The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power: Measuring the Mechanical E¡Ect of a Political Institution

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 25 ^ No. 3, 2002 ISSN 0080^6757 # Nordic Political Science Association The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power: Measuring the Mechanical E¡ect of a Political Institution Ellen M. Immergut* Recent discussions of Swedish political change have focused on the decline of Social Democratic `hegemony' and on the end of the `Swedish model'. In contrast to preference- or interest-driven explanations for these developments, this paper investigates the impact of constitutional changes made in 1969 in Sweden, which included the elimination of the Upper House or First Chamber of the Swedish parliament and the introduction of a more directly proportional electoral system. Using a simulation model, the actual electoral results from 1969 through 1994 were plugged into the formulas set forth by the old constitutional rules, in order to generate the number of parliamentary seats each party would have received under the old system. This simulation shows that the Social Democratic Party would have received a signi¢cantly larger share of parliamentary seats under the old constitutional rules than under the current constitution. Thus one can conclude that the new constitution decreased Social Democratic power in Sweden. A Change in the Rules of the Game In 1968 and 1969, the parliamentary representatives of the Swedish Social Democratic Party voted together with the political opposition for a partial revision of the Swedish constitution. This revision eliminated the indirectly elected Upper House (or First Chamber) of the Swedish parliament, and provided for a new, more proportional, system of electoral representation. Plans were made for incorporating these partial revisions into a total revision of the constitution ^ or more exactly, the 1809 Regeringsform or Instrument of Government, and the 1866 Riksdagsordning or Law on Parliament ^ which was eventually approved by the Swedish Riksdag in 1973 and 1974. This total revision of the constitution also included provisions on popular referenda and civil rights. The most important political changes, however, were e¡ected by the partial constitutional * Ellen M. Immergut, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, Postfach 5560, D 9178457 Konstanz, Germany. E-mail: [email protected] 231 reform of 1968/69, which went into e¡ect in January 1971 when the ¢rst unicameral parliament was constituted. Since that time, debate has ensued about the impact of the Swedish constitution on Swedish politics. For, at the same time that these changes in the rules of the game were enacted, Swedish voting patterns underwent a dramatic shift. Since the election of 1970, the Swedish Social Democratic Party has su¡ered a large drop in electoral popularity. From an average of 47.46 percent between 1936 and 1968, electoral support dropped to an average level of 42.78 percent between 1970 and 1988, reaching a low of 36.4 percent in 1998. Consequently, observers of (and participants in) Swedish politics have been divided about whether this decline in votes or the constitutional reforms are responsible for the major changes in Swedish politics that have taken place since 1970. Former Prime Minister Tage Erlander, for example ^ while being grilled on whether his constitution had not contributed to weakening Swedish social democracy ^ argued that `votes and not constitutional provisions determine the success of political parties: that the bourgeois parties have managed to attract more voters during the 1970s cannot be blamed on the Constitution' (Erlander 1982, 180). His later successor as Prime Minister, GÎran Persson, on the other hand, argued that the constitution was indeed responsible for some of the problems of Swedish social democracy. In 1997 he argued: I believe that one of the most important explanations behind the shocks to the Swedish economy lies in the constitutional reforms of the 1970s. The impaired opportunities to build the strong governments necessary to manage long-term sustainable growth are a great weakness in the new constitution. (Persson, cited in MÎller 1999, 271) This article aims to make a contribution to this debate by disentangling the e¡ects of the constitutional changes from those of the changes in electoral results. First, the main changes in Swedish politics are reviewed; next, the results of a simulation experiment to measure the mechanical e¡ect of the constitutional revision are presented. Changes in Swedish Politics Swedish social democracy has received a great deal of international scholarly attention, not only because of Social Democratic policies, such as Sweden's generous welfare state, but also because of the country's unusual political pattern. From 1936 to 1969, Swedish governments could be classi¢ed as being unusually `strong', `stable', long in `tenure', and `dominated' by one party ^ terms that will be de¢ned in more detail below. Since 1970, however, Swedish politics have undergone a sea change. 232 Governmental Strength First, if one measures governmental `strength' in terms of the parliamentary basis for government, one observes that whereas governments from 1936 to 1969 enjoyed reliable parliamentary majorities, since that time the majorities have narrowed signi¢cantly. Using Bergman's ¢gures (2000, 196, 200, own calculation), the average parliamentary support for the government was 52 percent from 1945 to 1969, but only 42 percent from 1970 to 1998. A second, but more controversial, measure of government strength might be the frequency of majority government. Sannerstedt and SjÎlin characterize even minority Social Democratic governments as `majority governments' because they were supported by the Communist Party. Using this indicator, they conclude that majority governments were in power for 13 percent of the months between 1917 and 1936, 100 percent of the months between 1936 and 1973 and 54 percent of the months between 1974 and 1991 (Sannerstedt & SjÎlin 1992, 108).1 Strom de¢nes majority government more stringently to be a government with 50 percent active parliamentary support, and counts seven (out of 12) governments formed between 1945 and 1969 as majority, and two (out of nine) governments formed between 1970 and 1985 as majority. Notably, the average parliamentary basis for majority government declined from 54 percent to 50.5 percent between the two periods (Strom 1990, 268, and own calculations). Thus, regardless of the particular indicator used, majority governments have become less frequent in the post-1970 period, and the margin of parliamentary support for all types of governments has declined (see also Ruin 1988, 321). Governmental Stability Like governmental strength, the degree of governmental `stability' depends upon the indicator one uses. Here, the critical issue is what counts as one government; that is, when does one consider an old government to have been terminated, and a new government to have been formed? MÏller and StrÖm (2000, 584) use three criteria to determine government termination: new elections, change in Prime Minister and change in governing party or parties. They are prepared to loosen this de¢nition, however, to discount a change in Prime Minister for non-political reasons, such as voluntary retirement or death (MÏller & StrÖm 2000, 12^13). By this measure, Sweden belongs to the group of countries with moderately stable governments, with a mean duration of 771 days, as compared to the European average of 702 days (MÏller & StrÖm 2000, 584^85). If one compares cabinet stability pre- and post-1970 using this measure, there is not much of a di¡erence between the 1945^1969 period (803 days) and the 1970^1998 period (775 days), (Bergman 2000, 196^97, own calculations). 233 Governmental Tenure The MÏller and StrÖm criteria measure the degree to which governments last through their mandated period of government, and so the extent to which governments maintain the con¢dence of parliament during a designated period of rule. This measure thus pinpoints cases where political disagreements lead governments to fall. However, it may also be relevant politically to measure the extent to which governments maintain their tenure beyond one electoral period. This is the logic of the Damgaard measure of government termination, which excludes elections as a ground of government termination, and counts only changes in the party composition of the government, and changes in Prime Minister caused by politically forced resignations (Damgaard 1994, 207). In order to dis- tinguish this measure from the previous indicator, one could perhaps speak of government `tenure' as opposed to government stability. Using Damgaard's criteria for government termination as the basis for a measure of the long-term tenure of government, there is indeed a large di¡erence between the two periods, with governments lasting an average of 2,945 days from 1945 to 1969, and 1,260 days between 1970 and 1998. Sannerstedt and SjÎlin use a similar measure of government termination (party change and formal resignation of the cabinet), but slightly di¡erent periods and conclude, also, that the average tenure of government has decreased since 1970: `During 1917^1936 Sweden had 11 cabinets, with an average life-span of 21 months. During 1936^1957 Sweden had 4 cabinets with an average life-span of 63.5 months. During the 194 months from 1957 to 1973, one single cabinet continued to govern. Since 1974, Sweden has had 7 cabinets, with an average duration of 29 months' (Sannerstedt & SjÎlin 1992, 109). One-Party

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