ADVERSARIAL and INQUISITORIAL SYSTEMS: a BRIEF OVERVIEW of KEY FEATURES Blurring of the Distinction Between Adversarial and In
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Spain: Phase 2
DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS SPAIN: PHASE 2 REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS This report was approved and adopted by the Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions on 24 March 2006. TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 4 A. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 5 1. Economic background and international economic relations........................................................... 5 2. Overview of corruption trends.......................................................................................................... 6 3. Preparation of the on-site visit.......................................................................................................... 6 B. PREVENTION AND DETECTION.................................................................................................... 7 1. Prevention of foreign bribery and related offences .......................................................................... 7 a) Government and public agencies in general ............................................................................... 7 b) Government efforts to improve private sector -
A Federal Criminal Case Timeline
A Federal Criminal Case Timeline The following timeline is a very broad overview of the progress of a federal felony case. Many variables can change the speed or course of the case, including settlement negotiations and changes in law. This timeline, however, will hold true in the majority of federal felony cases in the Eastern District of Virginia. Initial appearance: Felony defendants are usually brought to federal court in the custody of federal agents. Usually, the charges against the defendant are in a criminal complaint. The criminal complaint is accompanied by an affidavit that summarizes the evidence against the defendant. At the defendant's first appearance, a defendant appears before a federal magistrate judge. This magistrate judge will preside over the first two or three appearances, but the case will ultimately be referred to a federal district court judge (more on district judges below). The prosecutor appearing for the government is called an "Assistant United States Attorney," or "AUSA." There are no District Attorney's or "DAs" in federal court. The public defender is often called the Assistant Federal Public Defender, or an "AFPD." When a defendant first appears before a magistrate judge, he or she is informed of certain constitutional rights, such as the right to remain silent. The defendant is then asked if her or she can afford counsel. If a defendant cannot afford to hire counsel, he or she is instructed to fill out a financial affidavit. This affidavit is then submitted to the magistrate judge, and, if the defendant qualifies, a public defender or CJA panel counsel is appointed. -
Cops and Pleas: Police Officers' Influence on Plea Bargaining
JONATHAN ABEL Cops and Pleas: Police Officers' Influence on Plea Bargaining AB S TRACT. Police officers play an important, though little-understood, role in plea bargain- ing. This Essay examines the many ways in which prosecutors and police officers consult, collab- orate, and clash with each other over plea bargaining. Using original interviews with criminal justice officials from around the country, this Essay explores the mechanisms of police involve- ment in plea negotiations and the implications of this involvement for both plea bargaining and policing. Ultimately, police influence in the arena of plea bargaining -long thought the exclusive domain of prosecutors -calls into question basic assumptions about who controls the prosecu- tion team. A U T H 0 R. Fellow, Stanford Constitutional Law Center. I am grateful to Kim Jackson and her colleagues at the Yale Law journal for their invaluable suggestions. I also want to thank col- leagues, friends, and family who read drafts and talked through the issues with me. A short list includes Liora Abel, Greg Ablavsky, Stephanos Bibas, Jack Chin, Barbara Fried, Colleen Honigs- berg, Cathy Hwang, Shira Levine, Michael McConnell, Sonia Moss, Howard Shneider, Robert Weisberg, and the riders of A.C. Transit's "0" Bus. 1730 ESSAY CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1732 1. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS WITHIN THE PROSECUTION TEAM 1735 A. Academic Accounts 1736 1. Scholarship on the Police Role in Plea Bargaining 1737 2. Scholarship on the Separation of Powers in Plea Bargaining 1741 B. Prosecutor and Police Accounts of the Separation of Powers in Plea Bargaining 1743 II. POLICE INFLUENCE ON PLEA BARGAINING 1748 A. -
Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process Kevin C
Hastings Law Journal Volume 40 | Issue 5 Article 2 1-1989 Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process Kevin C. McMunigal Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 Hastings L.J. 957 (1989). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol40/iss5/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process by KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL* Consider the following disclosure problem. The government indicts a defendant on an armed robbery charge arising from a violent mugging. The prosecution's case is based entirely on the testimony of the victim, who identified the defendant from police photographs of persons with a record of similar violent crime. With only the victim's testimony to rely on, the prosecutor is unsure of her ability to obtain a conviction at trial. She offers the defendant a guilty plea limiting his sentencing exposure to five years, a significant concession in light of the defendant's substantial prior record and the fact that the charged offense carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years incarceration. As trial nears, the victim's confi- dence in the identification appears to wane. The robbery took place at night. He was frightened and saw his assailant for a matter of seconds. -
Administration of Criminal Justice in France: an Introductory Analysis George W
Louisiana Law Review Volume 23 | Number 1 Louisiana Legislation of 1962: A Symposium December 1962 Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis George W. Pugh Repository Citation George W. Pugh, Administration of Criminal Justice in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 La. L. Rev. (1962) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol23/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LOUISIANA Volume XXIII December, 1962 LAW REVIEW Number 1 ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN FRANCE: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS George W. Pugh* A system for administering criminal justice is a detailed tap- estry woven of many varied threads. It is often difficult to understand the nature and significance of any particular fiber without at least a general appreciation of the function of other threads, and also a realization of the impact of the whole. This is certainly true of the French system. An attempt at a comparative study of another procedural system is fraught with difficulty, for one becomes so accustomed to his own procedural patterns that he is tempted to make un- warranted translations in terms of his own institutional frame of reference. Comparative evaluation of a procedural device, on the other hand, is even more difficult, for it involves at least two aspects: whether the device functions satisfactorily in its own institutional setting, and whether utilization of the mechanism in the context of another given system would be feasible or desirable. -
You Are Victim You Are Victim of an Offence1
You are victim You are victim of an offence1. As this is a far-reaching event, you probably have all sorts of questions: what are my rights? How can I receive compensation? Who can help me? This leaflet briefly outlines the course of the proceedings, the rights you can exer- cise in the framework of these proceed- ings and the steps that you can take. Summary Report to the police services ........................................................4 General .......................................................................................................................................................18 After the report .................................................................................................5 Request for restoration of the damage ................................................................................19 Investigation and possible consequences ..............................................5 No compensation notwithstanding the decision of the judge ............................21 Hearing.....................................................................................................................................................9 Rights as a victim during Appeal ...................................................................................................................................................10 the sentence enforcement .......................................................................................22 The victim’s rights and role Request to be involved ....................................................................................................................22 -
A Survival Analysis of Pretrial Detention and the Timing of Guilty
CJPXXX10.1177/0887403419838020Criminal Justice Policy ReviewPetersen 838020research-article2019 Article Criminal Justice Policy Review 2020, Vol. 31(7) 1015 –1035 Do Detainees Plead Guilty © The Author(s) 2019 Article reuse guidelines: Faster? A Survival Analysis sagepub.com/journals-permissions https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403419838020DOI: 10.1177/0887403419838020 of Pretrial Detention and the journals.sagepub.com/home/cjp Timing of Guilty Pleas Nick Petersen1 Abstract Although numerous quantitative studies have linked pretrial detention to increased conviction rates, the precise mechanisms linking these decisions remain unclear. Qualitative studies shed light on these processes, revealing that many detainees plead guilty quickly to escape the pains of detention, including poor confinement conditions, strained work or family relations, and “dead time.” Moreover, these pressures to plead are often exacerbated by uncertain detention length, time-sensitive “exploding” plea deals, and temporal discounting. Utilizing data on felony defendants from large urban counties between 1990 and 2004, we assess whether pretrial detention accelerates the pace of guilty pleas. Survival analyses indicate that pretrial detainees plead guilty 2.86 times faster than released defendants do, suggesting that pretrial detention is a powerful prosecutorial tool. Moreover, local resources affect case processing time in ways that are consistent with the courtroom workgroup perspective. Implications for public policies and future research are discussed. Keywords guilty plea, pretrial detention, time-to-plea, bail, case processing time While considerable attention has been devoted to the effects of pretrial detention on convictions, surprisingly few studies have sought to identify the mechanisms underlying these patterns. The limited research in this area suggests that pretrial 1University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL, USA Corresponding Author: Nick Petersen, Department of Sociology, University of Miami, Merrick Building, Room 122G, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA. -
Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery Daniel S
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 107 | Issue 1 Article 1 Winter 2017 Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery Daniel S. McConkie Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Recommended Citation Daniel S. McConkie, Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery, 107 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (2017). https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol107/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 1. MCCONKIE 4/6/2017 7:01 PM 0091-4169/17/10701-0001 THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 107, No. 1 Copyright © 2017 by Daniel S. McConkie Printed in U.S.A. CRIMINAL LAW STRUCTURING PRE-PLEA CRIMINAL DISCOVERY DANIEL S. MCCONKIE* Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions come from guilty pleas.1 Defendants rely on prosecutors for much of the information about the government’s case on which the decision to plead is based. Although federal prosecutors routinely turn over most necessary discovery to the defense, the law does not generally require them to turn over any discovery before the guilty plea. This can lead to innocent defendants pleading guilty and to guilty defendants pleading guilty without information that could have affected the agreed-upon sentence. This Article argues that the lack of a judicially enforceable pre-plea discovery regime flouts structural protections that due process is supposed to provide. Defendants who plead not guilty and go to trial get a jury to adjudicate guilt and a judge to preside over the proceedings and pronounce sentence. -
Nonadversarial Justice: the French Experience Edward A
Maryland Law Review Volume 42 | Issue 1 Article 9 Nonadversarial Justice: the French Experience Edward A. Tomlinson Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons Recommended Citation Edward A. Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: the French Experience, 42 Md. L. Rev. 131 (1983) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NONADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE EDWARD A. TOMLINSON* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM - AN O VERVIEW ................................................ 134 A. Basic Characteristics.................................. 134 - B. The Ideology of French CriminalJustice .............. 136 C. The Categories of Offenses ............................ 141 II. THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES IN F RA N CE ................................................... 146 A. The Office of the Prosecutor .......................... 146 B. Limitations on ProsecutorialPower .................... 147 C. The Decline of the Examining Magistrate ............. 150 D. The Rise of the Police's Investigatory Authority ....... 156 E. The Prosecutor'sDominant Role ...................... 161 III. THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL -
The Institution of the Examining Magistrate in the Second Polish Republic*
CZASOPISMO PRAWNO-HISTORYCZNE Tom LXXII — 2020 — Zeszyt 2 Małgorzata Materniak-Pawłowska (Poznań) The institution of the examining magistrate in the Second Polish Republic* I. Discussions pertaining to the model of criminal procedure, especially its preliminary phase, have been taking place in Poland in recent years. The discus- sions are, among others, about proposals which concern changes aimed at creating a broader scope of court control over the preliminary procedure. The possibility and validity of introducing the institution of the examining magistrate, in one form or another, or rather reinstating it as it existed in Poland in the past, is under consideration. It does not probably mean a return to the 19th century concept of a magistrate conducting an inquiry but rather it refers to a concept of the court or of the judge for the preliminary procedure, who would be appointed to carry out and control the steps undertaken in its course. The discussion pertaining to the changes of the model of the preliminary procedure, and especially reinstating the institution of the examining magistrate, is also accompanied by a revitalization of professional writing concerning this subject matter. A number of interesting publications on this topic have appeared in recent times.1 * Original version: M. Materniak-Pawłowska, Instytucja sędziego śledczego w II Rzeczypo- spolitej, „Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne” 2013, Vol. LXV, issue 2. 1 K. Eichstaedt, Rola sądu w postępowaniu przygotowawczym a instytucja sędziego śled- czego [The role of the court -
Spain's Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Prosecuting Chinese Genocide
The Impasse of Tibetan Justice: Spain’s Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Prosecuting Chinese Genocide Craig Peters∗ CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 166 I. A BRIEF HISTORY & THEORY OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION ............ 169 A. Jurisdictions ................................................................................. 169 B. The Problem of Impunity .............................................................. 172 C. Universal Jurisdiction in Europe ................................................. 173 II. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN SPAIN ................................................. 175 A. Spanish Law ................................................................................. 175 B. The Pinochet Case ....................................................................... 176 C. Backlash, Reversion, and Resurrection ....................................... 178 III. THE TIBET CASES ............................................................................ 181 A. The Complaint .............................................................................. 181 B. Rejection, Acceptance, and Oscillation ....................................... 183 1. Struggle for Admission ............................................................ 183 2. First Proceedings and Chinese Backlash .................................. 185 3. Amendment to Spanish Law and Retraction ............................ 187 4. The Cases Proceed .................................................................. -
Case No. 21184/01/16 State Attorney of Israel V. Breaking the Silence
Case No. 21184/01/16 State Attorney of Israel v. Breaking the Silence Brief of Amici Curiae Prof. Eva Brems Anthony Lester, QC Gilbert Marcus, SC Prof. Monroe Price Prof. Andrey Rikhter Prof. Herman Schwartz Prof. Yuval Shany Prof. Dirk Voorhoof Prepared with the assistance of the Open Society Justice Initiative 1. As experts in the field of international law on freedom of expression and comparative media law, we provide this submission to assist the Petah Tikva Magistrates’ Court in its deliberations on the State Attorney’s request for a warrant for the production of documentation held by Breaking the Silence (BtS). The submission provides an overview of international law and standards relevant to the issue, as well as legal precedents established at the domestic level in other democracies. 2. This brief was drafted by the Open Society Justice Initiative. We have requested Michael Sfard, attorney for BtS, to file the brief with the Court. 3. This submission addresses two issues: A. The right to protect sources extends to non-governmental organizations such as BtS. It is well-established in international law that media workers and outlets enjoy a right to protect their sources of information, subject only to narrow exceptions. This right derives from the right to freedom of expression. The practice of international courts and mechanisms, although limited, indicates that the right to protect sources is not limited to traditional journalists and media, and can also be invoked by other social communicators, notably non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that gather and publish information of public interest. A number of precedents established at the domestic level in other democracies lend further support to this view.