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Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 26 Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1973 Article 4 3-1973 Recent Cases Law Review Staff Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Torts Commons Recommended Citation Law Review Staff, Recent Cases, 26 Vanderbilt Law Review 340 (1973) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol26/iss2/4 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RECENT CASES Conflict of Laws-Torts-Lex Loci Delicti Is Proper Law When Parties Are Domiciled in Different Juris- dictions Unless Displacing That Law Advances Forum State's Substantive Law Purposes Without Impeding Interstate Relations or Predictability of Result Plaintiff, an Ontario domiciliary, brought an action in New York for the wrongful death of her husband, also a domiciliary of Ontario, who was killed in a collision in that province' while a passenger in an automobile driven by defendant's2 intestate, a New York domiciliary.3 Defendant pleaded as an affirmative defense the Ontario guest statute, 4 which restricts a guest's recovery to damages for injuries sustained only as a result of his host's gross negligence. Plaintiff argued that because it conflicted with the policy of the New York guest statute,5 the Ontario statute was inapplicable, and moved to dismiss the defense. The Special Term of the Supreme Court denied plaintiff's motion,6 and the Appel- late Division reversed. 7 On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, reversed. When a tort action involves parties domiciled in different jurisdictions, the law of the place of the tort controls unless displace- ment of that rule would advance the substantive law purposes of the forum state without impeding the multistate process or producing liti- 1. Kuehner, the driver and a resident of Buffalo, drove his car from that city to Fort Erie in Ontario where he picked up the decedent. Their proposed trip was to take them to Long Beach in Ontario and back again to Fort Erie. On the way to Long Beach, however, in the town of Shirkston, the automobile was struck by a train and both occupants of the car were instantly killed. 2. Two defendants were named in the suit. One was the administratrix of the driver's estate, the other was the owner of the train involved, Canadian National Railway Company. Since only the former brought appeal to the instant court, this comment eliminates the latter from discussion. 3. The driver was a permanent resident of New York, and his automobile was registered and insured there. 4. ONTARIO REV. STAT. ch. 202, § 132(3) (1970), provides that "the owner or driver of a motor vehicle. is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in . .the motor vehicle, except where such loss or damage was caused or contributed to by the gross negligence of the driver of the motor vehicle." 5. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970): "Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable . for death or injuries to person[s] . resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle .... 6. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 63 Misc. 2d 766, 313 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup. Ct. 1970). 7. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 37 App. Div. 2d 70, 322 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1971). 340 1973] RECENT CASES gants' uncertainty. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). The traditional rule for resolving conflict of laws problems in the context of tort litigation is that the law of the place of the wrong-lex loci delicti 8-determines the substantive rights and liabilities of the par- ties involved. The rule prevailed in most jurisdictions9 with the attendant virtues of ease of application and predictability of result.10 Despite these strengths, however, the mechanistic application of the rule has been criticized considerably during the past 40 years" for frequently requiring the application of the substantive law of a jurisdiction having no connec- tion with the case, other than the fortuitous occurrence of the tort within its borders, and consequently having no interest in the outcome of the litigation. Moreover, laws often have been applied under the rule with- out regard for the substantive policies they were designed to implement. Thus, many courts have tailored numerous exceptions to the lex loci rule'" or have abandoned it altogether in search for more flexible ap- proaches that would effectuate better the policy needs of those jurisdic- tions whose interests were involved, without sacrificing the virtues of predictability and simple application inherent in the traditional rule." 8. The rule had its foundation in the "vested rights doctrine," which provided that the rights of a person vested at the time of the tort and followed the person into whatever jurisdiction the action was brought. Such rights could not be cancelled without the person's consent. See 3 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73, at 1967-69 (1935); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 90, at 205-06 (rev. ed. 1968). The lex loci rule was adopted by the original Restatement. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934). 9. See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (Holmes, J.); Hall v. Hamel, 244 Mass. 464, 138 N.E. 925 (1923); Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959); Kaset v. Freedman, 22 Tenn. App. 213, 120 S.W.2d 977 (1938). 10. Under this rule, the court merely needs to determine the situs of the wrong and apply the law of that jurisdiction. As a result, forum shopping by the parties is eliminated. 11. See, e.g., Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1945); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. RaV. 205 (1958). The vested rights doctrine has been rejected by several of the leading scholars in conflict of laws. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, supra note 8, at 206; Cavers, supra; Cheatham, supra. 12. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892) (penal law exception); Sampson v. Chanell, 110 F.2d 754 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940) (exception based on substance- procedure distinction); Noe v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1966) (substance-procedure distinction); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (public policy exception). 13. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). The lex loci rule has been rejected under certain conditions in at least 16 other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 Significant advances in the judicial quest for a more.equitable conflicts system have been made by the New York courts. In the 1963 case of Babcock v. Jackson,4 the New York Court of Appeals formulated a new "grouping-of-contacts" or "center-of-gravity" approach to replace the older rule. 5 In Babcock, which involved an action between two New York domiciliaries for injuries sustained in a one-car accident in On- tario, the court rejected the lex loci rule and defendant was unsuccessful in interposing the Ontario guest statute"6 as a defense. The court de- signed a test that accords controlling effect to the law of that jurisdiction which, because of its relationship with the occurrence or parties in- volved, has the greatest concern with the particular issues raised in the litigation. Fundamental to the Babcock approach is a three-step analy- sis, which demands isolation of the issue, identification of the policies underlying the conflicting laws, and examination of the jurisdictions' contacts with the parties.' 7 Applying this formula, the Babcock court determined that the Ontario statute was designed to protect Ontario insurance companies from fraudulent claims by guest-passengers and collusion between guests and drivers," whereas the New York law was enacted to compensate innocent victims of automobile accidents. Rec- Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965). Several jurisdictions, however, continue to follow the rule. See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965). 14. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). In Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), a case laying the groundwork for Babcock, the court had discarded the lex loci rule in the contracts area and replaced it with the "most significant contacts" or "center-of-gravity" rule. 15. Under this test, the court looks to the law of the place which has the most significant relationship or the dominant contacts with the issue raised in litigation.