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Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government

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Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°59 Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 20 April 2009 Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government I. OVERVIEW white farmers by continued farm invasions and stall- ing on the appointment of provincial governors as well as reconfiguration of ministerial powers. After nearly a year of seemingly endless talks brokered by the Southern African Development Community Nevertheless, there are at the same time signs that a (SADC), Zimbabwe’s long-ruling ZANU-PF party more constructive political dynamic is developing, and the two factions of the opposition Movement for including within the parliament, the one institution Democratic Change (MDC) formed a coalition govern- with some democratic (if imperfect) legitimacy and ment in February. Opposition entry into government where cross-party collaboration will be needed to pass is a landmark development, and broad segments of the major reform legislation. Also, while the humanitarian population are optimistic for the first time in years and economic situations remain dire, there have been that a decade of repression and decline can be reversed. some signs of improvement: many schools have re- There is considerable international scepticism whether opened, prices have stabilised, basic stocks are return- the flawed arrangement can succeed; many are tempted, ing to shops and civil servants are being paid at least a with some reason, to second-guess the decision of modest stipend. As a result, Tsvangirai’s political mainstream MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai to accept credibility is rising. the deal under SADC and ZANU-PF pressure. But he had no good alternative, given a collapsed economy The intense internal struggle to control ZANU-PF and humanitarian catastrophe from which his constitu- after Mugabe goes has led one faction (that of the hus- ency was suffering. Donors should re-engage and apply band-wife power team of Vice President Joice and a “humanitarian plus” aid strategy. South Africa, in ex-general, now businessman, Solomon “Rex” Mujuru) collaboration with SADC, should negotiate retirement to explore cooperation with the Tsvangirai faction of of hardline senior security leaders in the lifespan of the MDC (MDC-T). The smaller MDC faction led by the inclusive government. Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M) was used by ZANU-PF in its attempt to manipulate the SADC negotiations The long talks over implementation of the Global Politi- but now increasingly sees its political survival, beyond cal Agreement (GPA) signed by ZANU-PF and the the term of the inclusive government, as dependent on MDC on 15 September 2008 gave few signs that Presi- brokering parliamentary compromises and moving dent Robert Mugabe genuinely accepts the need for closer to the Tsvangirai wing. political and economic reforms and national recon- ciliation. He has described the new inclusive govern- It would be premature for the U.S., the European Union ment as a temporary one in which ZANU-PF remains (EU) and others to remove the targeted sanctions (travel in the driver’s seat. By contrast, Tsvangirai sees it as bans, asset freezes) against key members of the Mugabe a transitional process that can stabilise the country, regime or to fully embrace the inclusive government. leading to elections under a new constitution in two But they as well as SADC members should work in a years. In effect, the deal has established two power concerted fashion among themselves and with both centres and left the ZANU-PF establishment ample formations of the MDC as well as progressive ZANU- opportunities to block or undermine reforms. PF elements to help make the reform process irreversi- ble. The following steps should be taken now to sup- Some old regime elements seek to cause the new gov- port such efforts: ernment to fail, out of fear of prosecution, loss of power and its financial sinecures, hatred for Tsvangi- Donors should pursue a “humanitarian plus” assis- rai or the MDC or a genuine belief that they are the tance strategy that covers the priority areas in the guardians of the country’s liberation. They are thus con- government’s Short Term Emergency Recovery tinuing to provoke and frustrate the MDC, as shown Program (STERP), including revival of the educa- by such actions as continuing arrests and detention of tion, health and water sanitation sectors, as well as MDC activists, refusal of police to carry out some gov- a functioning civil service, and reconstruction of ernment orders, efforts to drive out the last few hundred basic infrastructure. Zimbabwe should be treated as Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°59, 20 April 2009 Page 2 a post-conflict society in need of some front-loaded should be sworn in by 11 February and the govern- aid. Donors might also create a contact group, both ment on 13 February.1 The MDC-T initially denied it to support the political process and to coordinate had agreed to this timetable2 and said its national aid flows. council would decide on 30 January. However, Tsvangi- rai eventually declared his party would join the govern- SADC countries, most significantly South Africa, ment and stick to SADC’s schedule.3 should also provide more direct assistance but require strict compliance with the GPA and avoid This decision to join the government was made amid in particular direct support to the Reserve Bank, major divisions within the party. While Tsvangirai which remains in the control of Mugabe loyalist, was pushing to enter, a faction led by Tendai Biti – Gideon Gono, and could be expected to divert it to the secretary general and lead negotiator at the talks ZANU-PF patronage networks. with ZANU-PF – was opposed.4 This faction argued that the best option was to continue to mobilise sup- Support is also needed for programs to reform poli- ticised legal institutions, including the judiciary, port at home and abroad so as to pressure Mugabe to and strengthen civil society that has been deeply resign the presidency. Tsvangirai’s preference was to fractured in recent years, including religious, press, initiate reforms through government, then win the next labour, academic, women’s and youth groups. SADC election decisively. After months of stalemate, the and the Commonwealth secretariat might work choices had narrowed, the party did not have a Plan together to build parliament’s legislative and over- B, and the deepening humanitarian and economic cri- sight capacities. sis was threatening its support base. With almost no chance that the African Union (AU) would agree to To counter the greatest and very real stability risk take on the Zimbabwe case, there was no realistic way – an attack against Prime Minister Tsvangirai or a to challenge SADC.5 This left the party with the military coup – a strategy is needed to retire virtu- choice of being blamed for the failure of the Global ally all members of the security sector senior lead- Political Agreement (GPA) or entering the govern- ership. Persuading them to go peacefully will not be ment, despite its shortcomings.6 easy: the generals fear the post-Mugabe era. The government could create leverage with a law that Nelson Chamisa, the MDC-T spokesperson and now offers immunity to senior generals from domestic communications minister, told Crisis Group: “Over prosecution for past political crimes (excluding the years we have been winning elections but not tak- crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide) ing over power, so we had to change strategy. We had in return for retirement. At the same time, it should create a panel tasked to recommend the modalities for setting up transitional justice mechanisms such as a truth commission and vetting processes as part 1 of security sector and other administrative reforms. “Communiqué Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State and Government”, 27 January 2009, at www.sokwanele. The U.S., EU and others could, in accordance with com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/3132. On 11 February 2009, their laws, sweeten the deal by removing targeted Tsvangirai became prime minister and Mutambara and sanctions on those who accept and comply. The Thokozani Khupe (MDC-T vice president) became deputy new South African president, working with the prime ministers under the terms of the GPA. 2 SADC mediation team, should negotiate with the “MDC Statement after SADC Talks”, 27 January 2009, at www.thezimbabwestandard.com/local/19611-mdc-statement- generals, making clear that those who do not step after-sadc-talks.html. aside risk prosecution for their crimes domesti- 3 “Statement by President Tsvangirai on the Resolutions made cally or internationally. by the National Council”, 30 January 2009, at http:// allafrica.com/stories/200901300702.html. 4 Crisis Group interview, MDC National Executive Council II. HOW THE INCLUSIVE members, Pretoria, 6 February 2009. 5 GOVERNMENT WAS FORMED Most Western and several prominent African leaders had publicly called on Mugabe to step down. Mugabe claimed their calls demonstrated especially Western interference in Ten months after the 29 March 2008 elections, the the country’s internal affairs. See Crisis Group Africa Brief- MDC-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) announced it would enter ing N°56, Ending Zimbabwe’s Nightmare: A Possible Way the government alongside ZANU-PF and MDC- Forward, 16 December 2008, Section II.B. Several heads of state, including Botswana President Ian Khama, reportedly Mutambara (MDC-M). The announcement followed opposed the GPA during the closed summit sessions, push- an extraordinary SADC summit on 26 January 2009, ing without success for new elections. whose final communiqué stated that the prime minister 6 See the analysis of the GPA in ibid. Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°59, 20 April 2009 Page 3 to share power in order to take it”.7 The MDC-T enlarged list of 23 ministers on the day the govern- pointed to some ZANU-PF concessions to explain its ment was to be sworn in triggered a dispute with both choice.8 In reality, little additional was offered after MDC formations.12 A ZANU-PF politburo member said the party had insisted implementation of the GPA was Mugabe “wanted to ensure that key members in every impossible without further negotiations.
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