The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power: Measuring the Mechanical E¡Ect of a Political Institution

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 25 ^ No. 3, 2002 ISSN 0080^6757 # Nordic Political Science Association

The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power: Measuring the Mechanical E¡ect of a Political Institution

Ellen M. Immergut*

Recent discussions of Swedish political change have focused on the decline of Social Democratic `hegemony' and on the end of the `Swedish model'. In contrast to preference- or interest-driven explanations for these developments, this paper investigates the impact of constitutional changes made in 1969 in Sweden, which included the elimination of the Upper House or First Chamber of the Swedish parliament and the introduction of a more directly proportional electoral system. Using a simulation model, the actual electoral results from 1969 through 1994 were plugged into the formulas set forth by the old constitutional rules, in order to generate the number of parliamentary seats each party would have received under the old system. This simulation shows that the Social Democratic Party would have received a signi¢cantly larger share of parliamentary seats under the old constitutional rules than under the current constitution. Thus one can conclude that the new constitution decreased Social Democratic power in Sweden.

A Change in the Rules of the Game In 1968 and 1969, the parliamentary representatives of the Swedish Social Democratic Party voted together with the political opposition for a partial revision of the Swedish constitution. This revision eliminated the indirectly elected Upper House (or First Chamber) of the Swedish parliament, and provided for a new, more proportional, system of electoral representation. Plans were made for incorporating these partial revisions into a total revision of the constitution ^ or more exactly, the 1809 Regeringsform or Instrument of Government, and the 1866 Riksdagsordning or Law on Parliament ^ which was eventually approved by the Swedish Riksdag in 1973 and 1974. This total revision of the constitution also included provisions on popular referenda and civil rights. The most important political changes, however, were e¡ected by the partial constitutional

* Ellen M. Immergut, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz, Postfach 5560, D 9178457 Konstanz, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

231 reform of 1968/69, which went into e¡ect in January 1971 when the ¢rst unicameral parliament was constituted. Since that time, debate has ensued about the impact of the Swedish constitution on Swedish politics. For, at the same time that these changes in the rules of the game were enacted, Swedish voting patterns underwent a dramatic shift. Since the election of 1970, the Swedish Social Democratic Party has su¡ered a large drop in electoral popularity. From an average of 47.46 percent between 1936 and 1968, electoral support dropped to an average level of 42.78 percent between 1970 and 1988, reaching a low of 36.4 percent in 1998. Consequently, observers of (and participants in) Swedish politics have been divided about whether this decline in votes or the constitutional reforms are responsible for the major changes in Swedish politics that have taken place since 1970. Former Prime Minister Tage Erlander, for example ^ while being grilled on whether his constitution had not contributed to weakening Swedish social democracy ^ argued that `votes and not constitutional provisions determine the success of political parties: that the bourgeois parties have managed to attract more voters during the 1970s cannot be blamed on the Constitution' (Erlander 1982, 180). His later successor as Prime Minister, GÎran Persson, on the other hand, argued that the constitution was indeed responsible for some of the problems of Swedish social democracy. In 1997 he argued:

I believe that one of the most important explanations behind the shocks to the Swedish economy lies in the constitutional reforms of the 1970s. The impaired opportunities to build the strong governments necessary to manage long-term sustainable growth are a great weakness in the new constitution. (Persson, cited in MÎller 1999, 271)

This article aims to make a contribution to this debate by disentangling the e¡ects of the constitutional changes from those of the changes in electoral results. First, the main changes in Swedish politics are reviewed; next, the results of a simulation experiment to measure the mechanical e¡ect of the constitutional revision are presented.

Changes in Swedish Politics Swedish social democracy has received a great deal of international scholarly attention, not only because of Social Democratic policies, such as Sweden's generous welfare state, but also because of the country's unusual political pattern. From 1936 to 1969, Swedish governments could be classi¢ed as being unusually `strong', `stable', long in `tenure', and `dominated' by one party ^ terms that will be de¢ned in more detail below. Since 1970, however, Swedish politics have undergone a sea change.

232 Governmental Strength First, if one measures governmental `strength' in terms of the parliamentary basis for government, one observes that whereas governments from 1936 to 1969 enjoyed reliable parliamentary majorities, since that time the majorities have narrowed signi¢cantly. Using Bergman's ¢gures (2000, 196, 200, own calculation), the average parliamentary support for the government was 52 percent from 1945 to 1969, but only 42 percent from 1970 to 1998. A second, but more controversial, measure of government strength might be the frequency of majority government. Sannerstedt and SjÎlin characterize even minority Social Democratic governments as `majority governments' because they were supported by the Communist Party. Using this indicator, they conclude that majority governments were in power for 13 percent of the months between 1917 and 1936, 100 percent of the months between 1936 and 1973 and 54 percent of the months between 1974 and 1991 (Sannerstedt & SjÎlin 1992, 108).1 Strom de¢nes majority government more stringently to be a government with 50 percent active parliamentary support, and counts seven (out of 12) governments formed between 1945 and 1969 as majority, and two (out of nine) governments formed between 1970 and 1985 as majority. Notably, the average parliamentary basis for majority government declined from 54 percent to 50.5 percent between the two periods (Strom 1990, 268, and own calculations). Thus, regardless of the particular indicator used, majority governments have become less frequent in the post-1970 period, and the margin of parliamentary support for all types of governments has declined (see also Ruin 1988, 321).

Governmental Stability Like governmental strength, the degree of governmental `stability' depends upon the indicator one uses. Here, the critical issue is what counts as one government; that is, when does one consider an old government to have been terminated, and a new government to have been formed? MÏller and StrÖm (2000, 584) use three criteria to determine government termination: new elections, change in Prime Minister and change in governing party or parties. They are prepared to loosen this de¢nition, however, to discount a change in Prime Minister for non-political reasons, such as voluntary retirement or death (MÏller & StrÖm 2000, 12^13). By this measure, Sweden belongs to the group of countries with moderately stable governments, with a mean duration of 771 days, as compared to the European average of 702 days (MÏller & StrÖm 2000, 584^85). If one compares cabinet stability pre- and post-1970 using this measure, there is not much of a di¡erence between the 1945^1969 period (803 days) and the 1970^1998 period (775 days), (Bergman 2000, 196^97, own calculations).

233 Governmental Tenure The MÏller and StrÖm criteria measure the degree to which governments last through their mandated period of government, and so the extent to which governments maintain the con¢dence of parliament during a designated period of rule. This measure thus pinpoints cases where political disagreements lead governments to fall. However, it may also be relevant politically to measure the extent to which governments maintain their tenure beyond one electoral period. This is the logic of the Damgaard measure of government termination, which excludes elections as a ground of government termination, and counts only changes in the party composition of the government, and changes in Prime Minister caused by politically forced resignations (Damgaard 1994, 207). In order to dis- tinguish this measure from the previous indicator, one could perhaps speak of government `tenure' as opposed to government stability. Using Damgaard's criteria for government termination as the basis for a measure of the long-term tenure of government, there is indeed a large di¡erence between the two periods, with governments lasting an average of 2,945 days from 1945 to 1969, and 1,260 days between 1970 and 1998. Sannerstedt and SjÎlin use a similar measure of government termination (party change and formal resignation of the cabinet), but slightly di¡erent periods and conclude, also, that the average tenure of government has decreased since 1970: `During 1917^1936 Sweden had 11 cabinets, with an average life-span of 21 months. During 1936^1957 Sweden had 4 cabinets with an average life-span of 63.5 months. During the 194 months from 1957 to 1973, one single cabinet continued to govern. Since 1974, Sweden has had 7 cabinets, with an average duration of 29 months' (Sannerstedt & SjÎlin 1992, 109).

One-Party Dominance of Governments Finally, the duration of government can be measured simply in terms of changes in the Prime Minister or changes in the political party that controls the post of Prime Minister. If one counts a change in Prime Minister for any reason as the end of a government, the average duration of government dropped from 4,417 days for 1945^69 to 1,120 for 1970^98. If one removes changes in Prime Minister caused by death ^ and does not, for example, count the shift from Per Albin Hansson to Tage Erlander or from Olof Palme to Ingvar Carlsson as a shift in government ^ and thus measures only changes in the party that controls the post of Prime Minister, the duration of government was 8,834 days for 1945^69, and 1,260 for 1970^98. Here, however, we are no longer really speaking of length of tenure in government ^ as shifts between single party and coalition governments disappear ^ but more of the `dominance' of one party over governments. In the 1946 to 1969

234 period (and indeed in the 1936 to 1969 period) the Social Democratic Party dominated governments, in that it uninterruptedly controlled the post of Prime Minister. In fact, the party controlled this post even until 1976, when the ¢rst non-socialist government of the entire postwar period came to power. Thus, whether one focuses on governmental strength, tenure, or one-party dominance, we observe a marked shift in Swedish governments after 1970. Some observers have lumped these developments together, and discussed a decline in the stability of Swedish governments, but if we use an indicator of government stability intended to measure the survival of governments through the full electoral period, we see that `stability' has actually declined less than strength, tenure and Social Democratic dominance.2

Patterns of Swedish Policy Making This decline in Social Democratic electoral and governmental strength has been associated with changes in the style of Swedish policy making. During the pre-1970 period, Swedish policy making was described as `deliberative', `rationalistic', `open' and `consensual' (Anton cited in Ruin 1982, 143). Particularly in the era of Social Democratic single-party governments, policy making was often removed to the executive arena, and many decisions were made in high-level negotiations between government o¤cials and interest-group representatives. Since 1970, parliamentary voting patterns have displayed more con£ict, all-party coalition votes have become less common, and bloc-based voting more pronounced. Until 1994,3 the e¡ects of increased party competition were exacerbated by the shorter electoral cycle of three years, which forced each government to attempt to implement its campaign program in an extremely short time-frame (Ruin 1988; Sannerstedt & SjÎlin 1992).4 Further, the traditional organizations for interest intermediation have changed their orientation to government and politics. The labor unions have become less willing to maintain their blanket endorsement of the Social Democratic Party; and the Employers' Association has become increasingly political. For a number of reasons ^ changed production methods, the growth of public sector unions, the problem of skill di¡erentials, international competition ^ corporatist institutions are breaking down, removing an alternative arena for policy making that underpinned Social Democratic policies. Taken together, these changed political, social and economic conditions have had signi¢cant consequences for the politics and policies of Sweden's universalist welfare state. As Olof Petersson states in his summary of the government study of power and democracy in Sweden, `The era characterized by a strong public-sector expansion, centralized collective

235 bargaining based on a historic compromise between labor and capital, social engineering and centrally planned standard solutions has come to an end' (Petersson 1991, 190). All in all, one can speak of a decline in Social Democratic `hegemony' and an `end' to the Swedish model.

Explanations for the Loss of Support for the Swedish Social Democratic Model Voter Preferences Swedish and international scholars have proposed three types of explanations for these changes in Swedish politics. The ¢rst explanation focuses on changes in voter preferences. First, class-based voting has declined. Second, voters have become more volatile, switching more frequently between parties, and even splitting their votes for national and local elections held simultaneously among di¡erent parties, including those from opposite political blocks. Consequently, one can speak of a decline in political partisanship or party identi¢cation, a decline that has been even more extreme in Sweden than in other advanced democracies (Gilljam & Holmberg 1993, 175). These changes in voters' preferences, in turn, have been interpreted in di¡erent ways. One group of scholars focuses on what could be considered objective causes for these changing voting patterns. Social-structural change ^ the decline of the working class or its `embourgeoisement' ^ could lead to a decline in class voting, and hence to Social Democratic decomposition. An alternative view focuses on the impact of education: as Swedish voters have become more highly educated and better informed through the news media, they may tend to base their voting choices on issues rather than on ideology, thereby becoming more volatile, as issues change from election to election. A third hypothesis to explain the decline of partisanship stresses the increasing di¤culty of ¢nding governmental solutions to the problems that occupy voters. The oil price shocks and in£ation of the 1970s, as well as the ever increasing competition to Swedish industries caused by globaliz- ation, have drastically altered Sweden's economic environment, making it much more di¤cult for Social Democratic Keynesian solutions to work. Social changes have brought new political cleavages to the fore, such as those centered on immigration or the environment ^ each of which has been represented by a new political party, Ny Demokrati and MiljÎpartiet-De grÎna, respectively (Stephens 1981; Petersson, 1991; Oskarson 1994). Analysts focusing on more subjective causes for these changing voter patterns, on the other hand, have argued that, despite the objective di¤- culties, a great deal of room for manoeuvre remains for the political parties.

236 On these views, voters have responded directly to party strategies and party policies ^ particularly those of the Social Democrats ^ and, hence, the responsibility for electoral success or failure lies with the party leadership, and the decisions it has taken in the face of various political issues and problems (Korpi 1978; Sainsbury 1985; 1991). Nevertheless, even while proposing very di¡erent arguments to explain changes in Swedish voting patterns, all of these explanations share a common feature: individual-level changes in political preferences (even if ultimately accounted for by social- structural change) are responsible for the loss of popularity of the Social Democratic Party program.

Interests of Important Social Groups A second type of explanation focuses on the interests of important social groups, and, in particular, the representatives of capital and labor. Here changes in production and in the ways these groups perceive their interests have resulted in a loss of support for the Swedish model, and hence for the Social Democrats. Solidarity within the labor movement, and correspond- ingly the support for a solidaristic wage policy, has declined as white collar and public sector workers have grown in importance in the economy and in the union movement. Cleavages between public and private sector, between skilled and unskilled workers, and between the export and sheltered domestic sectors are becoming more severe, making the logic of the Swedish model obsolete (Hernes 1991; Kjellberg 1992; Swenson 1992; Pontusson & Swenson 1996). Swenson (1993) in particular stresses the changed interests of the Swedish Engineering Employers Association (VerkstadsfÎreningen). Whereas in the 1930s, Social Democratic policies helped the engineering employers achieve dominance within the employers' association, and to solve wage drift problems created by the construction industry, by the 1980s the Social Democratic policies and corporatist arrangements no longer served their interests, especially when they lost their control over the employer association. Economic interests thus account for the breakdown of the Swedish model of industrial relations. The impact of the industrial relations system on the electorate (whether, for example, voting patterns strictly adhere to shifts in union loyalties), however, is not fully speci¢ed in these arguments.5

Constitutional Revision The third approach focuses on the changes in the constitution (Stjernquist 1969; 1976; 1977; 1989; 1996; WesterstÔhl 1976; Ruin 1982; 1988; Sannerstedt & SjÎlin 1992, 108; Steinmo 1993, 129^31, 179^81; Lindbeck et al. 1994). On this view, two changes in particular have reduced the strength

237 and longevity of Swedish governments. First, the electoral system has been made more proportional, by increasing the number of seats in each electoral district, and by introducing 40 additional seats (utjÌmningsmandat) to be distributed in order to bring the parliamentary distribution of seats more in line with the national electoral results. These provisions increased the number of seats to the smaller parties ^ especially those of the very smallest, the ex-Communists or Left Party, the Greens and the Christian Democrats ^ and reduced those of the largest (the Social Democrats). Under a more proportional electoral system, it should be more di¤cult to form a governing majority; majorities are generally more narrow; and, consequently, more frequent shifts in the governing coalition are to be expected. Second, the reforms eliminated the indirectly elected First Chamber or Upper House of the Swedish parliament. The First Chamber was elected by local county council politicians, in elections held each year in di¡erent First Chamber electoral districts. In each year, one-eighth of the seats were up for re-election; the term of o¤ce was also eight years. The First Chamber, in other words, introduced a lag e¡ect in the Swedish parliament: local county councillors ^ who might have been elected up to four years before the First Chamber election in which they took part ^ elected members of parliament that were to serve for eight years. At any one time, an MP might be serving in o¤ce based on electoral results from 12 years before. In the Swedish literature, this lag e¡ect is very much stressed. But equally if not more important was the double disproportionality resulting from indirect elections: disproportionality occurred in converting votes into seats at the county council election (using the modi¢ed Sainte-Lague« method), and again during the First Chamber elections (where the less proportional d'Hondt method was used) (Nyman 1966, 187). Although it was a legacy of the transformation of the estates parliament to a liberal parliament in 1866 ^ when it had assured the nobility of veto power over parliamentary decision making ^ the First Chamber had proved to be very advantageous for the Social Democratic Party during the postwar period. Since the landslide victory of the Social Democrats in 1942, the party had maintained an absolute majority of the seats in the First Chamber, as is depicted in Figure 1.6 Indeed, if one compares the per- centage of seats held by the Social Democratic Party in the First and Second Chambers (Figure 2), as well as in the full Riksdag (Figure 3), one observes that the Social Democratic Party generally held less than 50 percent of the seats in the Second Chamber, but that the First Chamber majority was su¤cient to give the Social democrats a majority in the full Riksdag (other than in 1956). When supported by the Communist Party (Figure 4), the Social Democratic Party could control an absolute majority in the full Riksdag. It should be noted, of course, that the Social Democratic governments of the 1950s and 1960s were based on Second Chamber

238 Figure 1. First Chamber Real Results ^ Percentages.

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Figure 2. Second Chamber Real Results ^ Percentages.

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M+C+F S majority coalitions between the Social Democratic and Farmers' parties, or on Second Chamber Social Democratic minority governments that relied on the passive support of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the left bloc majority in the full Riksdag can be used as an indicator of Social Democratic `veto power' (see also Bergman 1995, 62^63).

239 Figure 3. Full Riksdag Real Results ^ Percentages.

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Figure 4. Full Riksdag ^ Percentages by Blocs.

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The First Chamber majority was important for Social Democratic rule for three reasons. First, all legislation was required to be passed by both chambers, so that a Social Democratic majority in the First Chamber was su¤cient to veto any and all legislation. Second, the First Chamber majority contributed to giving the Social Democrats a majority in the full

240 Riksdag, even when the party did not enjoy a majority in the Second Chamber. As the full Riksdag voted on the yearly budget, this majority yielded the Social Democratic Party veto power over government budgets. (In the very few years of the postwar period when the Social Democratic Party did not enjoy an absolute majority in the full Riksdag, the votes of the Communist Party were su¤cient to yield a majority to the left bloc, as shown in Figure 4, and hence to restore Social Democratic veto power over budgets.) Third, although the Second Chamber majority was considered decisive, the First Chamber majority was a contributing factor in decisions on forming governments, since this majority was su¤cient to cripple any government based solely on a Second Chamber majority (Nyman 1966, 219^20). These political-institutional conditions (the particular con¢guration of constitutional rules and electoral results) had rami¢cations for the style of policy making in Sweden. Because the opposition parties had virtually no hope of gaining o¤ce, they moved towards cooperation with the Social Democrats in order to have at least some in£uence over policy ^ and to be able to demonstrate to their voters that they had accomplished something while in o¤ce, even if only in the opposition (Stjernquist 1966, 138^46). In addition, the eight-year term for the Upper House made it possible to calculate how long the majorities would last, helping to extend the time- frame for Swedish parliamentary politics. Interest groups, as well, were moved to work in a spirit of compromise, because it was clear that they would be negotiating in a framework of Social Democratic rule for some time to come. This was particularly important for moderating the views of employers, for instance (Immergut 1992, 210, 222^23). At the same time, the need to seek coalition partners or votes in the Second Chamber helped to moderate both the Social Democratic Party program (for instance moving away from a stress on nationalization in the 1930s and 1940s to placate the Farmers' Party) and the demands of its allies, especially the unions (Steinmo 1993, 7, 121^22). Given the important role of the First Chamber in sustaining Social Democratic governance in the past, it is not implausible to think that the loss of the First Chamber might be an important factor in weakening Social Democratic governmental capacities in the post-1970 period. Whereas before, one could have said that decisive parliamentary majorities provided the Swedes with a functional equivalent of the strong governments of the Westminster system despite their proportional electoral system, since the constitutional changes Sweden has experienced the oscillations of the Westminster system without its strong governments. The dramatic change of the pre-1945 period was the decline of the Conservative Party and the rise of the Social Democratic Party between 1910 and 1940. In the postwar period, the political pattern stabilized into two fairly evenly matched blocs.

241 The Social Democratic Party, however, was able to form de facto majority governments, and, consequently, to remain continuously in government from 1936 to 1969. By contrast, the post-1970 period is characterized by frequent oscillations in government, and by several periods where the two blocs hold exactly or nearly exactly the same number of seats. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that party competition has increased, parliamentary bargaining has become more con£ictual and corporatist- style interest-group negotiations no longer support a pattern of consensus politics (see also Hermansson 1993; Pappi & Schmitt 1994). It is thus plausible to claim that constitutional changes can account for the dramatic changes in Swedish political patterns. Yet, the constitutional changes were accompanied by a signi¢cant decline in Social Democratic electoral strength. How can one disentangle the e¡ects of the changes in votes from those of the changes in constitutional structure?

Institutionalist Theory Social Cleavages versus Political Institutions It is precisely this dilemma that makes this case of interest not only to students of Swedish politics but also to those of institutionalist theory. First, the origins and impact of institutions on complex political patterns are complicated by the fact that political institutions are embedded in particular societies with their characteristic social-structural and cleavage patterns. For example, the political institutions we associate with con- sociational politics ^ proportional representation, bicameralism, and, in the Swiss case, direct democracy ^ are systematically located within religiously and ethnically divided societies (Lehmbruch 1967; Lijphart 1968; 1992; Deutsch 1976). But, if cleavages and institutions co-vary, how then are we to disentangle the impact of social cleavages versus political institutions (Knight 1992)? Constitutional change provides an exciting experimental situation, whereby some political and social (and even cultural) factors may (hopefully) be held constant, and the variation in institutions can be observed in isolation.

Single Events or General Theory? Second, the Swedish case of constitutional change is of scienti¢c interest as well, because it is an example of routine rather than crisis-driven constitutional change. The constitution of the French Fifth Republic, for example, was drafted in the middle of the Algerian crisis, making it di¤cult to know whether de Gaulle's success in exploiting its provisions in its early

242 years was due to this crisis background, or to the constitutional provisions themselves ^ that is, whether he was exercising charismatic or legal-rational authority. The Swedish constitutional change, by contrast, was enacted in routine proceedings, with two commissions of inquiry deliberating for many years, and parliamentary votes in two legislative periods, separated by an election. Routine constitutional change should provide a better basis for generalizations than crisis-driven change, because the e¡ect of one-time events is minimized. Caution should be used, nevertheless, in overextending the ¢ndings to a general theory of constitutional change, as so many constitutions are indeed enacted under special circumstances (O¡e 1996; Elster 1997). Instead, the Swedish case may serve better as an example of the dynamics of institutional (as opposed to constitutional) change and institutional redesign.

Political Preferences versus Political Institutions Third, and ¢nally, the Swedish case is of interest to institutionalist theory, because, as stated above, it is a good example of conscious rather than evolutionary or accidental institutional change (Tsebelis 1990). For, despite their many di¡erences, scholars from both the `rational choice' and the `historical institutionalist' approaches agree that the problem of institutional origins and institutional change is a frontier issue for institutionalist analysis (Shepsle 1989; 2001; Hall & Taylor 1996; Rothstein 1996; Weingast 1996; Thelen 1999; Pierson 2000). It remains a frontier issue, because the scope of institutional change is so di¤cult to assess. As in the Swedish case, the normal situation is that many di¡erent constitutional provisions and political factors change at the same time. The picture is further muddied by long-term shifts in social structure and incremental changes in political culture. Once again, we are back to the problem of disentangling the impact of constitutional changes from changes in social structure, cultural attitudes, and other developments that may a¡ect political preferences.

A Simulation Experiment As a ¢rst step to understanding the important changes in Swedish politics that have taken place since 1970, this paper presents the results of a simulation experiment. This simulation holds electoral results constant, and assesses the impact of the changed constitutional rules.7 The actual post- 1970 electoral results were plugged into the provisions of the old constitutional rules in order to calculate how many seats each party would have gained under the old system. This isolates the drop in votes after 1970 from

243 the constitutional changes, providing a measure of what Duverger called the `mechanical' e¡ect of the new constitution. In order to evaluate the impact of Swedish constitutional change on the overall Swedish pattern of consensus politics and social concertation, much more work would need to be done. The research results presented here are merely the ¢rst step in such an evaluation. The contribution here is to provide an exact measure of the extent of institutional change, by posing a hypothetical question: what would have been the distribution of parliamentary seats if the constitution not been changed and if voters had nevertheless voted exactly as they did under the new constitutional rules.

Strategic Voting This last assumption cannot be made without addressing the issue of strategic voting. The simulation attempts to separate the e¡ects of voter preferences from those of constitutional rules. But as voter strategies are a¡ected by the constitutional framework and party system, one must consider the impact of the constitutional rules on strategic preferences, which are de¢ned as the impact of the constitutional rules on voter choices with voter preferences held constant (Riker 1982; Bawn 1993). In com- paring the old and new constitutional rules, there are three anticipated strategic e¡ects, which all go in the direction of reducing the Social Democratic majority. First, bourgeois voters should be more motivated to go out and vote if they feel that there is a realistic chance of knocking the Social Democrats out of o¤ce; the new constitutional rules should therefore produce higher votes for the bourgeois parties. Second, voting for small parties makes more strategic sense in a more proportional system, where they will get more seats; the new constitutional rules should therefore produce higher votes for the Communist, Green, Christian Democratic and other small parties, and indeed should favor the formation of new parties. Third, in the case of the Communist Party, not only are votes rewarded with a higher number of seats, but the threat that the party might fall below the 4 percent threshold seems to have motivated Social Democratic voters to vote for the Communist Party, for example in the 1970 election (Forsell 1971, 206, 209); the new constitutional rules should therefore produce higher votes for the Communist Party. In other words, all strategic considerations lead one to believe that Social Democratic electoral results should be better under a continuation of the old rules. That is, holding preferences constant, the impact of the new electoral rules on voter behavior is not expected to be advantageous for the Social Democratic Party, such that one would expect voter results after 1970 to be higher under the new constitution than they would have been under the old. Consequently, a simulation of the parliamentary seats each party would have held under the

244 old rules but using the new electoral results is not anticipated to be biased in favor of higher numbers of seats for the Social Democratic Party. Political preferences of voters, on the other hand, may also be a¡ected by the new constitutional rules. If governance becomes more di¤cult, the appeal of the Social Democratic Party as the party of government would be expected to weaken. One could only attribute this change in voter preference to the constitutional changes, however, if the di¤culties of governance are directly caused by the constitutional changes. But if, for the sake of argument, one does make this assumption, one again ¢nds that the expected impact of constitutional change on voters' political preferences would be unfavorable for the Social Democratic Party. Once again, using electoral results from the post-1970 period biases the simulation against the Social Democratic Party. On the other hand, if the old constitution had remained in force, and had contributed to keeping the Social Democratic Party in power, a voter backlash might have occurred, with increasing numbers of voters sharing a political preference for a change of government. It is hard to imagine that such a shift in voter preferences would have been stimulated in the early 1970s solely because the constitution was unchanged. Thus, at least for the earlier years of the simulation experiment, even taking a hypothesized connection between the constitution and the political preferences of voters, there do not seem to be grounds for arguing that plugging post-1970 votes into pre-1970 rules biases the simulation in favor of the Social Democratic Party. Indeed, the abrupt drop in popularity of the Social Democratic Party that occurs in 1970 would provide prima facie evidence that the total strategic and political e¡ects of the new constitution weaken the electoral strength of the Social Democratic Party.

Empirical Results The First Chamber of parliament was indirectly elected by the members of the county councils, the provincial governments responsible mainly for health care. For the majority of county councils, the number of county council politicians was determined by population in each county council electoral district. These county councils were elected every four years, at the same time that local municipal and rural councillors were elected. Seats were allocated according to the modi¢ed Sainte-Lague« method adopted in 1952 for communal elections, and in 1954 for the Second Chamber elections. This method gives less of a boost to the largest party than the d'Hondt method, since, as the votes are divided by bigger numbers, they dwindle more rapidly to regions where the smaller parties can get seats. Because the ¢rst divisor is 1.4, however, there remains a barrier to small parties. The county councils were divided into 19 First Chamber electoral districts, each generally containing one or two county councils. These

245 electoral districts were then grouped into eight groups. Each year, one group composed of two or three electoral districts would hold a First Chamber election. The number of First Chamber seats to be allocated to each electoral district was determined once every ten years, and was based on the population within each electoral district at that time. The councillors voted for their First Chamber representatives, and the seats were allocated according to the d'Hondt method. In 1962, for example, the 137 county councillors of Stockholm and Uppsala, which comprised one First Chamber electoral district, voted together for 13 members of parliament. In the same year, VÌsterbotten and Norrbotten, the second electoral district that was part of this group, held a separate First Chamber election, in which the 124 county councillors elected ten members of parliament. This electoral method for the First Chamber increased the majorities and stabilized the governments of the Social Democrats for two reasons. First, no method of representation is purely proportional. Proportionality in this case was particularly reduced because the disproportionality occurred twice: ¢rst at the county council level, and then at the First Chamber level. The disproportionality of the First Chamber election was particularly pronounced, and worked in favor of the largest party, because the number of voters in relation to seats was small, and the d'Hondt method bene¢ts larger parties. The stabilizing bene¢t came about because the First Chamber electors had been elected at an earlier point in time. In this example, the electors voting in 1962 had been elected in 1958. In addition, the term of the First Chamber MPs was eight years, and only approximately one-eighth of the Chamber was replaced each year, leading to smoother transitions. The constitutional changes of 1969/1970 eliminated the First Chamber entirely, and introduced a unicameral body containing 350 seats,8 which was thus larger and more proportional than the old Second Chamber with its 233 seats. In addition, the proportionality of electoral representation was further increased by providing for extra seats that would be appor- tioned based on national electoral results (utjÌmningsmandat). The 28 Second Chamber districts were maintained as previously, but because each district received more seats the distribution of seats was more directly proportional to electoral results. The only remaining barrier to proportionality was the 4 percent national threshold (or 12 percent within one electoral district).

Simulation without Electoral Alliances For the simulation experiment, actual election results from 1970 on were plugged into the old constitutional rules, so as to calculate the number of parliamentary seats each party would have gained using the old rules. This

246 simulation was achieved in three steps: simulation of county council elections; simulation of First Chamber elections; simulation of Second Chamber elections. For the simulation of the county council elections, the number of seats that would have been accorded to each county council electoral district was ¢rst calculated.9 Next, actual county council electoral results were used to simulate the distribution of county council seats among the parties using the modi¢ed Sainte-Lague« (jÌmkade uddatals) method.10 These simulated county council elections then served as the basis for a simulation of the First Chamber elections. The seats per First Chamber electoral district were calculated on the basis of the population in the 19 districts in January 1971, 1981, and 1991.11 Next, First Chamber d'Hondt elections were simulated using the county councillors as electors.12 Finally, the Second Chamber elections were simulated by calculating the number of parliamentary seats that would have been awarded to each of the 28 Second Chamber electoral districts based on the population,13 and then the seats were awarded to the political parties using the modi¢ed Sainte-Lague« method.14 The ¢rst simulation used only the electoral results for separate parties and did not assume any cooperation in elections at any level in the system. The results of this simulation can be seen in Figures 5^7, which show the number of seats received by each bloc in the full Riksdag (i.e. the two chambers added together, as they would be for a joint vote), and in the First and Second Chambers, respectively. Under the conditions of the simulation,

Figure 5. Full Riksdag Simulation without Electoral Alliances.

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38% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4

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247 Figure 6. First Chamber Simulation without Electoral Alliances.

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38% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

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Figure 7. Second Chamber Simulation without Electoral Alliances.

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M+C+F S the Social Democratic Party alone enjoys a majority in the First Chamber for the entire period (Figure 6). This First Chamber majority is su¤cient to give the left bloc a majority in the full Riksdag for the entire period

248 (Figure 5), despite the loss of its majority in the Second Chamber from 1976 to 1981 and from 1991 to 1994 (Figure 7). Interestingly, the Social Democratic advantage in the First Chamber is large enough that a left bloc majority is preserved in the full Riksdag even after the 1991 election.

Simulation with Electoral Alliances The ¢rst simulation is not entirely realistic, however. For the old system provided the bourgeois parties with the opportunity to align in electoral agreements (MÎller 1986; von Sydow 1989).15 This could improve the ratio of seats to votes for these parties. Consequently, the simulation was repeated, using the exact electoral agreements used in the 1960s, for the county council, First Chamber and Second Chamber elections. Of course, it is not credible to think that the same electoral agreements that were reached in the 1960s would have held throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. In one sense, these agreements are vastly overestimated, because the electoral results were based on campaigns by single parties, whose gains were then added together after the fact to simulate the alliance. But under the post-1952 rules, parties wishing to enter into an electoral alliance were required to campaign under a common party label. It is not at all clear that in the 1970s the Center Party with its opposition to nuclear energy, for example, could have successfully cam- paigned under a single banner together with the pro-nuclear Moderate Party. On the other hand, the ideological polarization of Swedish politics into two blocs (left and right) in the 1970s might have led to much more extensive cooperation. Nevertheless, the `1960s cartels' simulation tests the credibility of the threat posed by the bourgeois alliances, as they looked in the 1960s. The simulation with electoral alliances (which does not allow us to report seats for the Social Democratic Party alone, even though they comprise an overwhelming majority of the left bloc seats in the First Chamber and a large majority of the seats in the Second Chamber)16 results in a left bloc majority in the First Chamber for the entire period (Figure 8). This majority is not, however, su¤cient to maintain a left bloc majority in the full Riksdag from 1976 to 1982 (Figure 9). In 1991, on the other hand, the left bloc does maintain its majority in the full Riksdag, despite its poor showing in the 1991 election and, consequently, in the Second Chamber (Figure 10). The possibility of electoral alliances signi¢cantly reduces the Social Democratic majorities, but, nevertheless, the First Chamber allows the Social Demo- cratic Party to control all legislation and budgets, even under this simulation condition.

249 Figure 8. First Chamber Simulation with Electoral Alliances.

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Figure 9. Full Riksdag Simulation with Electoral Cooperation.

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250 Figure 10. Second Chamber Simulation with Electoral Alliances.

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Discussion This simulation experiment shows that the mechanical e¡ect of the 1969/ 1970 partial revision of the Swedish constitution is both large and politically signi¢cant. As shown in Figure 11, which compares directly the proportion of Social Democratic seats under the two institutional arrangements, the identical numbers of votes yield very di¡erent numbers of seats. Even with the relatively poor post-1970 electoral showing, the Social Democratic Party would have received an average of 53.2 percent of the seats in the full Riksdag from 1970 to 1994. This average compares favorably with the average actually obtained from 1944 to 1969 (50.56 percent), and is far better than the average actually obtained from 1970 to 1994 (44.59 percent). If we move to the simulation with electoral alliances, the simulation yields an average of 50.95 percent of seats for the left bloc from 1970 to 1994, as compared with 53.02 percent actually received from 1944 to 1969 and with 49.96 percent actually received in the unicameral parliament from 1970 to 1994. Here we see that the drop in votes does indeed a¡ect Social Democratic parliamentary strength, but that the mechanical e¡ect is large enough to constitute the di¡erence between a parliamentary majority versus a minority. Moreover, the simulation without electoral alliances renders the Social Democratic Party an absolute majority in the First Chamber for the entire period. In the simulation with electoral alliances, the left bloc enjoys an absolute majority for the entire period, and the Social Democratic Party

251 Figure 11. Comparison of Real Unicameral Parliament with Simulated Full Riksdag (S Only, Percentages).

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S - real S - Full Sim-nc alone enjoys either an absolute majority (in all years except 1976^81) or a relative majority, and, in any case, occupies the pivotal position in this chamber for the entire period. Consequently, under the conditions of both the simulation without electoral alliances and that with the electoral alliances of the 1960s, the Social Democratic Party would have retained its veto position over legislation and budgets for the entire post-1970 period. Thus, even with the decline in partisanship and in class-based voting, the old constitution would have placed the Social Democratic Party in a pivotal position by virtue of its control of the First Chamber. Such a simulation cannot predict the pattern of government formation in the 1976 to 1982 period, as this is an outcome of coalition politics, but a few general observations can be made. First, the King would have been thrust into a key political position through his right to invite a particular party to form a government. Second, the di¡erence between the two simulation conditions demonstrates the importance of the threat of electoral alliances, supporting the argument of von Sydow (1989). Third, and ¢nally, even if one assumes that bourgeois coalition governments would have been formed in this period, their room for manoeuvre would have been greatly reduced by Social Democratic control of the First Chamber. Indeed, the First Chamber majority would have provided a considerable incentive for both cross-bloc political alliances and interest-group cooperation. Consequently, one can conclude that the constitutional reforms weakened not only the parliamentary power of the Social Democratic Party, but also the political conditions for Swedish consensus politics.

252 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank Olof Ruin, JÎrgen WesterstÔhl, and Gunnar Wallin for agreeing to be interviewed for this project. I also wish to acknowledge the help of Christina Behrendt, Saskia Richter, and, especially, Bertrand Lisbach in carrying out the simulation, and that of Isabelle Schulze for the calculation of government tenure, as well as that of Anika Rasner with the production work. I am grateful to the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, the Max-Planck-Institut fÏr Gesellschaftsforschung in Cologne, and the Western Societies Program at Cornell University for giving me the opportunity to present drafts of this paper in their seminar series, and to the participants of those seminars and the two anonymous reviewers for Scandinavian Political Studies for their comments.

NOTES 1. Between 1936 and 1957, majority governments were in power for 71 percent of the months; between 1957 and 1973, a single party was in power for 100 percent of the months. Sannerstedt and SjÎlin classify the Social Democratic government as majority, since it enjoyed the passive support of the Communists. Between 1974 and 1991, single-party governments ruled for 38 percent of the period, coalition governments for 28 percent (Sannerstedt & SjÎlin 1992, 108). 2. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Scandinavian Political Studies for this point, and for providing the appropriate references. 3. Prior to the 1998 election, the Swedish constitution was revised so as to extend the mandate period from three to four years. Thus, whereas elections were held in 1991 and 1994, the following election was ¢rst held in 1998 (MÎller 1999, 270). 4. For an argument about the advantages of Swedish minority government since 1970, see Lewin (1998). 5. In a variation on these interest-based arguments, Rothstein (1998) suggests that a decline in trust between the social partners is of central importance to the decline of the Swedish model. This `cultural-institutionalist' view may be pro¢tably combined with the `structuralist-institutionalist' view that will be presented here. 6. All points in all ¢gures refer to the distribution of parliamentary seats following the election held in the year indicated on the x-axis ^ regardless of whether the seats were actually occupied in the September of the election year, or in January of the subsequent year. For the First Chamber, real results are depicted only for the composition of the First Chamber following Second Chamber election years; simulated results are reported for every year, since there was a First Chamber election held in every year. 7. Lanke & Bjurulf (1986) have conducted a similar simulation experiment, but they do not consider the impact of the First Chamber, only that of the changed electoral law, looking speci¢cally at the additional seats (utjÌmningsmandaten), 1.4 divisor (jÌmkningen), and odd divisors (uddatalsmetoden). 8. After the parliamentary tie, with each bloc holding 175 seats from 1973 to 1975, the number of seats was reduced to 349 in 1976. 9. As laid out in the 1954 Landstingslag, 2. Kapitel, ½10^½11 (Svensk FÎrfattnings- sammling (SFS) 1955: 138), each county council electoral district (Landstingsvalkrets) gets one seat regardless of population, plus one for each unit of 5,000 population plus one for any remainder [integer(population/5000) + 2]. Each district must have at least seven representatives, but no more than 13. It was obviously not possible to divide or consolidate the electoral districts when the number of mandates fell below or surpassed these ranges. However, more members per district increases the proportionality, which decreases the electoral advantages of these rules for the Social Democratic Party. Owing to the various communal consolidations, in a few rare cases estimates of the population per district were made by dividing the population in the entire county council in proportion to the number of eligible voters in the district as a fraction of the total eligible voters in the county council. One di¤culty in this estimation is that the county council mandates were calculated according to an absolute population rule (one mandate per 5,000 population, plus two per district). Presumably, this divisor would

253 have been revised over the years. As increasing the number of county council seats per electoral district makes the translation of votes into seats more directly proportional, this anachronism skews the estimate against the Social Democratic majority. For Gotland and MalmÎ, the number of electors was estimated by dividing the population by the proportion of eligible voters in each of the three electoral districts to get an estimate of the total population in the electoral district for that year. Then the electors were estimated using the usual integer(population/5000) + 2 rule. For the election years 1970 and 1973, it was not necessary to recalculate the number of county council seats, since until that time the 1955 communal law was in force. 10. As a check of the simulation, 100 electoral districts were simulated for the year 1966 and checked against actual data. 11. Following the method laid out in Riksdagsordningen (Law on Parliament) 6 ½ 5^6 mom. and 7 ½ 4 mom., and revised in Kunglig MajestÌts kungÎrelse of 24 May 1957 (nr 161) [calculations published in Kunglig MajestÌts kungÎrelse of 18 May 1951 (nr 232), Kunglig MajestÌts kungÎrelse of 24 May 1957 (nr 162), Kunglig MajestÌts kungÎrelse of 12 May 1961 (nr 112)], the number of First Chamber parliamentary seats in each of the 19 electoral districts was calculated for 1971^80, 1981^90, and 1991^94. The Swedish population for 1 January 1971, 1981, and 1991, respectively, was divided by 150. Next, the population in each electoral district was divided by this electoral quotient (Riksvalkvoten), to yield an initial distribution of seats per district. The remaining parliamentary seats were distributed to the districts with the largest remainders after division by the electoral quotient. Finally, any districts with less than ¢ve seats were given additional seats to bring the minimum number of seats per district up to ¢ve. Any First Chamber district that was entitled to a larger number of seats when compared with the last seat's calculation, however, received the additional seats only when they became free when a district that had experienced a reduction in seats held its First Chamber election. At that time, a ny sammanrÌkning was held to determine which party would be awarded the additional seat or seats. As a check, this method was applied to the 1961^70 distribution of seats, and compared with the actual number of seats given to each district. 12. The First Chamber seats were distributed among the political parties using the d'Hondt method. The electors for the First Chamber were the county council politicians (or, for MalmÎ, GÎteborg and Stockholm, the city council politicians). When a First Chamber electoral district included a city outside a county council (as in the case of MalmÎ) or was allowed to elect larger numbers of county councilors than as calculated by the 5,000 population rule (as in Gotland), a separate d'Hondt election was held to determine the number of First Chamber electors for that jurisdiction. There were 19 First Chamber electoral districts, each generally composed of one or two county councils or cities. These 19 districts were assigned to eight groups. For each year, one group of the 19 First Chamber electoral districts elected its First Chamber MPs. These served for eight years. This simulation was tested by simulating all 1960s First Chamber elections. 13. The number of seats were calculated according to RO 15 ½ 1 mom., RO 15 ½ 2 mom., and RO 15 ½ 3 mom, as described in Riksdagsmannavalen 1965^1968, Del 2, 25. The population of Sweden for 1 January in the election year was divided by 230. The population of each of the 28 Second Chamber electoral districts was divided by this electoral quotient (Riksvalkvot) to yield the initial number of seats per district. Next, the remaining seats were distributed to the electoral districts with the largest remainders. Finally, any districts with less than three seats were awarded additional seats to bring their total seats up to three (Gotland); any electoral districts with three or four seats were given extra seats to bring their total seats up to ¢ve. In general, the electoral district boundaries were contiguous with Landstings boundaries. For other cases (cities, Ølvsborgs, etc.), we went down to the primary commune level to calculate the population ¢gures. Where this was not possible, we divided the actual population among the electoral districts using the numbers eligible to vote per district. 14. The votes received in the elections to the unicameral parliament were used to estimate the seats per party, using the previous calculation of seats from the population per

254 electoral district and the Sainte-Lague« method (jÌmkade uddatals metoden, 1.4 as ¢rst divisor, then 3, 5, etc.). For 1994, votes that had been consolidated for the County Councils of Stockholm, MalmÎhuslÌn, and ØlvsborgslÌn, as well as the commune of GÎteborg together with the County Council of BohuslÌn, had to be separated. 15. Up until the 1952 election, the parties could sum together their votes. After 1952, the parties had to enter the election with a common party name, such as `Medborglig Sammling' or `Mittenpartierna'. 16. To separate out the seats in the First Chamber held by Social Democratic versus Left Party deputies would require an additional step in the simulation. Namely, the seats would need to be distributed between the parties using the d'Hondt method. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the size of the majorities that the Social Democratic Party alone would have maintained both its majority and pivotal position in the First Chamber for the entire period.

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