Curriculum Vitae Mathew D. McCubbins
Publications
Authored Books:
1. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (with D. Roderick Kiewiet). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Spring 1991.
1.1 Chapter 2 reprinted in Readings in American Politics: Analysis and Perspective. Ed. Ken Kollman. W. W. Norton & Company, December 2009.
2. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (with Gary W. Cox). Berkeley: University of California Press, Spring 1993.
2.1. Pages 253-273 reprinted in Classics in Congressional Politics. ed. Lisa Campoli, Eric Heberlig, and Herb Weisberg. Longman Press, 1999.
3. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (with Arthur Lupia). Cambridge University Press, 1998.
3.1. Translated and reprinted in Japanese by Bokutakusha Ltd. 2005.
3.2. Chapter 1 reprinted in, An American Government Reader, Pearson Custom Publishing, 2007. 3.3. Pages 205-227 reprinted in Norton American Politics Online Reader, W.W. Norton & Company, 2008.
4. Stealing the Initiative: How State Government Responds to Direct Democracy. (with Elisabeth Gerber, Arthur Lupia, and D. Roderick Kiewiet). Prentice-Hall, 2001.
5. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the US House of Representatives (with Gary W. Cox). Cambridge University Press, 2005.
5.1 Pages 17 – 36 reprinted in Readings in American Politics: Analysis and Perspectives, W. W. Norton & Company, forthcoming.
6. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House Second Edition (with Gary W. Cox). Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Edited Books:
1. Congress: Structure and Policy (with Terry Sullivan). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
2. Under the Watchful Eye: Managing Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, August 1992.
3. Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States: An Institutionalist Approach (with Peter Cowhey). New York: Cambridge University Press, August, 1995.
4. The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World (with Paul Drake). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
5. Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice and the Bounds of Rationality (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel Popkin). Cambridge University Press, 2000.
6. Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (with Stephan Haggard). Cambridge University Press, 2000.
7. Party, Process and Political Change in Congress, Volume 1: New Perspectives on the History of Congress (with David Brady). Stanford University Press, 2002.
8. Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress, Volume 2: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress (edited with David Brady). Stanford University Press, 2007.
Articles in Journals:
1. Policy Components of Arms Competitions , American Journal of Political Science, August 1983.
2. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms (with Thomas Schwartz), American Journal of Political Science, February 1984.
2.1. Reprinted in: McCubbins, Mathew and Terry Sullivan, Congress: Structure and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 1987;
2.2. Reprinted in: Johnson, William C., Public Administration: Policy, Politics, and Practice, Dushkin Publishing Group; 2.3. Reprinted in: Cohen, Joshua and Archon Fung (eds.), Constitution, Democracy and State Power: The Institutions of Justice, London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
2.4. Reprinted in: Susan Rose-Ackerman, Economics of Administrative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007.
3. Policy Choice as an Electoral Investment (with Gary W. Cox and Terry Sullivan). Social Choice and Welfare, December 1984.
4. Constituency Influences on Legislative Policy Choice (with Terry Sullivan). Quality and Quantity, Vol. 18, 1984.
5. Congressional Appropriations and the Electoral Connection (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), Journal of Politics, February 1985.
6. Appropriation Decisions as a Bilateral Bargaining Game Between the President and Congress (with D. Roderick Kiewiet). Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 1985.
7. The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, American Journal of Political Science, November 1985.
8. The Politics of Flatland (with Thomas Schwartz). Public Choice, Vol. 46, No. 1, 1985.
9. The Congressional Foundations of Agency Performance (with Talbot Page). Public Choice, May 1986.
10. Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game (with Gary W. Cox), Journal of Politics, May 1986. 11. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Fall, 1987.
11.1. Reprinted and excerpted in: Bonfield, Arthur E. and Michael Asimow, State and Federal Administrative Law, West Publishing, 1989;
11.2. Reprinted in Paul Joskow (ed.) Economic Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.
11.3. Reprinted in Cary Coglianese and Robert Kagan, eds., Regulation and Regulatory Processes, the International Library of Essays in Law and Society, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007.
11.4. Reprinted in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Economics of Administrative Law, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2007.
11.5 Reprinted in Torun Dewan, Keith Dowding and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Rational Choice Politics. London. Sage Publications, January 2009.
11.6 Reprinted in Pablo Spiller ed. Institutional Law and Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.
12. Congress, The Courts and Public Policy: Policy Consequences of the "One Man, One Vote" Rule (with Thomas Schwartz), American Journal of Political Science, May 1988.
13. Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriation Decisions (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), American Journal of Political Science, August 1988.
14. Structure and Process; Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Virginia Law Review, March 1989.
14.1. Reprinted in Thomas Lyon, The Political Economy of Regulation, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 2007.
15. A Theory of Political Control and Bureaucratic Discretion (with Randall L. Calvert and Barry R. Weingast). American Journal of Political Science, August 1989.
16. Parties, Committees, and Policy Making in the U.S. Congress (with D. Roderick Kiewiet), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, November 1989.
17. Positive and Normative Models of Due Process: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast) Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 1990.
18. On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress (with Gary W. Cox). Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1991.
19. Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation (with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Georgetown Law Journal, February 1992.
19.1. Reprinted in Sutherland Statutory Construction 5th, 6th and 7th Editions. 20. Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter 1994.
20.1. Reprinted in Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Public Law. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2007.
20.2 Reprinted in Legal Institutions and Economic Development. Ed. Robert D. Cooter and Francesco Parisi. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. Forthcoming.
21. Designing Bureaucratic Accountability (with Arthur Lupia), Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter 1994.
21.1. Excerpted and reprinted in E. Gellhorn and Byse (eds.) Administrative Law, Ninth Edition.
22. Learning From Oversight: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms Reconsidered (With Arthur Lupia). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, March 1994.
23. Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House (With Gary W. Cox), Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 1994.
23.1. Reprinted in Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast, eds. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor, Mi., University of Michigan Press 1995.
24. Who Controls? Information and the Structure of Legislative Decision Making (with Arthur Lupia). Legislative Studies Quarterly, November 1994. 24.1. Reprinted in Shepsle, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast, eds. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. Ann Arbor, Mi., University of Michigan Press 1995.
25. Political Control of the Judiciary: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). The Southern California Law Review, September 1995.
26. Rationality and the Foundations of Positive Political Theory (with Michael Thies). Leviathan (in Japanese), Fall 1996.
27. As a Matter of Faction: The Budgetary Implications of Shifting Factional Control in Japan’s LDP (with Michael Thies). Legislative Studies Quarterly, August 1997.
27.1. Reprinted in Ramseyer, Mark, ed., Japanese Law and Legal Theory: The Political Economy of Japanese Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 2000.
27.2. Reprinted in Ramseyer, Mark, ed., Japanese Law. Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002.
28. Politics, Institutions, and Outcomes: Electricity Regulation in Argentina and Chile (with William Heller). Journal of Policy Reform, 1997.
29. The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Spring 1999.
30. When is Delegation Abdication: How Citizens Use Institutions to Make Their Agents Accountable (with Arthur Lupia). European Journal of Political Research, 1999.
31. Agenda Power in the Japanese House of Representatives (with Gary Gox and Mikitaka Masuyama). Japanese Journal of Political Science, Fall 2000.
31.1 Reprinted in Hood, Christopher P., ed. Politics of Modern Japan: Critical Concepts in the Modern Politics of Asia. Routledge 2008.
32. Agenda Power in Brazil´s Câmara dos Deputados, 1989 to 1998 (with Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox). World Politics, 2003.
33. When Do State Governments Overturn Election Results? (with Elizabeth Gerber and Arthur Lupia). Journal of Politics, 2004.
34. Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives and Policy Making by Direct Democracy (with Thad Kousser). Southern California Law Review, 2005.
35. Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent (with Arthur Lupia). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2005.
36. Canonical Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon (with Daniel B. Rodriguez). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2005.
37. Statutory Interpretation and The Intentional(ist) Stance (with Cheryl Boudreau and Daniel B. Rodriguez). Loyola Law Review, 2006. 38. The Elusive Links Between Governance and Biodiversity (with C. Barrett, C. Gibson, and B. Hoffman). Conservation Biology, 2006.
39. Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980 - 2002 (published as Mathew D. McCubbin with William Chandler and Gary W. Cox). German Politics, March 2006.
40. Courts, Congress and Public Policy, Part I: The FDA, the Courts and the Regulation of Tobacco (with Jeff Lax). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.
41. Courts, Congress and Public Policy, Part II: The Impact of the Reapportionment Revolution on Urban and Rural Interests (with Jeff Lax). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.
42. Conditions for Judicial Independence (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.
43. When Does Deliberating Improve Decision Making? (with Daniel B. Rodriguez). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2006.
44. The Dual Path Initiative Framework (with Elizabeth Garrett). Southern California Law Review 80:2. January, 2007.
45. What Statutes Mean: Lessons From Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation (with Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia and Daniel B. Rodriguez). San Diego Law Review, 2007.
45.1 Excerpted and Reprinted in Peter L. Strauss ed., Legal Methods, Second Edition, Foundation Press 2008. 46. Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies 1988-2000 (with Gary W. Cox and William B. Heller). Legislative Studies Quarterly, May 2008.
47. When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democracy is Shaping American Cities (with Elizabeth Garrett). Public Works Management and Policy. July 2008.
48. For Whom the TEL Tolls: Can State Tax and Expenditure Limits Effectively Reduce Spending? (with Thad Kousser and Ellen Moule). State Politics and Policy Quarterly. Fall 2008.
49. Nothing But the Truth? Experiments on Adversarial Competition, Expert Testimony, and Decision Making (with Cheryl Boudreau). Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2008, Vol. 5 (4): 751-89.
50. Knowing When to Trust Others: An ERP Study of Decision-Making After Receiving Information From Unknown People (with Cheryl Boudreau and Seana Coulson). Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, March 2009, Vol. 4 (1): 23-34.
51. The Problem of Being Special: Democratic Values and Special Assessments (with Vladimir Kogan). Public Works Management and Policy, July 2009, Vol. 14 (1): 4-36.
52. Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination (with Ramamohan Paturi and Nicholas Weller), American Politics Research, September 2009, Vol. 37 (5): 899-920.
53. Competition in the Courtroom: When Does Expert Testimony Improve Juror’s Decisions (with Cheryl Boudreau), Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, December 2009, Vol. 6 (4): 793-817. 54. Proposition 13 and the California Fiscal Shell Game (with Colin McCubbins). California Journal of Politics and Policy Vol. 2 (2), 2010.
55. The Blind Leading the Blind: Who Gets Polling Information and Does It Improve Decisions? (with Cheryl Boudreau), Journal of Politics, April 2010, Vol. 72 (2): 1-15.
56. The Rule of Law Unplugged (with Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast). Emory Law Journal, forthcoming Summer 2010.
57. Party Power or Preferences?: Quasi- Experimental Evidence from the American States (with Gary Cox and Thad Kousser), Journal of Politics, 2010, Vol. 72 (3): Pp. 1–13.
58. Deficit by Design: State Tax and Expenditure Limitations and Lessons for Revising the California Constitution (with Ellen Moule), California Journal of Politics and Policy, forthcoming 2010.
59. What Price Pension Reform? (with Vladimir Kogan), California Journal of Politics and Policy, forthcoming 2010.
60. Making Mountains of Debt out of Molehills: The Pro-Cyclical Implications of Tax and Expenditure Limitations (with Ellen Moule). National Tax Journal, September 2010.
61. Agenda Control in the Israeli Knesset during Ariel Sharon’s Second Government (with Osnat Akirav and Gary W. Cox) Journal of Legislative Studies, December 2010, Vol.16 (4).
62. Making Talk Cheap (and Problems Easy): How Political and Legal Institutions Can Facilitate Consensus (with Cheryl Boudreau, Daniel B. Rodriguez and Nicholas Weller), Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 7 (4), 2010 forthcoming.
Articles in Books:
1. A Theory of Congressional Delegation (with Talbot Page), in Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
2. Party Politics, Divided Government, and Budget Deficits, in The Politics of Economic Policy in The U.S. and Japan, edited by Samuel Kernell. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991.
3. Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits: Divided Control and Fiscal Stalemate, in Politics and Economics in the Eighties, edited by Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, National Bureau of Economic Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
4. Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits Under Divided Government, in The Politics of Divided Government, edited by Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
5. Fiscal Policy and Divided Government (with Gary W. Cox), in The Politics of Divided Government, edited by Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
6. Party Decline and Presidential Campaigns in the Television Age, in Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era, edited by Mathew D. McCubbins. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992. 7. Party Coherence on Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives (with Gary W. Cox), in Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System, edited by Joel H. Silbey. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994.
8. Equilibrium Behavior and the Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats and the Budget Process in the U.S. and Japan (with Gregory Noble). In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.
8.1. Reprinted in Milhaupt, Curtis J., J. Mark Ramseyer, and Michael K. Young (eds.), Japanese Law in Context: Readings in Society, The Economy, and Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
8.2. Reprinted in The International Library of Essays in Law and Legal Theory, 2nd Series. ed., J. Mark Ramseyer. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
9. Perceptions and Realities of Japanese Budgeting (with Gregory Noble). In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.
10. Partisan Allocation of the Personal Vote in Japan and the United States (with Frances M. Rosenbluth). In Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.
11. The Politics of Nuclear Power in Japan and the United States (with Linda Cohen and Frances M. Rosenbluth). in Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States, eds. Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.
12. Putting the State Back into State Government: The Constitution and the Budget. In Constitutional Reform in California: Making State Government More Effective and Responsive, eds. Bruce Cain and Roger Noll. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, September 1995.
13. Legislative Control of Bureaucratic Policy Making (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast). Peter Newman, ed. New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 1998, London: Palgrave-MacMillan.
14. Political Structure and Economic Liberalization: Conditions and Cases from the Developing World (with William Heller and Phil Keefer). The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World, eds. Paul Drake and Mathew McCubbins. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
15. The Institutional Foundations of Political Competence (with Arthur Lupia) Elements of Reason, eds. Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
15.1. Reprinted in Saward, Michael ed., Critical Concepts in Political Science. Oxfordshire, Routledge, November 2006.
16. Constructing a Theory of Reasoning (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel L. Popkin) Elements of Reason, eds. Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
17. Beyond Rationality: Reason and the Study of Politics (with Arthur Lupia and Samuel L. Popkin) Elements of Reason, eds. Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
18. Political Institutions and the Determinants of Public Policy (with Stephan Haggard), in Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
19. The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes (with Gary W. Cox), in Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
20. Political Institutions and Economic Development: The Case of Electric Utility Regulation in Argentina and Chile (with William Heller), in Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
21. Agenda Power in the US House of Representatives, 1877 to 1986 (with Gary W. Cox). In David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins eds., Parties, Procedure and Policy: Essays on the History of Congress, Stanford University Press, 2002.
22. Agenda Power in the US Senate, 1877 to 1986 (with Andrea Campbell and Gary W. Cox). In David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins eds., Parties, Procedure and Policy: Essays on the History of Congress, Stanford University Press, 2002.
23. The Motion to Recommit in the U.S. House of Representatives (with Gary W. Cox and Chris Den Hartog), in David W. Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins eds., Parties, Process and Political Change in Congress: Further New Perspectives on the History of Congress. Stanford University Press, 2006.
24. When Does the Ballot Box Limit the Budget? Politics and Spending Limits in California, Colorado, Utah and Washington (with Thad Kousser and Kaj Rozga). In Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy and Howell Jackson, eds., Fiscal Challenges, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
25. Pathways to Persuasion: How Neuroscience Can Inform the Study and Practice of Law (with Cheryl Boudreau and Seana Coulson), in Current Legal Issues, edited by Michael Freeman, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2010: Pp 19.
26. Agenda Power in the U.S. Congress in a Comparative Perspective (with Gary W. Cox), in Oxford Handbook of the American Congress, edited by Lee, Frances and Eric Shickler, forthcoming 2010.
27. Zombieland (with Mark B. Turner), in Grounding the Social Sciences in Cognitive Science, edited by Sun, Ron, MIT Press, forthcoming 2010.
Book Chapters and Encyclopedia Entries:
1. Introduction: Institutional Aspects of Decision Processes (with Terry Sullivan), in Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
2. Representation (with Terry Sullivan), in Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
3. The Shape of Congressional Institutions (with Terry Sullivan), in Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 4. The Impact of Institutional Arrangements: Implications for the Study of Congress (with Terry Sullivan), in Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
5. The Impact of Institutional Arrangements on the Development of Public Policy (with Terry Sullivan), in Congress: Structure and Policy, eds. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
6. Introduction, in Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era, edited by Mathew D. McCubbins. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992.
7. Conclusion, in Under the Watchful Eye: Presidential Campaigns in the Television Era, edited by Mathew D. McCubbins. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1992.
8. Introduction, in Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins (eds.) Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.
9. Conclusion, in Peter Cowhey and Mathew McCubbins (eds.)Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States. New York: Cambridge University Press, August 1995.
10. The Origins of Liberty (with Paul Drake), in Paul Drake and Mathew McCubbins (eds.), The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
11. Afterword, in Paul Drake and Mathew McCubbins (eds.), The Origins of Liberty: Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
12. Gridlock and the Democratic Tradeoff Between Decisiveness and Resoluteness. In The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, eds. Barry Clarke and Joe Foweraker, Routledge Press, 2000.
13. Legislative Process. In The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, eds. Barry Clarke and Joe Foweraker, Routledge Press, 2000
14. Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle. In The Handbook of the New Institutional Economics, eds. Claude Menard and Mary Shirley, Kluwer Press, 2005.
15. The Political Economy of Law: Decision Making by Judiciary, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger Noll and Barry R. Weingast). In The Handbook of Law and Economics, edited by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Elsevier Press 2007.
16. Delegation to International Agencies (with David Lake). In Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, edited by Hawkins, Darrin G., David Lake, Daniel Neilson, and Michael J. Tierney. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
17. An Introduction to PPT and the Law (with Daniel B. Rodriguez). In The Handbook of Positive Political Economy, edited by Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, Oxford University Press, 2006.
18. American Political Geography (with David Brady). In Process, Party and Policy Making: Further New Perspective on the History of Congress, Edited by David Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, Stanford University Press, 2007. 19. Afterword (with David Brady). In Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress, Edited by David Brady and Mathew D. McCubbins, Stanford University Press, 2007.
Notes, Comments, and Responses
1. Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 1990. 2. Budget Policy Making and the Appearance of Power. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 1990. 3. The Theory of Interpretive Canon and Legislative Behavior: A Comment on Rodriquez (under the nom de plume of McNollgast, with Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast), International Law and Economics Review, November 1991. 4. Towards a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: A Response to Schickler and Rich (with Gary W. Cox). American Journal of Political Science, July 1997. 5. Abdication or Delegation? Congress, the Bureaucracy, and the Delegation Dilemma. Regulation. 1999, Vol. 22, No. 2. 6. A Precis on Party Leadership (with Gary Cox). Extensions, Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center. Fall 2003. 7. Theories of Legislative Organization (with Gary Cox). American Political Science Association – Comparative Politics Newsletter, Winter 2004. 8. Advances in Statutory Interpretation (with Daniel B. Rodriguez). Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 2005. 9. Revisiting the Links between Governance and Biodiversity Loss (with Christopher Barrett, Clark Gibson and Barak Hoffman). Conservation Biology. Vol 21, number 4, 2007. 10. Administrative Law Agonistes (with Barry R. Weingast, Roger Noll and Daniel B. Rodriguez). Columbia Law Review Sidebar. Vol. 108., April 28, 2008, pp. 15-22.
Book Reviews
1. Foreman, Christopher H., Jr. Signals From the Hill: Congressional Oversight and the Challenge of Social Regulation. American Political Science Review Vol. 84, March 1990: 302-304.
Reports
1. The Fiscal Shape of the American States: Trends and issues in state budgeting in the 21st Century (with Ellen Moule), in Governing Arizona, copyright 2009 the Communications Institute, Los Angeles, CA.
Work in Progress:
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Education
B.A. University of California, Irvine, 1978 M.S. California Institute of Technology, 1980
Ph.D. California Institute of Technology, 1983
Employment
Assistant Professor of Government, University of 1982-84 Texas Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, 1984-85 Stanford University Visiting Associate Professor of Political Economy, 1985-86 Graduate School of Business Administration, Washington University Associate Professor of Government, University of 1986-87 Texas Associate Professor of Political Science, University of 1987-90 California, San Diego Professor of Political Science, University of 1990 - California, San Diego 2009 Distinguished Professor and Chancellor’s Associates Chair VIII Spring 2001 – Adjunct Professor of Law, University of San Diego Spring 2008 2006 - Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Southern 2010 California 2010- Provost Professor of Business, Law and Political present Economy, University of Southern California
Honors and Awards:
• Thompson Teaching Fellow, University of Texas, 1986. • Legislative Studies Section, American Political Science Association, Congressional Quarterly Award for Best Paper on Legislative Politics Presented at the 1986 Meeting of the APSA, for "Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions." • American Political Science Association, Gladys M. Kammerer Award for Best Publication on U.S. National Policy, 1991, for The Logic of Delegation. • Legislative Studies Section, American Political Science Association, Richard F. Fenno Jr. Prize for the Outstanding Book Published in 1993 in legislative studies, for Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. • Fellow, Center of Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1994- 95. • Jacob Marschak Memorial Lecturer, Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences, UCLA, 1998 & 2008. • Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, elected 2001 • State Politics and Policy Quarterly 2005 Best Paper Award, for the best paper on US state politics presented at any political science conference. • APSA’s, Leon D. Epstein Outstanding Book Award for outstanding and lasting significance in the field for Setting the Agenda, 2006. • Chancellor's Associates Award for Excellence in Graduate Teaching, 2008 • Faculty Research Lecturer, University of California, San Diego, 2009
Professional Activities:
• Coordinator, Law and the Behavioral Sciences Project, UCSD, 0521. 1993-1997 • Coordinator, Public Policy Research Project, and Seminar in Law, Economics and Public Policy, UCSD, 0521. 1997- 2009 • Coordinator, Program in Behavioral, Computational, and Social Sciences, CALIT2, UCSD, 2007 – 2009 • Co-Director, USC-CalTech Center for the Study of Law and Politics, 2007 - present • Co-Editor, The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Yale Law School, 127 Wall Street, Yale Station, New Haven, CT 06520. 1994 – 2001 • Co-Editor, The Journal of Legal Analysis, Harvard law School 2008 - . • Member, Founding Board of Directors, Society of Empirical Legal Studies. 2006-2010 • Co-President, Society for Empirical Legal Studies, 2008-09 • Member, Economics and Politics, Editorial Board, Department of Economics, Columbia University. 1991-1994. • Member, Legislative Studies Quarterly Editorial Board, Comparative Legislative Research Center, 349 Schaeffer Hall, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242. 1994-1996. • Nominations Committee, American Political Science Association, 2004-6. • Service on numerous disciplinary committees, conference program chairs and committees, and referee for many dozens of journals in political science, law, economics and reviewer of grant and fellowship applications for federal agencies and private foundations.
Addresses and Phone numbers:
Department of Finance and Business Economics Marshall School of Business University of Southern California 3670 Trousdale Parkway Bridge Hall 308 Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804 (Tel) (213) 740-5036 (Fax) (213) 740-6650 (personal fax) (213) 973-7538 (email ) [email protected]
Gould School of Law 699 Exposition Boulevard, 421 Los Angeles, CA 90089 (email) [email protected]