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P2B: NPF in Netbsd 6
NPF in NetBSD 6 S.P.Zeidler [email protected] Mindaugas Rasiukevicius [email protected] The NetBSD Foundation The NetBSD Foundation Abstract form for a packet. This design has the advantage of pro- tocol independence, therefore support for new protocols NPF has been released with NetBSD 6.0 as an exper- (for example, layer 7) or custom filtering patterns can be imental packet filter, and thus has started to see actual easily added at userspace level without any modifications use. While it is going to take a few more cycles before to the kernel itself. it is fully ”production ready”, the exposure to users has NPF provides rule procedures as the main interface to given it a strong push to usability. Fixing small bugs use custom extensions. The syntax of the configuration and user interface intuitivity misses will help to evolve it file supports arbitrary procedures with their parameters, from a theoretical well-designed framework to a practical as supplied by the extensions. An extensions consists of packet filtering choice. The talk will cover distinguish- two parts: a dynamic module (.so file) supplementing the ing features of NPF design, give an overview of NPF’s npfctl(8) utility and a kernel module (.kmod file). Thus, current practical capabilities, ongoing development, and kernel interfaces can be used instead of modifications to will attempt to entice more people to try out NPF and the NPF core code. give feedback. The internals of NPF are abstracted into well defined modules and follow strict interfacing principles to ease 1 Introduction extensibility. Communication between userspace and the kernel is provided through the library libnpf, described NPF is a layer 3 packet filter, supporting IPv4 and IPv6, in the npf(3) manual page. -
Tor and Circumvention: Lessons Learned
Tor and circumvention: Lessons learned Nick Mathewson The Tor Project https://torproject.org/ 1 What is Tor? Online anonymity 1) open source software, 2) network, 3) protocol Community of researchers, developers, users, and relay operators Funding from US DoD, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Voice of America, Google, NLnet, Human Rights Watch, NSF, US State Dept, SIDA, ... 2 The Tor Project, Inc. 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of tools for online anonymity and privacy Not secretly evil. 3 Estimated ~250,000? daily Tor users 4 Anonymity in what sense? “Attacker can’t learn who is talking to whom.” Bob Alice Alice Anonymity network Bob Alice Bob 5 Threat model: what can the attacker do? Alice Anonymity network Bob watch Alice! watch (or be!) Bob! Control part of the network! 6 Anonymity isn't cryptography: Cryptography just protects contents. “Hi, Bob!” “Hi, Bob!” Alice <gibberish> attacker Bob 7 Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking... “You can't prove it was me!” “Promise you won't look!” “Promise you won't remember!” “Promise you won't tell!” “I didn't write my name on it!” “Isn't the Internet already anonymous?” 8 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. Anonymity “It's privacy!” Private citizens 9 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. Anonymity Businesses “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Private citizens 10 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. “It's traffic-analysis resistance!” Governments Anonymity Businesses “It's network security!” “It's privacy!” Private citizens 11 Anonymity serves different interests for different user groups. -
Sna003-Network.Resources.Pdf
link aggregation Link aggregation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link_aggregation Link Aggregation and LACP basics https://www.thomas-krenn.com/en/wiki/Link_Aggregation_and_LACP_basics Chapter 4. VLANs and Trunking https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/packet-guide-to/9781449311315/ch04.html balance modes Chapter: Layer 2 LAN Port Configuration https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst6500/ios/15-4SY/config_guide/sup6T/15_3_sy_swcg_6T/layer2.html Aruba 2930F / 2930M Management and Configuration Guide for ArubaOSSwitch 16.05 https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/HPE/MigratedAssets/AOS-SW-Management%20and%20Configuration%20Guide- v16.05.pdf lacp An Overview of Link Aggregation and LACP https://web.archive.org/web/20170713130728/https://thenetworkway.wordpress.com/2015/05/01/an-overview-of-link-aggregation-and- lacp/ Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) (802.3ad) for Gigabit Interfaces https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios/12_2sb/feature/guide/gigeth.html IEEE 802.3ad Link Aggregation (LAG) https://www.ieee802.org/3/hssg/public/apr07/frazier_01_0407.pdf Understanding IEEE 802.3ad Link Aggregation https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junose15.1/topics/concept/802.3ad-link-aggregation-understanding.html Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) (802.3ad) for Gigabit Interfaces https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios/12_2sb/feature/guide/gigeth.html linux bonding Linux Ethernet Bonding Driver HOWTO https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/networking/bonding.txt –> 2. Bonding Driver Options Manual:Interface/Bonding -
Wireless Mesh Networks 10 Steps to Speedup Your Mesh-Network by Factor 5
Overview CPU/Architecture Airtime Compression Cache QoS future wireless mesh networks 10 steps to speedup your mesh-network by factor 5 Bastian Bittorf http://www.bittorf-wireless.com berlin, c-base, 4. june 2011 B.Bittorf bittorf wireless )) mesh networking Overview CPU/Architecture Airtime Compression Cache QoS future 1 Agenda 2 CPU/Architecture efficient use of CPU rate-selection 3 Airtime avoid slow rates separate channels 4 Compression like modem: V.42bis iproute2/policy-routing compress data to inet-gateway slow DSL-lines? 5 Cache local HTTP-Proxy Gateway HTTP-Proxy B.Bittorf DNS-Cache bittorf wireless )) mesh networking synchronise everything compress to zero 6 QoS Layer8 7 future ideas ressources Overview CPU/Architecture Airtime Compression Cache QoS future 1 Agenda 2 CPU/Architecture efficient use of CPU rate-selection 3 Airtime avoid slow rates separate channels 4 Compression like modem: V.42bis iproute2/policy-routing compress data to inet-gateway slow DSL-lines? 5 Cache local HTTP-Proxy Gateway HTTP-Proxy B.Bittorf DNS-Cache bittorf wireless )) mesh networking synchronise everything compress to zero 6 QoS Layer8 7 future ideas ressources Overview CPU/Architecture Airtime Compression Cache QoS future 1 Agenda 2 CPU/Architecture efficient use of CPU rate-selection 3 Airtime avoid slow rates separate channels 4 Compression like modem: V.42bis iproute2/policy-routing compress data to inet-gateway slow DSL-lines? 5 Cache local HTTP-Proxy Gateway HTTP-Proxy B.Bittorf DNS-Cache bittorf wireless )) mesh networking synchronise everything -
Freelab: a Free Experimentation Platform
FreeLab: A Free Experimentation Platform Matteo Varvello|; Diego Perino? |AT&T Labs – Research, ?Telefónica Research ABSTRACT In this work, we set out to build a free experimentation As researchers, we are aware of how hard it is to obtain access platform which can also be reliable and up-to-date. In classic to vantage points in the Internet. Experimentation platforms experimentation platforms applications run directly at vantage are useful tools, but they are also: 1) paid, either via a mem- points; we revert this rationale by proposing to use vantage bership fee or by resource sharing, 2) unreliable, nodes come points as traffic relays while running the application at theex- and go, 3) outdated, often still run on their original hardware perimenter’s machine(s). By leveraging free Internet relays as and OS. While one could build yet-another platform with vantage points, we can make such experimentation platform up-to-date and reliable hardware and software, it is hard to free. The drawback of this approach is the introduction of imagine one which is free. This is the goal of this paper: we extra errors (path inflation, header manipulation, bandwidth set out to build FreeLab, a free experimentation platform shrinkage) which need to be carefully corrected. which also aims to be reliable and up-to-date. The key idea This paper presents FreeLab, a free experimentation plat- behind FreeLab is that experiments run directly at its user form built atop of thousand of free HTTP(S) and SOCKS(5) machines, while traffic is relayed by free vantage points inthe Internet proxies [38]—to enable experiments based on TCP, Internet (web and SOCKS proxies, and DNS resolvers). -
A SOLUTION for ARP SPOOFING: LAYER-2 MAC and PROTOCOL FILTERING and ARPSERVER Yuksel Arslan
A SOLUTION FOR ARP SPOOFING: LAYER-2 MAC AND PROTOCOL FILTERING AND ARPSERVER Yuksel Arslan ABSTRACT Most attacks are launched inside the companies by the employees of the same company. These kinds of attacks are generally against layer-2, not against layer-3 or IP. These attacks abuse the switch operation at layer-2. One of the attacks of this kind is Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Spoofing (sometimes it is called ARP poisoning). This attack is classified as the “man in the middle” (MITM) attack. The usual security systems such as (personal) firewalls or virus protection software can not recognize this type of attack. Taping into the communication between two hosts one can access the confidential data. Malicious software to run internal attacks on a network is freely available on the Internet, such as Ettercap. In this paper a solution is proposed and implemented to prevent ARP Spoofing. In this proposal access control lists (ACL) for layer-2 Media Access Control (MAC) address and protocol filtering and an application called ARPserver which will reply all ARP requests are used. Keywords Computer Networks, ARP, ARP Spoofing, MITM, Layer-2 filtering. 1. INTRODUCTION Nowadays Ethernet is the most common protocol used at layer-2 of Local Area Networks (LANs). Ethernet protocol is implemented on the Network Interface Card (NIC). On top of Ethernet, Internet Protocol (IP), Transmission Control/User Datagram Protocols (TCP/UDP) are employed respectively. In this protocol stack for a packet to reach its destination IP and MAC of destination have to be known by the source. This can be done by ARP which is a protocol running at layer-3 of Open System Interface (OSI) model. -
Detecting Packet Injection a Guide to Observing Packet Spoofing by Isps
Detecting Packet Injection A GUidE TO OBSERVING PACKET SPOOFING BY ISPs By Seth Schoen [email protected] ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION eff.org Version .0 November 28, 2007 Detecting Packet Injection: A Guide To Observing Packet Spoofing by ISPs Introduction Certain Internet service providers have begun to interfere with their users’ communications by injecting forged or spoofed packets – data that appears to come from the other end but was actually generated by an Internet service provider (ISP) in the middle. This spoofing is one means (although not the only means) of blocking, jamming, or degrading users’ ability to use particular applications, services, or protocols. One important means of holding ISPs account- able for this interference is the ability of some subscribers to detect and document it reliably. We have to learn what ISPs are doing before we can try to do something about it. Internet users can often detect interference by comparing data sent at one end with data received at the other end of a connection. Techniques like these were used by EFF and the Associated Press to produce clear evidence that Comcast was deliberately interfering with file sharing applications; they have also been used to document censorship by the Great Firewall of China.1 In each of these cases, an in- termediary was caught injecting TCP reset packets that caused a communication to hang up – even though the communicating parties actually wanted to continue talking to one another. In this document, we describe how to use a network analyzer like Wireshark to run an experi- ment with a friend and detect behavior like this. -
Integration and Configuration of a Safe Hotspot Throught a Communication
Centro Universitario de la Defensa en la Escuela Naval Militar FINAL YEAR PROJECT Integration and configuration of a safe hotspot through a communication tunnel on TOR net Mechanical Engineering Bachelor Degree STUDENT: Ernesto Golmayo Fernández SUPERVISORS: Rafael Asorey Cacheda ACADEMIC YEAR: 2016-2017 Centro Universitario de la Defensa en la Escuela Naval Militar FINAL YEAR PROJECT Integration and configuration of a safe hotspot through a communication tunnel on TOR net Mechanical Engineering Bachelor Degree Naval Technology Specialization Naval Branch ABSTRACT The present project develops the design and integration of a TOR’s net redirecting device into a Raspberry Pi (versions 2 model B and 3 model B). Therefore, information will be encrypted between clients and servers. According to nets’ menaces, system will provide security within LAN and WAN by the means of virtual private networks and protection software (an antivirus and a firewall). Acting as a hotspot it will generate a Wi-Fi area (shell with wireless encryption, WPA2), supplying certificates to the workstations to authenticate themselves. Last sections analyse the capabilities of the device created, studying possible solutions to the problems presented. Finally, the document concludes displaying profiles of potential users and future lines of investigation. KEYWORDS Raspberry Pi, hotspot, TOR’s redirection, encryption, tracking i ii RESUMEN El actual documento recoge el diseño y la implementación de un sistema de redirección de tráfico de datos a través de un canal de comunicación en la red TOR en una Raspberry Pi 2 modelo B y en una Raspberry Pi 3 modelo B. El objetivo es crear un instrumento capaz de encriptar toda la información transmitida creando un punto de acceso seguro a una red abierta. -
Index Images Download 2006 News Crack Serial Warez Full 12 Contact
index images download 2006 news crack serial warez full 12 contact about search spacer privacy 11 logo blog new 10 cgi-bin faq rss home img default 2005 products sitemap archives 1 09 links 01 08 06 2 07 login articles support 05 keygen article 04 03 help events archive 02 register en forum software downloads 3 security 13 category 4 content 14 main 15 press media templates services icons resources info profile 16 2004 18 docs contactus files features html 20 21 5 22 page 6 misc 19 partners 24 terms 2007 23 17 i 27 top 26 9 legal 30 banners xml 29 28 7 tools projects 25 0 user feed themes linux forums jobs business 8 video email books banner reviews view graphics research feedback pdf print ads modules 2003 company blank pub games copyright common site comments people aboutus product sports logos buttons english story image uploads 31 subscribe blogs atom gallery newsletter stats careers music pages publications technology calendar stories photos papers community data history arrow submit www s web library wiki header education go internet b in advertise spam a nav mail users Images members topics disclaimer store clear feeds c awards 2002 Default general pics dir signup solutions map News public doc de weblog index2 shop contacts fr homepage travel button pixel list viewtopic documents overview tips adclick contact_us movies wp-content catalog us p staff hardware wireless global screenshots apps online version directory mobile other advertising tech welcome admin t policy faqs link 2001 training releases space member static join health -
Attacking Tor at the Application Layer
Attacking Tor at the Application Layer Gregory Fleischer gfl[email protected] http://pseudo-flaw.net/ Friday, July 31, 2009 Introduction Friday, July 31, 2009 Introduction • What this talk is about • identifying Tor web traffic • fingerprinting users • attacking at the application layers • There is a heavy emphasis on the client- side, web browsers attacks and JavaScript Friday, July 31, 2009 Introduction • What this talk is NOT about • passive monitoring at exit nodes • network attacks against path selection • using application functionality to increase the likelihood of network attacks • breaking SSL Friday, July 31, 2009 Introduction • Software tested • The Tor Browser Bundle • Vidalia Bundle for Windows • Vidalia Bundle for Mac OS X • Firefox 2, Firefox 3.0 and Firefox 3.5 • Torbutton • miscellaneous add-ons Friday, July 31, 2009 Does your browser... Friday, July 31, 2009 ... look like this? Friday, July 31, 2009 Background Friday, July 31, 2009 Background • Brief overview of Tor • free software developed by The Tor Project • volunteer effort on the Internet and anyone can run a Tor server • uses onion routing and encryption to provide network anonymity • can be used to circumvent local ISP surveillance and network blocking • can also be used to hide originating IP address from remote servers Friday, July 31, 2009 Friday, July 31, 2009 Background • Application stack for Tor web surfing • web browser (most likely Firefox) • local HTTP proxy (Privoxy or Polipo) • Tor client as SOCKS proxy • Tor exit node proxies request • remote web server -
NPF – the Packet Filter of Netbsd
NPF { the packet filter of NetBSD Mindaugas Rasiukevicius October 17, 2012 1 Introduction NPF is a layer 3 packet filter, supporting IPv4 and IPv6, as well as layer 4 protocols such as TCP, UDP and ICMP. NPF offers a traditional set of features provided by most packet filters. This includes stateful packet filtering, network address translation (NAT), tables (using a hash or tree as a container), rule procedures for easy development of NPF extensions, packet normalisation and logging, connection saving and restoring and more. NPF focuses on high performance design, ability to handle large volume of clients and use of the speed of multi-core systems. Our main objective for the preview release is to stabilise initial set of features and have a robust code base for further development. This paper covers NPF version distributed by the NetBSD 6.0 release. 2 Brief notes on design Inspired by the Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF), NPF uses "n-code", which is conceptually a byte-code processor, similar to the machine code. Each rule is described by a sequence of low level operations, called "n-code", to perform for a packet. This design has the advantage of protocol independence, therefore support for new protocols (for example, layer 7) or custom filtering patterns can be easily added at userspace level without any modifications to the kernel itself. BPF just-in-time (JIT) compilation itself is planned for the future release. NPF provides rule procedures as the main interface to implement custom extensions. Syntax of the configuration file supports arbitrary procedures with their parameters, as supplied by the extensions. -
Bsdploy Documentation Release 2.4.0.Dev0
bsdploy Documentation Release 2.4.0.dev0 Tom Lazar Dec 22, 2017 Contents 1 Main Features 3 2 How it works 5 3 Example Session 7 4 Best of both worlds 9 5 Under the hood 11 6 Full documentation 13 7 Dive in 15 7.1 Client requirements........................................... 15 7.2 Server requirements........................................... 15 7.3 Client Installation............................................ 16 7.4 Quickstart................................................ 17 8 Tutorial 23 8.1 Tutorial.................................................. 23 8.2 Webserver................................................ 24 8.3 Transmission............................................... 27 8.4 Staging.................................................. 29 9 Setup 31 9.1 Overview................................................. 31 9.2 Bootstrapping.............................................. 38 9.3 Configuring a jailhost.......................................... 42 10 General usage 45 10.1 Managing jails.............................................. 45 10.2 Ansible integration............................................ 46 10.3 Fabric integration............................................. 48 10.4 Combining Ansible and Fabric...................................... 49 11 Special use cases 51 11.1 Staging.................................................. 51 11.2 Updating................................................. 53 i 11.3 Customizing bootstrap.......................................... 53 12 Contribute 55 13 License 57 14 TODO 59 ii bsdploy