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Maeresera Sadiki 2012.Pdf University of KwaZulu-Natal Military Interventions in African Conflicts: The Southern African Development Community Coalition of the Willing’s Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2002 By Sadiki Maeresera Supervisor: Prof Ufo Okeke Uzodike Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Postgraduate programme in Political Science, School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietemaritzburg, South Africa 2012 DECLARATION I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. All citations, references and borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged. It is being submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. ----------------------------------- -------------------------------------------- Sadiki Maeresera Professor Ufo Okeke Uzodike ---------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- Date Date i DEDICATION I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, who through the power and blessings of Almighty God have always and will forever remain the source of inspiration. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to first and foremost acknowledge my appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, for his unwavering kindness in giving me advice, constructive criticism, and firm guidance from the first day I registered with the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s School of Politics as a doctoral candidate up to the completion of this gruelling academic work. My appreciation goes to members of staff and students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg and more specifically Professor Deane Peter Baker (now with the United States Naval Graduate School), Dr Noleen Loubser, Dr Bernard Matolino and Ayo Whetho, my fellow doctoral candidate in the School of Politics for their scholarly inspirations. I am greatly indebted to the following institutions and individuals who assisted me in conducting interviews during my fieldwork research: staff at the United Nations Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC), the office of the African Union (AU) special representative in the DRC, and the respective government ministries and departments and civil society groups in the following countries where fieldwork research was conducted: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe as well as South Africa. Special mention goes to the staff at the following embassies in Kinshasa: Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. I wish to thank the following Professors for their assistance in facilitating interviews during fieldwork research: Ernest Wamba dia Wamba (former president of the DRC rebel group, RCD and now a member of the DRC government), Gavin Cawthra and Antoni Van iii Nieuwkerk of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Assindie Mungala of the UNESCO Chair at the University of Kinshasa, Andre Du Pissani of the Department of Political Science at the University of Namibia and Bizeck Phiri of the Department of Political Science at the University of Zambia. Special thanks to Colonel Manuel Barros of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Luanda, and Lt. General Louis Fisher of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Botswana. Last but not least, I appreciate all the continuous constructive criticism and comments I got from the following professors: Theo Neethling of the Department of Political Science at the University of the Free State; Louis Du Plessis of the Centre for Military Studies, University of Stellenbosch, Mark Hough of the Institute for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria and Lloyd Sichone of the University of South Africa, and Professor Martin Rupiya of the African Public Policy and Research Institute. The long time scholarly encouragement and motivation I got from the academic staff at the University of Zimbabwe’s Department of Political Science, particularly Professors Hasu Patel, John Makumbe, Dr Joseph Kurebwa, Dr Charity Manyeruke, Dr Max John Chinyanganya, Mr Eldred Masunungure and Mr Simon Badza, is much appreciated. I would like to express my appreciation for the moral support I got from my beloved and caring family (Tinotenda, Laura-Nyaradzo, Oppah and Joyce). I acknowledge the research grant awarded to me by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) through the United Nations University for Peace, Africa Programme. The views expressed in this thesis are the author’s own. iv ABSTRACT This study focuses on the premise that national interests of governments are the primary motivating factors that inform decisions on military interventions. Military strategy remains a principal tool in the attainment, pursuance and safeguarding of these interests. Military intervention is the last resort to a series of options that begin with and continue to inform the dynamic: diplomacy, policing, reliance on alliance action and finally, deterrent or pro-active military action. Military interventions in the 20 th century have been undertaken at the multilateral, regional and sub-regional levels in given conflicts by a range of actors. Scholarly questions have been asked about the rationale behind the respective governments’ decisions to undertake these interventions. In the case of this study, which focuses on the SADC coalition of willing nations’ military intervention in the Congo conflict, questions have centred on the following: What was the rationale and motive that led governments of the three countries to undertake the decisions for military intervention in the Congo? Was the intervention an altruistic act by the intervening governments seeking to stop aggression of an ally or was it driven by the personal quests by leaders of these intervening countries to secure their share of the DRC mineral wealth? Or, was it merely a case of the three governments intervening as a coalition in pursuit of their varied interests? What was the strategy that this coalition adopted in pursuit of the member countries interests? It is this attempt to explain and determine the rationale and principal factors that informed the three countries’ decision to intervene in the conflict and the military strategy adopted to safeguard these interests that serve as the focal basis for this study. In trying to answer its key questions, this study uses historical and qualitative approaches in collecting and analysing data not only from both primary and secondary sources but also v interviews with participants (some off the record as still serving). Thus, the findings of the research would be analysed critically within the framework of the core objectives of the study, which seek not only to identify and establish how the interests of the governments that intervened in the DRC conflict were the primary motivating factor that informed their decisions on military interventions, but also to ascertain the extent to which the SADC coalition’s military strategy became a principal tool in the attainment and safeguarding of these varying interests as well as how that strategy was utilised as a mechanism for the translation and development of these varying interests into common ones among the intervening countries. Lastly, the study seeks to offer policy suggestions on the execution of future military interventions in African conflicts, particularly at the SADC sub-regional level. Whilst literature on military interventions seems to be informed by realpolitik, with the notions by Barry Buzan (and others) that strong states take decisions to intervene when their geostrategic and economic interests are served, states can also militarily intervene for humanitarian purposes. Using the realist paradigm as a theoretical tool of analysis, the study noted that military intervention can best be understood in terms of the power and interests of particular nation states acting individually or collectively as a coalition using the brand of a sub-regional, regional or even international organisation with or without the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). An analysis is made on the scholarly legal debates surrounding the decision to intervene by the SADC coalition. The study generally established that the claimed interests that motivated the decisions by the respective governments were generally based on the political, economic and military/security dimensions. A critical evaluation of these respective interests of the interveners show that their interests shifted in regards to the levels of importance (that is primary and secondary vi level) at the initial stage of the intervention and during the intervention period. The coalition’s military strategy became a tool for attaining, securing and safeguarding of these respective interests. As part of the strategy, the SADC coalition’s Mutual Defence Pact acted as a political and legal guide in the promotion of complimentary and common interests of the interveners. Despite formulating such a military strategy, the unexpected longevity of the intervention impacted on the intervening countries’ logistical capacity to sustain the war effort. An initiative by the DRC government to enter into bilateral business ventures with the respective SADC countries and its awarding of mining concessions to the same was meant to be part, arguably, of sustaining the military intervention. However, this war time economic initiative has raised questions among scholars and policy practitioners on whether or not the
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