Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House (With Gary W. Cox), Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 1994. 23.1. Reprinted in Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast, eds. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor, Mi., University of Michigan Press 1995. 24. Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making (with Arthur Lupia). Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1994. 24.1. Reprinted in Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast, eds. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor, Mi., University of Michigan Press 1995. 25. Political Control of the Judiciary: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). The Southern California Law Review, September 1995. 26. Rationality and the Foundations of Positive Political Theory (with Michael Thies). Leviathan (in Japanese), Fall 1996. 27. As a Matter of Faction: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan’s LDP (with Michael Thies). Legislative Studies Quarterly, August 1997. 27.1. Reprinted in Ramseyer, Mark, ed., Japanese Law and Legal Theory: The Political Economy of Japanese Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 2000. 27.2. Reprinted in Ramseyer, Mark, ed., Japanese Law. Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002. 28. Politics, Institutions, and Outcomes: Electricity Regulation in Argentina and Chile (with William Heller). Journal of Policy Reform, 1997. 29. The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Spring 1999. 30. When is Delegation Abdication: How Citizens Use Institutions to Make Their Agents Accountable (with Arthur Lupia). European Journal of Political Research, 1999. 31. Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives